

Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development up to 1980

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Abstract

This dissertation is a case study in nationalism. It examines the theoretical writings on the subject and concludes that nationalism is the sense of identity shared by a group of people who are linked by either a civic-territorial or by a linguistic-ethnic bond and by the belief that their corporate interests can best be protected by control of their own state.

The central theme of the dissertation revolves around two basic questions:

1. Is there a Baloch nationality with a sufficiently developed national consciousness and distinctive characteristics shared by the members of this nationality/
2. If so, is the national consciousness of the Baloch, their determination to maintain their national identity, and their desire for political self-government, strong enough to say that there is a Baloch national movement.

The dissertation serves several purposes. It fills a gap in our knowledge of Baloch nationalism in Pakistan and Iran and explores in detail its development in the 1920-80 period. By adopting a comparative approach it contributes to a better understanding of sub-national movements in both countries. The main approach to the study is historical: using primary and secondary sources, it describes and analyses the foundations, evolution, dynamics and implications of Baloch nationalism.

A Note About Transliteration and Calendar

The transliteration of Balochi, Urdu, Arabic and Fasi names and subject matters in this dissertation had been in accordance with both scholarly systems and pronunciation. In the main, I have attempted to preserve consistency in pronunciation.

Prior to 1990 the transliteration of the ethnonym “Baloch” was spelled a myriad of ways – “Baluch”, “Baloch”, “Belooch”, “Biloch” – the most common being “Baluch” into English. In 1990 the provincial government of Pakistani Balochistan decreed that the official English spelling was to be “Baloch”, and this has become the accepted standard in Pakistan. I have therefore opted for this spelling. All occurrence of the term in this thesis, except when used as a personal name, in the title of a book, or in a direct quotation, have been so standardised.

The dates that appear next to the Christian dates in the footnotes and bibliography are for the books published in Iran and Afghanistan, which correspond to a civil solar calendar. The books published in Arab countries are dated on the basis of an Islamic lunar calendar, but in this thesis only the Christian equivalent date has been used.

FOREWORD

The Baloch people have awakened to a sense of nationhood rather belatedly, and in this lies their tragedy and that of the people among whom they live. They now seek to wrest what they regard as their divided homeland from the Punjabis, the Afghans, and the Persians – a difficult and dangerous undertaking. The Balochi environment, which has moulded the character of the Baloch as individuals, has also shaped their destiny as a people. Separated by impassable mountain barriers, divided by linguistic and sectarian differences, rent by narrow tribal loyalties, and split up by international frontiers, they now yearn to be what other more fortunate peoples are – a nation-state.

The Baloch occupy an extremely important region at the heart of the world's oil route. Despite the failure of numerous Baloch rebellions over the past decades in Pakistan and Iran, Baloch nationalism continues to be a source of deep concern to the governments of these countries. Aroused by the success of surrounding nationalisms – the Indian, the Persian, and the Turkish – and goaded into desperation by its own failures, Baloch nationalism has in the sixties and seventies become increasingly radical and uncompromising. For these reasons, the Baloch have come to play an increasingly significant role in Southwest Asian affairs. Their behaviour is one of the important factors in the future stability and security not only of the Baloch-inhabited countries but also of the entire region. Thus, it is important to know the Baloch and to understand their aims, their political orientation, and the course they are likely to pursue.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Baloch nationalists advocated the idea of the "Greater Balochistan" covering an area equivalent to present-day Pakistan.¹ But no leader of any major movement since the Second World War has seriously considered this. Social developments, inter-ethnic exchange, submission to different historical situations, Persian domination in Iran, and Punjabi rule in Pakistan have created very different sets of conditions. Though Baloch nationalist movements have existed in Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty as well as under the Islamic Republic, the centre for the development of Baloch political and cultural identity has been situated mainly in what is now known as Pakistani Balochistan.

The Eastern Balochistan (Pakistani Balochistan), with an area of more than 135,000 square miles not only comprises more than 40 percent of the land mass of

¹ The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 310403 sq. miles.

Pakistan as a whole, but demographically also the bulk of the Baloch population are dwelling there. More important, however, is the historical context and the political environment in which the Baloch nationalism is rooted and evolved in that part of the country. Eastern Balochistan was the centre of the Rind-Lashari tribal Confederacy in the late 15th century, and later the Khanate of Kalat, which ruled over the whole Baloch country, included the Iranian Balochistan since the 17th century up to the British advent in mid-19th century.² The thrust of this analysis is to understand the historical determinant of the Baloch question. Thus, the main focus of this study will be on the Baloch nationalism on the Eastern Balochistan (Pakistani), rather than the Western (Iranian).

It should be added that since its emergence in the 1920s, the Baloch nationalism in Pakistan in terms of organisation and development has achieved much greater importance than that of Iranian Balochistan. As will be discussed in the following chapters, its political and military strength in the 1960s and 1970s makes the Baloch nationalism in Pakistan the unchallenged leader and spokesman of the Baloch nationalism as a whole.

While the modes and scale of oppression have varied in time and by place, the conditions of the Baloch share some important features. First the Baloch areas overlap nation-state borders; they thus acquire significance for "national security" and are vulnerable for interference and manipulation by regional and international powers. Second, the Baloch regions of these countries are usually the poorest, least developed areas, systematically marginalized by the centres of the economic power. A third shared feature is that the dynamic of assimilation, repression and the Baloch resistance in each countries have affected the direction and outcome of the Baloch struggles in the neighbouring countries.

My interest to this study dates from 1970s. As a young man I learned about the sacrifices of the Baloch people for the cause of the liberation of Balochistan. Since 1978, I took part in political activities against the Shah's regime, when I was a student of political science. Being present on the scene of Iranian revolution in 1979, I personally witnessed at first hand an unprecedented upsurge of nationalist activities among various Iranian nationalities including the Baloch. The open political environment, which then prevailed in Iran in the immediate aftermath of the victory of the Islamic revolution, made it possible.

² Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, *Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan*, vol. 4, pp. 88-92.

Much of the material upon which this dissertation is based was gathered in Pakistan, Sweden and England during 1996 and 1997. At that time I was able to use the library facilities of the British Library, the India Office Library Records, the Public Record Office, the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, and the University of London Library (Senate House). Additional information was later gathered in Sweden, particularly at the Library of the Stockholm University, *Kungllia Biblioteket* (the Royal Library), *Vitterhetsakademiens Bibliotek* and *Uppsala Univesitetsbibliotek* (Library of the Uppsala University). In addition, I started collecting documents on Baloch nationalism from Baloch political workers and politicians. They not only provided me with their personal records, old newspapers, and records of political parties but answered sensitive questions. My affiliation with the Baloch National Movement (Baloch Raji Zrombesh-Iran) was a decisive factor in gaining their confidence.

A survey of the existing literature on the subject indicates that early information on Baloch history is scattered in the works of the medieval Muslim historians (of both Arabic and Persian origin). The most important sources on the early history of the Baloch are the works of the Arabi chroniclers al-Baladhuri (died AD 892), al-Tabari (died AD 932), al-Mas'udi (died AD 943), al-Istakhri (died AD 951) and ibn Hauqal (died AD 977).³ An extensive range of studies produced by British scholars, explorers, and officials during the colonial era follow these.

The beginning of formal study of Balochistan by the British can be tied to the unavoidable competition between Russia and England over parts of Asia. Thus, the early works about the Baloch belong to the British spies sent to the region. In this respect, Henry Pottinger's book, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, (1816) is the most important work, which was published in the West. He wrote in detail about the geography, history, and the politics of Balochistan in the early 19th century. Equally important, however, are the historical information collected by the two other British spies, N. P. Grant (1809) and Hajee Abun-Nabee of Kabul (1844) respectively. The works of Pottinger, Grant, and Abun-Nabee not only give us a picture of Balochs' socio-political life before the British advent, but also their political relations to their neighbour, the Persians, the Afghans, and the Indians.

³ For more information See, M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p. 29 and N. Frye, Remaks on Baluchi History, p. 46.

Considering the issue of philology as the basis of Orientalism in general and Indology in particular, it should be recalled that the notion of language was important in the European evolution of nationalism. The Indo-Iranian languages as the philologists classified them, became the basis of study of the region's history and other broad topics in a national context as well. The philologist, Longworth Dames, in his The Baloch Race (1904) and Popular Poetry of the Baloches (1907) classified Balochi as an Iranian language, which later became an important ground for discussion on the Baloch ethnic origin and history by many scholars. Charles Masson's Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, the Panjab, (1844); Hughes The Country of Balochistan (1877); G. P. Tate, Frontiers of Baluchistan (1909); R. E Dyer The Raiders of the Sarhad, (1921) also provide important information about the history and politics of Balochistan in the early 20th century.

Moreover, the memoirs of the British officials who served in the region as members of the (Imperial Indian) Foreign and Political Service continue to appear in the form of books, essays and luncheon speeches. Conrad Corfield, The Princely India I Knew: From Reading to Mountbatten (1975) and Edward Wakefield, Past Imperative: My Life in India 1927-1947 (1966), for example, contain chapters on Balochistan and the Khanate of Kalat, where some of them served as Agents to the Governor General and Political Agents, etc. Though in general they have ignored detailed discussion of the Baloch nationalism, nevertheless they provide basic material for an understanding of British "indirect rule" in the region.

The above-mentioned contributions, which are the first systematic studies of their kind, include historical, geo-political, anthropological, linguistic, and archaeological studies on the subject. Beside these important published books, there are important unpublished records available in the India Office Library, the Public Record Office, and the British Records Library. Among the unpublished records, which are valuable in understanding Baloch nationalism under British period, the files, IOR: L/P+S/13/1846-47, L/P-S/12/3174, and R/3/1/155+166 are important for understanding the reform and constitutional status of Balochistan. In the Foreign Office Records, the memoranda on Balochistan and Afghanistan written by Sandeman and Ramsay provide information concerning the late 19th and 20th centuries.

Among the Baloch sources, Gul Khan Nasir's Tarikh-e Balochistan 1952/1954, (the history of Balochistan), in two volumes, is seemingly the best and the most authentic account of the events, activities and personalities related to the Baloch

history, nationalism and national movement. Nasir was among the top leaders of the Baloch national movement. He was also, during the 1930's, one of the few indigenous deputy ministers in the Khanate Cabinet before he resigned and joined the national movement. In 1971, he became the Minister of Education of the short-lived autonomous Balochistan within the Federation of Pakistan. At the same time, he was an elected member of the provincial legislature dominated by the Baloch movement under the rubric of the National Awami Party.

M. Sardar Khan Baluch's Baluch a Nation, (1947), and History of Baloch Race and Baluchistan, (1958), and of Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri's Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, (1974) are two important works. Sardar Khan Baluch, who had a Master's degree from Aligarh University, was among the ideologues of Baloch nationalism during the 1930s and 1940s. He was also close to the Khan's Darbar (Court) as Minister of Education of the Khanate for a short period. The preparation of the first map of a Greater Balochistan showing all the traditional Baloch regions is ascribed to Sardar Khan and Abdul Aziz Kurd simultaneously. It seems to have been a joint work which is still in use in different ways. Khuda Bakhsh Marri (Bar-at-Law) was a Pakistan High Court judge. He belongs to the most rebellious and the largest Baloch (Marri) tribe. Like Sardar Khan's book, Marri's work suffers from imposed political limitations. In Mir Ahmad Yar Khan's political autobiography, Inside Baluchistan (1975) his naive insistence to justify his demand for a sovereign Balochistan and his goodwill for Jinnah's Islamic Pakistan at the same time, give a senile colour to his work. However, with all their shortcomings, these works provide useful background material and some clues to alert and curious readers.

In the West, on the Balochi language, history and nationalism some authentic researches have been undertaken specially after the 1960s. This includes PhD. dissertations, books, and journalists investigative reports. Brian Spooner (1989) and Riccardo Redaelli (1997) have contributed two major works on understanding the Baloch question, in the early 20th century. Dealing with the emergence of Kalat State, Nina Swidler has completed her doctorate thesis, The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation in 1969. The Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan by Janmahmad (1989), Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance by Syed Iqbal Ahmad (1992), and The Baluchis and Pathans by Robert Wirsing (1987), are also some important publications in this respect.

Moreover, a few available past issues of the People's Front (occasionally with some material in Balochi), London, and Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani's "Memoirs" in monthly Neda-e-Baluchistan (The Voice of Balochistan, in Balochi and Urdu) London, have proved more basic than the other sources for my research. Having joined the Baloch national movement in the 1940s, Nizamani accompanied the rebellious prince Agha Abdul Karim, who led the rebellion against Pakistan's occupation of Balochistan in 1948. He is seemingly the only participant who is openly critical of the un-preparedness and unscientific operations of the Baloch national movement.

Two pioneering secondary works on the subject of Baloch nationalism are by the Soviet scholars, Yu. V. Gankovsky (1971), and M. G. Pikulin (1959). Gankovsky (1971) proceeding in terms of an orthodox Marxist standpoint on the national question argues that during the British period capitalism began to transform the feudal nationalities of Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. In the post-independence Pakistan, besides Bengalis and Punjabis, who formed bourgeois nations, the Sindhis and Pakhtuns (people of North West Frontier Province) were more advanced than the Baloch in the process of becoming nations. Gankovsky's work on Pakistan, however, covers more fully the period before independence. Similarly in his book Baloch (1959), Pikulin analyses the socio-economic conditions of the Baloch, mainly in Iranian Balochistan which led to several Baloch uprising under Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941).

It would be impossible not to mention here the two most intriguing scholars of the Baloch political history and nationalism, Inayatullah Baloch and Selig S. Harrison. Through painstaking studies and credible scholarship, both have maintained the nationalist methodology – Baloch in nationalist history and Harrison in modern Baloch nationalism. Baloch with his several works on the political history of the Baloch and Balochistan is the most authentic and well-informed scholar. Being educated in Germany, Baloch received his academic inspiration from European sources in the field of politics and history. He has introduced the Western methodology and models to approach the Baloch history and historiography. His contribution to the consolidation of nationalist beliefs in Balochistan was central to his works. In his The Problem of Greater Baluchistan (1987), Baloch analyses the Baloch national movement from a historical standpoint. He argues that the Baloch movement up to the partition of sub-continent into Pakistan and India was directed toward the demand for independence and the Greater Balochistan.

Selig S. Harrison, as mentioned above, is another person of prominence on the topic. Having close contact with the Baloch national movement leaders in 1970s, and access to rare and invaluable documents, relating to history and politics of Balochistan, Harrison has produced the most significant work about the Baloch national movements and nationalism. In his work, In Afghanistan's Shadow (1981), Harrison analyses the Baloch nationalist movement of the 1970s, which led to armed conflict during 1973-77, between the Bhutto government and the Baloch guerrillas as the result of the failure of the Baloch to win autonomy for them from the Bhutto regime.

It may be of great interest to note that on the nationalist account, the forced merger of Balochistan into Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948) raised the question of the right of self-determination for the Baloch.⁴ On the other hand, however, most of the Pakistani and the Iranian scholars by denying the very existence of Baloch nationalism in practice reject such a right for the Baloch. For example, in Feroz Ahmed (ed.) Focus on Baluchistan and Pukhtun Question (1975), and Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (1998), there is no abstract theory of Baloch nationalism. He argues that it is difficult to define what comprises the Baloch nation. "On the one hand", Feroz Ahmad points out, "the people of African origin, because of exclusive emphasis on paternal heritage, are considered Baloch... On the other hand", he adds, "any person of the Baloch 'race' who may have culturally, economically and politically assimilated into Sindhis or Punjabis, is still regarded as Baloch and expected to support Baloch nationalism."⁵

Moreover, Ahmed argues that the various Baloch and Brahui tribes are included among the Baloch are not integrated into a larger social or economic structure, and lack a sense of unity beyond the tribal identity. In short, Ahmed rejects any common historical, linguistic, geographical and ethnic bases for the Baloch nationalism. Ahmed stresses the social and economic aspects of the Baloch question. Notwithstanding, the above factors attach considerable importance to the development of nationalism, but what lies at the root of the Baloch nationalism, is largely political and psychological in nature. Feroz Ahmed's analysis took its cue from the official Pakistan version of events contained in the White Paper on the Crisis in Balochistan.

Similarly, rejecting the ethnic characteristics of the Baloch nation, the Iranian nationalist scholar, Hamid Ahmadi, in his book, Qaumiyyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran:

⁴ Baloch, Inayatullah, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987, p. 9.

Az Afsaneh ta Waqiyyat (Ethnicity and Nationalism in Iran: From myth to reality), (1999), emphasises that the Baloch are a part of the Iranian nation. Quoting from Ferdowsi's *Shahnama*, Ahmadi argues that the Baloch are of Iranian origin.⁶ He holds the British, the *Sardars* and Reza Shah (the first Pahlavi) responsible for the creation of the present Baloch national feeling in Iranian Balochistan. According to him, the Western orientalist especially the British propagated the idea of nationalism in early 20th century to divide Iran. The reactionary *Sardars*, when resisting the modern state of Reza Shah Pahlavi exploited this idea (nationalism) as a weapon to protect their own interest.⁷ Thus, as a result of co-existence and co-operation of these three factors (the British, the *Sardars* and the modern Iranian state), Ahmadi opines, the Baloch nationalism was created.⁸

Ignoring the salient features (namely historical experiences, common ethnic bond, common language, religious beliefs, distinct territory, socio-economic structure, and psychological make-up) of the Baloch nation, these Iranian and the Pakistani writers blame the external factors such as the propagation of the doctrine of nationalism by the orientalist, the opposition of *sardars* to modernisation process and the elite competition as the main causes for the emergence of Baloch nationalism.⁹ Defending their own nationalisms (Iranian and Pakistani) the common concern of these intellectuals is to protect the territorial integrity of their countries, and to combat any tendencies for separation.¹⁰ Probably, it was due to this fact that in 1979, Richard Cottam pointed out, most of the liberal-minded 'Iranians', meaning here Persians, favoured the banning of non-Persian publications.¹¹

However, both, Ahmed (1975), and Ahmadi (1999) condemn the brutal policies of their central governments, and acknowledge the fact that the Baloch are being neglected economically and politically, but at the same time, by rejecting the Balochs' nationhood, they disregard the right of self determination for them. In Ahmed's view, the economic backwardness of the region and the misrule of the governments are responsible for the emergence of the Baloch question.¹² Nevertheless, the above-

⁵ Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 180.

⁶ Hamid Ahmadi, Qaumiyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqiyyat (Ethnicity and Nationalism in Iran: From myth to reality), Tehran, 1378/1999, pp. 112-113.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-85.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

¹¹ W. Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 32.

¹² See Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

mentioned factors have their effects to set free the process of Baloch nationalism, but undoubtedly the essence of the question as it will be discussed in the following chapters is rooted to the Baloch ethnicity, with its historical, cultural, territorial, and psychological background.

Several articles are devoted to the analysis of the ethnicity and change in Post-Colonial Balochistan (ed.) Paul Titus (1996). The articles in the volume bring together the work of many leading European, American, and Pakistani scholars working on Balochistan and make up for the serious shortage of scholarly work on the Baloch. They deal with various aspects of Baloch social life in which ethnicity is salient, and examine how Baloch identity is being transformed by the presence of such factors as markets, roads and institutions of state.

With a few exceptions such as M. G. Pikulin, Selig Harrison and to some extent Inayatullah Baloch, most of these works' focus of analysis is geared more toward Baloch nationalism in Pakistan than in Iran. Works which mostly deal the Baloch nationalism in Western Balochistan are, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism" by M. H. Hosseinbor (1984), and Pozhuheshi Dar Tarikh-e Ma'aser-e Balochistan: Majera-e Dad Shah (A Research about the Contemporary History of Balochistan: Dad Shah's Story), by Azim Shahbakhsh (1373/1995). However, as noted earlier, Hamid Ahmadi's (1999) work is of considerable importance. Hosseinbor's work is primarily a historical description of Baloch nationalism in Iran. Shahbakhsh also describes the revolt of Dad Shah Baloch, its socio-economic milieu and its impact on the Baloch national movement in western Balochistan during the 1950s. Hence, both of these works can be described as a political history of Baloch nationalism in Iranian Balochistan.

There are also several general works written by Iranian authors in Farsi (Persian) dealing specifically with the general socio-economic conditions of the Baloch in Western Balochistan. These include the works of General Amanullah Jahanbani (1957-1959), General Hossein Ali Razm-Ara (1940), S. M. Seyed-Sajjadi (1374/1996) and Iraj Afahar (Sistani) (1371/1993). These works, however, do not deal directly with the issues of the Baloch nationalism, and, as such, they are not reviewed here. However, they will be extensively used in the second and third chapters dealing with the bases of the Baloch nationalism particularly in its historical background in chapter three.

The empirical investigations in this thesis are organised in terms of a historical and comparative analysis of the rise and development of Baloch nationalism in Iran and Pakistan. Special attention is given to the impact of British colonialism on the existing political map in the region. The socio-economic and political factors influencing Baloch nationalism are identified, and circumstances under which Baloch nationalism developed in British Balochistan, the Khanate and western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) are analysed. Considering that during the struggle against British colonialism fairly large communities (Pashtun, Baloch, etc.) with different interpretations of history, levels of socio-economic development, and cultural and religious traditions were subsumed under the notion of Iranian or Pakistani nation, their struggles today to claim the right to self-determination may be indicative of some genuine need to adjust or alter fundamentally the political framework in which they find themselves. Making sense out of such struggles in terms of a right to self-determination is a major concern of my investigation.

As the title of this dissertation states, in covering the events, I have chosen not to go beyond 1980. By this time, the last remnant of the Baloch struggle inside Balochistan for self-autonomy was crushed by the regime of *Ayatullahs*. The real crack-down, however, came during the power struggle between the former president, Bani-Sadr and his clerical opponents during the 1981. Similarly after several unsuccessful meetings with General Zia ul-Haq in 1977 and 1978, the two prominent leaders of the Baloch national movement, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, went into self imposed political exile in early 1980, having despaired of General Zia's intentions with the political impasse in Pakistan. By the early 1980s, the inspired fervour of Baloch nationalism of the 1970s had dissipated in Balochistan.

As will be seen in this dissertation, up until the eve of 1980s, the central governments both in Pakistan and in Iran succeeded in putting down the Baloch movements through their use of overwhelming military force. It was aided, however, by the continuing rivalries within and among the Baloch tribes and parties. The Bugtis and some other tribes did not cooperate with the nationalist forces in the 1973-77 uprising. Similarly, in Iranian Balochistan, some tribal chiefs supported Khomeini's regime in the 1979 revolution. Islamabad and Tehran had considerable success in finding Baloch tribes, who were willing to cooperate with them against the Baloch nationalist forces in return for their governments' recognition and treasure.

While the notion of a Baloch nation or an autonomous Baloch area continues to live in the nationalist pronouncements published abroad, the struggle within Pakistan and Iran has degenerated since the early 1980s. The Baloch have been unable to discover the centres of gravity in Pakistan and Iran, and they do not appear to have the capability to attack those centres if they do. For the immediate future, the Baloch nationalism has again been defeated in both Pakistan and Iran. It should be remembered that, having largely cut off the Baloch from external patronage, Tehran and Islamabad have reinforced the inter-Baloch division along the Iran-Pakistan border in an attempt at divide and rule, through various agreements and transit control since the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran.

This study was intended to fill in a void in the literature pertaining to the Baloch by presenting as complete a picture of the Baloch problem as possible in the present condition of research. Moreover, this is also an original contribution to the state of comparative political science because it is the first time that any one has applied existing nationalism theory to the Baloch. Former studies of this subject have provided many valuable insights into various aspects of the problem. However, so far no attempt has been made to deal with the whole problem in a detailed manner including its historical development. Thus, by examining much hitherto unexplored evidence that traces the roots of Baloch nationalism to the colonial era, this dissertation has tried to push the frontier of enquiry in this subject beyond its familiar limits.

The importance of the Baloch as a case study is twofold. First, the Baloch represent more than ten million people dispersed throughout Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Gulf States. Baloch nationalist aspirations are a direct challenge to the sovereignty of these countries. An understanding of this phenomenon can lead to insights into potential elements of regional instability. Second, nationalist movements are again on the rise throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Findings from a study of the Baloch could have applicability to these other peoples.

This dissertation is organised into seven chapters, which are preceded by the present foreword. The problem being investigated has been introduced in the present section. This is followed by a conceptual discussion in chapter one. Chapter two describes the Baloch by nomenclature, demographics geographical location, linguistic characteristics, religious affiliation, social organisation, cultural expression, and economical position. In order to place the question in its proper historical context the historical developments of the Baloch nationalism are treated separately, in chapter three.

The political factors affecting the Baloch are the subject of the chapters four to six. The last chapter or chapter seven contains the concluding remarks of the dissertation.



Map 1. Map of Balochistan

CHAPTER ONE

Theories of nationalism

Introduction

Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote: "It would be better, before examining the act by which a people give itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society."¹ Using the Baloch as a case study, this dissertation will follow Rousseau's advice and examine what makes the Baloch a group, and why this group makes its claim for its own state.

Nationalism, for the purposes of this dissertation, is the feeling of a group of people linked by either ethnicity or territorial bond, and the belief that the corporate interests of that group can best be protected by control of their own state. However, the sociologists and political scientists who have studied nationalism are divided on the question of what unifies the group: some arguing that an ideological affinity based on a common history or belief in a political group unites them, while others argue for the primacy of ethnic markers such as common ancestry, language, colour, etc.² Regardless, the social scientists agree that once an in-group is created, and that group is different from others who lack the unifying characteristic, then that in-group acquires corporate interests that need to be defended. The group is often referred to as a nation. The intelligentsia in that "nation", whose upward mobility has been stymied by members of the competing "nation" that controls the mechanisms of the state, then mobilises the nascent polity's group sentiment. The intelligentsia has the goal of establishing a separate nation-state to protect the group's corporate interests in a hostile world. This would also give the intelligentsia the upward mobility it had been denied.³

The first examples of modern nationalism have been identified variously as appearing in the tensions that led to the English Civil War (Greenfeld 1992), in Latin American independence movements (Anderson 1983), in the French Revolution (Best 1988), and in German reaction and Romanticism (Kedourie 1994). It is difficult to settle these differences empirically. They reflect slightly varying definitions. For our

¹ Jean Jacques Rousseau in: Robert Maynard Hutchins (ed.), Great Book of the Western World, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1982, vol. 38: Montesquieu, Rousseau, p. 391.

² A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 22-31.

³ Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 23-26.

purpose, it suffices to indicate that by the end of the eighteenth century, in the French Revolution and its wake, the discursive formation was fully in play. In post-industrial mass consumption societies, the theories of ethnicity suggested interaction between cultural groups, vertically structured with their own ranking systems, as a more reliable measure of social behaviour than social class.⁴ In the post-Cold War period, ethno-nationalism has assumed prominence because some new countries were constituted on the basis of ethnicity and this raised the expectations of many ethnic groups to be able to achieve their cherished goal of establishing a new country on the basis of ethnicity and nationalism.

Nationalism is the hegemonic principle of political order in the world today. Its central claim, which is that political legitimacy derives from the demands of the national community, informs the majority of all political action and reaction. It should be remembered that legitimacy is the key to whether a state will successfully rule. The primary sources of legitimacy in the Middle East, and the sources of loyalty for the population to groups larger than a family unit, are traditional religions and nationalism.⁵ This is a study of one of the sources of legitimacy, nationalism.

Having persistently denied their right for self-rule, the Punjabi and Persian dominated states of Pakistan and Iran have always claimed that the Baloch are not a nation, but a tribal society with traditional tribal characteristics, thus lacking legitimacy for the right to self-rule and self-determination.⁶ The Baloch nationalists, on the contrary, reject these claims, and argue that they constitute a national community, in the fullest sense of the word, and occupy a relatively well-defined territory (which is the strongest argument anyone has to the right to self-determination).⁷ Apart from common ethnic bond and common historical experiences, the Balochs' common cultural heritage includes language, religion, and all other manifestations like food, dress and perhaps their entire way of life. From the 17th century until 1928 and 1948 respectively, Balochistan preserved its independent status. The Baloch country maintained diplomatic relations with Mughal India, Ottoman Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Oman,

⁴ Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation", in: John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (ed.), *Ethnicity*, Oxford University Press 1996, pp. 85-86.

⁵ G. Hossein Razi, "Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East", in: *American Political Science Review*, 84, no. 1 (March 1990), p. 75.

⁶ Selig S. Harrison, "Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case", in: John Hutchinson, & Anthony D. Smith, (ed.), *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, 298.

⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, "Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry", Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.

and British India.⁸ Its occupation by the modern armies of Iran in 1928, and Pakistan in March 1948, led to the birth of the Baloch liberation movement.⁹

Since the early 20th century, the Baloch nationalist movements have been trying to establish their legitimacy by appeals to nationalism throughout Balochistan. Balochistan comprises the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of Sistan-wa-Balochistan (Sistan and Balochistan), and the contiguous areas of southern Afghanistan. This dissertation will examine how nationalism has affected the ability of that people to obtain self-government. In order to place the question in its proper conceptual context, this chapter deals at first with a conceptual discussion on ethnicity, nation, and nationalism, followed by a discussion on the right of “self-determination”.

The emphasis in this chapter is on the assertion that the nationalism theory of Anthony D. Smith is best suited to providing an adequate analysis of numerous issues which pertain to the notion of nationalism in the context of the Baloch. As will be discussed in the following sections, Smith’s theory offers a forceful response to the very concepts on which nationalism at least in the Baloch case relies.

Ethnicity

It has been generally observed that human beings act individually or in groups in the pursuit of their goals and interests. Thus loyalty to one’s own group is certainly of ancient origins. It is this dimension of nationalism that has the clearest claim to be primordial, to have existed since before memory, before human history was recorded. But groups and group loyalty can take many forms and hardly constitute or explain nationalism by themselves. According to Max Weber in modern industrial society, social consciousness based on ties of affection would be supplanted by ‘rational’ affinities. He argues that nation replaces primordial identity.¹⁰

In modern research, groups bound together by consciousness of common ancestry, religion, language, territory or historical traditions – striving for the specific interests of their members – are conceptualised as ethnic entities. Ethnicity not only comprises a potential force of mobilisation in a democracy, but it has become the

⁸ Ibid., and see also, Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987, pp. 164-65.

⁹ For more detail see, Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, Emergence Dimensions Repercussions, Quetta: Gosha - e -Adab, 1989 (Chapter Four).

¹⁰ Max Weber, “The Origin of Ethnic Groups”, in: John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (ed.), Ethnicity, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, pp. 35-36.

most significant manifestation of seeking identity through shared descent in the late 20th century. The term ethnicity first appeared in the 1950s in the English language.¹¹ The word “ethnic”, however, is much older. It is derived from the Greek *ethnos*.

Michael Banton describes ethnicity as a variety of nationalism, in which the leaders “seek to make their fellow constituents conscious of a shared attribute” and to persuade those constituents that the attribute is more important than the group members previously realised.¹² This shared attribute, according to Banton is physical and cultural, and ethnicity is created because of this attribute. What kind of physical or cultural attribute the groups needs, Banton does not specify. He, however, argues that once the group has settled on the attribute, it has a self-identity and it reacts negatively to other groups which lack the same attribute.¹³

For Raymond Hall the differences between ethnicity and nationalism are merely matters of timing. He writes that before the impact of European organisation on non-European people, they were ethnic minorities. Those groups, which remained autonomous from the newer, larger political states, were transformed to “national minorities”.¹⁴ Thus, according to Hall’s analysis, the European colonialists created the “nations” of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, etc. out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The groups that did not achieve their independence at that time continued to remain national minorities. The difference between ethnicity and nationality in this analysis therefore appears to be the date when Western imperialism reached a foreign shore – hardly a theoretical difference.

Generally, two major schools of thought concerning the origins of ethnicity are developed; those emphasising primordiality and those laying stress on situational and contextual factors. The primordialists consider the ethnic identity as a given. Because of primordial affinities deriving from race, skin colour, tribe, caste language, religion and other such factors, each ethnic group has a different historical experience. The primordialists argue that human beings have always been grouped together on the basis of given primordial characteristics.¹⁵ Other writers, who can be called instru-

¹¹ Thomas H. Eriksen, “Ethnicity, Race, Class and Nation”, in: *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² Michael Banton, “Ethnic Bargaining”, in: Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (ed.), *Ethnicity, Politics, and Development*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 14.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hall, Raymond L., “Introduction”, in Hall, Raymond L. (ed.), *Ethnic Autonomy – Comparative Dynamics: The Americas, Europe and the Developing World*, New York, 1979, p. xix.

¹⁵ Clifford Geertz, “The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states”, in: C. Geertz (ed.) *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York: Free Press, pp. 110-11.

mentalists, point out the situational nature of the ethnic identity. Identity is multi-dimensional containing often more than one objective marker: skin colour, facial structure, tribe, language, religion and so on. This enables a rather flexible adjustment to concrete situations.

Anthony D. Smith provides us with the most succinct definition of community. He describes community as a shared experience of temporal progression.¹⁶ The community is a unit of population, which is conscious of its collective movement from a past of shared memories and myths¹⁷, through a present of shared experiences¹⁸, to a future of shared destiny.¹⁹ According to Smith, the *ethnie* (ethnic community) has six attributes: a collective distinctive name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; shared culture; an association with a specific homeland; and a sense of ethnic solidarity.²⁰ The complex of myth, values, memories and symbols (ethnic *mythomoteur*) constitute the ethos of ethnic communities. They have played a decisive role in preserving the ethnic identities from the immemorial past until the introduction of modernity. Under the influence of modernity and its concomitant triple revolutions in the spheres of culture, economy and administration, the old ethnic communities transformed into modern nations. National identities have preserved the ethos of the old ethnic identities; however, they have added to it the principle of citizenship.²¹

Thus, national identities are based on two elements: an ethnic element, which stems from cultural-historical legacies and a civic-territorial element, which stems from modernity. In spite of tensions between these two principles both of them are necessary for the shaping of a fully-fledged national identity. In order to be a nation, an ethnic community must establish a civil society based on political citizenship. And a territorial nation relies on myth of descent and historical memories for distinguishing itself from its neighbours.²²

For Smith the factors that produce the sense of community are the shared memories, myths, and symbols and, above all, ethnic history. Every modern commu-

¹⁶ A. D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", p. 58.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

²⁰ A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 22-31.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

nity is framed, he writes, by its pre-modern heritage.²³ In pre-modernity, the community finds a reservoir of shared traditions and experiences that create a sense of common descent which lends a unifying framework to the increasingly disaggregated nature of modern life. It is perhaps Nina Swidler who best captures the significance of ethnic markers in the context of Baloch nationalism. She writes that the common memories and myths, and the shared historical experiences form the cohesive basis of the Baloch nationalism.²⁴ With this in mind, Smith's conception of ethnicity meets best this study's definition of nationalism.

Nation, Nationalism and State

The question "What is a nation?" was most seminally asked by Ernest Renan in a paper of the same title, written in 1882.²⁵ Giving an inspiring definition of nation, Renan wrote:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together.²⁶

Thus, nation is defined as a subject of history. It is for Renan a body of people who have moved through the same historical events together. Shared religion, geography or language may have been conducive to this historical sharing. It is in this sharing that the essential matter of the nation is to be found.

Smith defines nation as "a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more common characteristics) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict."²⁷ The ethnic roots of modern nations, according to Smith, are to be traced back into their collective memories and myths. The historically derived ethnic identity serves as the basis of nation-formation in movement of revolutionary change. Therefore nations can more appropriately be considered ethnic groups politicised during modernisation.²⁸

²³ A. D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity" in: International Affairs 68, no.1, 1992, p. 62.

²⁴ N. Swidler, "Beyond Parody", p. 169.

²⁵ Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in: Bhabha, Homi (ed.), Nations and Narration, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 8-22.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁷ A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 175.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, see, chapter 7.

According to Smith nations are modern phenomena, but their cultural stuff (myths, values, memories and symbols) are ancient.²⁹ He argues that, nations originate from ancient ethnic communities and their corresponding ideology of "ethnicism" without being identical with them. Smith argues that nationalism, as ideology and movement, dates only from the later eighteenth century, but believes that the 'ethnic origin of nation' is much older. Smith focuses on *ethnies* – ethnic communities with their myths and symbols – and shows that these exist in both modern and pre-modern times, and with substantial continuity through history. He writes:

[Because] ethnicity is largely 'mythic' and 'symbolic' in character, and because myth, symbols, memories and values are 'carried' in and by forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only slowly, so ethnies, once formed, tend to be exceptionably durable under 'normal' vicissitudes, and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming 'moulds' within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact.³⁰

Some cultural anthropologists, however, postulate a five-tiered hierarchy of such groups beginning with the family. A number of families constitute a band, several of whom ultimately join to form a clan. Clans, in turn, unite to form a tribe, and tribes over time join together to form a nation.³¹

For Brass³² when objectively distinct groups (i.e. those sharing common ethnic characteristics) become aware subjectively of their separate identity and organise themselves politically for the attainment of autonomy or independent statehood they become a nationality or nation. He emphasises the role of elite competition as the basis for ethnic group developing subjective consciousness and making political demands.³³

Anderson emphasises the novelty of the nation. He describes a nation as an "imagined community".³⁴ Such a community comes into being as a result of the vast extension and expansion in communication. He considers the nation to be "an imag-

²⁹ A. D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin Books, 1991; See also, A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³¹ See Roger Pearson, Introduction to Anthropology, New York, 1974, pp. 175-90.

³² Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 8-9.

³³ Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 23-26.

³⁴ Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 1983, pp. 5-7.

ined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".³⁵ It is limited because it borders on other nations. It is sovereign in the sense that the nation derives legitimacy from the people not from God. It is imagined in the sense that most of the members of nation do not, or will not, ever know each other. Moreover, the idea of nation implies a horizontal comradeship between its members and conceals the real exploitative relations. In the nationalist imagination, Anderson says, the nation is assumed to be ancient. And this antiquity is related to future generations. This continuity provides an ontological security against death, fatality and contingency under the conditions of the decline of religion".³⁶

Anderson argues that the decline of sacred languages, which claimed a monopoly over access to truth, the decline of loyalties to divine authority and the separation of history from cosmology, created an empty space for the emergence of nationalism. He emphasises the role played by the print revolution and capitalism in forming the modern nation. The literate middle classes according to Anderson became the bearers of national consciousness centred upon the vernacular languages rather than Latin, which was cultivated by the priestly and aristocratic classes. In Anderson's view people who live in remote places far from each other feel themselves contemporary with others through reading the same books and newspapers. This kind of abstract communication (as opposed to the face-to-face communication people experience in small communities) based on the circulation of the printed word, laid the ground for the imagining of abstract communities like nations.³⁷ Printed languages contributed to the shaping of nationalism in three ways. Firstly, they created unified forms of exchange and communication. Secondly, print capitalism gave a new permanence to language, which was instrumental for the imagining of antiquity of a nation and thirdly, it led to the creation of centralised languages of power, different from previous local dialects, and languages. While these processes were gradual in Europe, in the rest of the world they were replicated consciously in the creation of nations. Besides the printed word, censuses, maps and museums were other elements, which contributed to the discourse of imagining nations.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-46.

³⁸ For more detail see Ibid., Chapter 10 (pp. 163-85).

Scholars like Karl Deutsch³⁹ lay emphasis on communications as the chief factor in the modernisation process. Smaller units of society, which are fed with a standardised code of communication, particularly language, become a people. When a people is organised for political action to acquire a measure of effective control over its members it becomes a nationality. A nationality graduates to a nation when it acquires the power to back its aspirations. The consummation to full nationhood according to Karl Deutsch occurs when it achieves sovereign status in a state of its own.⁴⁰

Put in its starkest terms, Deutsch's contention is that the nation is that group of people for whom it is easier to communicate amongst themselves than with others outside the group. This he refers to as "communicative complementarity," on which he elaborates as follows:

The test of complementarity of any set of communications . . . is communicative effectiveness. How fast and how accurately do messages get through? How complex and voluminous is the information that can be so transmitted? How effectively are operations on one part of the net transmitted to another?⁴¹

What are the salient features of a nation? In the west the word "nation" initially was used to form the sovereign states of Europe, as we know them today. But the word is also used today by ethnic groups within these sovereign states, in their demands for autonomy, self-rule, and secession. Stalin, Lenin's approved spokesman on the national question and later Lenin's Chairman of the Commissariat for Nationalities, elaborated that a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.⁴² A nation is neither tribal nor is it racial. Most of the modern nations are formed from different tribes and races; the American nation is formed from British, Africans, Spanish, and Indians etc. The same holds true for other nations.

Marxism-Leninism emphasises the importance of all the above factors, although the economic cohesion and the collective character or the cultural-psychological aspect of national awareness, are more stressed. There can be people living in the same territory who don't have a common language, common culture,

³⁹ Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966, pp. 86-106.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴² Stalin, Marxism And The National Question, Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.

strong economic bond etc. There can be people speaking the same language who don't have the same culture, strong economic bond or even inhabit different territories, etc. There can be people having strong economic bond who don't speak the same language etc. Therefore, all the characteristics must be present for any and all communities to be called nations. However, there are times when all the above-mentioned characteristics may not be found equally magnified. One or two of the characteristics may be more prominent than others, but all the factors must be there.

Most centrally, the orthodox Marxists stress common language as an essential pillar for the nation. Incidentally, the growth in the number of languages has been a continuous, unending phenomenon. European culture, civilisation and science have since the 18th centuries been dominated by three languages—English, French and German—but this has not prevented the growth of standard languages in Europe from 16 in 1800 to 30 in 1900 and 53 in 1937.⁴³ A claim to a national status for a new language may lead to the formation of a new ethnic group and demand for recognition of its independent identity. The government, thus, may oppose such a demand leading to confrontation between the two. At times, the agitation for recognition of a new language as a national language may become violent and attract the attention of the international community. In fact, many independent sovereign countries and units of a country differ from each other only because their people speak different languages. In India, many states were constituted because of different spoken languages.

Stalin was right to point out that a nation is a historically evolved community of people and direct attention to the influence of the material conditions of existence of a people on the growth of their group identity. But, in placing objective characteristics such as language, territory and economic life on the same footing as the subjective characteristic of 'psychological makeup' he effectively objectified the latter as well - and ended with a static definition, which ignored the dynamic interplay between the objective and subjective. He dismissed the 'ideal' as 'something mystical, intangible and supernatural'. He failed to recognise that the ideal and the material go together - and neither has primacy.

Stalin's 1913 article was written to refute the view that the Jews were a nation. Forty-five years later, the Jewish nation did establish the Jewish state of Israel. The subjective determination and will of the Jewish people, rooted in an ancient heritage

⁴³ For more information see, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 1983, (chapter five).

and consolidated by suffering led to a growing togetherness, a renaissance in the Hebrew language and eventually, to the promised land. In the end, Theodor Herzl, and not Stalin, was proved right. In 1882, Herzl pointed out:

We are one people - our enemies have made us one. Distress binds us together, and, thus united, we suddenly discover our strength. Yes, we are strong enough to form a state and a model state. We possess all human and material resources for the purpose.⁴⁴

Nationalism in turn builds on the nation's hopes and fears, arousing popular support by appeals to national pride and patriotism, not uncommonly couched in a promise of a new golden age, often resurrecting a popular view of some historical or even near mythical episode in the nation's struggle to achieve independence. Smith defines nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential "nation".⁴⁵ According to Smith the central propositions of this ideology or its "core doctrine" are four: 1- the world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality, history and destiny. 2- the nation is the source of all political and social powers, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances. 3- Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realise themselves. 4- Nation must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world.⁴⁶ Smith asserts that nationalism cannot be understood in isolation from the historically rooted, cultural constitution of the nation: "[Nationalism] is dependent upon earlier motifs, visions and ideals. For what we call nationalism operates on many levels and may be regarded as a form of culture as much as a species of political ideology."⁴⁷

The analysis of the nation offered by Max Weber is remarkably similar to that of Smith. And like Smith he asserts, "above all, national identity may be linked to memories of a common political destiny."⁴⁸ Weber, however, is more specific in outlining the character of the nation's historical progression. The nation exists therefore

⁴⁴ Theodor Herzl, "The Jewish State", quoted in: Wittamayer Baron, Modern Nationalism and Religion, New York 1947.

⁴⁵ A. D. Smith, National Identity, p. 73.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁴⁸ Max Weber, "The Nation." In: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge, 1991, pp 173.

as a culturally distinct body of people who share a sense of the prestige associated with their culture and the consequent need to ensure its preservation.⁴⁹

It should be noted that in the modernist approach of the nation, it is nationalism that creates the national identity and not the other way round. Ernest Gellner⁵⁰ asserts: 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.' The term originated during modernization and industrialization and was not to be found in pre-modern societies. Gellner puts the matter succinctly when he declares, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, indicated, these are purely negative..."⁵¹ In the same vein Kedourie argues that nationalism itself is a "invented doctrine": "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century."⁵² How shall we understand such 'invention'? In what sense does nationalism invent or create nations 'where they do not exist'?

According to John Breuilly it is misleading to think of nationalism in cultural terms. Nationalism 'is above all and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is about power. Power in the modern world is primarily about control of the state'.⁵³

Reinhard Bendix describes how the intelligentsia obtains this nationalist spirit:

In comparison with some or all advanced countries, the educated minority or intelligentsia sees its own country as backward. This is a troubled perception, for it identifies strength if not goodness with alien forces and sees weakness if not evil in the land of one's birth. In this setting, ideas are used to locate and mobilize forces which will be capable of effecting change and thus redressing this psychologically unfavourable accounting.⁵⁴

Agreeing with Bendix's analysis, Smith believes that the Third World intelligentsia undergoes a process of dual legitimisation; both in the traditional cultural setting in which they are born and in the modern culture in which they are educated. When the intelligentsia tries to harmonise these two competing cultures, they have three potential strategies: assimilate into the modern culture, attempt to blend the modern and traditional cultures, or reject modernization for traditional values. Ethnic

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 176.

⁵⁰ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1983, p. 1.

⁵¹ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964, p. 168.

⁵² Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell (first published 1960), 1994, p. 1.

⁵³ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, pp. 1-2.

nationalism is born as a result of this third strategy: "Nationalism is born among the intelligentsia when the messianic 'assimilationists' try to realize their former vision by adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming 'revivalists.'"⁵⁵

The Soviet Union had long claimed to represent a special kind of internationalism and to bring an end to nationalism and the historical conflict of nations in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Writing in the state publisher Novosti's series on 'The Soviet Experience', for example, Nenarokov and Proskurin claimed that: "as social antagonisms disappeared under socialism, so did national strife and racial inequality and oppression in every form... The socialist multinational culture has been enriched through an intensive exchange of cultural and intellectual values. The socialist nations that have emerged in the USSR have formed a new historical community of people- the Soviet people... Today it would be no exaggeration to say that a feeling of being members of one family prevails among Soviet people".⁵⁶ The post-1989 wave of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union revealed the falsity of such claims- though we should not ignore the fact that ethnic and nationalist strife was greatly reduced under communist rule.

Soviet scholars discussed nationalism in the Third World as a contradiction arising out of the colonial legacy. Unfortunately, neither Marx nor Engels wrote extensively about the national question. It was therefore left to Lenin and Stalin to develop a theoretical framework to deal with the complexities of the national question. Concepts such as nation, nationality and national group - developed originally by Stalin - were employed to distinguish the different levels of economic and cultural development attained by different social configurations.⁵⁷

Stalin came to theorise the nation in the context of its significance for communist internationalism. His Marxism and the National Question, written in 1913, was an important contribution to the debate as to the appropriate attitude to be taken by communism (with its aspiration towards a proletarian solidarity beyond national borders) towards nationalist movements, which seemed patently in many cases to be pleading for the rights of proletarians, albeit within national borders.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, Berkeley: University of California, 1978, p. 271.

⁵⁵ A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 255.

⁵⁶ Albert Nenarokov and Alexander Proskurin, How the Soviet Union Solved the Nationalities Question, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1983, p. 44.

⁵⁷ For more detail see, Stalin, Marxism And The National Question, Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

The Marxist/neo-Marxist theories, while emphasising the primacy of class, point out that distinct and differentiated exploitation of communities marked by race, religion, or other factors is integral to the capitalist system. Group consciousness therefore may not be an ideological distortion, but the boundary along which class oppression may manifest itself in a given situation.⁵⁹ The Marxist concept views nationalism as a historical phenomenon whose appearance coincides with the epoch of capitalism. This school divides nations into two categories of “oppressed nationalities” and “oppressor nationalities”; a division supposed to disappear only with the disappearance of capitalism when replaced by socialism.

It may be of some interest to note that in the 1960s, and 1970s, influenced by the Stalin’s Marxist doctrine of oppressor and oppressed nationalities, the Baloch nationalists as well as many of the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking leftists, considered the Marxist definition of nationality as the cornerstone for understanding the national question in Pakistan. The Punjabis and the Urdu speaking *muhajirs*, who dominated the state apparatus, were considered as the oppressor, while the Bengalis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and the Baloch formed the oppressed nationalities. This was the dominant view in the multi-ethnic National Awami Party (NAP) as well as in the other nationalist organizations in Pakistan.⁶⁰

The political order required by the doctrine of nationalism is that of nation-state. The nation, to recall Renan's definition, consists in the desire to live together; the nation-state is the institutional framework, which facilitates, or should facilitate, this. It is a near-inescapable corollary of the nation's wish to live together that this same nation does not wish to live together in the midst of other nations or their members. Smith asserts that nations exist as of human nature, so therefore state ought to exist to accommodate them. He identifies this need for nations to capture the state as one of the components of the modernization process.⁶¹

Enshrining the importance of the state, Hegel wrote, “In the history of the World, only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state... The State is the Divine Idea as it exist on Earth.”⁶² The Baloch form a nation, but since 1948, they do not possess a state. There is, however, a difference between the nation and

⁵⁹ J. M. Blaut, The National Question, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987.

⁶⁰ Cf., Feroz Ahmed, “Ethnicity, Class and State in Pakistan” in: Sangat, March 1997.

⁶¹ Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 157.

⁶² Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, tr., by J Sibree, London: G. Bell & Sons, p. 40., as quoted by Kohn, Nationalism, pp. 110-111.

the state. The nation, we have seen, is a group of people; a state is a political structure. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner write that "the state implies a sovereign authority, a sovereignty based upon both consent and coercion...associated with a particular bounded territory over which it exercises a monopoly of coercive authority."⁶³

Walker Connor describes a state as a "legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government,"⁶⁴ while a nation is a "social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity."⁶⁵ Connor writes that this "nation" can be part of a state, be coterminous with a state, or extend into more than one state. While Connor defines both entities as social groups, the emphasis of the state is clearly on legality, political institutions, and government. The nation, however, does not need any of these things to exist.

Why has the state become important? In Joseph Rothschild's view, the state is a forum in which different pluralist forces compete for the distribution of scarce resources. He writes:

To protect and articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations, ethnic groups must enter the political arena...This means, in effect, that they (ethnic groups) must bid for exclusive or participant political control over and/or in a state...And if an ethnic group's bid for an adequate share of political power and control within an extant multiethnic state proves unproductive, is repudiated as nonnegotiable, or the like, it may then well make a secessionist bid for a state of its own.⁶⁶

Thus, whichever, ethnic group can capture the state apparatus reaps the benefits; those ethnic groups who are unable to obtain access to the output of state machinery need to construct their own state structure. Explaining this point furthermore, Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich write, "The institutional framework for the promotion and defence of ethnic group interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the modern world is the territorial state."⁶⁷

⁶³ Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (ed.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 7.

⁶⁴ Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", in: World Politics 24 (April 1972): 333.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 232.

⁶⁷ Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East", In: Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (ed.), Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 3.

As will be discussed in the following chapters, Punjabi rule in Pakistan and Persian domination in Iran led to the emergence of Baloch national movements. Having studied Baloch nationalism, both in Iran and Pakistan, Harrison in his book, In Afghanistan's Shadow (1981), argues that the Baloch, in search of self-defence from the dominant majority, seek to dismantle these states and create their own one. Expanding on this analysis, Harrison, wrote:

It is no accident that the smallest of the minorities [in Pakistan], the Baloch, who see no hope for achieving significant power in Pakistani politics even under a democratic dispensation as a result of their numerical weakness, is the most alienated from Islamabad and the most responsive to secessionist appeals.⁶⁸

The Baloch and the Concept of Ethnic and Nation

In the early 1980, Harrison wrote that Islamabad and Tehran ignore the emergence of Baloch nationalism. He considered that “they tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organisational patterns.”⁶⁹ Do the Baloch bear the characteristics of a nation as defined by the scholars of nationalism? A Nation as described above, is a group of people from the same region of origin who share a common history. They may share a common culture, tradition and language and all of this is true of the Baloch. It should be noted that, the Baloch had their own state, the “Khanate of Kalat” until 1948.

Smith presents nationalism as a link in an unbroken chain, both logical and historical, which binds it inextricably to the nation and to cultural history. Cultural history - that is, memories, myths, symbols, customs, etc. - exists as both a facilitating and constraining condition on the emergence of the nation. It facilitates the nation insofar as it provides the resources from which the national bond of cultural similarity and community is made. Rooted in myths and legends the common ethnic bond forms the most important component of the Baloch nation. With the antiquity of creation myths, the early history of Baloch makes its start. It was against this background that Richard Slimbach wrote that myths and memories have formed the cohesive bases of the Baloch resistance for the last 150 years to the colonial and post-colonial rulers.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case”, in: John Hutchinson, & Anthony D. Smith, (ed.), Ethnicity, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 295.

⁶⁹ Harrison, Selig S., “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case”, p. 298.

⁷⁰ Richard A. Slimbach, “Ethnic Bonds and Pedagogies of Resistance: Baloch Nationalism and Educational Innovation in Karachi”, in: Paul Titus, (ed.), Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 140.

Having studied the Baloch question, Harrison concludes that in order to assess the potential of Baloch nationalism, it is first necessary to understand how the Baloch view the large panorama of their embattled earlier history.⁷¹ The Baloch have developed a sense of common identity over the past 2,000 years.⁷² Apart from their common myths and legends, the common historical experiences of the last millennium have a great impact on the emergence of the Baloch nation. Since the 12th century the Baloch formed powerful tribal unions. The confederacy of forty-four tribes under Mir Jalal Khan in the 12th century, the Rind-Lashari confederacy of the fifteenth century, the Maliks, the Dodais, the Boleidais, and the Gichkis of Makkoran, and the Khanate of Balochistan in the 17th century, united and merged all the Baloch tribes at different times. Moreover, the invasions of the Mughals and the Tatars, the wars and the mass migrations of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, and the cross tribal alliances and marriages, contributed to the shaping of the Baloch identity.⁷³

Nationalism is also the voicing of personal views and expression of hopes and dreams of the nation with which they are associated. The music based on songs and dances of homeland has always been one of the most popular sources of inspiration for patriotism and nationalism. The homogeneous Balochi music and the dances of the Baloch form another significant common character of the Baloch nation.⁷⁴ Music, as observed by Dr. S. Badalkhan has always had a high place in the Baloch society. It is not only played as an accompaniment to singing, and to provide rhythm for dancing, but also for curing illnesses related to psychosomatic disorders.⁷⁵ Music, dances and songs are not only cultural vehicles for expressing Baloch romance, heroism, and the love of independence, but also potent forms of what Fanon called a "literature of combat".⁷⁶

The ethnic communities usually 'possess' a recognised territory, with which they are habitually associated. Ethnic groups also often display a jealous and deep-rooted attachment to particular areas or regions within one or more plural states. "A

⁷¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 5.

⁷² Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan*, Quetta: Khair - un -Nisa, Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984, p. 26.

⁷³ For more detail, see Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 89-125.

⁷⁴ Sabir Badalkhan, "Balochi Songs Genres, Balochi Dances, Instrumental Musicians, Singer, Musical Instruments", in: A. Arnold (ed.), *The Garland Encyclopaedia of Worlds Music*, in 10 vol., vol. 5, (South Asia: The Indian Subcontinent), New York, London, 2000, p. 773.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press, 1963, p. 240.

nation without its homeland is almost unthinkable".⁷⁷ Thus, nation has a strong attachment to territory, seeking to exercise absolute control over tracts of country regarded as vital living space. The territory usually has a prominent place in the nation's iconography, with the homeland personified as the 'fatherland' or 'motherland' and attachment to it expressed in poetry and song, with the surrender of any of it regarded as unacceptable. Thus because man has a strong feeling of territoriality in his make-up, the territorial dimension is the most powerful element in national iconography, reflected in such mental image as *die Heimat* for Germans, *Matka Rossiya* for the Russians or the Balochs' *Mulk Balochi*.

Language, as indicated above, plays a significant role amongst many cultural markers that differentiate one ethnic group from another.⁷⁸ For Smith, "One of nationalism's abiding myths is the identification of nationality with language".⁷⁹ He traces this myth to the 18th century notions of the emotional power of language developed in France and Germany. The Balochi language despite policies of assimilation and hindering of the growth of Balochi culture, and despite the lack of modern publications and their meagre circulation and the great intercourse between the Baloch and their neighbours, has preserved a striking and admiring purity and the Balochi vocabulary is still in daily circulation. This purity is especially evident in the speech of the illiterate who form the majority of the people.

It is patently clear that a common language is of pivotal importance for a nation. Karl Deutsch (see above) who defines the nation in terms of social communication does not restrict his conception of communication to the verbal-linguistic. In asserting the role of "learned memories, symbols [and] habits" we see him refer to the broader cultural phenomena prioritised by Smith.⁸⁰ People speaking Brahui at home in Balochistan are integrated in every respect, including clan organization, with those speaking Balochi alone, and have considered them nothing but Baloch. Thus, in this case, it is the common memories and habits which are prioritised rather than the language. Probably with this in mind, Tariq Rahman opined that, "it is the myth of common origin", which constitutes the central symbol of Baloch nationalism and not language.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 63.

⁷⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 145.

⁷⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, p. 45.

⁸⁰ Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and social Communication*, p. 96.

⁸¹ Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", p. 88.

Equally important is the role of religion in the development of nationhood. The role of religion has not only been in forming values and aspirations but also in moulding group identity through frictions between different beliefs. Frictions within the Christian ethos in Europe have been a powerful contributor to the groupings under the national banners. Similarly the major division of Islam into Shiite and Sunni left a deep impress on nationalism of the Shiite Persian and the Sunni Baloch. Ever since the Safavid Empire imposed Shiism as the Persian state religion in the 16th century, Shiites have been gradually expanding at the expense of Sunnis, including Baloches. Thus, faced with the ever-growing presence of Shiite Persian overlords, many Baloch, who belong to the orthodox Sunni sect of Islam, had turned to their Sunni faith to re-inforce their sense of Baloch identity.⁸²

However, the orthodox Marxists reject common religion or ethnic origin as the sole basis of nation, while common economy is stressed.⁸³ By contrast, other scholars attach no importance to the attribute of a common economy, but as mentioned above, regard the ethnicity and religion as two important components in nation formation. Although, it must be born in mind that Pakistan tested Islam as a legitimating ideology from 1947 to 1971. Yet in its third war with India, Muslim East Bengal established the independent state of Bangladesh. Thus confirming the Marxist view, religion did not prove a sufficiently strong legitimating factor to overcome other pressures pressing toward separation.

By adding the subjective criteria of spiritual culture and ethnic consciousness to the objective criteria required of a nationality, Gankovsky elaborated the Marxist theory of nationality further. In his view the Baloch had developed as a feudal nationality by the time of the British conquest. Gankovsky wrote, "It seems to me that the formation of the Baluch feudal nationality began in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries."⁸⁴ Thus, the Baloch are not merely a "national minority", scattered here and there, but constitute a nation, in the fullest sense of the word.⁸⁵ They are a stable community occupying a relatively well-defined territory (despite arbitrary frontier divisions) in southwest Asia, speaking a common language (the majority speak Balochi), and possessing the basis for a single national economy.⁸⁶ The Baloch economy

⁸² Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 71.

⁸³ Stalin, Marxism And The National Question, Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.

⁸⁴ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, p. 147.

⁸⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 200-201.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20, and 59-50.

is arbitrarily prevented from functioning naturally. The artificial political frontiers, which divide Balochistan into different regions, have hindered the development of trade and economic ties. However, the basis of a common economy is evident. Whenever possible, the Baloch completely disregard the “frontiers” and engage in unofficial trade, which provides the population with a constant source of income; indeed, the livelihood of thousands depends on the two way traffic in trade across the “frontiers”, and that is in spite of severe restrictions. Thus some kind of economic ties are already established between the different regions of Balochistan.

Walker Connor a scholar of ethno-nationalism emphasises the collective character of the nation. For Connor the essence of nation is psychological, a vivid sense of sameness or oneness of kind, which, from the perspective of the group, sets it off from all other groups in a most vital way. Connor believes that this sense or consciousness of kind is derived from a myth of common descent. Members of a nation feel or intuitively sense that they are related to one another. Giving importance to the psychological aspect of the nation, Connor wrote:

Although the defining characteristic of the nation is psychological, a matter of group self-perception, any nation necessarily has its tangible characteristics. Any human grouping can be described in terms of a certain set of overt traits: vital statistics, population distribution, religious and linguistic composition, and so forth. But such characteristics are relevant to the notion of the nation only to the degree to which they contribute to the intuitive sense of kinship as well as to the sense of vital uniqueness from non-members.⁸⁷

Let it not remain unsaid, however, that there are social scientists who reject or give little importance to the role of “national character” in generating common national feelings and coherence among the members of the nation.⁸⁸

Like the six other salient features of nationhood, namely historical experiences, common ethnic bond, common language, religious beliefs, distinct territory, and socio-economic structure, the Baloch collective character plays a significant role in distinguishing the Baloch from their neighbouring nations. Residing for more than 2000 years, as a dominant people, in a country with a formidable geography and harsh climate, have influenced their way of life in one way or another. Similarly, the devastating waves of alien armies, the migrations and internal tribal wars left their

⁸⁷ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 145.

⁸⁸ Roy E. H. Mellor, *Nation, State, and Territory*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 19-20

tating waves of alien armies, the migrations and internal tribal wars left their marks on all aspects of the Baloch society.

Obviously, in all the varieties of the interaction of people and land, the environment itself powerfully shapes the history, mores, and character of the nation and the life patterns of its individual members. Influencing its culture, socio-economic structure, institutions and its political psychology, the Baloch environment and circumstances shaped the Baloch own peculiar collective character or psychological make-up in the course of time.⁸⁹ Manifested in the *Balochmayar* (the Baloch code of honour), traditions, and habits, the Baloch collective character differentiates them from their neighbours significantly, and thus forms another salient feature of the Baloch nation.

There are no nations with pure racial origins. It would be truer to say that the concept of pure race is fictitious.⁹⁰ Thus, too, is the Baloch. "For it shows that", Anderson argues, "from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be 'invited into' the imagined community."⁹¹ The Baloch embraced and assimilated other minor groups to extend their strength. The present-day Baloch are not a single race, but are a people of different origins, whose language belong to the Iranian family of languages. They are mixed with Arabs in the South, Indians in the East, and with Turkmen and other Altaic groups in the North West. The Baloch along the coastal area (Makkoran) are a mixture of Iranian, Assyrian and Negro stock.⁹² The attitude of the Baloch towards the integration of strangers into their culture was a positive step in the development of nationalism.

By quantifying Smith's insights (see above), Bernard Nietschmann discusses nations as geographically bounded territories of a common people, defined on the basis of common ancestry, history, society, institutions, ideology, language, territory, or (often) religion. He estimates there are between 3,000 and 5,000 of these nations. A state, by contrast, is "a centralized political system, recognized by other states, that uses a civilian and military bureaucracy to enforce one set of institutions, laws, and sometimes language and religion within its claimed boundaries. This is done regardless of the presence of nations that may have pre-existing and different laws and insti-

⁸⁹ Henry Field, *An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan, 1955*, p. 17; see also Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 145.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 41.

tutions. States commonly claim many nations that may not consent to being governed and absorbed by an imposed central government in the hands of a different people.”⁹³ If one accepts Nietschmann’s definition that ethnic criteria define nationality, groups containing their own nationalisms exist within most countries of the world. In Iran, this reality was recognized under the monarchy by giving the ruler the title *Shahan-shah*, literally "King of Kings." The title recognises that the ruler in Teheran was overlord of more than one people, each with their own sovereign. The Baloch are one such people.

Modern nations as argued by Smith, often have historical roots in old ethnic identities.⁹⁴ The Baloch nationalists manipulate the powerful historical symbolism of tortuous struggle for survival stretching back to more than two thousand years. But nationalism is a different way of thinking about collective identity from ethnicity, and ethnicity itself is only an aspect of the way most collective identities were organized in the past. Nationalism can be regarded as the most essential characteristic, which provides the nation with its true identity and inspiring will.

The Kurdish nationalist scholar, Omar Sheikmous, giving as example the Kurdish case in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, argues that national appeal or ethnicity never depends on affinities such as modernity.⁹⁵ Cultural and national differences will persist in spite of inter-ethnic contacts and dependence. In India, the Sikh religious minority’s linguistic and cultural differences with the other Indian people are insignificant, but many of them are still expressing emotive solidarity with their own group. The Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are not altogether a community segregated from their non-Kurdish neighbours, but this has never proved strong enough for them to renounce their claim for separate nationhood. Similarly the majority of the Baloch have been parts of Pakistan and Iran for several decades. Despite being influenced by the Pakistani and Iranian “national cultures”, the Balochs’ sense of nationalism and their demand for national self-rule is overwhelming.

The common struggle against the alien invaders, while strengthening the common bonds, develops national feelings. According to Peter Kloos, for reasons that are still very unclear, people confronted with powerful forces that lie beyond their horizon, and certainly beyond their control, tend to turn to purportedly primordial cate-

⁹³ Bernard Nietschmann, “The Third World War”, in: *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 11, No. 3, 1987, p. 1

⁹⁴ See A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, see, chapter 7

⁹⁵ Omar Sheikmous, *Kurdernas kamp för självstyre: i serien Världspolitikens Dagfrågor*, Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1991, p. 12.

gories, turning to the familiarity of their own ethnic background. In the process they try to gain an identity of their own by going back to the fundamentals of their religion, to a language unspoken for generations, to the comfort of a homeland that may have been theirs in the past. In doing so they construct a new identity. This new identity is indeed a construct that often only flimsily resembles what is believed was past reality. The new identity is cast in terms of primordial attachments, but it is a thoroughly modern phenomenon. It needs only a small group of people to turn these feelings into an ethnic movement.⁹⁶

Having observed the imposition of One-Unit system (1955-69) of Islamabad and the Pashtun threat of early 1990s against the Baloch, the chairman of “Balochistan National Movement” (BNM), and the member of Pakistan Senate (1994-99), Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch opines that despite the internal polarisation, the Baloch always unite when confronted with the external challenge.⁹⁷ As discussed in chapter 6, the fundamental tension between the Punjabi dominated centre and regional interests was at the root of the discontent that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. This tension was also the ultimate cause for the development of the Baloch national movement in the 1970s, the uprising in Sindh in the 1980s, and the emergence of “Muhajir Qoumi Movement” (MQM) in the 1990s.

Just as the oppressive policies of the classical colonialism provoked the early Third World nationalisms, so has internal colonialism given rise to the nationalism of subordinate nationalities. Referring to the internal colonialism within multi-national Third World states as “poor peoples’ colonialism”, Ismet Sheriff Vanly had described its effect upon subordinate nationalities, such as the Kurds, as follows:

Within the artificial frontiers inherited from imperialism, many Third World states practice a “poor peoples’ colonialism”. It is directed against often sizeable minorities, and is both more ferocious and more harmful than the classical type. The effect of economic exploitation are aggravated by an almost total absence of local development and by a level of national oppression fuelled by chauvinism and unrestrained by the democratic traditions which in the past usually limited the more extreme form of injustice under the old colonialism.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ See Peter Kloos, “Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century” in: Tahir, Nadeem Ahmad (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and South Asia, Karachi, 1998.

⁹⁷ Dr. Abdul Hayee, quoted in: *The Herald*, March 1992, p. 64.

⁹⁸ Ismet Sheriff Vanly, “Kurdistan in Iraq”, in: Gerard Chaliand (ed.), People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Zed Press 1980. pp. 204-205.

Very often nationalism derives from some real or felt sense of deprivation and denial.⁹⁹ It is a matter of common observation that, the more oppressive a state system toward its nationalities, the more ardent will become the desire for separation among them and vice-versa. During the war against the British, the Baloch national consciousness grew stronger under the impact.¹⁰⁰ Since its inception, the oppressive state of Pakistan has been responsible for several successive armed rebellions against the Baloch, including the brutal conflict of 1973-77. Similarly, the Baloch nationalism in western Balochistan (Iran) steadily developed as a response to the aggressive Persian nationalism. The Shah of Iran followed a policy of destruction of all national identities other than the Persians. Such is also the case between Iran, Iraq, and Turkey with their respective Kurdish minorities.

For the Marxists, nationalism is related primarily to the economic base.¹⁰¹ When capitalist relations of production and exchange become the dominant mode of production, less advanced nationalities move on to become nations. Rejecting this Marxist view, other scholars believe that nationalism can never be attributed only to the level of economy. There are instances when such movements started among a people who were well off economically. The Basques and Catalans enjoy higher living standards than Castilians; Chinese (within Malaysia) higher than Malays, and also Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia had higher living standards than Serbs.¹⁰² As Walker Connor has demonstrated, there appears to be no correlation between degrees of ethno-nationalism and economic factors of any kind.¹⁰³

In contrast to the psychological characteristics of the nation, Connor underestimates the economic factors. For Connor, *ethnie* with its psychological make-up forms the most coercive basis for nationalism. It should be noted that ethnic nationalism is not a new phenomenon. In his essay on representative government, John Stuart Mill reached the conclusion that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with nationalities."¹⁰⁴ Connor, however, accepts that economic considerations may be an irritant that reinforces ethnic consciousness. But economic factors are likely to come in a

⁹⁹ E. Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 97-102.

¹⁰⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 126-145.

¹⁰¹ Stalin, Marxism And The National Question, Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1947, p. 15.

¹⁰² Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, p. 148.

¹⁰³ Walker Connor, "Eco - or enthno-nationalism?", in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 7. No. 3, 1984, pp. 342-59.

poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism.¹⁰⁵ Material wants and their realisation may not appear to have any obvious impact in arousing feelings of nationalism, but most people, especially the subjugated people living in a territorial state dominated by the majority, feel a strong resentment against what they regard as denial of their economic rights. Such thinking usually leads to national sentiments.¹⁰⁶

While prioritising the historical and cultural dimensions of nationalism, Smith also attaches lesser importance to the role played by modern and socio-economic factors. He writes: "My claim is not that [such] factors play little part in the genesis and course of . . . nationalisms. Clearly, they do, if only in the form of catalysts."¹⁰⁷ In Pakistan one of the main contributing elements to Baloch nationalism is the exploitation of their resources by the dominant Punjabis. Despite its essential feudal character, Punjab is more urbanized, has an elaborate irrigation system and some industrial activity, apart from being over-represented in the army and bureaucracy. Balochistan, on the other hand, is the least developed of the component regions of Pakistan.

In spite of its rich natural resources, after annexation in 1948 Balochistan remained on the whole extremely deprived. Natural gas deposits for example were found in 1952 in the Sui area and were brought into use in other provinces of Pakistan from October 1955. The Balochistan coast also provided Pakistan with new port possibilities and the harbour of Gwadar was developed in the 1960s. The benefits to the Baloch from these projects, however, were negligible, and as their consciousness developed, they began to sense the nature of the exploitation they were forced to suffer. This economic exploitation expanded the Baloch national feeling in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁰⁸

As indicated above, for Anderson the nation is an imagined community. According to him, what makes possible the imagination of nation is modernity, particularly "print capitalism". "Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism", wrote Anderson, "which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate them-

¹⁰⁴ John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, London: J.M. Deut and Sons, 1910, p. 362 as quoted in David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict", in: Survival, vol.35, no.1, Spring 1993, p. 65.

¹⁰⁵ Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding p. 47.

¹⁰⁶ E. Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 97-102.

¹⁰⁷ A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity, 1995, p. 73.

¹⁰⁸ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, A Judge May Speak, Lahore: Ferozsons LTD, 1990, p. 166.

selves, in profoundly new ways".¹⁰⁹ In comparison to British India, Balochistan was far behind in cultural developments. The print industry during the British rule was equal to nothing in Balochistan. However, in the course of time a Baloch intelligentsia, even though limited made its appearance. The opening of Western-style schools in the early 20th century, which reached a total number of 24 by 1902, served as another channel of new awareness.¹¹⁰ By the mid-20th century a Baloch intellectual class was formed.¹¹¹ "Despite the problems", Nek Buzdar wrote, "the 1960s saw for the first time a relatively large number of the Baloch receiving high school and university education and becoming involved in pioneering Baloch literary and nationalist activities."¹¹²

For Antonio Gramsci, every social group, which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure, has found intellectuals already in existence. These are, according to Gramsci, the "traditional" intellectuals, who consider themselves to be independent and standing above all class conflicts. He calls the intellectuals in industrial societies the "organic" intellectuals who are bound to the class, which is responsible for the industrial development, directing it because the class owns the means of production. These organic intellectuals give the capitalist-class homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not merely in the economic but also in the political and cultural fields.¹¹³ His theory is connected with the much wider concept of "hegemony" that Gramsci fully developed. To establish the hegemony, the intellectuals have a role to play.

Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, though formulated to reflect the conditions in Italy, is equally applicable to the intellectuals of the Third World. The process of dominance/subordination between the Punjabi elite and the Baloch elite, which had slowed down when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (from Sindh) was the country's chief executive between 1971-1977, greatly intensified after General Zia's coup d'état. During the period after the coup d'état, in the words of Gramsci:

[...]the government operated as a 'party'. It set itself over and above the parties not so as to harmonize their interests and activities within

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Moulai Shaidai, "Education During British Rule in Balochistan", in: Ouman, Karachi, August 1951, pp. 9-10.

¹¹¹ Yu. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 208.

¹¹² Nek Buzdar, "Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan" in: Monthly Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000.

¹¹³ For more detail see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.

the permanent framework of the life and interests of the nation and state, but so as to disintegrate them, to detach them from the broad masses and obtain 'a force of non-party men linked to the government by paternalistic ties of a Bonapartist-Cesarist type.'¹¹⁴

Emphasising the role of elite competition as the basis for ethnic group developing subjective consciousness, Brass, for example, believes that the group's keeper of identity, the elite, transmits ethnic consciousness and makes political demands.¹¹⁵ In Hamid Ahmadi's view, the Baloch nationalism is the invention of the Baloch elite.¹¹⁶ Ahmadi, whose study is mainly based on the Iranian Baloch, argues that the Baloch elite, when deprived from their privileges and power by Reza Shah after 1928, organised the Baloch people on ethnic lines,¹¹⁷ although he attaches no importance to the role played by the historical and cultural factors in the emergence of Baloch nationalism.¹¹⁸

Obviously, the intelligentsia from a constituent group of a state ruled by a second group, because of their dual-track socialization, feels uncomfortable in the traditional society in which they were raised. This group contains a group consciousness.¹¹⁹ Despite the progress the constituent group intelligentsia may make in academia, government, or business, its membership in that group limits the intelligentsia's upward mobility because of the group's subservient position. To compensate, the intelligentsia mobilizes the group sentiments with the goal of establishing a separate state in which their upward mobility is not checked, by convincing the members of the group that their corporate interest will be protected from the hostile intent of the larger society.¹²⁰

As it will be seen in the following chapters, this fits the description of the Baloch. The Baloch have a group identity, but have an inferior position relative to the Punjabis and Persians who control the central governments of Pakistan and Iran. The Baloch intelligentsia are prevented from achieving their goals because of their Baloch

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 224.

¹¹⁵ Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and nationality: Theory and Practice, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 23-26.

¹¹⁶ Hamid Ahmadi, Qaumiyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqiyat (Ethnicity and Nationalism in Iran: From myth to reality), Tehran, 1999, pp. 258-259.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 260-61.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 117.

¹¹⁹ Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 43.

¹²⁰ Joanne Nagel, and S. Olzak, "Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of Competition Model", In: Social Problems, 30, no.2, 1982, p. 130.

backgrounds. They therefore organise resistance to the central government, by convincing the populace that only by supporting their movement can Baloch corporate interests be protected.

Giving importance to the elite's role, Smith argues that contemporary ethnic conflicts are not caused only by the elite competition for power but also from the competition between different *mythomoteurs*. Smith explains the durability and prevalence of ethnic and national identities in terms of general human nostalgia for the past in order to combat mortality. Smith says the association of the present with the immemorial past through myth and memories establishes a kind of posterity and thereby a relation with coming generations in the future. By remembering our ancestors we sustain a tradition through which we will be remembered by our descendants and thus will be saved from oblivion.¹²¹ As observed by Erwin Orywal, it is the ethnic marker, "Baloch", which unites the Baloch community, thus confirming Smith's view in this respect more or less.¹²²

Nationalism and the Globalists

According to the critics of nationalism, the globalists, nationalism is a dying phenomenon. Enhanced cultural plurality and complexity within the territories of nation-states are a result of the processes of globalisation. Globalisation and its concomitant cultural complexity make the very existence of national cultures and nation states problematic.¹²³ It has been argued that trans-national forces (multi-national corporations, global telecommunication and transport systems, and international migration), which profoundly challenge the previous notions of national- political and cultural boundaries, are conterminous with the coming of a new phase in history, a "post industrial society."¹²⁴ The technological basis for this new phase is the information revolution. They give the example of the European union as an example of development in this direction. However, it should be noted that no trans-European national identity has as yet emerged.

¹²¹ A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 208.

¹²² Erwin Orywal, "Periphery and Identity: Process of Detribalization Among the Baloch of Afghanistan", in: Paul Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 79; E. Mockler, "Origin of the Baloch", in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1895, p. 36; Ibrahim Bashmi, Qaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood, Bahrain, 1998, p. 348-349.

¹²³ A. H. Richmond, "Ethnic nationalism and post-modernism", in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 7:1, 1984, pp. 5-16; A. Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference", in: Global Cultural Economy, Public Culture, 2:2, 1990; B. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, London and New York: routledge, 1994.

¹²⁴ D. Bell, Coming of the Post Industrial society, no detail, 1973.

Having noted the increase both in trans-national activity as well as in the density of global telecommunication networks, Smith asserts, "the question is whether there is anything new in such boundary-transcending activities and processes, and whether they serve to unite distinctive populations in more than superficial respects... Can there be a truly cosmopolitan culture, one that is genuinely 'post-national'?"¹²⁵ Obviously, the advantage for secessionist movements is that due to modern means of communication they can dodge government forces that oppose them. And if they cannot, then independence may be the way out in order to join the trans-national regime (EU). In this way the Scottish movement for independence justifies its moves: if 'London' does not defend Scottish interests in 'Brussels', then the only solution for the Scots is to go to Brussels themselves - but this presupposes independence. Thus, in this direct way a trans-national regime can elicit secessionism.

It has also been argued that in the age of scientific and cultural closeness communality and categorical ethnic distinctions may give way to an affinity of socio-cultural traits, which will ultimately prove to be a check on extreme national urges among the nations or groups within a territorial state. To the contrary, however, the new global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that the state borders, as presently delimited, are being increasingly challenged by this trend. For Connor¹²⁶ the modernisation and advances in communication and transportation tend also to increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their members more aware of the distinctions between themselves and others. "If", Connor says, "the process that comprise modernization led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favour of identification with state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease".¹²⁷ But, contrary to this, ethnic conflicts are intensifying around the world. Richard Mansbach¹²⁸ listed a total of 53 regional ethnic conflicts in 1994.

The digital revolution is accelerating the process not only of globalisation but also of localisation and helping to forge anew the cultural and economic togetherness of a people - even where they are divided between different states. Moreover, the nationalist movements use modern electronic communication to counter one-sided in-

¹²⁵ Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity" in: International Affairs 68, no.1, 1992, p. 65.

¹²⁶ Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding p. 37.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

¹²⁸ R. Mansbach, The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics. Boston, 1994, pp. 567-568.

formation of the government they oppose. Many movements, like the Basque ETA, have discovered the possibilities the internet offers to spread news that cannot be censored. Thus, it is not accidental that the commander of the Chiapas guerrillas in Mexico, Dr. Marcus, in an interview said, "I like my computer more than my Kalashnikov."¹²⁹

Today, not only the Baloch from different parts of Balochistan, but also from Turkmenistan to East Africa are becoming closer with each other by their daily contact through the internet. Thus, state boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, not only to the market but also to information and human rights – and deep-rooted kinship ties are finding fresh avenues for expression. In the present era of electronic media, ethnic minority groups in any country may try to magnify their cause by raising the issue of violation of human rights in the place of their residence. Contrary to the claims of the critics of nationalism, the Baloch nationalism, as observed by Selig Harrison, has been steadily advancing in the recent decades as compared to its past. Harrison wrote: "In mid-1980, I found a pervasive mood of expectancy among the Baluch, a widespread desire to vindicate Baluch martial honour, and a readiness to renew the struggle when and if circumstances appear to be favourable".¹³⁰

Thus, it is difficult to believe that the information revolution as argued by the opponents of nationalism, leads to a lessening of nationalism or at least of ethnic nationalism. On the 50th anniversary of the digital revolution (December 23, 1997), Walter Isaacson, a journalist, described this revolution as a decentralising power, rather than a centralising force.¹³¹ According to Isaacson, as the transistor was invented, George Orwell, in his book 1984, was making one of the worst predictions in a century filled with them: technology would be a centralising, totalitarian influence. Instead technology became a force for democracy and individual empowerment. The internet allows anyone to be publisher or pundit, e-mail subverts rigid hierarchies, and the tumult of digital innovation rewards wildcats that risk battle with monolithic phone companies. "The symbol of atomic age, which tended to centralize power", argues Isaacson, "was nucleus with electrons held in tight orbit; the symbol of the digital age is Web, with countless centres of power all equally networked."¹³²

¹²⁹ Marcus, quoted in: Daily Iran Emrooz, 12 December 2000.

¹³⁰ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, pp. 3-4.

¹³¹ Time, New York, December 19, 1997-January 5, 1998.

¹³² Ibid.

It seems that the more frequent one's direct contact with different cultures, the more aware one becomes of one's own cultural identity. Probably it was against this background that Peter Kloos came to the conclusion that the late 20th century separatist movements are in a complicated way related to the rise of globalisation.¹³³ In his view, the rise of trans-national forces in two ways related to the rise of regional, sub-national identities that provide the basis of secessionist movements. In the first place, there is the rising influence of trans-national forces on the daily life of people. The awareness of people that this is so means that people feel more and more that they lose their grip on what governs their daily life. Their life is more and more being determined by forces beyond the state. In his view, in the past secessionist movements had to do the job all alone. Nowadays they may seek support outside the boundaries of the state they wish to leave, and here the second relation between nationalist movement and trans-national forces comes in.¹³⁴ Thus, contrary to the globalist argument, the late 20th century globalisation and the growing importance of trans-national forces have weakened the authority of the multi-national states, and strengthened localized solidarities in the context of nationalism.

A Critique of Existing Theories of Nationalism

As discussed in this chapter, one of the major debates in the literature on nationalism is between those who see it as simply an extension of ancient ethnic identities and those who see it distinctively modern. The primordialist theory falls short because it assumes timelessness in nationalism which does not exist - nationalism did not appear until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The modernization theorists, although they accurately explain the origins of nations, also have their shortcomings because they insist that nations will eventually decline in importance. The Marxist school assumes that nationalism is caused by discrepancies in the development of capitalism between countries. The Marxists fail to explain why all underdeveloped states do not have violent nationalist movements and why many well-developed states do. Although the Marxist analysis of oppressed nationalities was originally developed with a view to colonised peoples, it can still be helpful in understanding the present day subordinate ethnic nations as well.

As far as the general theories of nationalism and their relevance to the study of the Third World ethnic nationalities are concerned, most of those suffer from two ma-

¹³³ Peter Kloos, "Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century" in: Nadeem Ahmad Tahir (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and South Asia, Karachi, 1998.

major shortcomings. First most of these theories are primarily based on the manifestations of the phenomenon of nationalism as experienced initially in the West. Academics such as Kedourie, Gellner, Connor, and A. D. Smith have provided various theories as discussed earlier. Their explanations as to ethnic movements in Europe are based on the weaknesses of the industrial society, and the centralised political state. These analyses are not necessarily relevant to Balochistan.

Secondly, they are state-centred in the sense that they are geared more often to civic nationalism as contrasted with the nationalism of ethnic nationalities, while conceptually nationalism is an attribute of nation, a politico-cultural entity identifiable by its 'character' and collective rights, and not of state, a politico-juridical entity identifiable by its sovereign right over a territory. However, their analysis of the various strategies used by the ethnic movements in Europe, is extremely relevant. These writers have attempted to outline the various strategies used by the European ethnic groups to obtain power. They point out that modern ethnic nationalisms have had to ground their aspirations in arguments appealing to general principles like popular sovereignty, inalienable rights and cultural diversity. Thus, concepts, themes, and the methodologies developed by these theories are, with some conceptual adjustments, useful to the study of ethnic nationalism in southwest Asia.

The Right of Self-determination

With the British occupation (1839) and the forced merger (Iran-1928, and Pakistan-1948) of the Baloch land, the question of the right of self-determination is raised. What is the right of self-determination? As defined by the scholars of nationalism, it means that each nationality has the right to decide for itself, how it shall be governed and by whom.¹³⁵ The self-determination movement has been a legitimate demand to liberate a country from the yoke of a colonial ruler. In fact, it "served well those who sought to dissolve empires".¹³⁶ The principle of self-determination has now often been propagated to acquire a sovereign independent nation state for an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic state.

The principle of self-determination has been widely accepted since the appearance of democratic ideologies in the American and French Revolutions of the late

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ A. D. Smith, National Identity, pp. 73-74; Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 8-10.

¹³⁶ Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination", in: Foreign Policy, no. 89, Winter 1992-93, p. 21.

eighteenth century. The term 'self-determination' was popularised by Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA from 1913-1921 and head of the League of Nations. The League of Nations was in existence from 1919 - 1946 and was the basis for the later United Nations Organisation. The idea of "self-determination" was first expounded in the League of Nations, and was taken up by the UN. It is included in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which says that all peoples are entitled to self-determination. Therefore the key question is who are the 'people'. The UN subsequently was obliged to provide a definition. It defined the 'people entitled to self-determination' as those living under colonial rule.¹³⁷

Thus, people in sovereign states which were democratically ruled, were not entitled to further 'self determination'. This decision was taken in two General Assembly rulings. These are: "UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) and the UN General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations among States" (1970).¹³⁸ These declarations affirmed the territorial unity of sovereign states. The 'self-determination' principle should not be interpreted in such a manner as to dismember the territory or political unity of sovereign states, which were conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights, and had a government which represented the whole people with no distinction as to race, creed or colour.¹³⁹

Returning to the concept of the right of self-determination, while nations may have ideologies of common descent and shared kinship, they are organised primarily as categories of individual members, identified on the basis of various cultural attributes – common language, religion, customs, names, etc. Nations are, moreover, commonly understood as being individuals – both in the literal sense of being indivisible, and metaphorically as singular beings that move through history as ordinary people move through their biographical life course. Yet, they, too, are prone to fission. A nation's rights in the international community are compared to those of individuals in the society. If individuals have a right to autonomy, then by analogy nations have the right to self-determination.¹⁴⁰ Nationalists commonly claim that the individuals of a population cannot realise their personal freedom unless the population is 'free' in the

¹³⁷ Per Ahlin, och Pål Wrange, Folkens Själbestämmanderätt, (Right of Self-determination of People), i serien "Världspolitikens Dagfrågor", Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1990, pp. 8-9.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹⁴⁰ B. Wittrock, "Kulturell identitet och den moderna staten", in: G. Winai-Ström (ed.), Konfliktlösning i det flerkulturella samhället, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1988, p. 299.

sense of political self-determination, and simultaneously demand that the members of a putative nation adhere to some common standard of culture and behaviour.¹⁴¹

Individualism is important not just metaphorically, but as the basis for the central notion that individuals are directly members of the nation, that it gives each of them an intrinsic identity and that they commune with it immediately and as a whole. In the discourse of nationalism, one is simply Chinese, French or Eritrean. The individual does not require the mediations of family, community, region, or class to be a member of the nation. Nationality is understood precisely as an attribute of the individual, not of the intermediate associations. This way of thinking reinforces the idea of nationality as a sort of trump card in the game of identity. While it does not preclude other self-understandings, within most nationalist ideologies it is held to override them at least in time of national crisis and need. In Michel Foucault's sense, therefore, nationality is understood as inscribed in the very body of the modern individual.¹⁴² A person without a country must therefore be understood to lack not only a place in the external world but a proper self.¹⁴³

The expression of the right of self-determination based on the fact of language and sectarian divisions within Christianity entered in European political thought, towards the end of the feudal epoch.¹⁴⁴ The 1688 Revolution in England and the French Revolution did away with the feudal order in Europe. German nationalism found its first forceful expression under Bismarck. Later, National Socialism emerged as an awesome form of militarism, expansionism and racism. Thus German nationalism, which originated as a defensive reflex against French hegemony, instead turned later into a veritable militarist doctrine of expansion and conquest.

It must be borne in mind that there are still differences among scholars on the time and the place of the emergence of the nation. According to Elie Kedourie, the doctrine of nation was invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, Benedict Anderson argues that the modern nation based on

¹⁴¹ Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, Princeton: Princeton University, 1970, pp. 89.

¹⁴² Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, New York: Pantheon, 1977, cited in, Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997, p. 46.

¹⁴³ William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, cited in, Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997, p. 46.

¹⁴⁴ G. H. Sabine and T. L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory, Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1973, pp. 271-346.

¹⁴⁵ Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell (first published 1960), 1994, p. 1.

the notion of equal rights of all citizens and democracy appeared as a political project first in Latin America and not in Europe as is commonly believed.¹⁴⁶ About Anderson's remark that Latin American nationalist leaders proclaimed equal rights of all citizens it can be said that the practical significance of such declaration was the abolition of slavery; a revolutionary act as such. In Karl Renner's opinion, "The birthday of the political idea of the nation and the birth-year of this new consciousness is 1789, the year of the French Revolution".¹⁴⁷ In 1862 Lord Acton, in an essay on "nationality", opined that before the French revolution the right of self-determination and autonomy of nationalities were not recognised, the interest of ruling classes determining the frontiers of states instead of the nationalities of nations.¹⁴⁸

In Europe, nationalism expressed as the demand for self-determination belongs to the period from the latter half of the nineteenth century onwards. The Italians Mazzini and Garibaldi presented nationalism in terms of humanitarian liberalism and as revolutionary patriotism respectively, as an integral element of democracy and social justice enshrined in the notion of self-rule. It followed logically from such theorising that the highest level of self-rule was the possession of sovereign power. In short, the hallmark of nationhood was the achievement of statehood. However, these liberal theorists who supported the idea of national self-determination had in mind a threshold in terms of size when they supported or opposed the right of self-determination. A large nationality, which could sustain a big state and ensure development, was entitled to separate statehood, but not smaller groups, which were thought to play a divisive and negative role. Thus Mazzini was opposed to Irish, Sicilian, and Welsh petty nationalisms.¹⁴⁹

Nationalism as a political doctrine of self-determination was put to use extensively in Europe rather late in history: in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. As earlier mentioned, in the early 20th century, W. Wilson and V.I. Lenin came out forcefully in support of the right of national self-determination for linguistic and colonised peoples.¹⁵⁰ The First World War resulted in the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian, Czarist, German and Ottoman empires. By the year 1922, many

¹⁴⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 52-65.

¹⁴⁷ Karl Renner, *Staat und Nation*, Vienna 1899, p. 89.

¹⁴⁸ Lord Acton, *Essay on Freedom and Power*, London, 1965, pp. 144-146.

¹⁴⁹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 31.

¹⁵⁰ V. I. Lenin, *The National Liberation Movement in the East*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, pp. 233-37; G. E. Fasnacht, *Acton's Political Philosophy. An Analysis*, London, 1952, pp. 126-139.

independent states came into being in central Eastern Europe. In place of the Congress of Berlin came the League of Nations, from which non-Europeans were not excluded. After the Second World War, the process of decolonisation began in earnest. Between 1945 and 1960, much of Asia and Africa secured their freedom by various peaceful and violent means. Since then, the number of independent states grew by nearly 50 percent, from approximately 120 to 190 in the mid-1990s.¹⁵¹

Colonial movements, according to Hobsbawm, picked up the language of European nationalism. He stated:

The leaders and ideologies of colonial and semi-colonial liberation movements sincerely spoke the language of European nationalism, which they had so often learned from the west, even when it did not suit their situation. And as the radicalism of the Russian Revolution took over from that of the French Revolution as the main ideology of global emancipation, the right to self-determination, now embodied in Stalin's texts, reached those who had been beyond the range of Mazzini. Liberation in the Third World was now seen everywhere as 'national liberation' or among the Marxists, 'national and social liberation'.¹⁵²

Turning specifically to the Islamic countries, Seyyed Hossein Nasr notes that from the time that the West conquered the Islamic World (which finally impinged on Muslim consciousness with Napoleon's capture of Egypt in 1798), that the Islamic world saw in the West a model which was accepted wholeheartedly by many leaders. As a result, as they achieved independence, Islamic countries organized themselves along the model of European states, i.e., attempting to use nationalism as a legitimating force.¹⁵³ Thus, the National Liberation Front fought for the liberation of Algeria, not for the liberation of the Maghrib. Similarly, the Palestine Liberation Front seeks an independent Palestine, having specifically rejected Pan-Arabist or Pan-Syrian models for legitimacy. Of course, older ideologies such as Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islam have survived among various peoples in the Middle East.

Despite being pan-nationalists (Pan-Arabists and Pan-Islamists), Muslim writers like al-Husri, an early supporter of Arab nationalism, and Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838-1897, also known as Asadabadi) wrote that the basis for a nationality is

¹⁵¹ Greerups Förlag AB, Gleerups Skolatlats, Uppsala: Gleerups, 1993.

¹⁵² E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 136.

¹⁵³ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, New York: Methuen Inc., 1987, p. 82.

language. Al-Husri went so far as to postulate that nationalities existed before they obtained a national identity¹⁵⁴ and that criteria other than “general will” were responsible for the establishment of a nation. “Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab... under no circumstances should we say: ‘He is not an Arab as long as he does not wish to be one, and does not accept his Arabness.’ He is an Arab whether he wishes to be one or not.”¹⁵⁵

Al-Husri’s nationalism became a basis of Pan-Arabism; an irredentist nationalist movement, which advocated the political union of all whose native tongue was Arabic. The pan-Arab identity generated in some Arab leaders during the First World War hopes of a Greater Arabia arising from the ruins of Ottoman Empire. However, the diversity of the Arab people and their regional interests failed to provide a firm enough common bond and they were subsumed mostly into territories under British, French, or Italian control, besides a few independent states. Once more al-Husri’s philosophy was tested in 1959-1961, when Egypt and Syria joined as the United Arab Republic. This experiments ultimately also failed, however, when the Syrians realized they had become a province of Egypt rather than co-equals in an Arab partnership. *Maulana* Ubaidullah Sindhi, another Muslim scholar, took a more positive stand with regard to nationalism in Muslim countries. Supporting the right of self-determination of divided nationalities, Sindhi openly favoured the right of the Pashtun of British India to join Afghanistan.¹⁵⁶ Adopting the Western concept of nationalism, Sindhi wrote:

The denial of nationality and nationalism is a denial of human nature. It is also wrong to consider the division of Muslims into nationalities as opposed to the unity of the universal Muslim community. To establish a harmonious combination of nationalism and internationalism and to keep the balance between the two is not only useful for the nation, but is also beneficial for the entire mankind.¹⁵⁷

In contrast to Sindhi and other modernist Muslim scholars, the fundamentalist Abu Ala Maududi and *Ayatullah* Khomeini followed a strict pan-Islamist line in their

¹⁵⁴ Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 118.

¹⁵⁵ Sati’ al-Husri as quoted in Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*, Translated by Mar-ion Farouk Sluglett and Petter Sluglett, New York: St. Martins Press, 1990, p. 189.

¹⁵⁶ Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the state and nationality problems: a study of ethnic rights in the Middle East, in: Gudmundur Alfredsson and Peter Macalister-Smith (ed.), *The living Law of Nations*, Strasbourg: N. P. Engel Publisher, 1996, p. 238.

political thought. In his work, Tarikh-e Azadi-e Hind aur Musliman (The History of Indian liberation and the Muslims), Maududi wrote, "Any Muslim who pledged himself to the devil of nationalism has been divorced from the angel of Islam".¹⁵⁸ Similarly, *Ayatullah* Khomeini definitely denies the existence of nationalities. In an interview at the moment of the Shah's Downfall and the eve of creation of an Islamic Republic, in 1979, Khomeini opined, "there are no nationalities in Islam".¹⁵⁹

Autonomy is central to the concept of nationalism and its affirmation of national cultural specificity. Baloch are a social group, which shares objective elements such as a common language and which has acquired a subjective political consciousness of oneness, by its life within a relatively well-defined territory, and by its struggle against alien domination. Before the advent of the British in 1839, Balochistan was an independent state ruled by the *Khans* of Kalat. The borders of Balochistan were demarcated in the late 19th century, without consultation of the Baloch people, who objected and revolted against the colonial decisions (see chapter 3). In 1928 the western Balochistan was occupied by the Iranian armed forces. With the lapse of paramountcy in 1947, the Khanate of Balochistan (eastern Balochistan) became an independent state, recognized by Pakistan, until 1948 (see chapter 4). On March 1948, Pakistan managed the accession of the country, without the popular consent of the Baloch people.

Nationalism may have developed in Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it has become a worldwide movement in the twentieth. Today nationalism is "the world's major ideological legitimator and delegitimator of states, regimes, and governments".¹⁶⁰ During the early 20th century, the Baloch began to consider the concept of nationalism, a notion introduced by the British amid the division of the Baloch country among themselves and their neighbouring countries (Iran and Afghanistan). Since then the Baloch nationalist movements have been trying to establish their legitimacy by appeals to nationalism and the right of self-determination throughout Balochistan. Generally, however, the sovereign state is the main vehicle through which the claims to national self-determination are realised. Therefore, the nationalist principle of national self-determination asserts the right of

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Abu Ala Maududi, Tarikh-e Azadi-e Hind aur Musliman (the Indian liberation History and the Muslims), Lahore, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 332.

¹⁵⁹ Talal Salman, "Interview with Khomeini at Movement of Shah's Downfall and Eve of Creation of Islamic Republic", in: Al-Safir (in Arabic), 18-19 January 1979.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, p. 14.

every nation to consolidate itself within the structures of a state – every nation should have a state.¹⁶¹

Summation

The idea of community and a sense of belonging to a human group are ingrained in the human condition it is difficult to say if these are naturally inborn or socially acquired characteristics. In a way, the distinction between the natural and the social is largely artificial in that human beings are generally gregarious and this quality compels them to associate with others. The ability to communicate through shared symbols and signs has been a precondition for the various forms of societal organisations, which human beings have devised in order to live together. Most centrally through language, but also various other cultural means, communication has advanced among human beings. The propensity to associate with those that one identifies with has simultaneously involved the exclusion of exogenous groups and people. Such identification and classification has been practised in all human societies whatever their level of development, structuration and stratification. Such practices would not have been of much consequence were it not to serve also as a way of laying claims to territory, property and other possessions and privileges in opposition to the claims of the other groups. Group identity and claim to a specific territory can be described as the essence of the nationalist movement. Its echo can be heard throughout the ages and in almost all stable societies the world over.

By a nation is meant a relatively large group of people sufficiently coherent in terms of cultural orientation, historical experience, and association with a particular geographical area, usually but not always the one where it resides. Such a group is either aspiring to or exercising self-rule. Nationalism may be defined in one of two ways - by ethnic or civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the consciousness of a shared identity, culture, belief in common ancestors and history, civic nationalism is encompassed within a geographically defined territory.

Nationalism, which defines the group on the civic or the territorial base, is known as civic nationalism. An alternative school defines the group as an ethnos, i.e., based on immutable, ascriptive characteristics. This is known as ethno-nationalism. Civic or territorial nationalism does not deny the existence of ethnic characteristics such as kinship ties, common language, or territoriality; it acknowledges that some-

¹⁶¹ Per Ahlin, och Pål Wrangé, *Folkens Självestämmanderätt*, (Right of Self-determination of People), i serien "Världspolitikens Dagfrågor", Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1990, p. 5.

times these characteristics may play a part in the creation of a group identity. But for civic or territorial nationalism, none of these characteristics are necessary for group identification: a group's *volonte generale* unites it. Theories of ethnic nationalism, by contrast, acknowledge the possible existence of a general will, but deny its importance in favour of ethnic characteristics. Various authors differ on which characteristics define a particular ethnic group, but all in the ethno-nationalism camp agree that it is the possession of these characteristics, which defines the group.

Possession of group identity, however, is not sufficient to create nationalism, even if we give the group the title of "nation". The nation's intelligentsia must mobilise group sentiment. The intelligentsia will often play this role because the members of an outside group, which control the state, block its upward mobility. The intelligentsia wants a separate nation-state to protect the group's corporate interests, and give it the upward mobility it has been previously denied.

While much has been written about the both versions of nationalism, ethno-nationalism is empirically flawed because the ethnic markers that are crucial to group identity are either inconstant or lack sufficient boundaries to make the concept meaningful. Despite the empirical flaws, however, both types of nationalism have travelled to South West Asia (Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan).

Because the Pakistani state assumed the mantle of two-nation theory (Islam/Hinduism) based on Islam for its legitimacy, as a countermovement one can expect most Baloch to rely on ethno-nationalism. The problem with this is that once ties of kinship or tribal affiliation become the recipient of terminal loyalty, the group receiving the loyalty changes as the definition of the kinship group varies over time and circumstances. Thus at one moment and individual could identify himself as a Baloch, at another as a member of the Marri tribe, or at a third moment as a merely a member of the Bijjarani clan. At each level of hierarchical organisation, the member of competing groups with equally strong "group feelings" increases, and each of these groups must pursue their own group interests even if this pursuit harms the interest of the nation as a whole. The Baloch nationalist claims must either overcome the fissiparous tendencies of ethno-nationalism, or attempt to superimpose a civic-territorial nationalism to unite the various tribes and clans. This study examines the interplay of these two competing strategies.

Nationalism, as demonstrated by Anthony Smith, may not be responsible for the many instances of reform and democratisation of tyrannical regimes, but it is a

frequent accompanying motive, a source of pride for downtrodden peoples and the recognised mode for joining and rejoining 'democracy' and civilisation'. It also provides the sole vision and rationale of political solidarity today, one that commands popular assent and elicits popular enthusiasm. All other visions, all other rationales, according to Smith, appear wan and shadowy by comparison. They offer no sense of election, no unique history, no special destiny. These are the promises, which nationalism for the most part fulfils, and the real reasons why so many people continue to identify with the nation. Until these needs are fulfilled through other kinds of identification, the nation with its nationalism, denied or recognized, oppressed or free, each cultivating its own distinctive history, its golden ages and sacred landscapes, will continue to provide humanity with its fundamental cultural and political identities well into the years to come.

CHAPTER TWO

Cohesive Bases of Baloch Nationalism

Introduction

The Baloch are an ancient people. Residing in a region whose history is marked by the invasions and political designs of outside empire-builders, the origin and history of the Baloch realistically could not be other than diverse. Nonetheless, and despite some regional variation, a distinctive Baloch culture and Balochi language emerged from the 12th century on. Indeed, Baloch self-consciousness about their cultural, linguistic, and historical distinctiveness informs the expression of their nationalism in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, the countries, in which they are significant minorities. Being an amorphous people, their economic position throughout history, their geographic position, even their language changes accordingly to circumstances.

As discussed in chapter one, in all the varieties of the interaction of people and land, it is obvious that the environment itself powerfully shapes the history, mores, and character of the nation and the life patterns of its individual members. Thus being predominantly mountainous the land has had a strong impact on the Baloch separateness from their neighbours. The formidable geography and the harsh climate of Balochistan has left its marks on all aspects of Baloch society, influencing its culture, history, socio-economic structure, and institutions and its political psychology and has led to the creation of its own psychological make-up or national character.¹

Living across one of the important crossroads in southwest Asia, the Baloch do not actually come from a single stock, but their myths and legends affirm to their satisfaction, if not the scholar's, their essential ethnic purity.² The Baloch belief in a common descent, their myths and *shajras* (genealogical tables) which connected them with the Qurish, the tribe of Prophet Mohammad, and their assertion to be the descendants of the ancient Babylonian king, Balus or Nimrud, their segmentary tribal organisation, language, code of values, and pool of distinctive cultural attributes had for centuries given them a sense of being different and special.³ In combination with a history as the dominant ethnic group in Balochistan, these attributes fostered an ethnic

¹ Henry Field, An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan, 1955, p. 17; see also Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 7-8.

² Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 41, 77-78.

³ Hittu Ram, Tarikh-e Balochistan, Quetta, 1997, p. 30; Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 23-24.

pride and self-confidence, which often gave way to chauvinism. "Whatever be the merit of their claim", the nationalist historian Muhammad Sardar Khan asserts, "we have to admit and acknowledge that the Baluch people have kept their blood purity and distinction of character to the best of their means and efforts".⁴ One need only look at the Baloch proverbs to see the premium they placed on their unique identity and the demanding code of personal conduct to which they insisted one had to conform in order to retain his honour as a Baloch.

The Names "Baloch" and "Balochistan"

The most inclusive Baloch ethnic identity is evident in the use of the ethnonym Baloch. The central marker that unites the Baloch community, as a whole is a more or less well-articulated conception of all Baloch as descended from a common ancestor, thus constituting a *qaum* (nation). Since at least the mid-seventh century the name Baloch has been applied to the people living in the southern Kerman Mountains, Sistan and Makkoran.⁵ It appears that the word "Baloch" is the corrupted form of Melukhka, Meluccha or Mleccha, which was the designation of the modern eastern Makkoran during the third and the second millennia B.C., according to the Mesopotamian texts.⁶ Dr. Munir Ahmad Gekhki, a history professor in Balochistan University, however, relates it to "Gedrosia" or "Bedrozia" the name of the Baloch country in the time of Alexander the Great (356-323 BC).⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan theorised that the term Baloch is a derivative of Belus, the title of Babylonian or Chaldian Kings. Nimrud, the son of Kush or Cush or Kooth, was called Nimrud the Belus.⁸ The followers of Nimrud were known as Belusis. Among the Arabs Belusis were pronounced Balos.⁹ Thus the word Baloch has come from Belusis or Balos, Sardar Khan and Marri argue. According to G. P. Tate¹⁰, however, the name has historically meant "nomads". It would therefore be a synonym for "bedouin".

⁴ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, p. 79.

⁵ Erwin Orywal, "Periphery and Identity: Process of Detribalization Among the Baloch of Afghanistan", in: Paul Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 79; E. Mockler, "Origin of the Baloch", in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1895, p. 36; Ibrahim Bashmi, Qaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood, Bahrain, 1998, p. 348-349.

⁶ J. Hansman, "A Periplus of Magan and Melukha", in BSOAS, London, 1973, p. 555; H. W. Balley, "Mleccha, Baloc, and Gadrosia", in: BSOAS, No. 36, London, 1973, pp. 584-87. Also see, Cf. K. Karttunen, India in Early Greek Literature, Studia Orientalia, no. 65, Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1989, pp. 13-14.

⁷ Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.

⁸ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 14-16.

⁹ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰ G. P. Tate, Seistan: A Memoir on the History, Topography, Ruins, and People of the Country, (in Four Parts, Part IV, The People of Seistan), Calcutta, 1912, p. 365.

The name Balochistan quite simply means “the land of the Baloch”, which bears in itself a significant national connotation identifying the country with the Baloch.¹¹ Gankovsky, a Soviet scholar on the subject, has attributed the appearance of the name to the “formation of Baloch feudal nationality” and the spread of the Baloch over the territory bearing their name to this day during the period between the 12th and the 15th century.¹² Confirming more or less the above notion, Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, the most prominent authority on the subject, believes that the country of the Baloch has been known as Balochistan since the founding of the first Baloch confederacy in the 12th century.¹³

Under the Arab rule (from the early 8th century to the end of 10th century) the Baloch country was divided into three separate political and administrative regions, namely Makkoran, Turan (Kalat highlands in central Balochistan) and Sajistan or Drangia (Sistan including Kharan). It appears that this division prevailed until 15 century.¹⁴ As it will be discussed in chapter 3, the successive Mughal invasions from the late 13th century on, led to mass exodus of the Baloch population eastwards, mainly to Sindh and Punjab. Probably it was during this mass movement that the entire Baloch region became known as “Balochistan” or the land of Baloch for its surrounding peoples. It should be noted that terms like “Balochistan” and *mulk Balochi* (country of the Baloch) are frequently encountered in Balochi classic poetry of the 15th and 16th centuries.¹⁵ Moreover, a Turkish admiral, Sidi Ali Reis who visited coastal Makkoran in 1554, also affirms the use of this name, calling “Balochistani” the inhabitants of coastal Makkoran.¹⁶ The word “Balochistan” is also mentioned in the commentaries of the Mughal emperor Babar (1526-1530), the Tuzak-e Babari¹⁷, and by the emperor

¹¹ That is also the case with other similar names such as Kurdistan (the Kurdish homeland), Arabistan (the Arab homeland), Uzbekistan, etc. In these names, the Persian affix “-istan” meaning land or territory is added to the name of its ethnic inhabitants.

¹² Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan: An ethnic history, pp. 147-8.

¹³ Inayatullah Baloch, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.

¹⁴ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. 1, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ Sabir Badalkhan, “A Study of Balochi Oral Poetry: Problems and Prospects”, in: Newsletter of Balochistan Studies, No. 8, Naples, 1991, pp. 15, 24-25.

¹⁶ Sidi Ali Reis, The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral in India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Persia, during the Years 1553-1556, translated from the Turkish, with notes by A. Vambery, London: Luzac and Co., 1899, p. 16.

¹⁷ Zahirudin Babar, Tuzak-e Babari, (Trans, Urdu, Rasheed Akhtar Nadvi), p. 268, cited in: Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. III, Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1988, pp. 532-533. It should be noted that this book (Tuzak-e Babari) originally written in Turki (Turkish), was translated in the middle of Akbar’s reign, by Addu-r Raheem, Khan Khanan. It (the Persian translation) was presented to the emperor Akbar in the thirty-fourth year of his reign (998/1590). For more detail, see John Dowson (ed.), History of India: As Told by its own Historians, London, 1872, p. 218.

Akbar's (1556-1605) biography, the "A'in-i Akbari", which was completed in 1596-7 AD.¹⁸

Henry Pottinger, however, coincides the birth of the designation to the rule of Nasir Khan the Great in the mid-18th century.¹⁹ After the death of the Persian King, Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747, the region adjoining the subcontinent, including the Baloch country, became the dominions of Nasir Khan. Thus a vast country, which lay between the Helmand valley and the sea, and stretching from Kerman on the west to Sindh on the east, was carved out as Balochistan.²⁰

Giving the Baloch country a worldwide recognition, Nasir Khan the Great used the designation "Balochistan" in official contact with its neighbours in the mid-18th century.²¹ Defining its borders, Nasir Khan believed wherever the Baloch race is living, there is Balochistan.²² For the Baloch nationalists, it means the eastern region of Persian Province of Kerman to the western bank of Indus River; the whole region in between is the Baloch country. It is mainly resided by the Baloch.²³ However, since the Nasir Khan's era, the term "Balochistan" has meant more than just geography. It also refers to Baloch culture and is therefore a social and political concept as well. It must be borne in mind that there is a general agreement among scholars of Baloch studies in identifying the land as the cradle of the Baloch ethno-linguistic identity.²⁴

¹⁸ Abul Fazl Allami, A'in-e Akbari, translated into English by H. Blochmann (2nd Edition), Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1927, p. 388.

¹⁹ Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, London, 1816, pp. 250. It is believed that about 6000 Baloch served in Nadir Shah's army (Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An, p. 133). Of these the most influential and powerful commander was Mohammad Khan Baloch. In 1142/1730, he was appointed as the Wali (governor-general) of Koh-Kiloyeh by Nadir Shah. Two years later supported by the Arab tribes of Khozistan, Mohammad Khan Baloch revolted against Nadir Shah to overthrow him. He occupied Shiraz and the whole south-western Persia. He proclaimed himself the "Shah of Persia" and appointed his allies Abul-Fath Khan (in Shuster), Sheikh-e Fares (in Koh-Kiloyeh) and Syed Reza (in Khoezeh) as the governors of these provinces (Ahmad Kasrawi, Tarikh Pansad Saleh-e Khozistan, Tehran, 1373/1995, p. 108). Nadir, fearful of Mohammad Khan Baloch's movement, requested him to surrender. Rejecting Nadir Shah's offer, Mohammad Khan wrote to him: "In the beginning you were no one and very poor among your friends. When you with two to three hundred of your family can make a claim of kingdom and dynasty... so why I who that can command 80,000 Baloch family from seaside towns to Indian border, shouldn't make the same claim (see, Mohammad Kazim Marvi-Wazir, Alam Ara-e Naderi, Tehran, 1364/1986, p. 342). However, in 1145/1733, Mohammad Khan Baloch was defeated and killed by Nadir.


²⁰ A. W. Hughes, The Country of Balochistan, its geography, topography, ethnography and history, pp. 26-27.

²¹ Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum (The Baloch Nation), Lahore: Takhliqat, 2000, p. 142.

²² For more detail see, Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 20.

²³ Interview with Abdur-Rahman Kurd.

²⁴ Parviz Natel Khanlari, Zaban-shonasi va Zaban-e Farsi, Tehran: Intesharat-e Bonyad-e Farhang-e Iran, Third edition, 1347/1969, p. 76; Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan, pp. 47-48.



Map 2. British Balochistan
 ADOPTED FROM GAZETTEER OF BALOCHISTAN

Location and Climate

The Balochs' separate consciousness is territorially rooted to their homeland Balochistan. Geographically, Balochistan does not fall within the territorial limits of India. On the north, it is separated from India by the massive barrier of the southern buttresses of the Sulaiman Mountains. On the south, there is the long extension from Kalat of the inconceivably wild highland country, which faces the desert of Sindh, the foot of which forms the Indian frontier. While it lacks boundaries in the modern sense of the term, Balochistan's core region has never been in doubt. The Baloch country, which is at present divided politically between three different countries, is physically a compact unit.²⁵ The Goldsmid line, drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, gave western Balochistan to Persia, while retaining the larger eastern part for the British. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, further divided Balochistan between British Balochistan and Afghanistan, assigning to the latter a small portion of northern Balochistan. As a British colonial legacy, these borders were inherited by Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and have served to divide the country ever since.

Today eastern Balochistan (British Balochistan and the Balochistan states) constitutes the Pakistani Province of Balochistan covering an area of 134,050 square miles or 347,188 square kilometres with its capital at Quetta. The major tribes of Eastern Balochistan are: Marri, Bugti, Brahui, Kurd, Jamaldini, Rakhshani, Bizenjo, Boleidai, Bangulzai, Umrani, Jamali, Qaisarani, Khetran, Lashari, Rind, Hout, Laghari, Mazari, Mengal, Kkoso, Gishkori, Mohammad Hassani, Mohammad Shahi, Raisani, Rend, Shahwani, Zehri, Lehri, Ghorchani, Qambrani, Kalmati, Lasi, Korai, Kolanchi, Magasi, Rais, Sanjarani, and Nusherwani.²⁶ The agrarian economy has prevailed mainly in southern Balochistan, while tribalism and pastoral economy have dominated the northern part of the country. In many parts, however, the dual economy of settled agriculture and pastoralism are practised side-by-side, engaging both the nomads and the peasants.

Western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) is administratively divided into three parts of which the largest is known as the province of "Sistan wa Balochistan" with its capital at Zahedan. It is bounded by the Lut desert and the Iranian province of Khorasan in the North, by the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea stretching from the entrance to the Strait of Hurmuz to the port of Gwatr on the South and Northwest, by

²⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

the province of Kerman on the West, and by the Goldsmid Line separating Pakistani and Afghani Balochistan on the East. Ethno-geographically, it comprises the Jaz Murian agricultural basin in the Centre and Northwest, the Sarhadd highlands in the North, the Mashkel lowlands and the Sarawan agricultural oasis on the East, the Coastal region of Makkoran in the South, and the Westernmost districts of Geyawan (Byaban) and Bashkard. To this one can add the Helmand depression inhabited by a mixed ethnic population of Baloch and Sistani people.²⁷

Economically, like eastern Balochistan, the region is divided into pastoralism in Sarhadd and agriculture in the central and southern areas. Fishing combined with some cultivation predominates in the coastal area. In the north where nomadism has been the prevailing basis of the economy until recently, the social organisation was tribal. Some of the major tribes in this area are the Rigi, Yarahmadzai, Narui, Gorgej, Ismailzai, Mir Balochzai, and Gamshadzai.²⁸ The natural boundaries, however, have always formed major barriers and strong defence lines against foreign invaders, even though they have not stopped the major invasions, such as the disastrous march of Alexander the Great and his armies through Gedrosia or devastating waves of Turkish and Mughal invasions from the 10th to the 15th centuries, from taking place.

From the 15th century on, Balochistan and the *Mulk Balochi* are frequently being admired in the Balochi poetry. Adoring the *Mulk Balochi* (the Baloch country), the Baloch nationalists in their *Qaumi Tarana* (National Anthem) in the early days of independence in 1947 sang, "We have conquered all the area which is now our homeland. It is real and true Balochistan. If we are separated and demarcated, then so what, this is a temporary division, our soul is one. We will destroy these walls. We are like a rain and a storm".²⁹ For the Baloch nationalists, the whole region from the east of Bandar Abbas - Kerman to the west of the Indus River, and from the Sulaiman mountains in the northeast, to the Dasht-Lut in northwest, is known as Balochistan.

The *Mulk Balochi* has a great impact on Baloch national feeling. It is praised by the Baloch poets and singers as the *bahesht-e ru-e zameen* (the paradise on the earth) or the *gul-e zameen* (the flower of the world), and its necessity for the Baloch is

²⁷ Great Britain. Admiralty. Naval Intelligence Division. *Persia* (Geographical Handbook series, B.R. 525), Oxford: Stationary office at the University Press, 1945, p. 389-399.

²⁸ Two of these tribes were renamed by Reza Shah; the Yarahmadzai tribe is nowadays also known as Shahnawazi, and the Ismailzai are called Shahbakhsh.

²⁹ *Weekly Bolan*, Karachi, April 8, 1947.

compared to that of the body's to the soul³⁰, or according to an old Baloch saying, *tou-e mai zend o hamm mai gour* (the place from which we came and to which in death we will return). According to legend, Beebagr, a folk hero, while carrying away the daughter of one of the Afghan notables from Kandahar, very proudly mentions the *Mulk Balochi* (Baloch land), "*Biroun Hamuda ke Mulk Balochien*" (lets go there, the country is Balochi), Beebagr says to Granaz.³¹ This deep-rooted sense of attachment and affection to the *Mulk Balochi* in turn has given the Baloch the sense of identity and national consciousness. It is, closely linked with a strong sense of awareness of and admiration for the natural features of the land as is best manifested in an ancient Baloch saying that, "*wa-e watan o hoshkin dar*", (I will always love my land, even if it is void and barren). The *watan* (country), or the *Mulk Balochi*, is often incorporated in patriotic songs chanted at nationalist gatherings.

The *Mulk Balochi* not only characterises the Baloch history and culture, but also their christening. The main source of the Balochi christening is the natural world of Balochistan. The Baloch borrow their names mainly from animals, trees, plants, colours and even parts of the body. Most of the names, however, are of a compound of Balochi and other neighbouring languages mainly Arabic and Farsi (Persian), like "Gul Mohammad", "Gul Khan", "Del Poll", "Gul Bibi", etc. There are also names, which are derived from the name of weekdays, like *Shanbeh* (Saturday) *Doshanbeh* (Monday), and *Saishanbeh* (Tuesday) etc. Almost all the Baloch tribal names, even of those who are living in Sindh and Punjab are rooted from the natural features of Balochistan. The semi-mythical heroes of 15th and 16th centuries like Kamambar, Hammal, Jiand, Hani, Kiyya, Sado, etc. form another important source for baptism.

Located on the southeastern Iranian plateau, with an approximately 340,000 sq. miles, Balochistan is larger than several European states.³² It is an austere land of steppe and desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. Naturally, the climate of such a vast territory has extraordinary varieties.³³ In the northern and interior highlands, the temperature often drops to 40⁰ F in winter, while the summers are temperate. The coastal region is extremely hot with temperature soaring between 100⁰ to

³⁰ Ismail Amiri, "Maulavi Abdullah-e Shaeri-e Raji Pahnat", in *Taptan*, No. 3, Karachi, March 1989, p. 13.

³¹ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *A Literary History of the Baluchis*, p. 13.

³² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 1987, pp. 19-23; See also Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 427.

³³ For a good description of the natural climate of Western Balochistan see Naser Askari, *Moghadamahi Bar Shenakht-e Sistan wa Balochistan*, Tehran: Donya-e Danesh, 1357/1979 pp. 3-14.



130° F in summers. While winters provide a more favourable climate. In spite of its position on the direction of southwest monsoon winds from Indian Ocean, Balochistan seldom receives more than 5 to 12 inches of rainfall per year due to the low altitude of Makkoran's coastal ranges.³⁴ The ecological factors have, however, been responsible for the fragmentation of agricultural centres and pasturelands, thus shaping the formation of the traditional tribal economy and its corresponding socio-political institutions.

The harsh climate and mountainous terrain breeds a self-reliant people used to hardship; the same conditions, however, result in isolation and difficulties in communication. While the geography has protected the Baloch from most outside influences, it also has divided the Baloch among themselves into competing communities (tribes).

It is important to note that beside the compact Balochi areas, the Pakistani provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, the Iranian provinces of Balochistan-wa-Sistan, Khorasan,³⁵ Ostan-e-Hurmuzgan, Kerman, and Nimruz-Valayat in Afghanistan, Baloch communities extend into neighbouring areas in each country: Gonbad, Semnan and Gorgan in north Iran, Farah, Herat, Badgis, Faryab, Juzjan in Afghanistan. They also extend into neighbouring countries, - Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, India, the countries of the Persian Gulf, Oman,³⁶ Kenya, and Tanzania (especially Zanzibar).

³⁴ Ibid., p. 9

³⁵ Since 1933, several maps of United Balochistan have been published, which include eastern Khorasan. Khorasan is a multi-national area, consisting of Baloch, Turkmen and several other ethnic groups.

³⁶ Among the Gulf states, the Sultanate of Oman, has more than fifty percent Baloch population, most of them in Muscat since the 18th century (Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*; and also M. Ismail Dashti, *Al-Balosh: Tarikh wa Harazat-e Arabiah*, Al-Ain, 1997, p. 35). According to the Arab writer, Ibrahim Bashmi *Qaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood*, p. 349, the Baloch migration to Oman traces back as far as the early Arab occupation of Makkoran in the reign of Caliph Al-Waleed ibn Abdul Malik (705-715). The Baloch migration, according to Muhammad Kamal Khan, a professor of Shanzu Teachers College in Mombasa, Kenya, intensified in the mid 17th century to Oman and East Africa. Around 1650 AD, one Seif bin Sultan, the ruler of Oman, visited the Makkoran coast where were situated the ports of Chabahar and Gwadar that had close trade links with the port of Muscat. He entered into an agreement with a Baloch "Amir" (ruler), Amir Shah Dad Chotah who gave him a force of Baloch mercenaries to send to East Africa. In 1664, Amir Shah Dad Chotah was the Commander-in-Chief of an Omani expeditionary force consisting of the Baloch mainly of Jadgal tribe, which attacked East African ports occupied by Portuguese colonialists. The Baloch forces under Amir Shah Dad Chotah, captured Malindi, Mombasa and Port Jesus. Since then many Baloch families migrated from eastern and western Balochistan and settled in Oman and east African coast. The mass Baloch settlement in the Sultanate can be traced to the point when one of the Muscat princes took refuge in Gwadar during the reigns of Mir Nasir Khan I, who had given Gwadar to the 'guest prince'. Baloch relations with Muscat prospered when the rebellious prince later took up the reins of government after the death of his father. In early 1980 some 5,000 Baloch were said to be serving in the army of Oman. See *Washington Post*, February 9, 1980.

There are pockets of Baloch settlement in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.³⁷ After the Iranian revolution in 1979, hundreds of Baloch migrated to Europe (especially Sweden and United Kingdom) and America.

Very little has been published about these diasporas communities. But several of the people interviewed point out that they very much tend to be encouraged to develop their ethnic identity.³⁸ "As far as I feel", Nawaz Khan Baloch, the Baloch Community secretary (Mombassa, Kenya) stated, "we are Baloch and Balochistan is our mother land, both in Iran and Pakistan, we only love the land of Balochistan."³⁹ Similarly, Abdulkadir Noormohamed also from Mombassa, believes, "The use of Balochi names, and the continuous narration of our history has kept the awareness of our roots still fresh in our minds, and our yearning for self-preservation is still very much alive."⁴⁰ According to him an impressive impetus of self-awareness is developing among the younger Baloch population of east Africa. The Balochi language, which was slowly fading away from the society, is gradually finding its way back with new awakened interest.⁴¹

Most of the Baloch in the Persian Gulf except Oman migrated in the last decades in pursuit of employment and better living conditions due to the oil-boom in these states. The Baloch in Turkmenistan came from Sistan, some from the Afghan and some from the Iranian side of the border.⁴² There were three main waves of migration. It is believed the first Baloch arrived in the mid 19th century, when the Persian occupied Sistan in 1865; the second wave between 1917 and 1920; and the last and largest between 1923 and 1928. In the Soviet census of 1979, their population was 20,000.⁴³ They live in the Mari (Marv) region, and are Sunni Muslims. Despite the influence of the years and the erosion of time, they have maintained their separate identity including their language and culture from the rest of people. They have also managed to maintain strong social cohesion amongst themselves.⁴⁴

³⁷ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, Royal Book company, Karachi, third edition, 1985, p. 4.

³⁸ Mohammad Sher-Del (Turkmenistan), Ismail Mumtaz (Oman), Abdu-Samad Amiri (United Arab Emirate) and Abdur-Rahim Kalati (Kenya).

³⁹ Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), August-September 1999, p. 33.

⁴⁰ Abdulkadir Noormohamed, "Balochs in East Africa", in: Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), August-September 1999.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Interview with Mohammad Sher-Del.

⁴³ Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, pp. 120-121.

⁴⁴ Yar Jan Badini, "Turkmenistan: Panjah Hazar Balochani Watan" (Turkmenistan: The Country of 50 thousands Baloch), in: Monthly Balochi Labzank, Hab, June-July 1998.

Demographics

With demography being one of the most powerful forces in politics, the Baloch nationalists claim that the Pakistani and Iranian authorities have deliberately underestimated their population. There is a great discrepancy between the nationalists' estimates and the official census of the Baloch population. The former range from 30 million, by the last ruler of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch (1975), to 15 million by Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch (1985). By contrast, the official Pakistani census of 1981 only showed a total Baloch population of 3.5 million. Thus, it is difficult to estimate the total number of the Baloch population, partly because official statistics often ignore ethnic affiliation and mother tongue, since it is generally not in the interest of the governments in the countries where Balochi is spoken to focus on the ethnic differences that exist within their borders.⁴⁵

It should be noted that the census issue in Pakistan is a politicised one, given the dynamics of ethnic politics in that country. Khuda Bakhsh Marri, a former Chief Justice of Balochistan, while criticising the 1961 census, discusses in detail the inconsistencies in the census figures and maintains that the Baloch population in Sindh by 1961 was over three million. He considers that most probably the Baloch and Brahuīs were jumbled together with the general Sindhi-speaking people without making proper inquiries about their language or community. He estimates that the Baloch population in Punjab stood at around six million out of a total population of thirty million, according to the 1972 census figures. He calculates the total Baloch population in the three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, at between fifteen to sixteen million people.⁴⁶ Speaking with Selig Harrison, the defence minister in the Zia regime, Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur criticised Marri's figure for Sindh and said that it might well be too low. However, he distinguished between 1.4 million Baloch who spoke Balochi, more than half of them in Karachi, and some 2 million more who were Baloch by ethnic origin but no longer spoke the language. He supported his estimates by pointing to the fact that thirteen of the twenty-seven members elected to the Sindh Provincial Assembly in 1970 were Baloch.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For a careful calculation of the number of Balochi speakers in the different countries where the language is spoken, see Carina Jahani, *Standardization and Orthography*, pp. 91-3.

⁴⁶ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlight on the Baloches and Balochistan*, pp. 15-25.

⁴⁷ Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur, quoted in: Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 177.

The percentage of Baloch population in Sindh, that is "Sindhi Baloch", is sometimes put as high as 50 percent⁴⁸, and there is evidence to support this. For example, the 1961 census reported that Balochi was spoken by only 34 percent of the population of Jacobabad district, one of four Sindhi districts adjoining Balochistan, but acknowledged that the Baloch constituted 60 percent of the population.⁴⁹ The situation of Punjab is similar to Sindh. For instance, it was reported in the 1961 census that in Dera Ghazi Khan, a district of Punjab bordering directly on Balochistan, Balochi was spoken by less than 6 percent of the population. But the same census report acknowledged that the inhabitants of the district, which includes a large separately administered tribal belt where presumably no census was taken, were "predominantly" Baloch.⁵⁰

In 1980, the Baloch population of Afghanistan was estimated at around 300,000.⁵¹ The Baloch nationalists in Afghanistan, however, like the Eastern and Western Baloch nationalists claim that their population is much higher than officially acknowledged. In early 1980, according to the exiled Baloch nationalist leader, Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, the total population of the Baloch in Afghanistan was approximately 500,000.⁵² The main settlement area of the Baloch is *Valayat-e Nimruz* (Nimruz province). Other Baloch groups of some numerical significance live in the neighbouring Helmand province and in the western Afghan provinces of Herat and Badghiz; scattered groups are also found in other provinces, namely Farah, Faryab, Samangan, Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Jauzjan, and Kandahar, as well as in the capital Kabul. In Badghiz and Herat the Baloch population in 1975 were 30,000-40,000 people.⁵³ According to official statistics the population of *Valayat-e Nimruz*, the majority Baloch populated province, was 122,000 in 1975. There are also scattered Baloch tribes and settlement along Afghanistan's border with Iran extending from south to north where the boundaries of Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan meet. Like Iran and Afghanistan, there is no official figure about the Baloch population in the Arabian Peninsula (mainly in Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Ku-

⁴⁸ Interview with Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani.

⁴⁹ See Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961: District Census Report (Jacobabad), Karachi, 1962, p. I/11.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. I/16.

⁵¹ Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 62.

⁵² Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, "Baloch-ha-e Afghanistan", Australia, September 1999.

⁵³ Erwin Orywal, "Periphery and Identity: Process of Detribalization Among the Baloch of Afghanistan", In: Paul Titus, Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 85.

wait). However, Elfenbein refers to “various estimates from 1979” and estimates a figure of 500,000.⁵⁴

In 1981, Selig Harrison estimated the total population of the Baloch speakers in the three countries of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan at around five million.⁵⁵ This figure, however, excludes the Brahuīs who are ethnically Baloch, but speak Brahui. If his estimation was based on ethnīe, rather than language, it could conceivably double or triple the number, as Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch did. In Pakistan’s population census of 1981, Balochi was given as the mother tongue of 379,148 households in Pakistan, a figure that was 3% of the total. Brahui was given as the mother tongue of an additional 151,958 households (1.2%). Together the Balochi – and Brahui speaking groups thus accounted for approximately 4.2% of Pakistan’s households. Extrapolating from that figure, Pakistan with a 1981 population officially placed at 84.3 million had a Baloch population of 3.5 million.⁵⁶ In the early 1981, an estimate of the number of the Iranian Baloch was 750,000.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, according to the Iranian official census, provided in 1976, the population of Sistan wa Balochistan was 659,297. These figures also include the non-Baloch population of the province as well, and exclude the Baloch population outside the province. Harrison’s estimate leaves us with a figure of about 5 million Balochi-speakers in 1981. As indicated earlier, there was also a similar figure of Baloch who spoke languages other than Balochi, mainly in Sindh and Punjab in 1981. Thus a total Baloch population of 10 million for 1981, in all the three countries of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, looks more reasonable to the author.

Language and religion

“I am proud to address you in Baluchi today”, declared the Khan, Ahmad Yar Khan, on 15th August 1947, the day of Independence. “*Insha Allah*, whenever I will address you in future, it will be in Baluchi because it is the language of the Baluch nation”, he continued.⁵⁸ The Balochs’ consciousness of their common language and cultural heritage constitutes another significant foundation of their nationalism. As manifested in a set of shared social norms, value systems, traditions, and folklore, the Balochi cultural values, together with their cultural environment, is the focus of the

⁵⁴ E. Yarshater, *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, III, p. 635.

⁵⁵ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 178

⁵⁶ See, Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organisation, *1981 Population Census of Pakistan*, Islamabad, 1984.

⁵⁷ William E. Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era”, in: George Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 383.

⁵⁸ Malik Allah-Bakhsh (ed.), *Tarikh-e Khawanin-e Baloch*, pp. 407-413.

nationalist appeals for broader popular support for their overall demands of which cultural autonomy is only one. The Baloch see themselves as the heirs to an ancient culture, which has served as a strong unifying force, giving them the sense of a distinctive identity and enabling them to counter the ever-present threat of absorption and assimilation into the surrounding cultures. So they have successfully preserved their cultural traditions throughout recorded history. "To a great extent", Selig Harrison wrote, "it is the vitality of this ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of the present demand for the political recognition of Baloch identity".⁵⁹

Language, culture, and perception are intimately intertwined. It is thus not surprising that language has been a key element contributing to a sense of national identity. Spooner points to the importance of the Balochi language as a unifying factor between the numerous groups nowadays identifying themselves as "Baloch". He wrote, "Baluch identity in Baluchistan has been closely tied to the use of the Baluchi language in inter-tribal relations".⁶⁰ In spite of almost half a century of brutal assimilation policy, both in Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch people have managed to retain their culture and their oral tradition of story telling. The harsh oppression of the Iranian and Pakistani states has strengthened the Balochs' will to pass on their heritage to coming generations. Language plays a powerful role in the struggle of Baloch people for their right to self-determination. The Balochi language is both proof and symbol of the separate identity of the Baloch, and impressive efforts are made to preserve and develop it.⁶¹ Thus, having realized the significance of the language (Balochi) as the most determinant factor for the Baloch identity, the Persian and Punjabi dominated states of Iran and Pakistan have sought to "assimilate" the Baloch by all possible means.⁶²

The Balochi is generally classified as a northwestern Iranian language. It can be divided into two major dialect groups, namely Eastern Balochi and Western Balochi.⁶³ Eastern Balochi is spoken mainly in the northeastern areas of the province of Balochistan in Pakistan and in neighbouring areas of the province of Punjab and Sindh. Western Balochi is spoken in the western and southern areas of the Pakistani province of Balochistan as well as in Karachi and other parts of Sindh, the Arabian

⁵⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, op cit., p. 11

⁶⁰ Brian Spooner, *Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography* p. 599.

⁶¹ Carina Jahani, "Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement", p. 110.

⁶² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 95-96.

⁶³ Mussa Mahmudzai, "Moqayeseh-e Zaban-e Balochi Ba Zabanha-e Irani-Bastan", p. 59.

Gulf States, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. There are an estimated six to seven million speakers of Balochi, most of whom speak Western Balochi, which is also the dialect that has been mostly used in Balochi literature. Since there are fewer speakers of Eastern Balochi than of Western Balochi, Josef Elfenbein⁶⁴ has suggested that the eastern dialect speakers “form a very small and isolated group”. Calculations based on figures from the 1981 census of Pakistan suggest, however, that about one-third of all Balochi speakers use Eastern Balochi.⁶⁵ Furthermore, to the socio-economic division of Iranian Balochistan into a northern versus a central and southern part corresponds the main dialect division within western Balochistan, namely between the northern (Rakhshani) versus the southern (Makkorani). There are however, as noted both by Elfenbein⁶⁶ and Spooner,⁶⁷ some dialects that have their own very distinct features and do not readily fit into one of the two groups mentioned above. One such dialect is that of Sarawani.

As discussed in chapter 3, in the course of history, the Baloch country has been attacked, occupied and populated from West and North by, Persians, Greeks, Parthian, Arabs, Turks and Mughals. They had their own languages but the Balochi language and culture was so rich and deep rooted that it absorbed all the languages and cultures of invaders and developed itself into a unique language and culture. The Balochi language has its own grammar, and it is rich in vocabulary and contains many words for different objects like different words for domestic animals according to their age and condition, which cannot be alternatively used. Balochi is also rich in idioms, idiomatic phrases, lullabies, folk stories, folk songs, and folk literature.⁶⁸

However, the Brahui Baloch, and many other Baloches in Sindh and Punjab speak languages other than Balochi. Emphasizing on the common cultural heritage (except language), the former defence minister of Pakistan, Mir Hazar Khan, pointed out in an interview with author, that except their language, they (the Sindhi speaking Baloch) have fully maintained their *Balochi* customs, traditions and culture. He said, “We have different ceremonies regarding marriage, we sing Balochi songs in our marriages about our forefathers, songs of Chakar and Gwahram, Shaih Morid and Hani,

⁶⁴ Josef Elfenbein, “The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts”, in: The Royal Asiatic Society, London 1966, p 10.

⁶⁵ Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography, pp. 93-6.

⁶⁶ Josef Elfenbein, “The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts”, pp. 19-20, 23.

⁶⁷ Brian Spooner, “Note on the Baluchi Spoken in Persian Baluchistan”, pp. 51-71, in: Iran, Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, 5 (1967) pp. 51-76.

⁶⁸ Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note on Balochi Folktale and Folktale Studies”, pp. 83-85.

Duda and Balach and many other such traditional songs are common among us. We still have our own traditional clothes, which is called Balochi Douch. We have many things which really separate us from other Sindhis".⁶⁹

The Baloch have many interesting characteristics in their culture. They have a different perception about religion than other nations in Middle East. They are not fundamentalist and do not believe in mixing religion with politics.⁷⁰ The overwhelming majority of the Baloch adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam of the Hanafite rite. It is important to note that before succumbing to Islam the Baloch were mostly Zoroastrians. The remnants of some Zoroastrian tradition are still evident among some Baloch tribes.⁷¹ The conversion of the Baloch to Islam had a sterilising effect on their sense of nationhood.

However, the Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions, and culture play a very significant role in the daily lives of the people as well as the overall aspect of their society. In the early 19th century, Henry Pottinger wrote, "With regard to religion, they are, with a very few exceptions to the westward, Soonee [Sunni] Moosulmans [Muslims], and inveterate in their hatred and enmity against the Sheeas [Shiites], under which persuasion, I am convinced, it would be more dangerous to appear in Beloochistan [Balochistan], than even as a Christian".⁷² According to the Sinni-Baloch the Shiites abuse three of the four Caliphs who followed the Prophet Mohammad and who are held in great veneration by Sunni Muslims. It should be noted that the antagonism between the Sunnis and the Shiites, for example, sometimes manifesting itself in violent clashes between the two sects, is about thirteen-and-a-half centuries old. Moreover, in western Balochistan Sunnism has taken on a political significance as well in the sense that it has always served as a major rallying point against the ruling Persians whose overwhelming majority follows Shiism.⁷³

While most Baloch are Sunni Muslims, there are two non-Hanafite communities among them. The Bameri community centred on Dalgan west of Bampur are Shiite, and a relatively large community in Makkoran who called themselves "Zigri" (Zikri). The exact figures of this breakdown are not available, as the countries in

⁶⁹ Interview with Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani.

⁷⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 75.

⁷¹ See *Ibid.*, p. 70; The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, p. 259; Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, Emergence Dimensions Repercussions, p. 5.

⁷² Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, London, 1816, p. 61.

⁷³ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 110.

which Balochistan is located either do not classify individuals by religious community in their censuses, or they do not classify the Baloch separately.

When the Bameris became Shiite in Iranian Balochistan, it is not known. Sir Henry Pottinger records how some of the Baloch tribes living in the central Perso-Baloch border regions in Kerman were converted by Persian authorities to Shiism and settled there during the first decade of the 19th century.⁷⁴ Writing in 1872, Henry Bellew also testifies that the ruling clan of the Narui tribe in Sistan was converted to Shiism after the region fell to Persia in 1865.⁷⁵ In a conversation on this subject with Dr. Danish Narui, the former Governor of Balochistan, he also himself from Sistan, he said that there are a few Narui Baloch in Sistan who are Shiite”.⁷⁶

It should be noted that Shiite communities can be found among the Baloch in Sindh and Punjab. How might this have happened? It is still a matter of discussion among the scholars.⁷⁷ Most probably it was in Sindh that the Baloch were converted to Shiism. As the Baloch tribes were settled in Sindh in 15th century, the country was already a centre for Shiite activities.⁷⁸ Historically the Shiite influence in Sindh started with the arrival of Ismaili missionaries during the 10th century. Since then the Ismailis (Shiites) dominated religious development in the country until the late 15th century.⁷⁹ As observed by Khuda Bakhsh Marri, Mir Shahdad, son of legendary Baloch hero, Mir Chakar Rind is said to have introduced Shiism among the Baloch during the first half of the 16th century.⁸⁰ However, the Balochi ballads from 12th century, claim that Baloch were followers of Caliph Ali.⁸¹

Discussing on the role of Sunni Islam in the Iranian Balochistan, Dr. Inayatullah Baloch states, “Sunni Islam forms an important factor in preserving Baloch identity against Iranian nationalism, which is expressly Shia and Persian”.⁸² By contrast, however, in Pakistani Balochistan, the Baloch face no such threat from Shiites and, as a result, secular forces have historically dominated the Baloch national movement in

⁷⁴ Henry Pottinger, *Travels in Beloochistan and Sindh*, p. 199.

⁷⁵ Henry Bellew, *From Indus to Tigris, a Narrative of Journey Through the Countries of Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Khorasan, and Iran (1874)*, Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1976, p. 205.

⁷⁶ Interview with Dr. Danish Narui former Governor Sistan-wa-Balochistan.

⁷⁷ Sarah F. D. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 16-17.

⁷⁸ Sarah F. D. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power*, pp. 16-17.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan*, p. 256.

⁸¹ M. Longworth Dames, *Popular Poetry of the Baloches*, vol. I, p. 3.

⁸² Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, The State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan”, in: Titus, Paul (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity, Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 240.

that country. Thus, in Pakistan, as observed by Nina Swidler, “religion does not distinguish Baloch identity.”⁸³

Contemporary to the rise of Shiism in Persia, a new religion, Zikriism, emerged in Balochistan in the mid 15th century. As the Safavid rulers of Persia adopted Shiism, so the Boleidai rulers of Makkoran adopted Zikriism as their state religion.⁸⁴ Under Zigri (Zikri) rule, according to Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, the Balochi culture flourished due to the patronage of the ruling elite. The Zigri rites of worship are mostly conducted in Balochi.⁸⁵ Consequently, Zigri poets and religious scholars have enriched Balochi literature. In fact, because they attach religious significance to sites there, the Zigri have developed a special reverence for the land of Balochistan. For them Balochistan, and especially Turbat, was the “Gul-e-Zamin” (Flower of the earth). This patriotic attitude on the part of the Zigri Baloch according to Dr. Baloch is the forerunner of modern Baloch nationalism.⁸⁶

Historically, it is believed that the Zigris are the followers of Syed Mohammad (c. 1442-1505 AD) originally from Jaunpur, India, who is considered to be the Mehdi. According to Zigri tradition, he came to Makkoran and took abode at “Koh-e-Morad” a holy place in the suburb of Turbat, preached his doctrine, converted the whole of Makkoran, and then disappeared. Zigri doctrine deviates from orthodox Muslim belief, but Zigris consider themselves to be true Muslims. Despite their doctrinal differences there are many Sunni influences on Zigri religious beliefs and practices, and on their socio-political life. Both sects regard the Koran as their holy book and as the final *wahy* (revelation) and actual *kalam* (words) of *Allah*. In addition, the day-to-day life of Zigris, their names and their culture are a part and parcel of Baloch Sunni tradition. As estimated by Selig Harrison, in 1980 the Zigri Baloch population was estimated at 500,000 to 700,000, living in the coastal Makkoran area and in Karachi.⁸⁷ Moreover Harrison believes that the Zigris of Balochistan are allied with the Baloch national cause.⁸⁸

While many countries have attempted to use religion to legitimate their rule (e.g., Divine Right of Kings in medieval France and Spain, *Valayat-e Faqih* in Iran),

⁸³ Nina Swidler, “Beyond Parody: Ethnology Engages Nationalist Discourse”, in: Titus, Paul (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity*, p. 169.

⁸⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan”, p. 230.

⁸⁵ Interview with Rahim Bakhsh Azad.

⁸⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, “Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan”, p. 229.

⁸⁷ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 187.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

forms of worship in Balochistan are so diverse that a nationalist leader or movement cannot use religion as a unifying factor, despite the renewal of the importance of religion in Baloch self-identification (especially in Iranian Balochistan). In addition to the Sunni-Zigri split and the small minority of Shiites, there are also smaller minorities of Hindus, Khojas (Ismailis), and Sikhs in Balochistan.⁸⁹

Cultural Development

The Baloch possess a rich body of folklore, which is apparent in Balochi proverbs, common sayings, puzzles, songs and stories. The striking feature of the whole of the Baloch folklore is its strong national sentiment, its frequent references to the Baloch and Balochistan. Thus with its rich oral folklore, songs, and folk poetry, the Balochi literature constitutes one important source of inspiration for nationalist feelings and emotions. Describing the common characteristics of the Balochi literature, the Swedish scholar, Carina Jahani wrote:

Much of the literature that has been produced in Balochi is explicitly nationalist in content. Common themes are the glorification of the deserts and mountains of Balochistan and the bravery, pride, and honour of the Baloch people, often exemplified by semi-mythic heroes such as Mir Chakar and Mir Hammal.⁹⁰

Throughout the centuries, the Balochi oral literature has been an important vehicle for transmitting Balochi language, culture and national feelings. Occupying an important place in their life, the Baloch managed to safeguard their cultural heritage. As observed by Dr. Badalkhan, the Baloch tribes have maintained and developed numerous legends, proverbs, poems and songs. They are also keen on riddles, animal tales, and satirical and historical tales. In addition to these genres, there is a more sophisticated oral form of literature, which consists of long recitations that include both prose and verse. Badalkhan explains that this form of expression is part of the common Baloch cultural heritage.⁹¹

Giving the inspiration of Balochness to the Baloch youth, the best-known folk tale in Balochistan is that of "Shah Moreed and Hani". This is a love story, originated

⁸⁹ On the Sikhs population in Iranian Balochistan, see, I. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An, p. 369; On the Hindus population in Balochistan, see, Fred Scholz, "Trabal Structure and Religious Tolerance: Hindus in Pakistani Balochistan", pp. 195-196.

⁹⁰ Carina Jahani, "Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement" in: Titus, Paul (ed.), Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 114.

⁹¹ Sabir Badalkhan, "A Brief Note on Balochi Folktale and Folktale Studies", in: K. Maeda (ed.), The Studies of the Etno-Religious Images in Jhalawan and Las Bela Provinces in Balochistan, University of Wako, 1999, pp. 83-85.

from the early centuries of the last millennium, whose hero, Shaikh Moreed, and heroine, Hani, have become in Balochistan symbols of pure and tragic love, like Romeo and Juliet. It is created with great simplicity, but at the same time with great depth and power, mirroring the national life of the Baloch, their emotions and philosophical ideas (God, evil, predestination).

One of the most important mediums that have been very effective in preserving and transmitting the Balochi language and culture over generations is music.⁹² Music has always been a cultural link and a means of expression to the Baloch. History, poetry, etc. were all transmitted through music and songs. Songs are transmitted from one generation to another without altering the lyrics. Yet, the rhythm might vary from one region to another. Among the well-known Balochi musical genres are epic songs and political ones, which are directly linked to nationalism. Epic songs transmit the Balochi history, talk about Baloch customs and traditions, and remind people of the values, such as courage and honor, that a warrior should have in order to become a hero.⁹³

Dating of written Balochi literature is suspect, however, as the Baloch have a penchant to grant a greater antiquity to their tradition than they warrant. As an example, Kamalan Gichki, who lived in mid-19th century, supposedly authored the Balochi epic Labz-e Baloch.⁹⁴ Since 1948, as Balochistan became a part of Pakistan, a more favourable environment led to the growth of such cultural institutions as the Balochi Literary Society and the Balochi Language Association which have successfully functioned ever since.⁹⁵ These and the Balochi Academy in Quetta have made a significant contribution to Balochi publishing and other literary and cultural activities. Thus, the Baloch became increasingly concerned with the development of their language. In 1951 the first monthly periodical, Ouman in Balochi, appeared. The Baloch Educational Society (BES) published this in Karachi.⁹⁶ Ouman ceased publication in 1962 due to pressure from the Shah.⁹⁷ The magazine, according to its editor Moalavi Khair Mohammad Nadvi, supported Dad Shah's revolt in Iranian Balochistan and was a

⁹² Sabir Badalkhan, "Balochi Songs Genres, Balochi Dances, Instrumental Musicians, Singer, Musical Instruments", in: A. Arnold (ed.), The Garland Encyclopaedia of World Music, in 10 vol., vol. 5, (South Asia: The Indian Subcontinent), New York, London, 2000, p. 773.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 23.

⁹⁵ Dictionary of Oriental Literatures, vol. 2, London, 1974, pp. 56-58.

⁹⁶ Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 25.

⁹⁷ Interview with Maulana Khair Mohammad Nadavi.

tribune for the Baloch nationalists in the region.⁹⁸ The BES was formed in Karachi in 1948 to promote Balochi language and culture and also to voice Baloch political and social grievances. Apart from publishing Ouman, the BES started a school in Liari, which was later upgraded, to high school standard.

Being the capital city and the major Baloch residence in Pakistan, in the early fifties Karachi became the focus of intellectual activities in Balochi. The Liari Adabi Board, the Balochi Academy and the Fazol Academy were all established in Karachi after 1947.⁹⁹ Prior to the 1950s there was little literary work done in the Balochi language or on behalf of the Baloch cause. Several Baloch publishing academies first appeared in Liari (Karachi) in the early 1950s and served as the vanguard of Balochi literary activity.¹⁰⁰

Efforts to create an officially backed Balochi Academy started in 1958, and it was established in 1961 in Quetta.¹⁰¹ Radio Pakistan started its broadcasts in Balochi on 25th December 1949, from Karachi, and on 17th October 1956, from Quetta. When the radio station in Quetta was established, the Balochi programmes were transferred there. In 1959, Radio Iran also started relaying programmes in Balochi from Zahedan.¹⁰² It is interesting to note that in the radio of both Pakistan and Iran, western Balochi was the dominant language. This had a great effect towards homogenising the Baloch. Broadcasts in Balochi, according to Bashir Ahmad Baloch, “served as a great boon to the Baluchi language and the development of its literature”.¹⁰³

From the late fifties onwards, more publications came to be centred in Quetta. By this time it was indeed Quetta rather than Karachi, which had become the centre of Balochi language activities. The Baloch identity and national consciousness had, after all, better chances of being preserved now than before.¹⁰⁴ As far as Ayub Khan’s government, it too had cause for satisfaction. By partial patronage of linguistic and literacy activities, the bureaucracy could mollify the Baloch intelligentsia and control it. Thus it could prevent the intelligentsia from becoming as alienated from the Centre as

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Sayyid Hashimi, “Balochi Zaban aur us ka Rasmulkhat”, daily Jang, Jan 9, 1973.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Morad Saher.

¹⁰¹ Monthly, Balochi, April-May 1958, p. 5.

¹⁰² Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 86.

¹⁰³ Bashir Ahmad Baloch, “The Beginning of Radio Broadcasting in Baluchi: A Brief Report”, in: A. V. Rossi and M. Tosi (ed.), News Letter of Baluchistan Studies, Naples: Dipartimento di studi asiatici Istituto Universitario Orientale, No. 2, Spring 1985, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Bashir Ahmad Baloch.

the militant nationalists were. By contrast, no such institutions have ever been allowed to function in Iranian Baluchistan.

In this respect, the Shah's educational programmes, however, are worth mentioning. In the beginning the educational policy of the Iranian authorities in Baluchistan, first and foremost, was not to give the necessary education to the Baloch children, but was based on de-Balochisation and the creation of Persian speaking citizens.¹⁰⁵ In the view of the Iranian authorities, as observed by Zabihullah Naseh, every Baloch child who went to school should mean the creation of a new Persian-speaking citizen and decreasing of one Baloch linguistically.¹⁰⁶ To prevent them speaking Balochi in the schools with Baloch children, the few Baloch teachers were compelled to work in the other provinces of Iran. In their place non-Baloch and Persian teachers were encouraged to teach in Baluchistan. This policy, according to Baloch nationalists, complicated the teaching process and minimised the educational standard in Baluchistan compared with Persian speaking provinces.¹⁰⁷

Since the Shah's White Revolution in 1962, each year, the percentage of the population, which was literate, increased throughout Baluchistan. In 1971-72, the total number of the literate population of 7 years and over was listed at 73,300 for the province.¹⁰⁸ By comparison in 1978-79, the numbers of students of all ages enrolled in different provincial schools at various levels alone totalled 128,274, which by itself exceeded the previous figure given for the total literate.¹⁰⁹ Still more impressive was the growth in the field of higher education in the 1970s as compared to the 1960s. As observed by the Iranian writer, Naser Askari, up to 1955, no single Baloch student was enrolled in any institution of higher education throughout Iran.¹¹⁰ Between 1965 and 1967 only 12 Baloch students were admitted.¹¹¹ A series of developments, however, changed this situation during the last decade of Shah's regime.

The mounting guerrilla activities of Baloch nationalists in Iranian Baluchistan, and their connection with Iraq and other radical Arab forces were a major cause of concern to the Shah. This concern was further exacerbated by the break up of Pakistan

¹⁰⁵ Zabihullah Naseh, *Baluchistan*, p. 196.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Azat, "Mas'aleh-e Milli wa Samad Morted", in: *Baloch Komite*, *Tran: Boliten-e Mobahebat*, pp. 20-29.

¹⁰⁸ *Iran Yearbook 1977*, Tehran, 1977, p- 547.

¹⁰⁹ Government of Iran, *Natija-i Amar Giri Edara-i Koll-e Amouzesch wa Parvaresh Ostan Sistan wa Baluchistan dar Sale Tahsili 2536-2537*, Tehran, 1978, table 19.

¹¹⁰ Naser Askari, *Moqaddamehi Bar Shonakht-e Sistan wa Baluchistan*, Tehran: Donya-e Danish, 1357/1979, p. 109.

and the subsequent rise of Baloch nationalists to power in eastern Balochistan in 1972. Fearful of this situation, the Shah's government in addition to military pressure to suppress the nationalists initiated a series of economic and educational programmes to win over the Baloch population in the early 1970s.¹¹²

Moreover, in the 1970s, the Shah came under the influence of several Western-educated technocrats, especially Jamshid Amouzegar, who persuaded him that his long-term goals would be served by a more positive approach to the Baloch, placing emphasis on economic and educational developments. His liberal policy was followed by the rising oil prices simultaneously. This made available more development funds for the neglected minority provinces. Amouzegar also won authority to recruit "reliable Baloch" for key posts in the government bureaucracy and the *Rastakhiz* party in Sistan-wa-Balochistan.¹¹³

Consequently, the 1970s saw the establishment of the first institutions of higher education in the province, namely the Teacher Training College of Zahedan and the University of Balochistan in 1972, and 1973, respectively. The inauguration of these institutions brought a simultaneous sharp increase in the number of Baloch students enrolled at the college level. For instance, in the academic year of 1972-73, there were 198 students enrolled in the Teacher Training College.¹¹⁴ By 1978, the University of Balochistan had a student body of 450. Although the overwhelming majority of the student body in the two institutions was comprised of Persian immigrants, the total number of Baloch students has been estimated between 60 to 100 during the period from 1972 to 1979.¹¹⁵ This figure for the 1970s is much higher than the similar estimates for the previous decades.¹¹⁶

In spite of this progress in provincial educational programmes, the illiteracy rate in the province remained much higher than the national average indicating a gap similar to the economic one mentioned earlier. In 1965-66, the literacy rate in the

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Interview with Abul Samad Amiri.

¹¹³ Interview with Gholam Reza Hosseinbor.

¹¹⁴ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 102; see also, *Iran Yearbook 1977*, p. 548.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

¹¹⁶ After the Iranian revolution (1979), however, the number of the higher institutions and their students in Balochistan increased several times. In 1987, there were 4882 students in the higher educational institutions in Sistan-wa-Balochistan (For more detail see, Hamid Ahmadi *Qaumiyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran*, 1378/1999, p. 265). The number increased manifold furthermore to 30,331 in 1999, of which 8693 were students in "Danishgah-e Azad-e Islami" (see Government of Iran, *Salnameh Amari Keshwar*, 1375, Tehran: Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, 1377/1998, p. 555-56). As estimated by Azim Shahbakhsh, a lecturer at Sistan wa Balochistan University, there existed more than 4000 thousand Baloch students in different Iranian universities in 1999 (Interview with Azim Shahbakhsh).

province's population of 7 years of age and over was 16 percent¹¹⁷ as compared with the national literacy average of 29.4 percent.¹¹⁸ By 1972, the national literacy average for the same age group rose to 36.9 percent¹¹⁹ as compared with the estimated provincial average of 21 percent.

It should be noted that as in the early 1960s, transistor radios became commonplace, more and more Baloch began listening to Balochi broadcasts on Radio Kabul, All-India Radio, and Radio Quetta, in addition to the ninety-minute daily broadcasts in Balochi over Radio Zahedan.¹²⁰ Like Ayub Khan's regime in Pakistan, the Shah's regime also, confronted with a populace that could no longer be insulated from outside political ideas, hastily attempted to guide this burgeoning Baloch political awareness into safe channels by stepping up its own Balochi-language radio programming and, at the same time, embarking on a crash programme to expand educational facilities.¹²¹ With the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, however, tremendous cultural developments took place. Despite being short-lived, this period gave birth to numerous Balochi publications in Iran.¹²²

The bulk of the Baloch literature is poetry, which is transmitted orally.¹²³ The legendary history of the Baloch race and their migrations, wars, religion, and creed form its significant themes. A great number of them are about rule of Rind-Lashari confederacy in 15th and 16th centuries. Stories about the wars against the Persians, Afghans, Indians, Turks, and Europeans also form the salient features of the Baloch poetry of later centuries. Among the Baloch, the memory of poets such as Gul Khan Nasir, Syed Zahur Shah Hashomi and Atta Shad arouses deep feeling. They depict the Baloch as a free, autonomous people resisting Iranian, Afghan, Indian (i.e. Mughal), and Pakistani domination. The work of such poets as Mubarak Qazi, G. R. Mulla and *Maulavi* Abdullah Rawanbod reaches people through recitals held at public marriage ceremonies, at the meetings of community associations (*anjumans*), and as entertainment in private homes. These public recitals often seek to strengthen nationalistic sentiments and cultural pride, both in Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan.

¹¹⁷ Source: Plan and Budget Organization as Quoted in: Akhardad Baloch. Siasat Dar Balochistan, 1361/1983, p- 59.

¹¹⁸ Iran YearBook 1977, p. 42.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Interview with Gholam Reza Hosseinbor.

¹²² Monthly Makkoran, No. 1 (Tehran: 1979), p. 2.

¹²³ Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Press, 1963, p. 240.

After the fall of the Khanate, Gul Khan Nasir, Syed Hashomi, Morad Saher, G. R. Molla, and many other poets gave a new meaning and form to Balochi poetry. Gul Khan Nasir's (1914-1983) poetry is the greatest manifestation and the most profound expression of the Baloch political and social approach since the early thirties. His exhortation to the Baloch to uphold their traditions is a clear sign of the deep-rooted hatred felt towards the new rulers and strong disapproval of the new political dispensation. His poems soon turned to popular slogans and were the subject of discussion by the elite. Gul Khan Nasir comments: "Come, oh Baloch, come oh Baloch, I will tell [you] something today. Come, oh homeless Baloch, You have lost your way. A gang of robbers have attacked your land. They have set fire to your houses. They carried away your possessions, but you are not aware. A heavy sleep upon you, has made you unaware, hand and tongue have ceased to function, it has fettered the manly lion."¹²⁴

With Nauruz Khan's rebellion in the late 1950s, the nationalist feeling became deeper and was expressed more clearly in the Balochi literature. The myth of Nauruz Khan and his comrades was spread far beyond the provincial border and was felt among the Baloch population in Sindh and Punjab. It is said, after the execution of his supporters, the authorities sadistically requested the aged warrior to identify the bodies. In his memoir, the Baloch leader, Sher Baz Khan Mazari, describes the modern legend that has evolved around this episode as such:

'Is this one your son? An army officer cold-heartedly asked Nauroze Khan as he pointed to the body of the elderly warrior's son. Nauroze Khan stared at the soldier for a moment then replied quietly, 'All these brave young men are my sons.' Then looking at the faces of his dead supporters, he noticed that the moustache of one of them had drooped in death. He went over to the body and tenderly curled the moustache upwards while gently admonishing, 'Even in death, my son, one should not allow the enemy to think, even for one moment, that you have despaired'.¹²⁵

Similarly, in the 1970s, as the conflict escalated between the Baloch and the Pakistani State, those who lost their lives are depicted in the Balochi poetry as national heroes. The most notable hero was Mir Luang Khan, the elder brother of Gul Khan Nasir, who fought the army instead of submitting to search.¹²⁶ However, the tri-

¹²⁴ Gul Khan Nasir, *Gulbang*, Quetta, 1952.

¹²⁵ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 85.

¹²⁶ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 38-39.

umvirate – Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo – also emerged as nationalist heroes.

Admiring his motherland, the nationalist Maulavi, Abdullah Rawanbod, probably was the most famous poet in Iranian Balochistan in the 1970s. Rawanbod comments: “Oh my beloved ancestral land. The country of the brave Baloch. Rival and the envy of Yemen... I adore you so much. I need you as the body needs the breath.”¹²⁷ In the same way, the Baloch in Afghanistan were even more isolated and kept backward socially and culturally, but they have glorified their legends with various songs. Legends like Ghazi Sher Jan who fought against British hegemony in Nimruz and Helmand (Sistan) are as famous as Dad Shah in Iranian Balochistan.¹²⁸ Since the very beginning of Balochi programmes from Radio Kabul, the heroic songs about Ghazi Sher Jan, composed and sung by Ghulam Sakhi, a nationalist singer, are being broadcast.¹²⁹

As indicated, the Baloch of Afghanistan remained largely isolated from the events of Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan and from attempts by the Afghan governments to exert administrative control over them. Compared with Pakistani and Iranian Baloch, they are mostly backward. Even though the first school was inaugurated in the country during the reign of Amanullah Khan in 1922, there was too little development in the educational field. In 1979, there were only 20 persons who had university education.¹³⁰ Consequently, unlike their brethren in Iran and Pakistan, they had not mobilised to demand cultural and political autonomy as late as the 1970s. In fact, as stated by the Baloch writer, Syed Mohammad Shiranzai from Nimruz, the process of politicising of the Afghan Baloch started in 1964, when Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, changing the country from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. However, when Mohammad Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah and abolished its traditional *Shura* (parliament), the process gained further momentum. The competition for parliamentary seats under the new republic of Afghanistan united the Baloch tribes for the first time. It was from this period, Shiranzai believes, that “nationalism became a mobilising factor in the Baloch society in Afghanistan.”¹³¹

¹²⁷ Ismail Amiri, “Maulavi Abdullah-e Shaeri-e Raji Pahnat”, in *Taptan*, No. 3, Karachi, March 1989, p. 13.

¹²⁸ Gholam Mohammad Lalzad, “Baloch Kist” (Who are the Baloch?), in: Baloch Komitee, *Tran: Boliten Mobahebat*, No 5, Stockholm June 1999, pp. 32-33.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹³⁰ Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, “Baloch-ha-e Afghaistan”, Unpublished, August 1999.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

During the 1970s, however, the pro-Soviet coup of 1978 brought a dramatic change at least in formal cultural policy in Afghanistan. In contrast with Iran, where in 1979 the Islamic revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini rejected constitutional recognition both of ethnic minorities and of the Sunni religion, the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, adopted an unusually accommodative "nationalities model" akin to that of the Soviet Union.¹³² In autumn 1978, only months after the April coup, Balochi and three other languages (Uzbek, Turkmen and Nuristani) were singled out for recognition in addition to Pashtu and Dari as official languages of Afghanistan. Facilities for propagation were pledged, and steps were taken to implement the new policy in four areas - participation in government, education, publication of periodicals, and cultural expression. Soub, a Balochi-language weekly, began publication in September 1978. Beginning in September 1979, Balochi-speaking first graders were able to attend classes in their own language, if they so chose. And there were plans, according to Naby, a Harvard specialist on Central Asia, to provide complete Balochi-language schools in Baluchi-majority areas.¹³³ However, the military conflict that followed the Afghan revolution in 1980s disrupted the social and ethnic situation in Nimruz province. Fighting led to an exodus of the Baloch from the area. Many of them settled near related tribes in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran.

Baloch social organisation

James Bill wrote that in the Middle East "the politics of development and modernization are profoundly influenced by the patterns and process that mark group and class relationships."¹³⁴ But another way, even in the late 19th century as modernisation and urbanisation reduced the importance of tribes and tribal organisations, the influence of tribal patterns is not destroyed.¹³⁵ These already existent tribal patterns and processes influence how development and modernisation takes place in rural parts of the Middle East. In Balochistan, the informal, paternalistic patterns of control through family networks (the tribes) continue to have relevance – particularly since tribal sup-

¹³² It is important to note that like the National Awami Party in Pakistan, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Government of Afghanistan (PDPA) followed a policy of equal rights and autonomy toward national minorities of the country. See, Government of Afghanistan, Qanoon-e Asasi-e Jamhuri-e Afghanistan (Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan), Kabul, 1366/1987, p. 36.

¹³³ Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Baluchis, and the Turkmens", in: William O. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver (ed.), Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, New York: Pergamon, 1979, p. 102-103.

¹³⁴ James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, (3rd Edition) Glenview, Illinois: Little, Brown and Company, 1990, p. 86.

port or lack of support has been crucial to the success or failure of nationalist movements.

Dr. Nek Buzdar, a specialist on international economic development has written that the Baloch society, 'by and large, adheres to traditional ways of life'. He believes that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organisation and political leadership still play a dominant role in local and provincial administration.¹³⁶ Tribes in Balochistan are divided into *shahri* (sedentary) and nomadic units. The *shahris* were the backbone of the feudal order, which was predominant in central, and southern Balochistan (Makkoran), while the nomads were the cornerstones of the tribal order prevailing mainly in the northern tribal areas. Both groups, however, were bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, social, political, military, and lingual interactions.¹³⁷ Possibly, this separation of the tribes between the nomad (warrior nobility) and the sedentary *shahris* (peasants) had led many to conclude that the sedentary population may have been the original inhabitants who were conquered by later-arriving nomads.

The Baloch tribal system is segmentary. Describing this system, Salzman wrote, "By 'segmentary system' we mean a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contingently for political action, decisions being made by assemblies and councils, with no offices and hierarchy of authority, and thus no top."¹³⁸ Thus centralised authority is absent in such a system. They are constituted from a number of kindred groups. It has many sub-divisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another through common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Thus it is a major factor in regulating and systemising individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-political organisation of the entire tribe.

While the colonial government exercised control over the Baloch tribes, the British themselves were light on the ground, and in return for the chieftains' loyalty gave them a free hand to keep the tribal way of life largely unchanged. But the position began to change in the last decades of Raj, change accelerated with the creation

¹³⁵ An excellent collection of studies on the interaction between tribes and newly-centralising "modern" governments is *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. By Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

¹³⁶ Nek Buzdar, "Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan" in: *Monthly Balochi Labzank*, Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000, p. 82.

¹³⁷ Nina Swidler, "Beyond Parody", in: Paul Titus, (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity*, pp. 176-77.

of Pakistan and annexation of Balochistan to Iran. Furthermore, the growth of education, market forces, and electoral politics has drawn the Baloch into regional and national networks both in Iran and Pakistan. However, the tribal power structure is still very important in Baloch rural society. Selig Harrison in 1981 counted seventeen major tribal groupings in Balochistan. Each of them was headed by a *Sardar* (chieftain), selected usually from the male lineage of the ruling clan in each tribe. Harrison mentions some 400 tribal sub-grouping headed by lesser *sardars*.¹³⁹

Probably the most widely known and generally loathed features of Baloch society are the *Sardari* and *Jirga* institutions of tribal organisation and leadership. Under the traditional administrative set up of Baloch tribes, every tribe had its separate *Jirga* (council of the elders), which acted as a court of law.¹⁴⁰ Then this system presented itself at all the administrative tiers of the tribe. *Jirga* at the tribe's level operated under the leadership of *Sardar*. All other personalities of the tribe's administration like *Muqaddam*, *Wadera* and *Motaber* were its members. Besides, at all the administrative tiers of the tribe, *Jirga* also functioned over the head of the tribe. *Jirga* at this level dealt with important matters concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, the election of a new Khan or the eventual external threats. The head of Confederacy himself was the head of this *Jirga*.¹⁴¹

Providing the Baloch society a historical, social and political structure, the *Jirga* remained intact for a long period and helped the Baloch deal with the situation of anarchy, chaos and emergency.¹⁴² However, under the British rule in 19th century, the traditional pattern of the Baloch *Jirga* began to change. Having masterminded the political set up of the Baloch country, Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of *Jirga*, the "*Shahi-Jirga*" (Grand Council or the Council of the main tribal *Sardars*) where only *Sardars* and aristocrats could sit.¹⁴³ The *Shahi Jirga* was held at Quetta, Sibi and Fort Munro once or twice a year. The new *Jirga* could impose taxes in property and labour; only the Political Agent could review the decisions.¹⁴⁴ As described by Janmahmad, the *Shahi-Jirga* was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers

¹³⁸ Philip C. Salzman, "Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan", in Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran, and Afghanistan, London, 1983, pp. 267.

¹³⁹ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 9.

¹⁴⁰ Mohammad Usman Hassan, Balochistan: Mazi, Hal aur Mustaqbel (Balochistan: Past, Present and Future), Karachi: Indus Publications, 1976, pp. 174-176.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, and see also IOR. R/1/34/52.

¹⁴² Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, pp. 85-86.

¹⁴³ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 164.

¹⁴⁴ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 260.

vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people.¹⁴⁵

The other well-established and widely known institution in the Baloch society is the *Sardari* system. This system appears to have had its origins in the Mughal period of Indian history, but it is believed to have assumed its present shape rather late, during the period of British colonial rule. In contrast to the marked egalitarianism that pervades tribal organisation among the neighbouring Pathans, the *sardari* system is highly centralised and hierarchical.¹⁴⁶ At the apex of the system is the *sardar*, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to *waderas*, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub-clan leaders of the lesser tribal units. The *Sardar's* extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society.¹⁴⁷ This authority may also have originated in the requirements of the Baloch pastoral economy. The tribesmen's seasonal migrations and isolation in scattered small camps would seem to have justified the emergence of a powerful and respected central figure who could obtain pasture lands and water, arrange safe passage through hostile territory for herdsmen and their flocks, and in other ways provide a shield against an unusually harsh environment.

Modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged by the setting of international boundaries at the end of the 19th century. The new frontiers partitioned Balochistan between three states, dividing some of the large tribes between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of nomads and semi-nomads. The Naruis, the Sanjaranis, the Rikis and the Brahuis were divided among Iran, Afghanistan and British Balochistan. The second challenge occurred between the world wars, when the British and Persians largely pacified Balochistan. From 1928, Tehran used its army to forcibly subdue the Baloch, often exterminating whole tribes in process.¹⁴⁸

The termination of the traditional nomadic economic system devastated the tribes. In the case of Iranian Balochistan, to force sedentarization, Reza Shah introduced land registration. Land which had previously been considered the property of

¹⁴⁵ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 164.

¹⁴⁶ Fredrik Barth, "Pathan Identity and its Maintenance", in: Fredrik Barth, (ed.), *Ethnic Group and Boundaries*, Boston, 1969, pp. 117-34.

¹⁴⁷ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: its Strategic Importance*, p. 41.

¹⁴⁸ Philip Carl Salzman, "Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan", p.281.

the tribe as a whole, became the sole property of the tribal chief in whose name the land was registered. The chiefs, with income from rents, could now move into cities and towns. This increased their distance from the tribe. The sedentary farmers, tied to the land through debts and contracts, could no longer align themselves with rival chieftains. This increased the landlord's control over the peasant, but the peasant's loyalty to the landlord decreased as monetary ties replaced ties of sanguinity or of mutual self-interest. Baloch society lost its cohesiveness, and both landlord and rentier turned to the central government for protection of their "rights".

Parallel to the decline and disintegration of tribalism in Iranian Balochistan, the *Sardars* have also lost their base of power and influence there. This has been the case particularly during the 1960s and the 1970s, as the rapid growth in urbanization, expansion of modern means of communications, spread of modern education, and economic modernization in the province began to drastically undermine the tribal socioeconomic structure. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baloch elite identified with the middle-class. It must be borne in mind that the cooperation of the *Sardars* with the Shah's regime representing "Shiite Gajars", also served to undermine their traditional legitimacy among their peasant and nomadic followers politically.

Over the course of time, therefore, the traditional social organisation of the Baloch to a great extent has changed. There is now a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions.¹⁴⁹ Islamabad and Tehran, however, ignoring this emergence of nationalism, tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organisational patterns. Most *Sardars* have attempted to safeguard their privileges by avoiding direct identification with the nationalist movement, while keeping the door open for supporting the nationalist cause in time of confrontation between the Baloch and the central government, as in the case of the 1973-7 insurgency.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inflicted the most significant blow to the influence of *Sardars* in Western Balochistan.

However, in a traditional, tribal society a political ideology such as Baloch nationalism would be unable to gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not extend to entities rather than individual tribes. The failure of the tribes to unite in the cause of Baloch nationalism is a replay of tribal behaviour in both the Pakistani and Iranian Baloch revolts. Within the tribes, an individual's identity is based on his be-

¹⁴⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.

longing to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, the importance of the rise of a non-tribal movement over more tribal structures should not be underestimated. In this respect the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s provide us a good example.

In the post-colonial period a visible change in the Baloch society, as discussed in this chapter, was the rise of the urban population mainly due to detribalisation and to some extent land reforms under Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The differentiation and specialization in urban economies introduced new social strata. A small Baloch working class formed in the mine industry, construction, and a few factories. Small workshops required auto mechanics, electricians, mechanics, plumbers and painters, while services and transport employed many others. A modern bourgeoisie emerged, comprising mainly professionals rather than entrepreneurs- doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, bank managers, lawyers and journalists. Migrant labour travelled as far as Gulf States.

Thus, with the appearance of the Baloch middle class, even though small, and the decrease of the traditional role of the *sardars*, the modern Baloch intelligentsia seems to be more eager to assume a political role of its own. Highlighting the new changes in Baloch society, in 1993, Mahmud Ali, an specialist on South Asian politics, wrote, "In the absence of traditional leaders, the dynamic of socio-economic change has precipitated a new kind of leader – younger men of 'common', i.e., non-sardari, descent".¹⁵¹ The Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but realise that tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any potential success of a national movement. By accepting the support of the tribes, the nationalists fall vulnerable to tribal rivalries.

Economic development

In 1892, Lord Curzon stated that by the greater part of Balochistan, the Baloch were sedentary and pastoral.¹⁵² Despite the passage of almost one hundred years and the increase in urbanisation, Curzon's view is still fairly accurate (although there are more farmers and fewer shepherds). Describing the Baloch economy in early 1980s, a prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism, Selig S. Harrison wrote,

¹⁵¹ Mahmud Ali S., *The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal war in south Asia*, London, 1993, p. 153.

¹⁵² George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, pp. 260-61.

“Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, most Baloch practise a mixture of the two in order to survive”.¹⁵³

The economic grievances of the Baloch are dated from the British era. As the British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab, and NWFP, they ignored Balochistan. Thus there is a widely held view that the British rulers neglected the economic development of Balochistan.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps it was not merely a case of neglect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracking, even suppression.¹⁵⁵ Of course the British had their own imperial interests to protect. As argued by Aijaz Ahmad, a Pakistani Marxist writer, the British imperialist interest in Balochistan was not primarily economic; rather it was of a military and geopolitical nature.¹⁵⁶ What happened in Kabul and Kandahar and beyond in Central Asia was of greater importance to them in their Great Game with the Tsars and later with the Bolsheviks. Balochistan controlled some of the more important routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia. According to a military expert, Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan was the chessboard on which the Great Game was played.¹⁵⁷ The British rulers probably thought that an economically and politically enervated Balochistan would lend itself to be used more easily. On the other hand a prosperous and united Balochistan could become recalcitrant and forge relations with undependable principalities in the neighbourhood.¹⁵⁸ Speaking of Sandeman, Aijaz Ahmad wrote, “He kept Balochistan backward, for it served the aim of the British Empire”.¹⁵⁹

Despite this neglect, in the course of time, the British rule brought about some changes in Balochistan. Balochistan was connected with British India, Iran, and Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 20th century, the total length of the railways was 481 miles. In 1903, the total mileage of roads and paths was 1,128.¹⁶⁰ Thus, it encouraged commerce and trade and the administration had created an abundance of new professions with social status and influence. The new education system required teachers, the new medicine required physicians. All this gave rise to a middle class.

¹⁵³ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁴ *Dawn*, Delhi, February 1, 1946, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Baloch leaders, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch, Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, and Mohammad Akram Baloch.

¹⁵⁶ Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question In Baluchistan”, in: Feroz Ahmed (ed.), *Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question*, p 20.

¹⁵⁷ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: its Strategic Importance*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, pp. 70-85.

¹⁵⁸ Nicholas Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol.XII., (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982) No. 317, August 2, 1947, p. 480.

¹⁵⁹ Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question in Balochistan”, pp. 21.23.

The introduction of railways facilitated easy and quick movement and the introduction of modern postal and telegraph services shortened distances and helped in exchange of ideas. All these gradual developments led finally to the rise of Baloch national consciousness and nationalism in eastern Balochistan in the 1920s.¹⁶¹

However, with the annexation (1948), Balochistan remained on the whole extremely deprived. Since the early 1950s, the Pashtuns took control of most of the commercial life previously controlled by Sindhi Hindus. Then the Punjabis moved in and bought some of the best arable land, for example, in the Pat Feeder area near Kalat where land was distributed among military and civil bureaucrats under Ayub Khan. Provincial administration was predominantly Punjabi and few of the higher civil servants were Baloch. Similarly, the majority of the entrepreneurial class was non-Baloch, except for a few sectors like marble quarrying and ship breaking. According to preliminary surveys, underground water as well as mineral resources were available in large quantities in Balochistan.¹⁶² But the underdeveloped infrastructure of the province made them difficult to exploit.

The census of 1901 included only six towns, and Balochistan's total urban population was 40,000 or 5% of the total population. The town of Quetta was the largest with a population of 25,000; the other towns had populations ranging between 2,000 and 4,500. During the next 80 years, the urban population rose to 670,000 (16% of the population). The number of large towns had increased to 16 by 1981, ranging in population from 8,000 to 285,000.¹⁶³ However, the bulk (43 %) of the total urban population of 1981 was still found in Quetta (285,000); Loralai (11,000), Fort Sandeman (Zhob) (33,000), Turbat (52,000), Pasni (18,000), Mustang (17,000), Gwadar (17,000), Chaman (30,000) and Sibi (23,000).

According to the census (1981), Balochistan has experienced a total population increase of 431 % over 1901. As indicated in the demographic section, in 1970s Balochistan had a population increase of 77.23%. Its main cities, i.e. Quetta, Turbat and Hub, have doubled their population in the last decade. However, despite this spectacular urban growth, the majority of the population continues to reside in the countryside (84%). The enumerated population in 1981 was 4.3 million.¹⁶⁴ The general

¹⁶⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 23.

¹⁶¹ Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, pp. 203-208.

¹⁶² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 162-66.

¹⁶³ Government of Pakistan, *50 Years of Pakistan in Statistics*, Vol. III (1972-82), Karachi, 1997, p. 6.

¹⁶⁴ Government of Baluchistan, *Development Statistics of Baluchistan*, Vol. 1, No. 10, Quetta, 1980-81.

increase has been caused by many factors, but an important one is simply better coverage of the area and more accurate enumeration. By comparison in 1978 the urban population in Iranian Balochistan was 26 percent¹⁶⁵ out of the total population of 659,297.

Compared to the other three provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, in the 1970s Balochistan was the most neglected and impoverished province in Pakistan. In 1976, the annual per capita income was 54 dollars as compared with the 80 dollars for Punjab, 78 dollars for Sindh, and 60 dollars for NWFP.¹⁶⁶ In 1977 the life expectancy in rural Balochistan was 42 years as compared with the national average of 60 years.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, the national literacy average was 16 per cent, while that of Balochistan was 6 to 9 per cent.¹⁶⁸ To the Baloch such an economic gap can hardly be justified in the light of Balochistan's rich maritime resources along the several hundred miles of coast as well as its land-based mineral resources including coal, natural gas, copper, uranium, marble, etc.¹⁶⁹ Apart from minerals and gas and prospects of huge oil reserves which are still to be tapped, Balochistan produced more than 70,000 metric tons of marine fish annually, saving foreign exchange to the tune of 500 million dollars. The Federal government had an income of more than 10,426 million rupees from gas in 1976-1977.¹⁷⁰

Among the other grievances, the Baloch contended that they had not benefited from the mineral resources of their homeland that have been exploited so far. The most significant focus of controversy was the national gas. It was discovered in Balochistan in 1952, and was piped to industrial belts in Sindh and Punjab leaving the Baloch to "burn wood trucked in from Sindh".¹⁷¹ Similarly, when another gas field with reserves half as big as those at Sui was discovered at nearby Pirkoh in 1977, Pakistani officials promptly announced plans for piping it to already developed industrial centres in the Punjab and the Sindh, ignoring Balochistan altogether. Furthermore, another Rs 10,000 million was saved from minerals, and also Gaddani Ship

¹⁶⁵ Government of Iran, Shonasai-e Mokhatasar-e Ostan Sistan wa Balochistan, Zahedan, 1358/1980, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, p. 94.

¹⁶⁷ Robert Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan", in: Protection of Ethnic Minorities, Comparative Perspective, ed. Robert G. Wirsing, New York: Pergamon, 1981, p. 18.


¹⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 161.

¹⁶⁹ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijrani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, pp. 269-81.

¹⁷⁰ Mujahid Brailvi, Balochistan – What is the Issue?, Quetta, 1984.

¹⁷¹ New York Time, February 15, 1980; see also, Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 161-68.

NATURAL RESOURCES



Map 3. Natural Resources

Breaking Yard saved Rs 400 million in foreign exchange in 1975.¹⁷² In 1977 the BPLF alleged that Pakistan considered the Baloch country "a vast estate for plunder, an arid desert floating in oil and minerals. A large part of their political strategies are dictated by the desire to extract this treasure for the benefit of the Pakistani bureaucratic bourgeoisie and foreign imperialist interests. The Pakistani oligarchy needed Balochistan's oil and minerals to overcome the economic crisis gripping the whole country."¹⁷³

According to the Baloch nationalists, the people of Balochistan were not the beneficiaries of the huge resources and income the province provided to the Federal exchequer. Balochistan has been getting only a nominal royalty from the Sui Gas production. During 1979-1980 Balochistan received only 1.23 million dollars. Khuda Bakhsh Marri, a former Chief Justice and Governor of Balochistan wrote:

Can anybody honestly say that Balochistan is economically backward and incapable of sustaining its meagre population of nearly 4.5 million people. About one million metric tons of coal annually is produced by Balochistan. If its selling-price be estimated as 600 to 700 rupees per ton, the total amount will be 600 to 700 million rupees annually. Such funds are generated also by production and export of marble, and other minerals, from different parts of Balochistan. Even its land revenue is sufficient to support the population of Balochistan.¹⁷⁴

On 12th December 1947, while rejecting the accession proposal, the National Party leader in the assembly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo argued, "We have minerals, we have petroleum, we have ports. We should not be made slaves on the pretext of economic viability."¹⁷⁵ Balochistan, as claimed by the Baloch nationalists, has the richest resources in South-west Asia. "The per capita income of Balochistan", Janmahmad argues, "if it were to have at its disposal its entire resources and income, would be one of the highest in the world."¹⁷⁶ There is much to be considered in these claims. Apart from its natural resources, seaports and fisheries, Balochistan possesses many fertile valleys and plains, which have been the centre of towns and villages for the bulk of its settled population throughout history. Agricultural life is centred in the fertile valleys of Makkoran in the south, the rich plains of Las Bela and Kacchi in the southeast, the

¹⁷² Dawn, (Karachi) 25th April 1975.

¹⁷³ Jabal, July 1977, p. 6.

¹⁷⁴ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, A Judge May Speak, Lahore: Ferozsons LTD, 1990, p. 166.

¹⁷⁵ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo quoted in: Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 175.

Bampur region irrigated by a river of the same name in the northwest, and numerous other agricultural oases scattered throughout the country. In the late 1970s, Selig S. Harrison, has estimated that out of a total acreage of some 85 million in Pakistani Balochistan, only 3.3 million acres are cultivated of which only 800,000 are irrigated.¹⁷⁷

The Baloch grievances drives from numerous factors and are deeply rooted in their psyche. Among the main grievances, the Baloch have taken up the issue of linguistic redemarcation of provincial boundaries that would reduce the Pashtun influence in Balchistan and give the Baloch a clear majority. When the NAP came into power in 1972, the chief minister, Ataullah Mengal, suggested that the northern Pash-tun areas of Balochistan should be transferred to the NWFP whereas Baloch areas in Sindh and Punjab (i.e. Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad) should be attached to Balochistan.¹⁷⁸

Another principal grievance voiced by Baloch nationalists is that even in the few local mines and industries, outsiders got the best jobs. Jabal, the organ of the Baloch People's Liberation Front alleged that of forty employees at Goonga barite mine near Khuzdar in 1975, fifteen non-Baloch workers received wages three times higher than the Baloch workers there.¹⁷⁹ The higher posts of engineer and other technical staff went to people from Punjab or Karachi. Qualified Baloch engineers and technicians have not any ghost of a chance in these cartels of mine owners.¹⁸⁰ There was general agreement that the Baloch are grossly underrepresented in civil service jobs and thus have little or no say in the governmental decisions that shaped their economic lives. According to Selig Harrison, Pakistan and Iran in most spheres of economic development pursued broadly similar economic policies toward Balochistan, neglecting many critical areas, such as water development, while giving disproportionate attention to others, notably road construction, for military reasons.¹⁸¹ Equally alarming to the Baloch was also the growing number of settlers from other provinces and their cultivation of Balochistan's limited arable lands such as in Kacchi and Las

¹⁷⁶ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 273.

¹⁷⁷ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 9.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91; and see also, Sardar Ataullah Mengal's statement in the daily Dawn, Karachi, 30th June 1972.

¹⁷⁹ Jabal, November 1977, p.3.

¹⁸⁰ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *A Judge May Speak*, p. 167.

¹⁸¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 167.

Bela.¹⁸² As a result, many Baloch were forced on to more arid and less suitable agricultural fields, a factor which severely damaged the Baloch economy as a whole.

The continued negligence has deepened the sense of deprivation and feeling of hatred against Islamabad, among the Baloch. In 1997, Dr. Abdul Hayee, senator and the head of Balochistan National Movement (BNM) complained that Balochistan shares around 43 percent of the total road length of Pakistan, but its share in the budget allocated for building of roads is less than 5 percent.¹⁸³ The Baloch had voiced strong grievances about their lack of proportional representation in the Pakistani bureaucracy and armed forces or in the provincial administration of Balochistan. According to the census of 1981, the provincial quota for recruitment to the civil posts under Federal Government was determined, 5.2% of the total vacancies in Pakistan. This was obviously on the basis of the population of the province, which was 4,305,000 forming 5.2% of the total population of the country. Although, according to the former provincial minister for coastal development, Kachkool Ali Baloch, this was not implemented and remained only on paper.¹⁸⁴ In 1997, Kachkool Ali Baloch complained that despite having 750-kilometers coast out of total 1100 kilometers in Pakistan, not a single seaman in the Navy belongs to Balochistan.¹⁸⁵

The grievances of the Baloch are due to the dominance of Punjabis in the administration. The Baloch leaders held very few key positions in the central government through which to exercise influence on the course of policy. For example, according to a study, of the 179 persons who were named to central cabinets in Pakistan from 1947 to 1977, only four (2.2) percent were Baloch from Balochistan, and only one of them was named prior to the 1970s.¹⁸⁶ Even decisions taken within the region during these years were more than likely to have been made by non-Baloch. According to the New York Times of 15 February 1980, of the roughly 40,000 civil employees of all kinds in Balochistan in 1972, at the outset of the NAP period, only about 2000 (5 percent) were Baloch. And according to the same source, they generally held inferior posts.¹⁸⁷ The only time the Baloch were able to take over the decision-making

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸³ Interview with Dr. Abdul Hayee.

¹⁸⁴ Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), September 1997, p. 6.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Mozaffar Shaheen, The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947-1977, Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980.

¹⁸⁷ New York Times, February 15, 1980; Wall Street Journal, February 15, 1980, p. 1; Salamat Ali, "Balochistan: An Upheaval is forecast", in: Far Eastern Economic Review, October 19, 1979, pp. 40-

positions in the province was during the short period of self-rule in 1972, as described earlier. However, in this respect, the Pakistani record is better than that of Iran, where the Baloch so far have held no Cabinet position.

Having launched his "White Revolution" in 1962, the Shah started a series of reforms, intended for the general economic and social transformation of the country. By the end of the 1960s, according to Salzman, a variety of development programmes were underway in Sistan-wa-Balochistan, and plans had been laid for improved roads, marketing of handicrafts, irrigation projects, as well as additional education, health and veterinary services.¹⁸⁸ In the early 1970s the construction of a huge air and naval base at Chabahar on the Balochistan coast begun. By establishing the "*Sazeman-e Tause'e Balochistan*" (Balochistan Development organisation) in 1973, the Shah government sharply increased the province's development allocations and laid plans for building its economic infrastructure for the first time.¹⁸⁹

As observed by Harrison, in 1972, the government expenditures for the development of the province were \$750,000 per year, while the following year saw talk of increasing that figure to \$100 million for the ensuing five years coinciding with the 5th Development Plan (1973-1978).¹⁹⁰ In 1972, the Shah's Court Minister, Asadollah Alam, wrote in his Diary, that the Shah was keen to obtain American credit for the development of Balochistan's seaport (Chabahar), which was crucial for the control of the Indian Ocean and for economic progress in Balochistan.¹⁹¹

Obviously, it was not earlier than the late 1970s that the province became to some extent integrated into the country's system of communication, of trade and ideas. Since then the Shah's regime increased development allocations, expanded educational facilities, introduced the first institutions of higher education such as the University of Balochistan, and constructed the first network of asphalted roads. The downfall of the Shah's regime in 1979, however, left most of those programmes incomplete.

The following indicators are good examples of the Shah's economic policies toward the Baloch. In 1972, the estimated annual per capita income in the province

42; Robert G. Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan", in: Robert G. Wirsing (ed.), *Protection of Ethnic Minorities, Comparative Perspective*, New York: Pergamon, 1981, p. 293.

¹⁸⁸ Philip C. Salzman, "National Integration of the Tribes in Modern Iran", in: *Middle East Journal*, 25, No. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 332-333.

¹⁸⁹ Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 229.

¹⁹⁰ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 99.

¹⁹¹ Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I*, p. 229

was \$975 as compared to \$2,200 national average for the rural areas and less than one-fifth if compared with the overall national average as demonstrated by Selig Harrison.¹⁹² Again, during the same period (1971/72), the average monthly household expenditure for the province was 5012 Rials as compared for instance, with 8711 Rials for East Azerbaijan and 8329 for Gilan, two of the northern provinces.¹⁹³ Another index of economic development is the literacy rate. Here, as indicated in the section on cultural development, Balochistan lags far behind the Iranian national average under the Pahlavi regime. The Shah's economics and social programmes tended to increase regional inequalities. For example, in 1975 the literacy rate was 62 percent in Tehran, but only 26 percent in Sistan-wa-Balochistan. The percentage of children in school was 74 in Tehran, but as low as 40 in Sistan-wa-Balochistan. Similarly, Tehran had one doctor per 974 people, one dentist per 5,626 people, and one nurse per 1,820 people. On the other hand, Sistan-wa-Balochistan had one doctor per 5,311 people, one dentist per 51,663 people, and one nurse per 27,064 people.¹⁹⁴

Moreover, the number of people living in urban areas tells a similar story. According to the first nation-wide census of Iran, which was taken in 1956, only 8.7 percent of the population in Sistan-wa-Balochistan were urbanised.¹⁹⁵ One decade later, in the 1966 census, the ratio of urban to rural population in the province was 15.9 to 83.¹⁹⁶ In 1976, those figures changed to 26 and 74 respectively, thus indicating a 9 percent increase in the urban population.¹⁹⁷ By comparison, in 1977-78, the national average for the urban and rural segment of the population was given as 47.1 and 52.9 percent respectively. This comparison indicates that one-fourth of the population in the province was urban as compared with close to one-half of the population of the country as a whole.¹⁹⁸ In each successive year, the percentage of population living in cities grew – but at a slower rate than urbanisation took place in the rest of Iran.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 99.

¹⁹³ M. H. Pesaran, "Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in Iran", Paper presented at Aspen-Persepolis Symposium, September 15-19, 1975, in Persepolis.

¹⁹⁴ Ervand Arahmanian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 449.

¹⁹⁵ Djamchid A. Momeni, "The Population of Iran: A Dynamic Analysis", PhD Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, August 1970, p. 50.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁹⁷ Government of Iran, *Shonasa-e-i Mokhatasar-e Ostan Sistan-wa-Baluchistan*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁸ *Iran Yearbook 1977*, p. 29. However, in 1986 the urban ratio of the population of the province increased to 41 per cent (Hamid Ahmadi, *Qaumiyyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqiyyat*, pp. 265).

¹⁹⁹ In 1999, however, about the half of the province was living in the urban centres. See, *Iran Statistical Yearbook: 1377 [March-1998-1999]*, Tehran, 2000, p. 62.

These statistics invite the question of whether this underdevelopment was intentional or coincidental. A closer look at the Iranian government statistics shows that the under development of the Baloch economy was systematic. The poverty of the area, and the reliance on undeveloped agriculture or nomadic pastoralism for employment in a “modernising” oil state indicates intentional discrimination against the Baloch by the Pahlavi regime. In the late 1970s, as estimated by the Baloch nationalist writer Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor the number of Baloch in the provincial administration was hardly more than 5% of total civil servants.²⁰⁰ According to Hosseinbor, even the limited development programmes were “geared toward the Persian bureaucrats and immigrants, serving and living in the province because they were the ones whose opinions and voices were heard in Tehran.”²⁰¹ The Pahlavis neglected Balochistan in all fields. It received a minimal share of Iranian oil revenues, had no large scale industries, no rail roads other than a rail link between Pakistan and Iran, built by the British during the First World War, and only a single asphalt road built for military purposes during the last years of the Pahlavi regime.

Like the Baloch in eastern Balochistan, the economical grievances of the Iranian Baloch are deep rooted. It appears that their backwardness was a result of the patterns of early Iranian modernisation, as established by Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1920s and 1930s. Industrialisation and infrastructure were concentrated on the ethnically Persian-occupied Iranian Central plateau. Mohammad Reza’s later industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s maintained this bias. In the early 1960s, an Italian concern known as Italconsul directed by the Iranian government revealed that the province was for the most part fertile, formed of volcanic layers and that there were substantial underground water reserves, as well as it was rich in minerals, including krumit, oil, manganese coal, marble, iron ore, and copper.²⁰² In spite of these positive results no step was taken for the development of these resources. As concluded by Selig Harrison, “the Shah did little to develop copper, uranium, or other mineral resources in Baluchistan, fearing that to do so would only whet the Baluch appetite for independence.”²⁰³

²⁰⁰ M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, p. 153.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Italconsul, Plan Organization of Iran Socio-Economic Development Plan For the South-Eastern Region: Preliminary Report (Agricultural Survey), Rome, 1959. See also, Government of Iran, Shonasai-e Mokhtasar-e Ostan Sistan wa Balochistan, Zahedan, 1358/1980, pp. 21- 23.

²⁰³ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 174.

Summation

In 1981, the Baloch consisted of approximately 10 million individuals whose ancestors have lived in southern Kerman, Makkoran and Sistan for at least 2 millennia. Despite differences from region to region, and from tribe to tribe, Baloch society developed its own distinctive culture. They are Sunni Muslims, although a minority of Baloches in Makkoran are "Zikris" (Zigris) and also a small minority in Dalgan (Iranian Balochistan) are Shiite. In fact religion plays only a minor role in creating the feeling of Baloch distinctiveness, although religious adherence may reflect loyalty to different villages and tribes.

Before the emergence of the Islamic fundamentalism in the region, Baloch were not religiously devout as compared to their neighbours, the Persians and Pashuns. Their primary loyalties were to their tribal leaders. An agricultural people originally organised on tribal lines, the importance of the tribe has begun to decline as the population migrates to cities. The urbanisation of the Baloch has not eliminated tribal loyalties, however, possibly because the Baloch have not experienced the economic benefits that urbanisation has produced in other provinces of Pakistan and Iran.

While the Baloch country lacks boundaries in the modern sense of term, it is generally understood by the Baloch and their neighbours to comprise an area of over half a million square kilometres in the southern part of the Iranian plateau, south of the central deserts and the Helmand river, and the coastal lowlands between the Iranian plateau and the Gulf of Oman. Its boundaries are vague and not consistent with modern geo-political boundaries.

However, on the basis of a common history, culture and language Balochistan is demarcated by the Indus and Hub rivers and the mountain of Kirthar, which form a natural border between it and the Indian subcontinent in the east; in the North-east, the Sulaiman mountains and the river Gomal separate the Baloch country from the Pashuns of Pakistan, while Western Balochistan is separated by Dasht-e-Lut and Dasht-e-Kavir from the main bulk of Persian speaking Iran; in the south, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf divide the Arabs and the Baloch; in the North-west, desert (Registan) and the mountains are the natural boundary between the Afghans and the Baloch. This vast tract of land covers a coastline of 1,000 miles stretching from the Strait of Hurmuz to the west of Karachi port on the Arabian Sea.

The extreme natural contrasts alternating between massive ranges of barren mountains, rocky plains, deserts, and fertile valleys, form the striking feature of the

land. Makkoran's massive coastal ranges in the south, the Bashakard mountains in the north-west, the Taftan (Daptan) volcano and Bazman ranges which are the extension of Iran's central and north-eastern mountains into the Sarhadd region of northern Balochistan, the snow-covered ranges of the central Kalat highlands, and the massive ranges of the Sulaiman mountains as the extension of the Hindukush mountains into the north-east and the east, have given the land a predominantly mountainous character. These mountains, stretching sometimes for a hundred miles in parallel, have always formed major barriers to easy communication within the country. At the same time they have served as natural harbours, sheltering the Baloch in cases of war and foreign invasion.

Tribal system, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, plays an important role in the Baloch society. It is a major factor in regulating and systemising individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-political organisation of the entire tribe. The social organisation of the Baloch tribes is based on the principle of patrilineal descent. Originating from an eponymous ancestor, a segmentary structure of descent groups in the form of clans and lineage emerges. Through the seniority principle, a hierarchy of superior and subordinate units arises due to the respective genealogical proximity of segments to the focal ancestor. In social reality this manifests itself in the form of a tribal society stratified into nobles and commoners and this stratification, legitimised through descent.

Tribal ties, however, are of little significance in southern Balochistan (both Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan), Makkoran, which was originally a stratified society, with a class of nominally Baloch landowners controlling the agricultural resources. Neither can the Kacchi plains in the east, nor Las Bela in the southernmost part of Balochistan be characterised as tribal. In contrast, tribal social structure is important in Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Barkan; in Kalat and Khuzdar districts in central Pakistani Balochistan, northern Iranian Balochistan, Sarhadd, southern Afghanistan, Nimruz, and even to some extent in the rural areas of Sindh and Punjab.

The Baloch mostly speak Balochi, but many of them also speak Brahui, Sindhi and Seraiki, so Balochi cultural development emphasised oral rather than written traditions. The first Baloch publications emerged in mid-20th century in eastern Balochistan, but except for a brief period, publications in Balochi have been forbidden in

Iranian Balochistan. The official policy of the Iranian government was to encourage acculturation of the Baloch into the dominant Persian culture.

Economically, however, basic economic transformation has occurred in all three parts of Balochistan (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) regardless of the regimes in power, although some leaders, such as Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah, Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, or the Marxists who came to power in Afghanistan in 1978, have shown more determination than others to accelerate the process. Thus, the Baloch nationalism is mainly based on ethnic, cultural, historical and territorial claims. It was accelerated by the modern socio-economic changes of 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, language and religion also play an important role in Baloch nationalism. Being an amorphous people, Baloch nationalism is based on both ethnic claims and on a willingness of the people to identify freely with the Baloch nationalist cause.

CHAPTER THREE

Historical Development

Introduction

History, according to Nina Swidler, is the heart of recent Baloch nationalist scholarship. Arguing the importance of the historical basis of the Baloch nationalism, Swidler points out, “in part because other conventional sources of national identity are problematic and in part because the failed insurgency of the 1970s highlighted parallels between the colonial and post-colonial situation of the Baloch”.¹ The Baloch nationalists largely emphasise their common history and cultural bonds, even more than their common ethnic origin.² It is because Baloch origins are obscure; legends suggest that heterogeneous groups of people migrated at different times to the territory to which they gave their name. According to G. P. Tate, “Whatever ethnological significance may have been attached at one time to the term Baluch disappeared and the name at last came to mean merely nomads of mixed blood.”³ Brian Spooner also suggests that the ‘Baloch’ may have been a generic term referring to all nomadic groups beyond the reach of settled authority.⁴

Religion and language are also problematic markers of an inclusive Baloch identity. The vast majority of Baloch are Sunni Muslims, as are most Pakistanis; thus religion does not distinguish Baloch identity in Pakistan. However, the case in Iranian Balochistan is different. In Iranian Balochistan, the Baloch are Sunni but most Iranians are Shiite Muslims. There are a substantial number of Brahui speakers in northern Balochistan who are culturally very similar to the Baloch, and the Baloch, who inhabit the Indus Plains, Punjab and Sindh retain their ethnic identity though they now speak Sindhi or Seraiki. Although Brahui and Balochi are unrelated languages, multilingualism is common among the Brahui speaking. “The Balochi and Brahvi languages”, Tariq Rahman believes, “are symbols of the Baloch identity, which is a necessary part of Baloch nationalism.”⁵ While Baloch scholars acknowledge past ethnic and tribal divisions, they are reluctant to acknowledge them in the present. They argue

¹ Nina Swidler, “Beyond Parody”, in: Paul Titus (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity*, p. 169.

² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 34-43.

³ G. P. Tate, *Seistan: A Memoir on the History, Topography, Ruins, and People of the Country*, p. 365.

⁴ Brian Spooner, “Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography” (pp. 598-632), In: Ehsan Yarshater, (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, (Vol. III) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.

that the cultural similarities between Baloch and Brahui far outweigh the differences, and they suspect the government of supporting ethnic distinctions in order to undermine a national identity.⁶

The use of history is central for modern nation building.⁷ Relying on their *Shajaras* (genealogies) and traditions the Baloch claim that they came from Aleppo, present Syria, through Iran to Balochistan, in the early years of Islamic calendar.⁸ Despite the lack of an early written literature, the *Shairs* (poets), and *Loris* (professional minstrels) have handed down to the present day the stories of their resistance against the invasions of the Turks and Mugals in the 13th and 14th centuries. Similarly the myths of wars with the Persians, the Afghans, and other foreign invaders in the later period, the mass migration into Sindh and Punjab, as well as the memories of the glorious days of their power during the reign of Mir Jalal Han (12th century), and Mir Chakar Rind (1485-1512), all have been maintained by their war ballads from generation to generation. Inspired by their myths and legends, genealogy and traditions, the Baloch claim to have a long and heroic history with endless resistance movements. Thus for them to be a Baloch is source of honour.

Describing the Balochs' perception of their history, Selig Harrison a prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism wrote in 1981, "Reliving their past endlessly in books, magazines, and folk ballads, the Baluch accentuate the positive". "They revel in gory details of ancient battles against Persians, Turks, Arabs, Tartars, Hindus, and other adversaries, focusing on how valiantly their generals fought rather than on whether the Baluch won or lost. They point to the heroes who struggled to throw off the yoke of more powerful oppressors and minimize the role of the quislings who sold out the Baluchi cause".⁹

The Early History

Evidence of civilisation in Balochistan has been found from as far back as the third millennium BC.¹⁰ Archaeologists believe that the people of the area had become familiar with agriculture and the use of wild animals, and that they lived in clay-brick

⁵ Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", in: *Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies* Vol. XIX, No.3, Spring 1996, p. 88.

⁶ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 260.

⁷ A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 191-199.

⁸ M. Longworth Dames, *Popular Poetry of the Baloches*, vol. 1, pp. 1-3.

⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 12.

¹⁰ Beatrice de Cardi, *Excavation at Bampur: A Third Millennium Settlement in Persian Baluchistan*, 1966, Volume 51: Part 3, Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History, New

houses. Stone-made ornaments and jewellery of precious stone were also found. In this period, Balochistan according to archaeological evidence served as an intermediary link between the cultures of South Asia and Middle East.¹¹

There is a marked cultural similarity between the settlements in Balochistan and those of the Indus Valley civilization. The material remains found in Nal, Quetta and Mehrgar support this assertion.¹² The Indus Valley civilization, which reached its zenith around 2000 BC, is presumed to have been founded by Proto-Australoid people maintaining regular contact with Mediterranean culture and mixing with its peoples.¹³ Trade and cultural links between the Indus Valley civilization and the contemporary Sumerian civilization were well established. The Sumerian and Akkadian records, dating from 3000 and 2000 B.C., mention such trade relations between the Tigris-Euphrates valley and places called Magan and Melukhka, identified with the present-day Makkoran.¹⁴ Migration to this region from other parts of the world began early in prehistoric times. Among the early arrivals were the Dravidian peoples. The Aryan tribes that began pouring into the Iranian plateau between 1500 and 1000 BC followed the Dravidians.¹⁵ They gradually established their hold over the whole Iranian plateau and the western and northern parts of the Indian sub-continent. From about 1000 BC the Indo-Aryans had vanquished all significant opposition and become the dominant and most numerous group in these areas.¹⁶

The Baloch form the core ethnic of the Baloch nation. Their history begins in the antiquity of creation myths. These myths of their origin also supported by the traditions and genealogy, tell us about their Arab origin. While such myths do not reflect much light on the historical roots of a people, they nevertheless demonstrate a people's belief in the antiquity of their origins. Myths like that of Daptar are widely believed and thus politically important today.¹⁷ The historical record itself is vague on

York: 1970, pp. 258-269; see also Gergory L. Possehl, Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 1986, pp. 1-7.

¹¹ Gergory L. Possehl, Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia, pp. 58-61.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ For more detail see S. Wolpert, A New History of India, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

¹⁴ J. Hansman, "A Periplus of Magan and Melukha", in BSOAS, London, 1973, p. 555.

¹⁵ The Aryan migration has been steady and taken place in successive waves. The first to arrive on the Iranian plateau, around the middle of second millennium BC, are termed Indo-Iranians. They moved from the region of the Oxus and Laxartes rivers. The Indo-Iranian appear to have lived in settled communities and spoken an Indo-European tongue (for more information see, Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan, p. 146).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The concept of myth and legend in political discourse is one, which is frequently used but rarely defined. It has become a convenient conceptual receptacle for all that is perceived to be irrational or

whether the Baloch were native to their land, or whether they arrived during one of the many waves of migration that swept the ancient Middle East. It must be borne in mind that various Islamic peoples in the region have pretended to an Arab descent and proudly displayed Arab genealogy – a fact no doubt due to the religious prestige which attaches to Arab descent among these peoples.

The Baloch Semitic origin has been questioned, not only by the non-Baloch scholars, but as well by the Baloch. Living in the vicinity of the Persians and Indians for millennia, having a close linguistic affinity with both of them, the Balochs' pretension to an Arab descent, probably rooted in the consistent suspicion and distrust between them and their Persian and Indian powerful neighbours. The Baloch inclination to their Arab neighbours as far as we know it has always been more or less politically motivated.¹⁸ For Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, "the belief of the majority of the Baluch that they are of Semitic or Arab descent, and are thus a non-Iranian and non-Indian race, justifies to themselves their status as a separate nation on the basis of a different background in Pakistan and Iran".¹⁹

There are two competing theories on the historical origin of the Baloch: the first states that the Baloch are a native people who have been described as the Oritans, the Jatts, the Medes, etc. in ancient records; the second states that the Baloch migrated into the area some 2000 years ago.

The native theory is based on the argument that the indigenous people of Makkoran form the bulk of the Baloch nation. Probably, the word "Baloch" is a corrupted form of Melukhkha, Meluccha or Mleccha, which was the designation of Mak-

judged false in political ideas. This view is essentially a product of the 18th century Enlightenment which sought to remove myth and legend through the use of reason and philosophy. Myth and legend as a concept, nevertheless enjoys substantial intellectual pedigree compared not always unfavourably with the study of history. Indeed Aristotle rejected history in favour of myth, arguing that while history dealt with the particular and provided no valuable lessons for mankind, myth in contrast dealt with universal truths, which could be applied to the human condition. Myth and legend therefore enjoyed a utility that history did not. The competition between classical "historians" and poets was such that Polybius conceded that some historians succumbed to the writing of what he termed "tragic history". The use of myth and legend as history, and indeed the porous nature of the boundary dividing them was not confined to the Western world as the Balochi "Daptar-e Shair" testifies, but while the West developed a discipline of history antagonistic to myth and legend, the close relationship between the two remained in the East. For more information see, Aristotle, *Poetics*, London: Penguin 1996, chapter 9.

¹⁸ With the invasion of the Arab Muslims in Iran in 651 AD, the Baloch commander of Iranian Army Siah Sawar Baloch supported the Arabs, who according to the Iranian national poet and historian, Bahar, was responsible to the Iranian defeat (for more detail see Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 93). It was also mainly due to the Persian fear that Nasir the Great established good relations with the Arab of Oman. In the last one hundred years many tribal chiefs and nationalist leaders, tried to get support from their Arab neighbours to free themselves from the Persian domination.

¹⁹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 41.

koran during the third and the second millennia B.C., as shown by the Mesopotamian texts.²⁰ The Baloch, according to the native theory, are considered to be the descendent of the Med, a nomadic people of the Median Empire (900-500 BC) and the Jatt. It appears that the Med are the early Aryan tribes who came to the region (c. 500 BC).²¹ The Jatt are presumed to be a people of Dravidian origin who migrated to Makkoran from the east before the Med.²² Col. Mockler, who served as a political officer in the region, argues that the mass of the Baloch people are the remnants of the ancient people of Makkoran.²³

Emphasizing the native theory of Baloch origin, Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, a specialist on Balochi oral poetry points out, "...it seems more likely that the majority of the Balochi speakers, living in the present-day Balochistan, had not come from outside as a result of a mass migration as it is generally believed by some writers basing their hypotheses on some poetic fragments most probably composed during the late 16th century".²⁴ Similarly, Munir Ahmad Gichki, a history professor in Balochistan University, strongly criticises the Baloch migration theory from northern Iran in late first millennium AD. Being outsiders and invaders, according to Gichki, the British conceptualised a history about the Baloch for their own perspectives and political views. They historicised the Baloch like themselves, as conquerors from foreign lands. The British, according to Gichki, created this concept because they wanted to paint the Baloch as an emigrant people in their own land, Balochistan.²⁵

According to the orientalist version of Baloch history, the Baloch came to the present Balochistan as immigrants in the 11th century²⁶ or according to some sources, even much later, in the 14th century.²⁷ This theory, as earlier mentioned, locates the Baloch migration into Balochistan just a few centuries before the British arrival in the region. Consequently, according to this interpretation of history, Gichki argues, "both

²⁰ J. Hansman, "A Periplus of Magan and Melukha", in BSOAS, London, 1973, p. 555; H. W. Bailey, "Mleccha, Baloc, and Gadrosia", in: BSOAS, No. 36, London, 1973, pp. 584-87. Also see, Cf. K. Karttunen, India in Early Greek Literature, Studia Orientalia, no. 65, Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1989, pp. 13-14.

²¹ Ibrahim Bashmi, Qaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood, Bahrain, 1998, p. 344; Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, Vol. 1, p. 11.

²² The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 95.

²³ E. Mockler, "Origin of the Baloch", in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1895, p. 36.

²⁴ Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, "A Brief Note of Balochistan", unpublished. This article was submitted to the Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore, New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South Asia, edited by Margaret Mills.

²⁵ Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.

²⁶ Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography, p. 599.

²⁷ M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, pp. 35-36.

the Baloch and the British should have the same status regarding their right over the country". Professor Munir Ahmad Gichki is of the strong opinion that the Baloch history in Balochistan is as old as the Persians' and the Afghan history in the region.²⁸

Like Gichki, the Iranian writer, Iraj Afshar (Sistani) in his book Negahi be Sistan wa Balochistan (A Glimpse to Sistan and Balochistan, 1985) argues that the Baloch since the ancient time have been living in their present homeland, Balochistan. Their history, according to Afshar is as old as the written Iranian history. He believes that the Baloch like the Persians, the Tajiks and the Kurds are an Aryan or Iranian race.²⁹ It should be noted that when the Arabs conquered the area during the reign of Caliph Waleed bin Abdul Malik (705-715), the Baloch were already living in Makoran, southern Balochistan.³⁰ Those who believe the Baloch are natives, however, trace the habitation of modern Balochistan by the same people, referred to by historians by different names.

Some scholars, however, challenge the view that the Baloch are the original people in the area. Based on linguistic evidence, they believe that the formation of the Baloch ethno-linguistic community is associated with the migration into Kerman and Makkoran of the principal ethnic group of today's Balochistan, the Baloch. Arguing largely on linguistic basis, these scholars believe that the Baloch were living along the southern shore of the Caspian at the time of Christ. They argue that the Balochi language originated in a lost language linked with the Parthian or Median civilisations, which flourished in the Caspian and adjacent areas in the pre-Christian era.³¹ Why and when this migration occurred is not clear. It is possible that it was brought about by Khusrow I Anushirwan's campaigns against the Baloch, the tribes inhabiting the territory of present-day Gilan and northern Khorasan, or by the incursion of the Ephtalites into Northern Iran.³² "If the latter is the case", believes Gankovsky, "the south-eastward migration of these tribes who account for the ethnogenesis of the Baloch nation took place approximately in the fifth and the early sixth centuries AD"³³

The above-mentioned two theories, however, are not totally antithetical. It is possible that a group of people who are native to the land lived in the area for thou-

²⁸ Interview with Munir Ahmad Gichki.

²⁹ Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Negahi be Sistan wa Balochistan, pp. 225-26.

³⁰ Ibrahim Bashmi, Qaus al-Khalij al-Mashdood, p. 349.

³¹ Josef Elfenbein, "The Baluchi Language: A Dialectology with Texts", in: The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1966, pp. 41-45; Frye, R. W, "Remarks on Baluchi History". In: Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 6, 1961, p. 49.

³² M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, p. 29.

sands of years speaking a dialect, which is related to the modern Brahui language. With the arrival of an Iranian-origin people from the region around Caspian Sea in the 5th or 6th centuries AD., as observed by Gankovsky, the original population may have abandoned their former tongue and accepted the language of the new arrivals. The dispute is likely to keep ancient historians busy for some times. Whether an indigenous people or migratory, the Baloch have lived in the area of Balochistan since the start of the Christian era, and their language is primarily related to the northern Iranian languages.³⁴

The Baloch, according to Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, are descendants of Chaldeans or Babylonians.³⁵ The great Chaldeans of ancient history, according to Sardar Khan Baluch, “hereafter, passing from turmoil and transition were no more heard by the same name but in intermittent periods of history in alien lands under alien rule were addressed as ‘Balus’ or ‘Baloch’ after the name of their patron deity and patent cult, the god Belus of temple Belus.”³⁶ Sardar Khan developed a theory originally from G. Rawlinson,³⁷ a professor of ancient history at Oxford University, that the word Baloch derived from “Balus” – the King of Babylon, who is identified with Nimrod or Nebrodes, the son of Kush, of the Holy Writ, and was the founder of the Chaldean dynasty.³⁸ In 538 BC, Cyrus the Great, Achaemenian ruler and founder of the Persian Empire, defeated the last Chaldean ruler, Beshazzar. Thus the Chaldean Empire came to an end. After the fall of Babylon, according to Sardar Khan Baluch, the ancestors of the Baloch (Chaldeans or Babylonians), were forced by the Achaemenian (Persian) ruler to migrate to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and the area called today Armenia and Kurdistan.³⁹ However, relying on Ferdowsi’s Shahnamah, Baloch were living in the northern regions of the Iranian plateau much earlier than Cyrus’s expeditions to Babylon. Shahnamah mentions the Baloch as the resident of Gilan and Khorasan in the Median era, that means before the time of Cyrus, the Persian conqueror who defeated the Meds and established the Persian Empire.⁴⁰ Thus, it directly contradicts to what Sadar Khan claims.

³³ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 144.

³⁴ Iraj Afshar (Sistani), Negahi be Sistan wa Balochistan, pp. 225-26.

³⁵ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Quetta: Khair - un -Nisa, Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984, p. 16.

³⁶ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 16.

³⁷ G. Rawlinson, Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World, London, 1862.

³⁸ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 16-26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi, vol. 4, p. 28.

Returning back to the second and the first millennia BC., mighty empires such as the Assyrians, the Medians, the Persians held sway in that “cradle of civilisation” which stretched from the shore of the Mediterranean to the hinterland beyond the Persian Gulf. According to Shahnamah, the legendary king of Media (Madistan), Kai Kawos, expanded his empire up to the Balochistan coast.⁴¹ Defeated by the Persians, the Median Empire came to its end in 549 BC. The mightiest Persian King, Darius (522-485), subjugated Balochistan at around 540 B.C. He declared the Baloch country as one of his *walayat* (province) and appointed a *satrap* (governor) to it.⁴² Probably it was during the Median rule and the later Persian domination that the Baloch tribes were gradually Aryanised, and their national characteristics formed. If that is the case, the formation of the Baloch ethno-linguistic identity should be traced back to the early centuries of the first millennium BC.

The earliest extant source, “Shahristaniha-e Eran-shahr”, a Pahlavi text written in the 8th century, though probably representing a pre-Islamic compilation⁴³, lists the Baloch as one of the seven autonomous mountain communities. The Arab writers in the 9th and 10th centuries⁴⁴ mentioned them, usually as Balus, who were living in the area between Kerman, Khorasan, Sistan and Makkoran. The Baloch appear to have had a separate district of Kerman, but they also lived in two districts of Sistan and appeared in a tract some distance to the east of the Fahraj (the eastern border of Kerman), probably Kharan or Chaghai.⁴⁵

The Baloch, as mentioned earlier, are generally considered to have arrived in Kerman from the north.⁴⁶ The evidence for this assumption depends on two arguments: the classification of Balochi as a “Northwest Iranian” language⁴⁷ and the fact that in Ferdowsi’s Shahnamah, one of the oldest documents in this regard, they are mentioned in conjunction with Gilan and Khorasan.⁴⁸ Referring to the Shahnamah, an Iranian linguist, Dr. Khanlari, further specifies the Baloch residence as to the north-

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² I. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An, pp. 89-90.

⁴³ Henrik Samuel Nyberg, A Manual of Pahlavi, Part II: Glossary, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974, p. 43.

⁴⁴ Especially Ebn Kordadbeh, Mas’udi, Estakri and Moqaddasi about Baloch or Balus in their works.

⁴⁵ S. M. Seyed-Sajjadi, Bastan-shonasi wa Tarikh-e-Balochistan, pp. 293-314.

⁴⁶ M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷ Mussa Mahmudzai, “Moqayeseh-e Zaban-e Balochi ba Zabanha-e Irani-Bastan”, p. 8.

⁴⁸ Shahnamah composed at the beginning of the 10th century on the basis of the earlier works particularly Khwaday Namag. Khwaday Namag, a mythical royal account of history compiled at the end of Saniyan times and translated from Middle Persian into Arabic by Ibn Muqaffa (d. 757) – is believed to have provided major sources that Ferdowsi (d. c. 1020) used for his 50,000 or 60,000 verse epic poetry. For more detail see, Mostafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation, pp. 119-120.

east and the east of the Caspian sea and the north of present-day Khorasan, before they moved to Kerman, Sistan and Balochistan.⁴⁹

The Baloch are mentioned both in mythological and historical parts of the Shahnamah. In the mythological part of the Shahnamah the Baloch make their appearance as gallant warriors forming a part of the army of Kai Kawos, also known as “Kai Khosrow”. The King’s son known as Siawosh in Shahnamah commanded this army. Siawosh was directed to wage a war against Afrasiab, the king of Turan, who was an enemy of Iran.⁵⁰ The army formations, composed of different tribes, were presented to Kai Kawos for inspection; and each contingent acted under its own leader. The Shahnamah comments: “After the Gustham came Ashkesh. His army was from the wanderers of the “Koch⁵¹ and Baloch”, intent on war with exalted “cock-combs”, whose back none in the world ever saw, nor was one of their fingers bare of armour. His banner (i.e. the banner of the Baloch contingent under Ashkesh) bore the figure of a tiger”.⁵² Shahnamah tells us about Kai Kawos’s expeditions both to central Balochistan (Turan), and Southern Balochistan (Makkoran). In the Makkoran expedition, according to Shahnamah the King of Makkoran was killed and his country was occupied. Ferdowsi also mentions that the King Kai Kawos ordered his Baloch forces, headed by General Ashkesh, to remain in Makkoran. The Shahnamah says: “*Be Ashkesh be farmood ta ba sepah. Be Makran be bashad yeki chand gah*” (He [Kai Kawos] ordered Ashkesh [his Baloch commander] to remain in Makkoran for some time).⁵³

⁴⁹ Parviz Natel Khanlari, Zaban-shonasi wa Zaban-e Farsi, Tehran: Intesharat-e Banyad-e Farhang-e Iran, Chap-e Sayum, 1347/1969, p. 154.

⁵⁰ It is important to note that when the Iranian philological classifications were being formed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Turan, due to perhaps phonetic similarity, was interpreted as the Turkish population of Central Asia, who did not speak either the Indo-Iranian or any other Aryan languages. Based on this tradition, it we assume that Turan did not belong to the Iranian plateau, we face a geo-political as well as philological paradox. Moreover, There is convincing geographical evidence that, during the Ferdowsi’s time (tenth to eleventh centuries) and possibly prior to that, Turan was a well-known country that included the Balochistan region with its capital in central Balochistan Quzdar. Furthermore, during the period of Ferdowsi and of the Ghaznavid dynasty of the eleventh century, Turan and its principal city, Quzdar, recognised only the authority of the caliph of Baghdad. For this reason Sultan Mahmud had launched attacks against Turan. For more detail see, W. Barthold, A Historical Geography of Iran, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 75. It is certainly possible that Ferdowsi had used Turan as the enemy in metaphorical sense in his construct of epic trough poetry, and had used as the enemy of the rightful sovereign the opponent of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna who was his patron.

⁵¹ Koch of Shahnamah are interpreted as the Brahui, see Gul Khan Nasir Koch wa Baloch, Karachi, 1969.

⁵² Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi, vol. 4, p. 28.

⁵³ Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 346-349.

Why did the king, Kai Kawos order his Baloch forces, to stay in Makkoran? Even though the probability of an accidental event cannot be discarded, it is more plausible that Makkoran was already a Baloch populated region. In such a case, no doubt, a Baloch force might have been more effective to establish peace in a Baloch-inhabited, far-flung county. Azim Shahbakhsh, a history lecturer in Balochistan University, believes that the Baloch commander, Ashkesh played a key role in the pacifying of Makkoran after its occupation by Kai Khosrow.⁵⁴ However, relying on the Shahnamah, the first Baloch contact into central Balochistan and Makkoran, was established during the reign of Kai Khosrow, in the early 6th century BC.

It should be added that, apart from its mythological part, the Shahnamah informs us about the Baloch in its historical part, during the Sasanid dynasty. The Sasanid kings Ardashir and Khusrow I Anushervan fought the Baloch and that the Baloch fought against several others Sasanid kings.⁵⁵ A 17th century historian, Akhund Saleh, in his book Kurd-Gal-Namak, cites the massacre of the Mazdakis (a Zoroastrian sect) in the reign of Anushervan, the anti-Mazdaki King of Sasanid dynasty. According to Akhund, among the massacred followers of Mazdak, two hundred thousand were Baloches. The survivors of this massacre, as mentioned by Akhund fled to Turan (Balochistan) and Sindh.⁵⁶ It has also been argued that the Baloch left traces of their language in the oases of the central deserts of the Iranian plateau as they migrated south.⁵⁷ There is no other evidence that could be used either to date or to confirm the theory of a southward migration by the Baloch. It is important to note, however, that there are still Baloch living in eastern Kerman province.

When and why did the Baloch migrate eastward? Evidence about this migration is also limited. The main sources of our information are of two major types: the corpus of traditional Balochi poetry, known as Daptar-e Shair⁵⁸, and the later Mughal histories. According to the written records, up to the late 10th century AD the Baloch or Koch-o-Baloch inhabited the western and northern areas of Kerman, Sistan and Makkoran.⁵⁹ Their migration eastward may have been the result of pressure, first from

⁵⁴ Azim Shahbakhsh, "The Baloch Race and Migrations", Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.

⁵⁵ Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi, vol. 8, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁶ Akhund Saleh, Kurd-Gal-Namak, p. 152.

⁵⁷ N. Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History", pp. 44-50.

⁵⁸ M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, volume 2, London, 1907, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹ Khaje Nezam al-Molk, Siyasat-Nameh, also known as Siyar al-Muluk, 11th Century A.D. Texts, Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Ketabha-e Jibi, 1364/1986., pp. 75-80; see also, E. Mockler, "Origin of the Baloch", in: Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1895, p. 36.

Muslim rulers, then from the Seljuk invasion in the 11th century and the devastating inroads later by Genghis Khan.⁶⁰ By the 14th century, the Baloch were settled in central Balochistan up to the Jhalawan hills. Their further migration to the Indus valley took place at a later date. In the early 13th century, the Baloch formed the bulk of the population in the region north of Herat in the 13th and 14th centuries and were friendly with the Kurt ruler of the area.⁶¹

The oldest and most important ballad, the Daptar, probably from the 12th century,⁶² states that the Baloch and the Kurd were kindred branches of a tribe that migrated eastward from Aleppo (Syria). But in this ballad, the cause of migration is stated to be their fight with Yazid, as the Baloch by their own account were the followers of Caliph Ali, father of Imam Hossein. After the martyrdom of Imam Hossein at Kerbala in 680 AD, the Baloch for fear of being persecuted by the army of Yazid, had to migrate eastward. The Daptar tells of the arrival of the Baloch in Sistan and of the hospitality of a king named Shams-al-Din.⁶³ After a time, another ruler called Badr-al-Din, persecuted them and drove them away. Furthermore, the Daptar, informs us about the forced migration of 44 Baloch tribes southward from Sistan to Makkoran, under the leadership of Mir Jalal Han.⁶⁴ Relying on Daptar, Longworth Dames believes that the lifetime of the legendary ancestor of the Baloch, Mir Jalal Han, falls in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries.⁶⁵

The belief, however, prevails among all the Baloch tribes that they came from Aleppo, through Iran to Makkoran, whence they again moved eastward and extended along the Indus valley in Kalat. "The Baluch", states Inayatullah Baloch, "differ from their neighbours not only in their language, literature, religion, and feelings, but also in their traditions and habits".⁶⁶ The Baloch, he says, presents a strong contrast to his Afghan neighbour. His build is shorter and he is more spare and wiry. He has bold bearing, frank manners, and is fairly truthful. He looks on courage as the highest virtue, and on hospitality as a sacred duty.⁶⁷ Unlike the Afghan he is seldom a religious bigot and, as Sir Denzil Ibbetson, in mid-19th century described the Baloch, "he has

⁶⁰ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 146.

⁶¹ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, Quetta 1965, pp.40-42.

⁶² M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, vol. 1, pp. 1-3.

⁶³ A ruler by that name claiming descent from the Saffarids is known to have died in 1164, A.D. For more information see Azim Shahbakhsh, "Barrasi-e Hemasah-Sarai Dar Zaban-e Balochi", p. 66.

⁶⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 95.

⁶⁵ M. Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race, pp. 35-36.

⁶⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 77.

⁶⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, pp. 83- 100.

less of God in his head, and less of the devil in his nature”⁶⁸ Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaldini a physician, is of the strong opinion that the Baloch are genetically different from the Punjabis and the Persians. He believes “the Baloch not only physically, but also biologically and mentally are unique.” Furthermore, Dr Jehanzeb points, “the Baloch have their own sets of values, which are quite different to rest of nations living in the region”.⁶⁹

The Balochs have their own national code of honour, which separates them from their neighbours. Inayatullah Baloch points to the importance of the Baloch national code of honour as a factor, which gives the Baloch a separate national identity. He points out that the most important part of the Baloch unwritten constitution is known as the “Balochmayar” (code of honour), which guides the Baloch national life. In many ways, the “Balochmayar” influences the life of the individuals and determines the future of Baloch society. These traditions are completely different from the traditions of the Muslims of the Indo-Pak subcontinent and from those of the Persians of Iran. Each person from his youth knows the Baloch traditions. The Baloch code of honour, as stated by Inayatullah Baloch, “is opposed to and contradicts state laws of Iran and Pakistan.”⁷⁰

Linguistically, beside the Baloch, the second important group in Balochistan are the Brahui. Brahui traditions and war ballads regard the word Brahui as derived from the eponym of one of their forefathers, Braho, which is not an uncommon modification of the name of Brahim or Ibrahim.⁷¹ According to The Imperial Gazetteer of India, the origin of the Brahui is as much an enigma to the ethnologist as their language has been to the philologist.⁷² Different views are expressed about the origin of Brahuīs. Khuda Bakhsh Marri holds the view:

The Brohis were, it seems, one of the many early tribes of Baloches; and to this day, the Brohi-speaking tribes in Balochistan claim to be Baloches. Most of them are bi-lingual, speaking both Balochi and Brohi. A close

⁶⁸ Sir Denzil Ibbeston, The races, castes and tribes of the people in the report on the Census of Punjab, published in 1883, cited in: Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, pp. 83-100. It is important to note that the Baloch way of life influenced the way in which Islam was adopted. Up to tenth century as observed by the Arab historian Al-Muqaddasi the Baloch were Muslim only by name (Al-Muqaddasi, Ahsanul Thaqaṣim, quoted in Dost Muhammad Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1975, p. 363.) Similarly, Marco Polo, at the end of the thirteenth century, remarks that some of people are idolators but the most part are Saracens (The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113).

⁶⁹ Interview with Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaldini.

⁷⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, pp. 80-88.

⁷¹ The Imperial Gazetteer of India: Baluchistan, pp. 80-90.

⁷² *Ibid.*

study of the Brohi language goes to show that about 75% or more words have been borrowed from Balochi. The remaining words must be of the language spoken since the ancient Dravidian rule of South Balochistan, which extended up to Moinjodaro in Sind.⁷³

In Henry Pottinger's opinion the Brahuīs are of Tatar or Mughal origin.⁷⁴ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat argues that they are of Baloch stock.⁷⁵ Based on linguistic evidence, however, a small group of scholars is of the view that the Brahuīs belong to the Dravidian stock. Denys Bray considers that the Brahuīs are of Dravidian origin. He perceived that the language spoken by the Brahuīs is similar to the Dravidian language.⁷⁶

The Brahui are considered by some to be a stumbling block to Baloch nationalism because of their different language. The Pakistani governments, as the British before them, classified the Brahui as a separate ethnic group in order to thus weaken Baloch nationalism.⁷⁷ But recent linguistic and anthropological researches have challenged this claim. According to linguist Carina Jahani, of Uppsala University, ethnic affiliation is not as quickly changed as language; there is no necessary correspondence between regarding oneself as Baloch and using the Balochi language. Balochi gives way to Indian languages in the east and Persian in west, and some groups in those areas no longer speak Balochi though they maintain their Balochi identity. "Brahui tribes, in central Balochistan", Jahani argues, "belong to this category which are bilingual in Brahui and Balochi."⁷⁸ Similarly, Walker Connor even believes that cultural assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation.⁷⁹

Nina Swidler, an anthropologist who studied the Brahuīs, stressed "many similarities in culture, traditions, and political organisation".⁸⁰ She did not discover any difference between the Baloch and the Brahuīs, apart from the language.⁸¹ Selig Harrison writes, "in terms of vocabulary ... Brahui is merely a variant of Balochi". In fact the existence of a few Dravidian words in Brahui cannot be made a reliable basis to advance the theory that the Brahuīs are Dravidian. Possibly, during the Mauryan rule

⁷³ Mir Khuda Baklsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchligh on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 110.

⁷⁴ Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sind, p. 71.

⁷⁵ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtaser Tarikh-e Baloch aur Khwanin-e Baloch, pp. 29-32.

⁷⁶ Denys Bray, The Life-History of a Brahui, Karachi, 1977 (Repr.).

⁷⁷ Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.

⁷⁸ Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 106.

⁷⁹ Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 46.

⁸⁰ Swidler, N., "Brahui Political Organization and the National State", in: Ainslee T. Embree (ed.), Pakistan's Western Borderlands, N. Delhi, 1977, p. 86.

of Chandragputa (ca.323-297 B.C.) the Brahuīs, who already occupied the Kalat plateau, had assimilated some words of the Dravidian language spoken in the adjoining areas of what is now Sindh and Punjab.

Since Brahui is categorised as a Dravidian language, a linguistic distinction is necessary. "However", writes Harrison, "there is a continuing controversy over whether Brahui enthusiasts emphasise its special characteristics, while Baloch nationalists point out the fact that Brahui and Balochi are mutually intelligible and that Brahui has become increasingly indistinguishable from Baloch as a result of borrowings".⁸² Another interesting element, which strengthens the cause of Baloch nationalism, is the bilingualism of the Brahuīs.⁸³ The majority of the Brahuīs regarded Balochi as their second language. The royal family of Kalat, the Bizenjo-*Sardar* family and Bizenjos of Makkoran speak Balochi as their first language. Moreover, almost all the Brahui tribes in Iranian Balochistan speak only Balochi.⁸⁴ It is interesting to note that many founders and prominent members of the Baloch national movement, like Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, and Agha Abdul Karim, are of Brahui origin. However, arguing on linguistic basis, Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, believes that the Brahuīs are of Dravidian origin.⁸⁵ In spite, of his belief in the Dravidian origin of the Brahuīs, Sardar Khan accepts that most of the Brahui population, as estimated by him in 1958, "less than quarter a million", was racially Baloch.⁸⁶

The theory of the Indian or Dravidian origin of the Brahuīs, according to Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, was a British fabricated theory. To justify their occupation and legitimise their rule over Balochistan the British attempted to prove that the Brahui are racially and culturally Indians. If the Brahui proved to be Dravidian, they would culturally form a part of British India.⁸⁷ However, Ahmadzai does not provide evidence to support his viewpoint. Similarly, the Vice Chancellor of Balochistan University, Professor Bahadur Khan Rodini, also rejected the Dravidian theory of the Brahuīs. To control and govern the Baloch country, according to Professor Rodini, the

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 112.

⁸² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 185.

⁸³ Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, *Census of Pakistan*, Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1951, pp. 50-51.

⁸⁴ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 17.

⁸⁵ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan*, p. 267.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.

British introduced the Brahuīs as an Indian ethnic group. “Generating such theories was a part of the British divide and rule policy”, argued Professor Rodini.⁸⁸

As mentioned above, many dispute the Dravidian origin of the Brahuīs. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, the last Khan of Kalat, calls the Baloch and the Brahuīs two groups of the same nation. According to him the Brahui group, which was originally called “Ibrahimi Baluches” is now pronounced as “Brahvi Baluches”.⁸⁹ Khuda Bakhsh Marri, as mentioned above, asserts that the Brahuīs are one of the many early tribes of the Baloch, and that many of them, including the ruling family of Kalat, use Baloch with their names.⁹⁰ However, he believes that there is some Dravidian blood in them.⁹¹ Similarly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the most popular politician in the 1970s, believes, “The Baloch and the Brahui are not two separate peoples; they are one and the same. The only difference is of language. There are absolutely no differences in social practices and the structure of their society. They follow the same customs from birth to death, happiness and sorrow.”⁹² According to Bizenjo, the Baloch came to Balochistan in three major groups. The first waves settled in Sistan and were called Narui (Naroi), followed by Brahui who settled in Turan, which is now-a-days called Jhalawan. The last wave, believes Bizenjo was of Rind.⁹³

For Kurd-Gal-Namak, a book written in 1659 by Akhund Saleh, a minister in the court of Mir Ahmad Khan I, the Khan of Kalat, the Brahuīs have the same origin as the Baloch and Kurds. The word “Brahui”, according to the source is a Kurdish word, called “Brakhui” in Kurdish.⁹⁴ The racial origin of the Brahuīs is still controversial. It is said that they are descendants of the ancient Oritans of Alexander’s time. According to P.H.L. Eggermont they were of Iranian origin⁹⁵, viz. the same origin as the Baloch. Gul Khan Nasir, in his book Koch wa Baloch argues that the Brahuīs are the “Koch” of Ferdowsi’s Shahnama.⁹⁶ The term Brahui, G. P. Tate believes, in the

⁸⁸ Interview with Professor Bahador Khan Rodini, the Vice Chancellor of Balochistan University.

⁸⁹ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1975, p. 56.

⁹⁰ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, Karachi: Royal Book company, 1974, p. 101.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 230.


⁹² Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, “Introduction”, in: Janmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982, p. xxi.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Akhund Saleh, Kurd-Gal-Namak, Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1991, see introduction, pp. 2-8.

⁹⁵ P. H. L. Eggermont, Alexander’s Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan and the siege of the Brahmin town of Harmatelia, Leuven University Press 1975, pp. 61-63.

⁹⁶ For more detail see Gul Khan Nasir, Koch wa Baloch, (First Edition 1969), Karachi, 1983, pp. 1-41.



Map 4.

Major tribal areas in eastern Balochistan (1981)

course of time has lost any ethnological significance that may originally have attached itself to that term.⁹⁷

Whatever their ethnic origin may be, the Oritans of Alexander's time, the Kurds of Kurd-Gal-Namak or the Koch of Shahnamah⁹⁸, the Brahui regard themselves as part and parcel of the Baloch nation, sharing a common culture, religion, historical experiences and unifying symbols with the Baloch, and above all, as discussed in this section, there is a strong desire among them to emphasise on a common origin with the Baloch, and that is politically very important.

The Expansion of Baloch Ethno-linguistic community

The Baloch ethno-linguistic identity took shape through a lengthy process. As mentioned earlier the Baloch fought with many mighty Persian kings in the fifth and sixth centuries before Christ. The Shahnamah tells us about their genocide by the most powerful Sasanian king, Anushirwan (531-578 AD) around 531 AD.⁹⁹ During the reign of Caliph Walid bin Abul Malik (705-715), the Arabs captured Balochistan.

With the emergence of Arab rule over the region in the early 8th century, the Baloch gradually accepted Islam.¹⁰⁰ The Arab rule brought some tremendous socio-economic changes in the region. Dealing with the province of Makkoran and its capital city Panjgur of the 10th century, Le Strange quotes the literary geographer al-Muqaddasi as his authority, and states:

Bannajbur (Panjgur) according to Muqaddasi had a clay built fortress protected by a ditch and town was surrounded by palm-groves. There were two gates of the city, Bab-Tiz opening south west on road to Tiz and Bab-Turan north east on the road to the district of that name of which the capital was Kuzdar [Khuzdar]. There was a stream to water the city and Friday mosque stood in the market square, though there were really only Moslem in name being savage Balusis (Baluchis) whose language was a Jargon.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ G. P. Tate, Seistan: A memory on the History, Topography, Ruins, and People of the Country, p. 363.

⁹⁸ Ibid., and Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan, vol. 1, pp. 11-12, and by the same author, Koch wa Baloch, Chapter 1.

⁹⁹ Ferdowsi, Shahnamah: Matn Inteqadi, vol. 4, pp. 346-349.

¹⁰⁰ Before the advent of Islam, a mixture of Buddhism, Hinduism, Mazdaki, and Zoroastrian dominated religion in Balochistan. Inayatullah Baloch, however, believes that in the pre-Islamic era the majority of Baloch were Mazdaki and Zoroastrians (see The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113; Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 70; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, p. 259; Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, Emergence Dimensions Repercussions, p. 5).

¹⁰¹ G. Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Cambridge, 1905, p. 329.

The British historian Thomas Holdich, also discussed the economic prosperity of Makkoran under the Arab rule. He states that in Makkoran the Arabs shaped out for themselves overland routes to India, establishing big trade centres in flourishing towns, cultivating their national fruit, the date, in Makkoran valleys, and surrounding themselves with the wealth and beauty of irrigated agriculture.¹⁰² Thus, the emergence of new cities and commercial centres in Makkoran and central Balochistan (Tiz or Tis, Panjgur, Khuzdar, etc.) benefited the material growth of the people. Their recruitment to the Arab armies improved their warfare skills and the tribal might. These developments enabled the Baloch to form their own polity with the fall of the Caliphate in the end of 10th century.¹⁰³ It must be borne in mind that since the 13th century, the Baloch population has constantly moved along a roughly, west-east direction. The Mughal invasion in the mid-13th century followed by Timur's forays into the country in the next century resulted in the decline of agriculture and breakdown of irrigation systems forcing large scale tribal migration from Makkoran further north and north east where they entered Sindh and Punjab in the 14th and 15th centuries.

The largest Baloch migrations eastward, however, occurred in the early 16th century. At this period the Baloch tribes of Rind and Lashari fought several memorable wars among themselves.¹⁰⁴ Their hostilities continued for 30 years, between 1490 A.D. and 1520 A.D. in and around Sivi, modern Sibi, and Kacchi with its capital at Gandawa. Consequently, this led to a massive wave of migration towards Punjab and Sindh. The Rinds who migrated from Sibi to Punjab spread up the valleys of the Chenab, Ravi, and Satlej rivers. It should be noted that the first record of the Baloch movement into Sindh is from 13th and 14th centuries. Simultaneously two other Baloch tribes, the Dudai and the Hout moved up the Indus and Jhelam in the same period from Makkoran. About 1470, Multan's ruler, Shah Hossein Langah (1467-1502) allotted lands on the western bank of the Indus for the settlement of the Baloch. Since the fifteenth century, they started to put down proper roots in Sindh.¹⁰⁵ In the year 1770, the Baloch overthrew the Kalhora Dynasty and became the rulers of Sindh. The Talpur Mir, a Baloch clan formed the new Mir dynasty (1770-1843).¹⁰⁶ According to

¹⁰² Thomas Holdich, The Gate of India: Being an Historical Narrative, London, 1910, p. 193.

¹⁰³ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan: An ethnic history, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental literature, 1971, p. 145.

¹⁰⁴ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary History of Baluchis, p.80.

¹⁰⁵ Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power, Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan. p. 189.

the census of 1901, some twenty-three per cent of Sindhi Muslims were Baloch.¹⁰⁷ It is interesting to note that the Sindh Muhammadan Association, a landlord organisation, petitioned Lord Montagu on his trip to India in 1917 that they wanted a separate province composed of Sindh and Balochistan.¹⁰⁸ This reflected the significant number of the Baloch tribes in Sindh and the prominence of their leaders, the *mirs*, in the early 20th century.

Why did the Baloch disperse over the vast territory between Kerman and the Indus? The main reason according to Gankovsky was the slow but steady development of the productive forces.¹⁰⁹ As a result, the Baloch clan organisation was disintegrating and feudal relations taking shape among them. As population grew, the grazing grounds were not enough to go round, the Baloch were compelled to take in new lands. Inter-tribal wars and clashes became frequent, and the defeated tribes either had to submit before the victor or had to abandon their lands and look for new lands. Warfare, which bulked large in the life of the Baloch as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries, rapidly gained in prestige.¹¹⁰

Under the reign of Shah Abbas Safavi (1585-1628), some Kurdish tribes migrated into Balochistan.¹¹¹ Their number increased in the time of Nadir Shah (1730-1747). Simultaneously, several Jadgal tribes took refuge in Bahu and Dashtiari, western Balochistan. Their migration possibly took place in the end of the 16th century during the Malik rule in Makkoran.¹¹² A vast assimilation process continued for many centuries. As observed by Spooner, it continued up to the 18th and the 19th centuries. He had credited, partly the success of Nasir Khan's policies, and partly the later British administrative classification, for the later integration and consolidation of Baloch national identity.¹¹³ Confirming the assimilation of non-Baloch tribes into the Baloch society, Feroz Ahmed argues, "Some of these tribes retained their languages, but got so thoroughly assimilated into Balochi ethnicity that there is no differences between

¹⁰⁷ Government of India, Gazetteer of Province of Sind, Calcutta, 1907, p. 154.

¹⁰⁸ "Addresses Presented in India to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India", in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1918, xviii (Cmd 9178), London, p. 553.

¹⁰⁹ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 147.

¹¹⁰ Khaje Nizam al-Molk, Siasat Namah, pp. 68.

¹¹¹ Mahmud Zandmoqaddam, Heka'yat-e-Baloch, vol. II, Karoon, 1370/1992, pp. 473-475. See also same book vol. I.

¹¹² Karim Bakhsh Saedi, cited in: Mahmud Zandmoqaddam, Heka'yat-e-Baloch, vol. I, pp. 262-267; interview with Gholam Mohammad Khanzai. However, according to the British sources, the Jadgal settlement in Makkoran can be traced as early as the first centuries of the Mohammadan era (The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, pp. 94-95).

¹¹³ Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography, p. 600.

them and other Baloch people of today.”¹¹⁴ However, according to Fredrik Barth a Norwegian anthropologist, large parts of some Baloch tribes acknowledge Pathan origin.¹¹⁵

As mentioned in earlier sections, over the course of centuries, the language and the culture of the Baloch have come to predominate throughout most of the country, so that the majority of the population may be characterised as Baloch. “See to our graveyards”, Dawood Khan Ahmadzai, son of the last Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan pointed, “our forefathers are engraved in their gravestones as the Baloch.” He continued, “We follow the same customs from the cradle to the grave.”¹¹⁶ Even many of these early immigrants have changed their tribal names, for example Kurds to Mir-Balochzai and Saddazi (Jadgal) to Sardarzai. Interviewing people with different background (the Brahui, the Jadgal, the Kurd) I realised that all of them eagerly emphasise on their Baloch ethnic origin. Speaking with Ghulam Mohammad Khanzai, a Baloch intellectual with Jadgal background, he told the author, “We come from Sindh, but we are originally Baloch. It is why we migrated to Balochistan, we returned back to our original homeland”. He continued, “For example look to our tribal names, I am a Mir, all the Mirs speak Sindhi in Sindh”.¹¹⁷ According to writer and former vice chancellor of Sindh University, Dr. Nabi Bakhsh Baloch, only the Baloch tribes are known as Mir in Sindh.¹¹⁸

In certain parts of the Baloch country, however, such as Kalat, the Brahui language is predominant. Along the border areas of Sindh, Afghanistan and Iran, there are some minor ethnic groups, which settled, in the 19th century or early 20th century. For example, Jamot of Lasbela, Pashtuns of Quetta, Jatts of Kacchi, Sibi and Derajat, Persian-Speaking Tajiks and Dehwars of Sistan and Mastung are among such minority ethnic groups in Balochistan.¹¹⁹

Rise of the Baloch Rule

When did the first Baloch tribal unions arise? The early political history of the Baloch is obscure. It appears to have began with the process of the decline of the central rule of the Caliphate, in the region and the subsequent rise of the Baloch in Mak-

¹¹⁴ Feroz Ahmed (ed.), Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question, p. 16.

¹¹⁵ Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Oslo, Johansen & Nielsen Boktrykkeri, 1970, p. 124.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Davood Khan Ahmadzai.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Gholam Mohammad Khanzai

¹¹⁸ Monthly, Balochi Labzank, June-July 1999, p. 27.

¹¹⁹ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, pp. 25-26.

koran in the early years of the 11th century.¹²⁰ The Umawid general Mohammad bin Qasim captured Makkoran in 707 AD. He also became the governor of Makkoran in the same year. Thereafter, Arab governors ruled the country at least until the late 10th century when the central rule of the Abbasid Caliphate began to decline.

The period of direct Arab rule over Makkoran lasted about three centuries. By gradually accepting Islam, the scattered Baloch tribes over vast area (from Indus in the east, to Kerman in the west), acquired a new common identity, the Islamic. Thus Islam gave them added cohesion.¹²¹ The Arab rule also relieved them from the constant political and military pressure from Persia in the north. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, they benefited materially from the growth of trade and commerce which flourished in the towns and ports under the Arabs, reviving the old sea and land-based trade routes that linked India to Persia and Arabia through western Makkoran. These developments appear to have played a significant role in enabling the Baloch to form large-scale tribal federations that led to their gradual political and military supremacy in the territories now forming Balochistan during the period of 11th to 13th centuries.¹²²

With the decline of the central rule of the Islamic Caliphate in the 10th century, local rulers and tribal chieftains began, once again, to reassert their power and influence. It is precisely during this period that the Muslim chroniclers took note of the accounts of the Baloch in connection with their conflicts with the rising local Iranian and Turkish dynasties in Kirman, Khurasan, and Sistan. The Baloch are reported to have been dealt a devastating blow in Kirman by the Dailami ruler Azdu-al Doula (949-982 AD) and his uncle Muizzu-Doula in second half of the 10th century.¹²³ They were also defeated around Khabis by the troops of Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud and his son Masud, at the beginning of the 11th century.¹²⁴

It is generally believed that the traditional era of the Baloch begins from Mir Jalal Han.¹²⁵ The Baloch oral history states that in the 12th century forty-four Baloch

¹²⁰ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", pp. 45-46.

¹²¹ The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. VI, Oxford: Calaredon Press, 1908, p. 275.

¹²² Thomas Holdich, The Gate of India: Being an Historical Narrative, London, 1910, pp. 297-301. See also Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, "A Brief Note of Balochistan", unpublished, 1998. This article was submitted to the Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore, New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South Asia, edited by Margaret Mills.

¹²³ M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, p. 32.

¹²⁴ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 118-119.

¹²⁵ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch: The Life and Times of Ameer Chakar Rind 1454-1551 A.D., Quetta, 1965, p 48.

Bolaks (tribes) headed by Mir Jalal Han were forced by the early Turkish raids¹²⁶ or as the historian Dr. Inayatullah Baloch believes, “by the Persians”, to migrate from Kerman and Sistan into Makkoran.¹²⁷ Relying on the corpus of traditional poetry, the *Daptar*, Mir Jalal Han founded a large tribal union in Makkoran with its capital at Bampur. The union was based on an egalitarian system. The Baloch under Mir Jalal Han recognised their military organisation by dividing the forty-four *Bolaks* into five military divisions. These divisions according to Dr. Baloch later became the basis of the five major tribes, namely Rind, Lashari, Korai, Hout, and Jatoi.¹²⁸ Gankovsky confirms this notion by asserting that it is evidently during this period that the major tribal unions, which formed the nucleus of the Balochi feudal nationality in the sequel, arose. He adds that “several small feudal states” also flourished there including Turan with its capital Khuzdar in eastern Balochistan, Kanabil, present day Gandava, Kech in Makkoran and others.¹²⁹

The early Balochi epic poetry, which dates from the 12th century, refers to Mir Jalal Han as the ruler of all the Baloch.¹³⁰ However, there is considerable confusion surrounding the whole reign of Mir Jalal Han. Apart from the Baloch traditions and the writings of the Baloch nationalist writers, there is not sufficient historical record. The war ballads do not give much detail about his further rule and his administration. It is, however, opined that after his death, Mir Jalal Han’s kingdom was divided among his five divisional military chiefs. According to Longworth Dames, however, four of them, namely Rind, Lashari, Korai, and Hout were his sons, and the fifth one, Jato Bibi was his daughter.¹³¹ The Baloch nationalist writers and poets have paid Mir Jalal Han great tribute. They consider him as the “founding father of the Baloch nation” and the founder of the first “Baloch confederacy” in Balochistan.¹³²

At the beginning of the 13th century, Balochistan was attacked over and over again by the Mughals. They destroyed the Baloch polity.¹³³ The economic system was damaged and oases were reduced to deserts. However, the Baloch ethnic stock, that successfully withstood the onslaughts of the Mughals, founded the Sultanate of Mak-

¹²⁶ M. Longworth Dames, *The Baloch Race*, p. 29.

¹²⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 95.

¹²⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.

¹²⁹ Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, p. 146.

¹³⁰ M. Longworth Dames, *The Baloch Race*, p. 36.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 95.

¹³³ Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, pp. 146-147.

koran, with Kech as its capital city possibly in the late thirteenth century. Marco Polo, who sailed along the Makkoran coast on his way home in 1290, describes, "Kesma-coran [Makkoran and its capital Kech] is a kingdom having a king of its own and a peculiar language". He further records that the people "live by merchandize and industry, for they are professed traders, and carry on much traffic by sea and land in all directions".¹³⁴

Consequently, resistance against alien inroads over long periods of time instilled among the Baloch tribes feelings of cohesion. Headed by Mir Chakar Rind, a tribal confederacy, referred by historians as the "Rind-Lashari union",¹³⁵ emerged in 1485. The Rind-Lashari confederacy was one of the largest Baloch tribal confederacies stretching from Kirman in the west to the Indus River Valley in the east, thus for the first time uniting all Baloch areas in the late 15th century. The confederacy as indicated, was mainly centred around the two most powerful tribes of Rind and Lasharis, each in turn, and constituted a loosely organised federation of several lesser tribes. In 1487, Mir Chakar Rind transferred the confederacy's capital from Kech, Makkoran to Sivi (Sibi), eastern Balochistan.¹³⁶ Having consolidated his power in eastern Balochistan, Mir Chakar also advanced into Punjab, taking Multan and southern parts of Punjab in the early 16th century.

In spite of being short-lived, this confederacy in many ways marks the beginning of modern history for Balochistan. It was now that the Balochi language and culture were diffused over a vast area. This period also is known as the classical era of the Balochi epic or heroic ballads and romantic poetry. Apparently most of the Balochi ballads are rooted in this period, describing the events, exploits, personalities, and the names of tribes and localities, which collaborated with the Baloch history of the 15th and 16th centuries.¹³⁷ Parallel to the expansion of the confederacy's hegemony in the country, Balochi language and oral literature also blossomed, thus strengthening and spreading a relatively homogeneous Balochi culture and value system throughout the country. The Rind-Lashari hegemony as observed by Janmahmad was the first Baloch principality with a pseudo-state machinery reminiscent of similar tribal monar-

¹³⁴ Sir Henry Yule (ed.), The Book of Ser Marco Polo. The Venetian Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East, translated and edited with notes, maps and illustrations in two volumes by Sir Henry Yule, London, 1903, p. 401.

¹³⁵ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 157-163.

¹³⁶ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: its Strategic Importance, p. 42.

¹³⁷ M. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, vol. I, xxi-xxiv.

chiefs in central Asia.¹³⁸ However, like the other tribal confederacies of that time in the region, the court language of Mir Chakar was Farsi (Persian).¹³⁹

Being depicted as the greatest hero of the Baloch history, Mir Chakar Rind receives highest tributes. It is believed that he was born in Kolwa, headquarter of Makkoran in the middle of the 15th century. He is regarded as the direct descendant of the founding father of the Baloch nation, Mir Jala Han. Describing his genealogy, Sardar Khan writes:

Chakar came of a cultured and princely stock and such is his pedigree:
Chakar ibn Ameer Shaihak ibn Amir Ishaq ibn Ameer Kalo ibn Ameer
Bizan ibn Ameer Baluch Khan ibn Ameer Rind ibn Ameer Jala Khan
[Han], who lived almost between 1100-1185 A.D., and died in Bampur in
Persian Baluchistan.¹⁴⁰

In 1487, Mir Chakar annexed Kharan, Kalat, and Las Bela to his domain. His military victory over the tribes of Kalat resulted in a unified Baloch state with its capital at Sivi (Sibi) in about 1487 AD.¹⁴¹ By the early 16th century the Baloch confederacy under Mir Chakar had established itself firmly in Makkoran, Kalat highlands and the fertile districts of Kachi and Sibi in Eastern Balochistan.¹⁴²

It appears that the threat of Shiite Iran in the early years of 16th century would be one of the decisive factors for further tribal cohesion and enlargement of the Baloch union. Probably, Shah Ismail's success in 1501 in establishing a Shiite dynasty in Iran, and his desire to spread Shiism, forced the Sunni Baloch tribes to leave their rivalry aside and strengthen the union and enlarge the Baloch confederacy's realm. In a conversation with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch on this subject, he strongly argued that the threat of the Shiite Safavids was one of the decisive factors for the Baloch unity in the Chakarian period. According to Maulana, the Safavids' repeated raids were not aimed only to occupy Balochistan, but to compel the Baloch to accept Shiism by force.¹⁴³ In 1613 A.D. the powerful Safavid King, Shah Abbas, sent an expedition under the then governor of Kerman Ganj Ali Khan to attack Balochistan. Subsequently,

¹³⁸ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 158.

¹³⁹ Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum, p. 100.

¹⁴⁰ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, pp. 117-118.

¹⁴¹ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, pp. 88-90.

¹⁴² Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, P. 137.

¹⁴³ Interview with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch.

the Baloch ruler of Makkoran, Malik Shams-ud-Din was defeated in Bampur, western Balochistan.¹⁴⁴

The 16th century saw not only the rise of Safavid power in Iran, but also the Mughal power in India, and the arrival of European ships in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Towards the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese found their way to the region and captured several places along the Makkoran coast. In 1510 AD, they occupied the port of Gwatr, east of Chabahar, in western Balochistan.¹⁴⁵ Later, they also occupied two other important ports of Pasni and Gwadar, and burnt them. Thus, the conflict of interest of these three outside powers (the Safavids, the Mughals and the Portuguese) could not fail to affect the internal politics of the Baloch and other communities that lay between them.

Although the Baloch confederacy did not survive more than three decades (1485-1512), it brought far-reaching cultural and ethnic changes to the region. It rein-

¹⁴⁴ Probably with the disintegration of the first Baloch confederacy, headed by Mir Jalal Han, between 11th and late 12th century, the Malik dynasty was established in Makkoran. Malik Hasan laid its foundation, most probably in 12th century. It is believed that Malik Hasan was a descendant of Mir Hout, one of the sons of Mir Jalal Han, the legendary Baloch chief. Dr Nabi Bakhsh Baloch, however, believes that Malik Hasan was a Sayyid (N. A. Baloch, "The Baloch People: Their Early Migrations to Subcontinent and their Principalities", in: *Monthly, Balochi Labzank*, Hub, Balochistan, August 1995, p. 85). It should be noted that in the old war ballads many Hout chiefs are called Malik. The famous Hout chief, Sohrab Khan Dudai, who headed the migration of the Dudais, a Hout sub-tribe eastward, from Makkoran to Derajat in 15th century, and there he founded the Baloch state of Derajat, was also known as "Malik" Sohrab Dudai. With its capital at Kej (Kech), this new State of Makkoran comprised the two former kingdoms of Qusdar and Makran. It was mainly inhabited by Baloch population, which had been using Mukri (the Baloch dialect of Makkoran) as their lingua franca since 10th century AD. The strong Baloch ethnic stock of the country enabled the State to successfully repulse the frequent onslaughts of the Guzz hordes from the northeast.

Obviously, with the establishment of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in the middle of 15th century, the dynasty lost its independence and became a part of the new confederation. According to the Baloch tradition, Mir Chakar Rind divided his kingdom into several administrative units, including Makkoran. Possibly he appointed the Hout chief, Malik Saeed Dorrakzai, a descendant of Malik Hasan, as their governor in Makkoran. When in the early 16th century, the Rind-Lashari confederacy weakened and finally dissolved by the internal tribal conflicts, the regional governors such as Malik Saeed in Makkoran became independent as a result. Historian Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, however, believes that Malik Saeed established his authority in Makkoran, in the same time as the Rinds shifted their power centre into Sibi and Kacchi in eastern Balochistan in 1487. Malik Saeed also according to Ahmadzai, was not the chief of "Hout" but the "Jat". Whatever might be his tribal background, Malik Saeed re-established the "the Malik dynasty" in Makkoran with its capital in Kech, in the early 16th century. It is believed that Makkoran during the Malik period was "a united independent country" forming constitutionally a single state, but divided into several governments or provinces...The provinces, indeed, composed a Baloch 'federation', united under on supreme authority – always the ruler of the province of Kej, who received homage and tribute from the rest" (See A. T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twelfth Century*, London, 1928, pp. 75-76). The Malik rule continued for more than one century. The last Malik, Malik Mirza (1617-1623) was killed by the Boleidais in 1623. They, in turn established their own dynasty in 1623, the Boleidai dynasty (see Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, *Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan*, vol. 4, pp. 109, and 275). However, (*The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran*, (repr. 1986), p. 46) relate the Malik dynasty of Makkoran with the Saffarids Malik of Sistan. It, however, admit that it is impossible to establish the identity of the Malik of Makkoran with certainty.

forced the existing Baloch settlements, which accepted this fresh influx without any opposition. Administratively, the area divided: Sivi with Rind, and Kach-Gandhava with the Lashari, while a Rind representative ruled Turan.¹⁴⁶ Soon after the creation of a unified Baloch state, rivalry began between the powerful factions of the confederacy, the Rind and Lashari, and led to civil war with disastrous implications.¹⁴⁷ Their differences began over the division of the fertile lands of Kacchi and Sibi, and led to a thirty-year civil war. The legendary chiefs of the two tribes, Mir Chakar Rind and Mir Gwahram Lashari, sought help from neighbouring rulers.¹⁴⁸ Finally, the Lasharis suffered a humiliating defeat at the hand of Mir Chakar and fled to Gujarat. Mir Chakar, however, weakened by this war stayed in Sibi. Simultaneously he faced the invasion of the Arghuns of Kandahar. After a fiercely contested battle with Shah Baig Arghun, the ruler of Kandahar, Mir Chakar gave up Sibi his capital and moved to Multan.

As earlier mentioned, Mir Chakar Rind ruled for about three decades from Sibi, which became the centre of Baloch authority. During his reign, and under his leadership, new standards were set in the arts, literature, bravery and chivalry.¹⁴⁹ Even today almost every Baloch tribe aspires to treat in the footprint of Mir Chakar who no doubt was a brave warrior and at the same time a man filled with compassion, generosity, and hospitality.¹⁵⁰ Describing the medieval importance of Sibi, the capital city of the Rind-Lashari confederation, Sardar Khan wrote:

The town of Sibi took its place as the most cultured and commercial town in the whole of Baluchistan under the Baluch Ameerate. It remained as the most celebrated capital of Chakar who maintained his imperial court with barbaric and luxurious pageantry patent to medieval glamour. The capital of Rinds acted as the eye of Baluchistan and mother of gay societies and songsters. The past traditions speak of Sibi as the most high and palmy city of Baluchistan, housing a population of one hundred thousand

¹⁴⁵ I. Afshar (Sistani), *Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An*, Tehran, 1371/1993, p. 125.

¹⁴⁶ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, *Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan*, vol. 4, p. 90.

¹⁴⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 97.

¹⁴⁸ Mir Chakar brought in Arguns of Kandahar while Gwahram had the assistance of many indigenous tribes and moral support from the Sindh rulers. In the final battle, the Rinds, supported by the Arguns, defeated the Lasharis but subsequently became too weak to continue their hold in the area. The editor of *Balochi Dunya* Chakar Khan Baloch and former director of radio Pakistan, Bashir Ahmad Baloch believe that the Sammah rulers of Sind supported Mir Gwahram Lashari (Interview with Chakar Khan Baloch and Bashir Ahmad Baloch); According to Anwar Roman, there is no proper evidence of any direct military support to Mir Gwahram by Sindhi Rulers. Cf., Anwar Roman, *Aina-e Baloch*, Multan: Qasar-e Adab, n. d., p. 31; See also Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan*, p. 184.

¹⁴⁹ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *A Literary History of Baluchis*, p. 72.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

souls... In Sibi, flocked poets and beaux esprits of Makuran, Sind and songstresses of Persian Balochistan.¹⁵¹

The Baloch nationalists describe the reign of Mir Chakar Rind as the golden age of the Baloch and regard him as the "Great Baloch".¹⁵² Sardar Khan asserts, "The age of Rind supremacy in all spheres of Baloch life, in its way and colour was just as important in its crude form in Baluch history as the Age of Pericles in ancient Greece, the Renaissance at the close of the Middle Ages, and the Industrial Revolution in modern time".¹⁵³ Having moulded their destiny by uniting them under one banner, Mir Chakar Rind gave the scattered Baloch tribes a common identity. Thus, in nationalist account he is considered "like a pillar of strength for the Baloch race and author of Baloch code of honour and Balochi traditions"¹⁵⁴

It is believed that Mir Chakar had an army of 40,000 men, while Babur conquered India with an army of only 12,000 soldiers.¹⁵⁵ Describing his army, Marri wrote, "Forty thousands warriors collect on Mir's call, all descendants of one ancestor. All bedecked with coats of mail and iron armours covering their head, chest and fore-arms; all are armed with bows and arrows, with silken scarves, with overcoats, and red boots on their feet, with golden rings on their fingers."¹⁵⁶ The Baloch under Mir Chakar were well organised and well disciplined. It is speculated that Mir Chakar had some 400,000 to 500,000 followers on his march.¹⁵⁷ The misfortune of Mir Chakar according to Inayatullah Baloch was that he did not have the political imagination or skill to convert his tribal confederacy into a more unified political identity.¹⁵⁸

The Baloch nationalists regard Mir Chakar as the symbol of their unity and strength. "We are the sons of Chakar", is the most famous song in the Baloch nationalist circles.¹⁵⁹ He mastered the martial virtues of the Baloch and established the largest ever, even though short-lived Baloch confederacy. Marri writes of him:

To this day Mir Chakar is regarded as one of the greatest heroes of the Baloches. He is the centre of Baloch love-lore and war-ballads. A natural

¹⁵¹ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Quetta: Khair - un -Nisa, Nisa Traders, (3rd Edition) 1984.

¹⁵² Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, p. 113.

¹⁵³ Ibid., pp. 216-17.

¹⁵⁴ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, A Literary History of Baluchis, p. 73.

¹⁵⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 96.

¹⁵⁶ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, pp. 60-61.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁵⁹ The National Anthem of the Baloch Students Organisation.

leader of men, it was him who nearly for two decades remained the sole leader of all the Baloches. He captured by strength of arm the Kalat highlands as well as lower Balochistan, and settled the Baloches there. Again, thanks to him and his arms, the Baloches later on ruled not only in Balochistan but also in Punjab and Sind as well. Had it not been for Mir Chakar, there would have been no Kalat State, nor Talpur rulers of Sind; nor could the Punjab Baloches have found it easy to secure Jagirs and settle down there.¹⁶⁰

Although the Baloch who settled in Punjab and Sindh are not closely linked to the mainstream of Baloch life today, but the principal link with their past for most of them is the vast body of popular ballads dating back to the day of Mir Chakar. Handed down from generation to generation, and first recorded by British scholars, sung by professional wandering minstrels, centre to a considerable extent on Rind-Lashari conflict. In these ballads, Mir Chakar occupies a dominant position.

In Balochi poetry, be it war ballads or love lyrics, Mir Chakar is mentioned extensively. As indicated above, it was he who led the Baloch tribes into the highlands of Kalat or lowlands of Kacchi. Again it was due to him that the Baloch came to rule over parts of Sindh and in Multan, even if for only short periods. He died in ca.1550 A.D., and lies buried in a mausoleum in the Sahiwal district of Punjab.

The inter-tribal rivalry dealt a fatal blow to the Baloch confederacy. It destroyed Baloch central organisation, weakened their strength and forced them to leave Balochistan and migrate eastwards, to Sindh and Panjab. In Sardar Khan Baluch's opinion, "The fratricidal plunged the whole race into a bath of blood and made the Baluch structure to collapse and sapped to its foundation".¹⁶¹ The main reasons, according to Inayatullah Baloch were the nomadic character of the Baloch society and the lack of statesmanship of Mir Chakar Rind.¹⁶² They could not resolve petty matters by diplomacy. Despite prosperity in Sibi and Kacchi, Mir Chakar's failure to stop Lashari challenges had so polarised the community and the civil war so drained the tribes that the Baloch failed to maintain their confederacy. The division of the newly occupied land and the political power, according to Professor Abdullah Jan Jamaldini

¹⁶⁰ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1974, p.181.

¹⁶¹ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 40.

¹⁶² Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 97.

of Balochistan University were the main cause of war between the two main rival factions, the Rinds and the Lasharis.¹⁶³

In this respect, however, the interference of the two powerful neighbours of Balochistan, the Arghuns of Kandahar and the Sammas of Sindh played an important role. Their constant involvement protracted the war. As viewed by Dr Shah Mohammad Marri, "The rich lands of Sibi not only coveted the Baloch feudals, but also whet the appetite of the outside rulers."¹⁶⁴ The Arghuns supported the Rind chief, Mir Chakar Rind, while the Sammas gave their assistance to the opponent camp, headed by Mir Gwahram Lashari. As a result of this lasting war the Baloch power in Balochistan weakened and finally disintegrated.¹⁶⁵

Thus, weakened by years long war with the Lasharis, Mir Chakar Rind after being badly mauled by the Arguns in a battle near Sibi, moved with his remaining army to Multan. At the end of the Chakarian era the whole Baloch society was disrupted by the inter-tribal wars, which led to enormous migrations toward Sindh and Punjab. Mir Chakar, as mentioned above, migrated with about four to five hundred thousand persons.¹⁶⁶

The end of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in about 1512 A.D. ended an era in Baloch history. Subsequently, the Baloch country was divided into several independent kingdoms, including the Dodai Kingdom of Derajat, the Makkoran Kingdom of Malik and Boleidai, and the Khanate of Kalat. Civil strife continued for about a century until Mir Ahmad Khan of the Ahmadzai tribe established the Khanate of Balochistan or the second important Baloch confederacy in 1666 AD. Its unification, however was completed by the Khans of Kalat, Abdullah Khan (1714-1734), and Nasir Khan the Great (1749-1795)¹⁶⁷, which will be discussed in the following section.

The Khanate of Balochistan

The Khanate of Balochistan grew, and became established, from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards. Centering in the Kalat highlands, southwest of Mir Chakar's former capital, the Khanate was the first Baloch State to embrace all the Baloch regions such as Makkoran, Western Balochistan, Derajat, Sistan, and Lasbela and

¹⁶³ Interview with Abdullah Jan Jamaldini.

¹⁶⁴ Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum, p. 102.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

¹⁶⁶ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 62

¹⁶⁷ It is believed that Bampur was governed by Nasir Khan the Great and paid revenue to the Khan of Kalat. See V/23/6/34; cf. Abdul Reza Salar Behzadi, Balochistan Dar Sal-ha-e 1307-1317 Qamari, Tehran, 137271994, pp. 15, 64-65, 122, 128.

consolidate them into a body under the authority of a central government. The Khanate not only gave the Baloch a concept of unity and patriotism but also provided an unwritten constitution (Rawaj or Dastur) that became a "holy" document.¹⁶⁸ The Khanate of Balochistan later became known, as the Khanate of Kalat or Kalat State because of its capital city, Kalat.¹⁶⁹

When in 1666, Mir Ahmad I was elected by the *Jirga* (council of the elders or tribal assembly), as the Khan of Kalat, the Khanate was a loose confederacy of Baloch tribes living around Kalat. As a political synthesis, its internal cohesion was still very weak, and indeed such weakness is typical of all tribal confederations; there were numerous local power centers, but no sovereign figure of reference. The Khanate of Kalat came into being by exploiting this very vacuum, which followed after the disintegration of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in Balochistan in the early fifteenth century.

Mir Ahmad I expanded the border of the Khanate. From then on, the history of the Khanate assumed a clear, definite shape; and its chronology could be determined.¹⁷⁰ Formation of the Khanate of Kalat, according to historian Inayatullah Baloch, was another important and significant chapter of Baloch history. The Rind-Lashari Confederacy did not survive because of its nomadic character. The Baloch State of Derajat was feudal in character but it did not expand because of its dependency on Mughal India. Makkoran maintained its independence but failed to expand due to the Persian invasion and internal tribal conflicts with its Baloch neighbour, Kalat.¹⁷¹

As indicated above, since the fall of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in 16th century, various empires and political syntheses were in fact contending for the Baloch country; the Shiite Safavids to the west and the Mughal to the east, both intent upon consolidating their frontiers, so as to fend off forays and incursions by nomadic tribes from Afghanistan and Central Asia.¹⁷² Thus, the rising Baloch confederacy was entangled in continual straggle with the Mughal and Persian empires. To encounter the growing pressure of the Shiite Safavids, the founder of the Ahmadzai dynasty, Mir Ahmad I pursued a policy of friendship with the powerful emperor of India, Aurang-

¹⁶⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 101.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, volume one, Quetta, 1952, pp. 27-29.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Cf. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 15.

zeb.¹⁷³ However, in the reign of Mir Samandar, the Iranian army under General Tahmasp invaded Balochistan aiming to occupy western Balochistan but it was defeated and Tahmasp was killed. The Mughal emperor not only admired this deed but also agreed to pay him Rs. 200,000 annually as military aid to meet the challenge of Iranian aggression.¹⁷⁴

The Khanate of Kalat consolidated most of the Baloch country into a feudal state during the 18th century. During the early 18th century, Abdullah Khan, the fourth Khan (1714-1734) expanded his realm “from Kandahar in what is now southeastern Afghanistan, across the Makran area all the way to Bandar Abbas in what is now a southern Iranian port and extended his dominion to embrace Dera Ghazi Khan District on the edge of Punjab”.¹⁷⁵ By the middle of the eighteenth century, Nasir Khan I (the sixth Khan), the most popular, powerful and dynamic ruler of the Khanate (1749-1795) claimed sovereignty over “all lands where Baloches lived”. He brought Karachi and most of western (Iranian) Balochistan under his administration.¹⁷⁶

Speaking of Nasir Khan, Masson, narrator of various journeys in Balochistan, said, “At an early period he consolidated his authority over an immense kingdom, the secret of his success being that he had influence enough to ensure the obedience of his feudal chiefs, and discretion enough to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs”.¹⁷⁷ With the confederate force bound to him by this feudal tie, Nasir Khan consolidated his dominions. The Marris and the Bugtis, Las Bela, Makkoran, Kharan, and Quetta was his kingdom. Moreover, according to Harrison, at the height of his power, Nasir Khan renewed Kalat’s claims of sovereignty over the Iranian Baloch areas and sent occasional expeditionary forces to his western borderlands.¹⁷⁸

Nasir Khan I reigned from the seaboard stretching from Karachi for about 400 miles west to the present Iranian frontier, the cairn of the Maliks (Maliki Chedag) on the “Minab River”¹⁷⁹, and up to Quetta and east from Quetta to the Derajat border – a country considerably greater than Great Britain and Ireland.¹⁸⁰ Administratively, Nasir Khan came closer to establishing a centralized bureaucratic apparatus covering all of

¹⁷³ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 102.

¹⁷⁴ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtasar Tarikh-e-Baloch aur Khawanin-e-Baloch, Quetta: Aiwan Kalat 1972, p. 38.

¹⁷⁵ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 18.

¹⁷⁶ Public Record Office, FO 60/385, p. 61.

¹⁷⁷ IOR.L/P&S/18.

¹⁷⁸ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 17.

¹⁷⁹ The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, Quetta, 1986, p. 50.

¹⁸⁰ MSS F. 131/24-27.

Balochistan than any other Baloch ruler before or since. Organizing the civil and military affairs of the Baloch Khanate on semi-modern lines, Nasir Khan established a "proto-parliament based on a workable constitution and congenial Baloch tradition".¹⁸¹ He had a *Wazir* (prime minister), who supervised all internal administration and foreign affairs matters, and a *Mustoufi*, whose responsibility was to collect revenue from crown lands.¹⁸² The Khanate under Nasir Khan had its own flag and currency.¹⁸³ Like Mir Jalal Han and Mir Chakar Rind, Nasir Khan continues to be the most popular hero in the Baloch folklore and political literature.¹⁸⁴

In 1816, describing Nasir Khan's personality, the British traveller, Henry Pottinger wrote, "If we contemplate the character of Nusseer [Nasir] Khan, whether as a soldier, a statesman, or a prince, and call to mind the people among whom he was placed, we shall find in him a most extraordinary combination of all the virtues attached to those stations and duties."¹⁸⁵ Possibly the most interesting aspect of the long reign of Nasir Khan was his skilful internal policy, directed towards the strengthening the powers and figure of the "Khan", though without destroying traditional political mechanisms of a society that was still eminently tribal and pastoral in nature. The Khanate under Nasir Khan, as observed by Janmahmad, was an improved version of the Rind-Lashari tribal union.¹⁸⁶ It did not bring any changes to the general tribal set-up. The tribal alliance was broad-based with tremendous power allowed to the tribal chiefs, who recognised the Khanate as the paramount power and contributed nominal revenue to him as well as a fixed contingent of men in time of war. The tribal area of responsibility was fixed and allowed to continue. A council of advisors representing the major tribes and allied people assisted the Khan, with a Wazir (Prime Minister) usually selected from Tajik or Hindu immigrants of Kalat.¹⁸⁷ Like the Afghan King, Ahmad Shah Abdali, in important affairs, Nasir consulted the *Ulema*.¹⁸⁸

The most important innovation of Nasir Khan I was a tribal army, traditionally known as the *Lashkar*. Being an accomplished fighter and commander, he had watched the Afghan and Persian techniques of warfare, and realised the necessity of

¹⁸¹ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1975, p. 84.

¹⁸² Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century)*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁸³ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 120.

¹⁸⁴ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 61

¹⁸⁵ Henry Pottinger, *Travels in Beloochistan and Sindh*, p. 285.

¹⁸⁶ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 160.

¹⁸⁷ Government of India, *Military Report on Baluchistan*, p. 4.

¹⁸⁸ Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 135.

maintaining a well-organised army in his Khanate. Accordingly, he chose and stationed a permanent army unit, called Dasta-e-Khas (Special Division) in his capital numbering 1,200 men. In emergencies Dasta-e-Khas increased to 10860 men. Furthermore, he had created two additional Divisions, which used to be called the “Sarawan *Lashkar*” (Sarawan Division) and the “Jhalawan *Lashkar*” (Jhalawan Division). Nasir Khan was the Supreme Commander of this whole body of the State army.¹⁸⁹

Describing Nasir Khan’s army, Selig Harrison stated:

Nasir Khan’s most notable achievement was the creation of a unified Baloch army of some 25,000 men and 1,000 camels, an impressive force by eighteenth-century southwest Asian standards. For the first time in their history, most of the major Baluchi tribes were rallied under the banner of an agreed system of military organization and recruitment.¹⁹⁰

The main revenue was from land produce and collections from the port of Karachi and goods passing through the Bolan Pass. Taxation was unequal and depended on many factors including the distance of the area from the capital. Taxation on sea-borne trade from Makkoran coast was also nominal. Generally, the Sarawan and Jhalawan tribes who provided the bulk of the Khan’s troops and other important factions in the area were exempted from land revenue. In Makkoran one-tenth of the land produce was the state share while the Jatt of Kacch-Gandhava paid one half and the indigenous and Dehwar cultivators of Kalat, Mastung and Shal (Quetta) paid one-third to the Khan.¹⁹¹

Nasir Khan I was the greatest and most powerful Khan among all the rulers of the Khanate. As a result of his successful reformist policies, he is sometime compared to “Peter the Great” of Russia, in the Baloch nationalist circles.¹⁹² Nasir Khan I sought to build a kingdom in which all tribes, including those in Kachhi, would be voluntarily united. In doing so, he was largely successful. The constituency of tribal chiefs, who willingly subordinated themselves, moderated his rule. The Khan stood at the head of a large tribal confederacy and went methodically about building the Khanate. So, the Khanate was a loose confederacy. Nasir Khan I augmented the union by an enlightened policy. He succeeded in evolving the most effective and strong union of tribes in the history of the region. In a grand gesture of political farsightedness, he

¹⁸⁹ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, *Tarikh-e-Baloch wa Balochistan*, vol. 5, pp. 224-232.

¹⁹⁰ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 16.

¹⁹¹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 122.

¹⁹² Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 131.

never interfered with internal tribal issues.¹⁹³ The Rind and Magasis of Kacch-Gandhava and a few others in Sistan had complete independence, without paying any land revenue. Their political allegiance was considered sufficient.¹⁹⁴

The reunification of the vast Baloch territory into a single political entity encouraged trade. Possession of the ports of Makkoran made the Khanate an important trading centre between the Iranian plateau, Central Asia, India, the Indian Ocean and the region that gave on to it, also attracting numerous communities of Hindu and Ismaili merchants, with beneficial results for the Khanate's fiscal revenue. Moreover Nasir Khan encouraged trade by reducing taxes and induced Hindu traders, bookkeepers and moneylenders to return by paying for the upkeep of the Hindu temple at Kalat. These measures strengthened the Khanate and the Khan. "Furthermore", M. H. Hosseinbor argues, "Nasir Khan strengthened the economic infrastructure of the state by constructing an extensive network of roads, caravanserais, and forts, expanding the irrigation systems, and improving the state treasury by reorganising the collection system for taxes and other revenues".¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, the 44 years' rule of Nasir Khan I, known to the Baloch as the "great", and the hero of Baloch history, was the years of strenuous administration and organisation interspersed with military expeditions.

While having a loose feudal relationship with the Afghan king, Ahmad Shah, Nasir Khan I never regarded himself a tributary to the Durranis but rather a junior participator in the division of the Persian Empire after the death of Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747.¹⁹⁶ However, the Afghan attitude towards the Khan provoked Mir Nasir Khan to declare the complete independence of Kalat in 1758. As a result, the Afghan forces under the command of Ahmad Shah himself invaded Balochistan and besieged the Kalat fortress for forty days. Ultimately they came to an amicable agreement and the Afghan troops were withdrawn. The agreement known as the "Treaty of Kalat" (1758), recognised the sovereign status of Balochistan.¹⁹⁷ The Afghan monarch promised not to interfere in the internal and external affairs of the Baloch confederacy. The Khan in turn promised to help Afghanistan in the case of external aggression against it or in its foreign expeditions. Both the countries agreed not to give asylum to rebels

¹⁹³ M. G. Pikulin, *Baloch*, p. 110.

¹⁹⁴ S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal war in south Asia*, p. 127.

¹⁹⁵ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", pp. 58-59.

¹⁹⁶ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathan*, pp. 372-373.

¹⁹⁷ For more detail see, Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 203

within their states. The agreement provided the basis for the Khanate's subsequent relations with Afghanistan.¹⁹⁸

Apparently the Afghan-Baloch alliance developed as a response to the common threat posed to their respective states by a relatively powerful, and Shiite-dominated Persian Empire. Interviewing with the author, a prominent Baloch scholar, Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch said, "It was mostly the common fear from Shiite of Iran which shaped the Baloch-Afghan alliance".¹⁹⁹ Subsequently, Nasir Khan joined the Afghan king in his military campaigns in Mashhad against the Persians in 1759 as well as his expeditions against the growing Sikhs in Punjab in 1761-1762.

Nasir Khan I, according to Inayatullah Baloch, was the first Baloch ruler to pay attention to foreign policy. He exchanged ambassadors with Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sultanate-Imamate of Oman as well as with Ottoman Turkey.²⁰⁰ The Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of Islam awarded him the titles of the *Ghazi-e Din* (religious fighter) and the *Naser-e Mellat-e Mohammadiyah* (supporter of the Mohammedan nation).²⁰¹ As viewed by Inayatullah Baloch, even the title of *Beiglar Beigi* (the Beig of Beigs or the Khan of Khans), was also awarded to him by the Ottoman Sultan.²⁰²

However, about his relation with Mughal India, nothing is known. Moreover, he received *wakils* (representative) from the Derajat Confederacy and Sindh, the vassal provinces.²⁰³ As asserted by Janmahmad, "the foreign policy of the Khanate was one of peaceful coexistence with all the neighbouring states. Although nominally under Afghan hegemony, the various Khans remained neutral and the Khanate was a sort of buffer zone between Persia and Afghanistan."²⁰⁴

With the death of Nasir Khan I in 1795, the deterioration of the central authority in Khanate started, even though it maintained its independence until the arrival of Britain on the scene in the mid-19th century. Given to ease and luxury, his son and successor, Mahmud Khan soon proved to be incapable of holding the vast territories and the state built up with so much hard work and bloodshed by his father, Nasir Khan. "Naseer had been hardly a year in his grave before the whole achievements of

¹⁹⁸ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 338.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch


²⁰⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p.120.

²⁰¹ Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 136.

²⁰² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 106.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

²⁰⁴ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 163.



Map 5. Khanate of Balochistan (1758 - 1795)

Adopted from Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 287.

his life were in destruction of oblivion".²⁰⁵ During his rule, Afghanistan occupied Derajat, the vassal province, the district of Kech in Makkoran refused to pay taxes, the port of Karachi slipped away from his dominions and was recovered and possessed by the Talpur, while in western Balochistan several chiefs became independent and refused to pay taxes.²⁰⁶ By 1810, the British team of spies (Pottinger, Christie and Grant) found the Khanate in chaos and anarchy.

While the Khanate and its military ally, Afghanistan, were in anarchy at the beginning of the 19th century, Punjab came under a powerful ruler, Ranjit Singh, and Iran became strong. Thus, the main source of income of the tribes and their chiefs, which was the share in the war-booty from their invasion of Mughal India, Iran and Sindh, disappeared with the new circumstances. The tribal chiefs instead occupied the crown lands and tried to consolidate their own power that according to Dr Inayatullah Baloch led to disintegration of the Khanate of Balochistan.²⁰⁷ Perhaps, it was against this background that the Baloch Hakomates (principality) of the distant western provinces were the first to succumb to their tribal/feudal loyalties, and become independent in the early nineteenth century.²⁰⁸

In 1809, Captain Grant, wrote that Shaikh Samander chief of Kaserkand and Mir Soban chief of Dashtiari-Bahu collected taxes for themselves. Similarly, Mir Mohammad Khan Hakom of Geh (Nikshahr) the second largest principality of Makkoran, after Kech was independent. As observed by Grant, none of them paid taxes to the Khanate of Kalat.²⁰⁹ At the time of his visit the following years, Sir Henry Pottinger, a British officer, also found that most of the Hakomates (principalities) in Western Balochistan were independent. Shah Mehrab Khan *Hakom* (ruler) of Bampur according to Pottinger was acknowledged from Dezzak in the Southeast to Bazman bordering Kerman in the north.²¹⁰

It is believed that the main reason for the disintegration of Khanate was the personal life of the Khan, and the economic crisis. Mahmud Khan was weak and fond

²⁰⁵ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 88.

²⁰⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.

²⁰⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.

²⁰⁸ For more detail see, N. P. Grant, "Journal of a Route through the Western Part of Mekran (1809)", in: Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 5, 1839, pp. 329-340.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, London, 1816, pp. 169-170.

of luxury.²¹¹ The Russian scholar, Gankovsky, however, attributes the decline of the Kalat State to the desire of the rulers of separate regions to raise their share in the gross feudal tillage by reducing the share due to the Kalat Khan as head of the state.²¹² He gives the example that Mahmud Khan had an income of only 350,000 rupees as compared to the more than three million rupees collected by his father. By contrast, Nina Swidler, an anthropologist, writes that the Khanate of Kalat failed to impose a unified tax system on caravan trade and the tribes and instead relied more on revenues from irrigated crown lands.²¹³ After the death of Mahmud Khan in 1821, his son and successor Mehrab Khan II, tried to correct many of the errors of his father but by then, the British had appeared on the scene and the affairs of Khanate had taken another turn. However, the disintegration of the Khanate, its political division into different provinces and states under British rule, and finally its annexation to the state of Pakistan, had great impact on the Baloch nationalism, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

The British Superiority

Modern Baloch nationalism is rooted in the anti-colonial struggle from the mid-19th century. The big-power rivalry in central Asia that resulted in the British invasion of Afghanistan also brought British forces into the Baloch region. The Khanate of Balochistan during the British Afghan wars did not want to be involved in the foreign aggression against the Afghan people.²¹⁴ The Baloch Confederacy had treaty obligations from the time of Mir Nasir Khan with Afghanistan. The British supply routes to Afghanistan could not be safeguarded without securing Balochistan, which had by now gathered much importance in British Central Asian policy. In his notes on Indian history wrote Karl Marx, "March 10, 1839, the column reached Dadar, at the mouth of the pass; Cotton rested a few days, found that Mehrab Khan of Khelat [Kalat], was hostile; no supplies to be obtained."²¹⁵ The British forces were therefore ordered to subjugate Kalat. A detachment from Quetta attacked Kalat on 13th November 1839. The Khan Mir Mehrab Khan refused to surrender and fought back against the invad-

²¹¹ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, p. 241; Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 88; Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 124.

²¹² Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 151.

²¹³ Nina Swidler, "The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan", PhD. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.

²¹⁴ Nek Buzdar, "Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan" in: Monthly Balochi Labzank, Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000, p. 71.

²¹⁵ Karl Marx, Notes on Indian History (664-1858), Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, pp. 133-34.

ers. Along with four hundred of his men he was killed in the battle.²¹⁶ The British installed Shahnawaz Khan, a fourteen-year-old distant relative of the deceased Khan, as the new ruler with a Lieutenant Loveday as regent, and started the dismemberment of the Baloch country. Quetta and Mastung were given to Shah Shuja of Afghanistan and Kacchi was annexed into Sindh.²¹⁷ However, as soon as the British army left Kalat, Baloch tribes revolted and Mehrab Khan's son, Nasir Khan II, was enthroned as the new Khan.

Nasir Khan II (1830-1857) was recognised by the British in 1841 and 13 years later (1854) Kalat signed its first twenty-year treaty. British political agents were assigned to the Khan and an annual subsidy was paid in exchange for loyalty, and also Quetta was returned to the Khanate.²¹⁸ In a new treaty with Kalat, which was ratified at the end of 1876, it was arranged that British troops might be stationed in Kalat territory. The establishment of the Balochistan Agency with its headquarters at Quetta followed early in 1877. In the same year, Robert Sandeman was appointed Agent to the Governor General (A.G.G), Chief Commissioner and put in charge of the Agency for Balochistan.²¹⁹

With Sandeman's appointment as the Agent to the Governor General in Balochistan a new chapter was opened up in relations between the colonial power and the Baloch.²²⁰ Robert Sandeman was born in 1835 in Perth, Scotland. His father retired as a General from the army of the East India Company. In 1856, Sandeman was offered an Infantry Commission and proceeded to India. After briefly serving on active duty during the Great Mutiny (1857-58), he was transferred to civil post in 1859 as Assistant Commissioner in Punjab. He served as District Officer in Dera Ghazi Khan (1866-1877), before being transferred to Balochistan in 1877. It must be borne in mind that the British tactics of indirect rule reached its most progressive and least clinical form in the 1870s through the so-called Forward Policy of Sandeman. In this respect, he is considered as the real "conqueror of Balochistan" by the British chroniclers.²²¹

²¹⁶ Zabihullah Naseh, *Balochistan*, Tehran, 1344/1965, pp. 22-23.

²¹⁷ A. B. Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political processes*, London, 1985, p. 62.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

²¹⁹ R. Hughes-Buller, (ed.) *Baluchistan*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 43.

²²⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, pp. 140-41.

²²¹ A. L. P. Tucker, *Sir Robert G. Sandeman Peaceful Conqueror of Balochistan*, Lahore: Yakki Gate, 1979, pp. 6, 8ff.

As mentioned in chapter two, by changing the traditional character of the old *Jirgas* altogether, Sandeman introduced a new system, the "Sandeman system" as it was later to be known. This system was aimed at establishing direct relations with the *Sardars* and tribal chiefs, bypassing the Khan. Sandeman managed to have his way, and earned the loyalty of the *Sardars* by granting them allowances; his personal charisma enabled him to establish a whole network of close personal relations, undermining the prestige and sovereignty of the Baloch central power. The "Sandeman system" gave the British a powerful weapon to control rebellions against themselves and broke the last remaining institution of a purely tribal character.²²²

Although, the Baloch people did not like to live under a foreign rule, soon after the martyrdom of Mehrab Khan in 1839, the hostility spread throughout the Baloch tribes in the Eastern Balochistan.²²³ In order to break down the Baloch resistance power, first the British detached "Derajat" and "Khangerh" (Jacobabad) from Balochistan and annexed these regions to British India.²²⁴ In the late 1870s, the British occupied the Afghan territory of Pishin and the Thal Chotialri district under the Gandamak Treaty. They also occupied the Afghan tribal areas of Zhob and Loralai and consolidated the British authority there. Under an agreement with the Khan of Kalat in 1883, the British leased Quetta, Bolan Pass, Nasirabad, Chagai, Marri-Bugti and certain other Baloch areas and attached those with the Pashtun regions to rename "British Baluchistan".²²⁵

Under the British the Khanate's administration was carried out through the *Wazir-e-Azam* (prime minister) who was appointed by the British Government. The State Budget was also subjected to the approval of the A. G. G.²²⁶ The leased regions (British Balochistan) were ruled by the "Agent to the Governor General of India" (AGG). The AGG with his headquarters at Quetta, was represented by "Political Agents" (PA's) at district level. As indicated above, with Sandeman's appointment as AGG in Balochistan in 1877, he armed the *Sardars* with unlimited powers over their tribes to such an extent that a tribesman could be arrested and imprisoned on the indication of the *Sardar* for disobedience to him while a tribesman who had been put in

²²² Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p. 141.

²²³ Riccardo Redaelli, The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century), p. 63.

²²⁴ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, pp. 18-20.

²²⁵ R. Hughes-Buller, (ed.) Baluchistan, Calcutta, 1908, p. 43.

²²⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, pp. 139-42.

prison for a serious offence could be released on the receipt of a letter by the *mirza* (accountant) of a *niabat* (district) from the *Sardar*.²²⁷

Generally, the State of Kalat held a unique position within the British Indian imperial system. In theory, it was sovereign and different from the other States. The northern belt of the Khanate (British Balochistan) and the responsibility for its defence and foreign affairs were handed over to the British Crown on the basis of mutually agreed upon friendly treaties. The Khan in general was expected to regain these territories and rights whenever the British decided to leave. What the British had gained by the treaties was not transferable to a third party. Responsible British authorities and Indian statesmen repeatedly confirmed these positions vis-à-vis the Khan's legal status and rights.²²⁸

In practice, however, the situation was different. The "unruly" nature and past of Balochistan and the strategic concern over real or perceived Russian, German, Afghan and then Soviet moves toward the northwestern regions of the Sub-continent, required strict British surveillance. From a British point of view, the Russo-British tug of war in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran during the 19th century; fear of German activities during the two great wars, uncertainties created by anti-western upheavals in Afghanistan and the Middle East in the early 20th century; and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, could not allow the border Baloch territory to enjoy the luxury of a relaxed policy. Constitutional, political, economic and educational reforms allowed to British India could not be extended to the Khanate and the leased territories (British Balochistan).²²⁹

The Khan at the top was traditionally bound to consult the *Jirga* (the Council of the main tribal *Sardars*) on social and political affairs. Only a limited number of *Sardars*, however, closer to the centre, participated in the decision-making process. The Khan also appointed a *Wazir-e-Azam* (Chief Minister) and other *Wazirs* (Ministers) and *Naib Wazirs* (Deputy Ministers) for the administration of the Khanate. The *Darbar* (Court of the Khanate) was a loose combination of the resident tribal Chiefs (at Kalat), the *Wazirs* and the Khan's close influential relatives and administrators. The *Darbar*, the *Jirga*, the indigenous Cabinet of Ministers, and the *Diwans* of the

²²⁷ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, Quetta: Third World Publication, 1994, p. 260.

²²⁸ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, volume two, Quetta, 1954, p. 11; Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 207-211.

²²⁹ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, pp. 101-103.

Khanate were overshadowed and overpowered by the parallel British administration backed by their political and military power. Thus, in general the AGG at Quetta and the Political Agents at district levels, aided by their staff, ruled the country.²³⁰

The early revolts

The British defeated the Khanate's army, killed Mehrab Khan, and occupied Kalat in 1839. Incited by the British advancement westward, the Shah of Iran captured western Balochistan in the early 1850s. Throughout Balochistan the British and the Persians were expanding their authority. The Baloch era was coming to a close. It was in this milieu that many tribes stood in revolt against the alien forces.²³¹ Writing about their bravery, Tucker stated that the Baloch never submitted to the British completely. During the blockades and in battles they fought to the last man. According to Tucker, the sheer number of casualties is the best proof of it. When on 1st October 1847, 700 Bugtis were blockaded in a battle on the border of Sindh against Lieutenant Mereweather, commanding the famous Sindh Horse, none of them surrendered to the British. All fought till the last man was killed, except two who avoided capture.²³²

On 26th January 1867, the 1200-strong combined forces of Bugtis, Marris and their allied tribe, Kethran, fought an important battle in the Chachar Valley near the border of Dera Ghazi Khan. Mir Ghulam Hossein Masoori Bugti led the Baloch troops in the battle. He was also killed in the battle, which was lost by the Baloch forces.²³³ On the 14th of October 1896, a religious group of Marri, called Ghazis, headed by Haji Kala Khan, commonly known as "Mast-Faqir", attacked the British railway and telegraph lines. The Ghazi movement, however, couldn't last long. The British soon defeated them, and Mast Faqir with five other Ghazis were executed in Sibi on the 2nd of November 1896.²³⁴

Simultaneously, there was unrest in Makkoran. Dissatisfied with the colonial administration, Mehrab Khan, who coveted authority in the Kech valley, detained the British *nazim* (agent) and the finance affairs manager, a Hindu, Diwan Udho Das on

²³⁰ For more detail see Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 123, and Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan, vol. 2, pp. 281-286.

²³¹ Charles Reynolds Williams, The Defence of Kahun, London, 1886, pp. 77.

²³² A. L. P. Tucker, Sir Robert G. Sandeman Peaceful Conqueror of Balochistan, Lahore: Yakki Gate, 1979, p. 19.

²³³ Gul Khan Nasir, Balochistan: Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men, Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982, p. 288.

²³⁴ V/23/72/349.

the January 1898.²³⁵ This infuriated the British, who ordered an attack on the district from Karachi to assert their authority. Resistance was organised by Mehrab Khan and Mir Baloch Khan. A large number of *lashkar* (tribal force) gathered at Gokprosh, a few miles from Turbat, on 27th January 1898 to fight the advancing British troops. The British forces, however, defeated the Baloch *lashkar*, killing all 250 of them including their leader Mir Baloch Khan.²³⁶ It is said that Mehrab Khan and Baloch Khan were encouraged and supported by their brethren from western Balochistan who were revolting against the Shiite Persians at the same time. The revolt leaders in Iranian Balochistan, Hossein Khan and later Mir Bahram Khan, both had close relations with Mehrab Khan and Baloch Khan.²³⁷ Defeated by the British army, Mehrab Khan Gichki who was the prime mover in the revolt sought refuge in Western Balochistan.²³⁸

When a proposal to recruit mercenaries in Balochistan was put forward in January 1917, the Baloch *sardars* not only opposed the idea, but also revolted against it.²³⁹ Two decisive battles were fought at Gunbuz and Hadab in which the Marris were defeated.²⁴⁰ It is said that seven hundred of them were killed and five hundred received injuries in the battle of Gunbuz. The rebel chief, Misri Khan Baloch, fled to the Soviet Union and formed the delegation to the famous "Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East". In 1918, another rebel chief, Karim Khan Baloch, from Iranian Balochistan migrated to Soviet Union with his tribe and took refuge. He was also one of the delegates to the Baku Congress.²⁴¹ As the head of the Baloch delegation, it is said that Misri Khan also met Lenin and some other top leaders of Soviet Union.²⁴²

Having outlined the theoretical guidelines and directives for "national liberation movements" in the east; the Bolsheviks launched campaigns to spread the revolutionary views and proletarian revolutions to the colonies and semi-colonies of the East. In the credentials issued to Y. Z. Surites, first Soviet Representative in Afghanistan, signed by Lenin in 1919, it was stated that the Council of People's Commissars

²³⁵ The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 54; see also, Gul Khan Nasir, *Balochistan: Kasim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men*, pp. 191-192.

²³⁶ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, vol. II, p. 343.

²³⁷ Interview with Amanullah Gechki. Historian Riccardo Redaelli believes that the Makkoran revolt "was the first occasion, since the arrival of the English in the region, that Islam was used by local tribal chiefs as a political means for drumming up support..." (Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India, 19th - 20th Century*, Firenze: Il Maestrale, 1997, p. 91).

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Jannahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 162.

²⁴⁰ Mir Mitta Khan Marri, *Rahm Ali Marri*, pp. 25-43.

²⁴¹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, pp. 147-149.

appointed Y. Z. Surites the “Representative Extra-Ordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic in Central Asia, empowering him to maintain diplomatic relations with the peoples of independent Afghanistan, independent (tribes of) Balochistan, and the people of India fighting for their liberation.”²⁴³

Baloch resistance to the British authorities continued for more than a century with varying intensity. These were undoubtedly the acts of individual tribal chiefs or a collection of them who were aggrieved by one or another action of the government. The early uprisings could not assume the form of a national struggle. The lack of communication between the Baloch tribes and contact with the Indian people,²⁴⁴ having an enemy superior in arms and resources, and the lack of a proper political organisation to mobilise the masses were the main reasons for this. But in spite of these drawbacks, the Baloch continued their resistance in their own particular way throughout the British period of hegemony and never allowed the alien influence to pervade their society.²⁴⁵ However, the Baloch look upon these battles as evidence of their valourous warlike traditions. Accounts of battle with the British have the same revered place in tribal folklore as those about war with the Persians, Afghans, Moguls and Hindus. The Baloch poets of the late 19th century, like Rahm Ali Marri, glorified the leaders of the uprising and composed songs of patriotism and condemned the pro-British *Sardars*, declaring them traitors.²⁴⁶

The Persian Occupation

In 1947, in the thick of the independence movement, Sardar Khan Baluch, the former director of education and secretary-*e-khas* (principal secretary) to the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, wrote: “Baluch race indeed cannot afford to forget that what is now Iranian Baluchistan, has, through the greater part of its history, been Western Makurann; and that it has always been ruled from the heart of Makuran either by native or foreign governors as a part of Baluchistan”²⁴⁷. Historically, western Balochistan is the cradle of Baloch history and the focus of their ancient heroic ballads and popular poetry. It was from here that their ancestors began to spread to and consolidate their power in eastern Balochistan from the 13th century. The territory, as

²⁴² Interview with Dr. Shah Mohammad Marri.

²⁴³ G. Bondarevski, “Bolshevik Policy and the Peoples of the East”, in: Mainstream, December 3, 1977, p. 34.

²⁴⁴ Interview with Sher Baz Khan Mazari.

²⁴⁵ Interview with Anwar Sajidi.

²⁴⁶ Mir Mitta Khan Marri, Rahm Ali Marri, Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1978, pp 25-44.

²⁴⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Baluch a Nation, Lahore, 1947, p. 157.

earlier mentioned, was the centre of the first Baloch Confederacy under Mir Jalal Han in the 12th century. It may also be of some interest to note that Western Balochistan is not only the cradle of Baloch history, but also according to the most prominent authority on the subject, Selig Harrison, the cradle of Baloch nationalism as well.²⁴⁸

Separated by the disintegration of the Khanate in the early 19th century, western Balochistan maintained its independence until the mid-19th century. Describing the state of affairs in Bampur, the major Hakomate (principality) of western Balochistan, in 1810, a British spy, Henry Pottinger, wrote, "Shah Mihrab Khan is the most powerful chief in these quarters; his regular troops, or at least those that he can muster at a few days notices, are six thousand, and he is acknowledged to be the paramount authority from Dizuk [Dezzak] to Basman".²⁴⁹ His revenue, according to Pottinger, was computed at four Lacs and a half of rupees annually.²⁵⁰ Noticing a deep hatred between the Baloch and the Persians, Pottinger pointed out:

Having explained these particulars as far as I supposed would be comprehensible, he begged to be informed why we Firingees, or European, did not root out the Persians (whom he styled Kafir Sheeas), saying, "I have understood, both from Grant and yourself, that the English government is eminently powerful; and if that is really the case, it will find no difficulty in exterminating that abominable race, for I myself can dispatch two hundred horsemen and ravage a whole district, even bringing off their very dogs."²⁵¹

Pottinger enquired if the intercourse was frequent between him and the government of Kerman, or if any species of trade was carried on between the two countries. "Intercourse!" rejoined he, laughing, "no! We have had none for these last two years, nor is it likely to be again renewed".²⁵² In 1838, another traveller, Hajee Abdun Nabee, an Afghan sent by the British for collecting intelligence on the political conditions of the country, also found that the ruler of Bampur held the Persian authority in contempt.²⁵³

As in the early 19th century the Persians were deprived of their northern provinces to the Russians, in order to compensate for lost areas, they pursued a policy of expansion towards Balochistan.²⁵⁴ During the two Russian wars, ending in the Trea-

²⁴⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 3.

²⁴⁹ Henry Pottinger, *Travels in Beloochistan and Sind*, p. 169.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Hajee Abdun-Nabee, "Notes Taken on a Tour through Parts of Baluchistan", In: *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, No. CLLIII and CLIV of 1844, pp. 693-94.

²⁵⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 28-29.

ties of "Gulistan" (1813) and "Turkmanchai" (1826), Persia lost all her territory on the west coast of the Caspian. By the terms of "Gulistan" peace treaty, Persia lost the Caucasian provinces of Qarabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku, Georgia and parts of Talish. In 1826, the treaty of Turkmanchai not only deprived Persia of further provinces of Erivan and Nakhchivan, but also it affirmed Russia's exclusive rights in the Caspian Sea.²⁵⁵

In Goldsmid's view, since Persia had lost a large portion of her territory to Russia in the North, and was checked by the Ottoman empire in the West, and by the British in Afghanistan, the only avenue for her expansion was in western Balochistan where the constant feuds between the petty chiefs had made the land an easy prey to their designs.²⁵⁶ In one of his reports prepared for the Government of Bombay and the Secretary of State for India on 27th April 1864, he had underlined the basic historical argument for recognising the Persian claims to their latest conquests in western Balochistan.²⁵⁷ General Goldsmid wrote in the final report of his proceedings to the Secretary of State for India on 9th November 1871 that "these tracts, had they power to be independent, would be independent; not having power to be independent, they are as fair prey to the strongest neighbour".²⁵⁸ Thereafter the name "Persian Balochistan" replaced "Western Balochistan" in official colonial documents.

Persian expansionism was furthermore stimulated by the extension of the British interest westward through Makkoran in the mid-19th century.²⁵⁹ In 1861, after the British intervention for the extension of the Indo-European telegraph line from Karachi to Gwadar in the domains of Kalat and then up to Jask on the coast of western Balochistan, the Persian military expeditions were extended up to Bampur-Pahra (Iranshahr) the major Hakomate in western Balochistan. It should be noted that the British telegraph project added to the geopolitical importance of the area. During the course of the British investigation for the construction of the telegraph line in 1862-68, they were confronted by conflicting territorial claims to western Balochistan by the Sultan of Oman, the Shah of Persia and the Khan of Kalat.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ Peter Avery, (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 334, 338.

²⁵⁶ F. J. Goldsmid, *Central Asia and Its Question*, London, 1873, p. 41-42.

²⁵⁷ J. A. Saldanha, *Precis of Mekran Affairs*, Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1905, p. 25.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁵⁹ Brian Spooner, "Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography", p. 614.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 616.

As observed by M. H. Hosseinbor, at the beginning the British took a neutral stand by avoiding accepting pretensions of sovereignty by any side, but finally they changed their position in favour of the Persians.²⁶¹ In 1849, one decade after the British occupation of Kalat (1839), the Persian forces headed by Ibrahim Khan Taqizada occupied the major Hakomate of western Balochistan, Bampur.²⁶² From 1850 onward, the Persian governor of Kerman on several occasions led attacks on the neighbouring district of western Balochistan and committed acts of unprecedented cruelty upon the helpless population. The Persian government continued its policy of playing off the local rulers one against another with the aim of reducing their authority and establishing its own as far as possible.²⁶³

By the time the line was completed in 1869-70 the Persian forces had advanced as far as Sarbaz, between the coast and Bampur. Up to the late 1870s the lesser Hakomates of Dezzak, Sarbaz, Geh and Kaserkand (Qasr-r Qand) also were invaded and subdued.²⁶⁴ In 1863, as the construction of the telegraph line began, Ibrahim Khan the Persian governor in Bampur threatened the Omani representatives in the ports of Balochistan.²⁶⁵ In 1869, Mir Din-Mohammad, ruler of Dashtiari, occupied Chahbar (Chabahar) and it was never recovered by Oman. But a period of struggle and negotiation ensued between Oman, Mir Din-Mohammad and Persia, in the course of which the Persian governor-general appeared in Kaserkand.²⁶⁶ But from this time, the rule of the Arabs of Muscat ended in Chahbar, after eighty years.²⁶⁷ In 1872, the Persian general, Ibrahim Khan, occupied Chahbar and annexed it to Persia. Two years later, in 1874, Bashkard then independent under Saif Ali Khan was also brought under subjection.²⁶⁸

Up to the late 1860s, the Khan of Kalat was claiming sovereignty over the whole of Balochistan.²⁶⁹ While contrary to his claim, the British and the Persian imposed the Goldsmid Line on the Khanate. In 1869 the King of Persia suggested a de-

²⁶¹ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", Washington D.C.: The Amerikan university, 1984, p. 96-97.

²⁶² M. G. Pikulin, Baloch, p. 125.

²⁶³ Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography, p. 617.

²⁶⁴ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 257.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 616.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. 6, Quetta: United Printers, 1995, pp- 363-64; cf. Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 167.

marcation of the Perso-Baloch Frontier.²⁷⁰ In the same year the Persian delegation, led by Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Bamm, and the Khanate delegation, led by Faqir Mohammad Bizenjo, met under the supervision of General Goldsmid, the British Chief Commissioner of the joint Perso-Baloch Boundary Commission at Bampur. This meeting is known as the "Bampur Conference", and was held on 1st December 1869. The Baloch delegates not only opposed the proposed border demarcation, but also demanded the withdrawal of Persians from western Balochistan. They argued that this region is an integral part of the Baloch country, the Khanate.²⁷¹ After two years of persistent Baloch resistance, however, in 1871, with the help of the British, the Iranians succeeded in dividing Balochistan.

In the 1870, a division of influence between Kalat, Afghanistan and Persia had been worked out and legitimised for the time being by the boundary commissions. But the Persians (working through Ibrahim Khan) both pre-empted and disputed some details of the commission's findings. They took Pishin in 1870, and Esfandak and Kuhak in 1871 directly after the commission had awarded these tracts to the Khanate. In the north Ibrahim Khan also defeated Syed Khan Kurd, known as *sardar* of the Sarhadd, in Khash.²⁷² From then on Ibrahim Khan controlled most of the western Balochistan up to the present border by a combination of force, threats, and the posting of minor officials, but he was not able to control the tribes of the Sarhadd.²⁷³

The Khan of Kalat, Khudadad Khan was not appointed to the border commissions that divided Balochistan, nor was he even consulted.²⁷⁴ As mentioned earlier, at the time of demarcation in 1871, western Balochistan was already under the Persian occupation. However, in 1860, the Khan of Kalat, Khudadad Khan, decided to recapture Geh (Nikshahr) and Kaserkand by force, but was warned off by the British authorities.²⁷⁵ Moreover, on 20th February, 1863, when the British decided to build the telegraph line from Jask to Karachi, they signed a treaty with the Khan of Kalat, Khudadad Khan, and the local Baloch *Sardars* of western Balochistan, not the Persian

²⁷⁰ Cf., Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 29.

²⁷¹ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. 6, Quetta: United Printers, 1995, pp- 363-64; cf. Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 167.

²⁷² Percy Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran, London, 1902, p. 106.

²⁷³ M. G. Pikulin, Baloch, p. 122.

²⁷⁴ Nina Swidler, "Beyond Parody", in Paul Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 182. Interviews with Baloch leaders, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Akbar Barakzai, Siddiq Baloch and many other Baloch nationalists

²⁷⁵ Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, Tarikh-e Baloch wa Balochistan, vol. 6, pp. 290-91.

Government.²⁷⁶ This action itself, according to Baloch nationalists, was a justification of the Khan's sovereignty claim over western Balochistan.²⁷⁷ It is important to note that despite the border demarcation and the British recognition of Persian sovereignty over western Balochistan, their rule was nominal. In fact it was the modern army of Reza Shah that finally defeated Mir Dost Mohammad Khan and occupied western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) in 1928, as will be discussed in the following section.

Resistance in Western Balochistan

In 1896, the assassination of the Qajar king Nasir-al-Din Shah prompted the Baloch chiefs to take the opportunity for re-establishing their rule in western Balochistan.²⁷⁸ In 1897, the Baloch rose against in Sarhadd, Saravan and Bampur under the leadership of the chief of the Narui tribe, Sardar Hossein Khan. In 1897, Hossein Khan attacked Pahra (Iranshahr)²⁷⁹ and led a general rebellion against Persian rule in the Sarhadd, Saravan, and Bampur, demanding a reduction of taxes, from one third to one tenth, and autonomy.²⁸⁰ The revolt spread to Sarbaz, Dezzak, Lashar, and Bampost. Hossein Khan occupied Bampur, Pahra, and Bazman and other places, which had small Persian garrisons, and controlled most of the northern part of Balochistan. Several Baloch groups, which had hitherto remained neutral in troubles between ruling families and the *Gajars* (as the Baloch called Persians), joined him.²⁸¹

In 1897, the Baloch defeated a large Persian force that was sent from Kerman to restore order. The uprising lasted for nearly two years but eventually Hossein Khan was defeated in 1898.²⁸² However, according to Pikulin, a Soviet scholar who studied Western Balochistan, the revolt continued and spread and was only crushed when Hossein Khan was bought off by being made ruler of a Boluk (district), with the right to collect taxes.²⁸³ The widespread revolt in Western Balochistan, according to Pikulin was due to heavy taxation and the "tyranny and oppression" of the Qajar governors as the cause of rebellion.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁶ The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, pp. 230-231; see also M. Mahmud, Tarikh-e Rawabet-e Sias-e Iran wa Englis Dar Qarn-e Nuzdahum Miladi, 2nd Edition (in 8 volumes), Tehran, 1335/1956, Vol. III, pp. 614-616.

²⁷⁷ Interview with Akbar Barakzai.

²⁷⁸ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 111.

²⁷⁹ Percy Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran, p. 132; Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography, p. 618.

²⁸⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 144.

²⁸¹ Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography, p. 618.

²⁸² Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

²⁸³ M. G. Pikulin, Baloch, p. 178.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162- 165.

The Baloch kept up their struggle during the reign of the Qajar dynasty, which ended ignominiously in 1921. In the process the Baloch lost effective control of most of their land. In spite of all this bloodshed and atrocities against the Baloch, the wishful designs of the Persian Government to annihilate them did not materialise. The Baloch with their usual tenacity and resolute determination maintained their political influence and semi-independent position. In spite of these military moves, Hosseinbor, the Baloch nationalist writer, wrote, "the Qajar rule in the country was more nominal than real and was directly limited to Bampur, then the capital of Baluchistan. The rest of the country remained independent or semi-independent to be disturbed only by periodical military expeditions sent for levy taxes".²⁸⁵

Even though, the revolt of 1896-1898 was crushed, it weakened and effectively minimised the rule of Qajar in Balochistan.²⁸⁶ Hossein Khan, the leader of the revolt, as mentioned above, was defeated in 1898, and died in the same year. But his son Sayad Khan succeeded to retain the control of the forts of Geh, Bent, Kaserkand and the ports. At the same time he was recognized by the Persians as the ruler of Geh, with the right to collect taxes.²⁸⁷ Meanwhile, he decided to expand, and took Sarbaz. Next, he joined up with Mir Bahram Khan Baranzai, who ruled Dezzak. However, as the Iranian Constitutional movement of 1906 weakened the central government, the Baloch began again to expand their raiding activities.

Having consolidated his power in Dezzak and Sarbaz, Mir Bahram Khan turned his attention in 1907, against the Persians. In the same year he recaptured the plains of Pahrah and Bampur. By 1910, he controlled as far as the seaports of Gwatr and Chabahar. Being defeated and lost the fort of Bampur, the Persians used a new tactic. They bought off Sardar Sayad Khan, by giving him the governorship of Balochistan.²⁸⁸ Sayad Khan was officially given the title of the "Sardar-e Nizam", and the right and duty to collect taxes from the whole of Balochistan within Persia. In return, Sayad Khan acknowledged the Persian claims over the region. Thus, Sayad Khan betrayed his ally Mir Bahram Khan, and sided with the Persians. But in spite of all, the Persian never succeeded. The real power in Iranian Balochistan remained with Mir Bahram Khan.²⁸⁹ In 1910, another Qajar force sent by Sardar Nosrat Isfandiari,

²⁸⁵ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 105.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁸⁷ Brian Spooner, *Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography*, p. 618.

²⁸⁸ M. G. Pikulin, *Baloch*, p. 216.

²⁸⁹ Amanullah Jahanbani, *Amaliyat-e-Qushun dar Balochistan*, Tehran, 1957, p. 35.

the Commander of the Kerman Garrison, attempted to regain control of Bampur, but Bahram Khan too defeated them.²⁹⁰

However, after 1910, when the Baranzais established their authority in the area, the British influence beyond Makkoran became a source of constant worry in Iranian Balochistan. In his search for allies Bahram Khan maintained close links with foreign governments especially with the Germans.²⁹¹ Being a devout Sunni-Muslim, he tried also to win the moral support of the Ottomans and Afghans. In the late 1914, Bahram Khan was in a powerful position, possessing almost 10,000 rifles. In addition, he was believed to have purchased a considerable number of firearms in Muscat through a weapon smuggler, Mir Kamal Chahani. Armed with his weapons and his grievances, Bahram Khan launched an uprising against the British government. In 1915, he defeated troops under the command of British agent and occupied the whole Kech valley in Makkoran.²⁹²

During this raid his *lashkar* numbered 5000 to 8000 men. Furthermore he was supported by the tribal *Sardars*, Mohammad Shah ruler of Sib and Suran, Shah Sawar Damani from Sarhadd, Sardar Din Mohammad from Dashtiari, Shah Jehan of Magas, Jalal Khan of Hoshagwala, and many others.²⁹³ Moreover, the German activities during the First World War in the region also encouraged him. During the War, the Germans and Ottoman Turks attempted to enter into relations with him with the aim of supporting the Baloch against the British.²⁹⁴

Impressed by Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani's pan-Islamism and supported by Bahram Khan and Barkat Khan of Jask, Khalifa Khair Mohammad, on May 1915, proclaimed Jihad (holy war) against the British.²⁹⁵ Khalifa from Karawan was a Naqshbandi *sufi*. He used his spiritual authority to command the allegiance of his followers, some of whom like Bahram Khan and Barkat Khan were tribal chieftains. Furthermore, Khalifa's Fatva was supported by many *mollas* of Sarhadd and by the chief *qazi* (judge) of Dashtiari, Qazi Sayad Ali.²⁹⁶ Many religious people or *mureeds* (followers), mostly from Karawan, Bint, Jask and Geyavan, accepted Khalifa's invitation.

²⁹⁰ Amanullah Jahanbani, *Sargozasht-e Balochistan wa Marzha-e-an*, Tehran, 1959, p. 36.

²⁹¹ IOR. R/1 (34-38).

²⁹² Amanullah Jahanbani, *Sargozasht-e Balochistan wa Marzha-e-an*, pp. 291-292.

²⁹³ IOR. R/1 (34-38).

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ G. M. Bayliss (ed.), *Operations In Persia, 1914-1919*, London (Imperial War Museum), 1987, p. 156.

²⁹⁶ IOR. R/1(34-38).

Mir Yar Mohammad, the nephew of Barkat Khan of Jask, commanded the *mureeds*.²⁹⁷ On the 3rd of May 1915, the *mureeds* attacked the British garrison in the fort of Chabahar. After one day's fighting the *mureeds* were repulsed with heavy losses. Meanwhile, they cut the telegraph line between Chabahar and Jask. However, the pro-British *Sardars*, Sardar Sayad Khan of Geh, known as Sardar-e-Nizam, Nawab Khan Bamari, and Islam Khan Mir Hajee of Bent, were opposed to Khalifa's call for *jihad* (holy war).

Meanwhile Khalifa and his *moreeds* (disciples) were busy propagating anti-British feelings throughout western Balochistan, Bahram Khan by attacking Kech and defeating the British forces, created a real threat against the British interest in the region. Supporting Bahram Khan's action, Khalifa declared it as a *Jihad* against the infidels (the British). The British anxiety was unavoidable. On the 6th of October 1915, Ramsay, AGG in Balochistan to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla wrote:

And what will Muhammadan opinion say when it is know that the British are retreating before Muhammadans, who are well-known (as they will say) to have German support behind them? Why should we give what will be considered ocular demonstration that Germans are speaking the truth when they say that British power is receiving its death-blows in Europe?²⁹⁸

Anti-British Baloch chiefs of Kech also supported Mir Bahram Khan. Mehrab Khan Nausherwani of Kuhak and Mehrab Khan Gechki were in close alliance with him. "The common talk is" said Mehrab Khan Gechki to the British authorities, "if Government does not protect us, why should we pay revenue? The power has been taken from our national leaders and, if we must pay, why should we not pay to the stronger party (Bahram Khan), who are Mohammadans, and obtain their protection?" In western Balochistan, anti-British agitation continued. On 26th of October, Khalifa ordered his followers to cut the Sadeich telegraph line, the most important communication line between Makkoran and Karachi.²⁹⁹

To stop Bahram Khan's further advancement, the pro-British *Sardars*, Sayad Khan of Geh, Islam Khan Mir Hajee, Mahmud Khan of Dashtiari, Mir Hoti Khan of Lashar, Nawab Khan Bamari, Rustam Khan of Champ, Sahib Khan Dehwari and Lalla Khan Bozorgzada were given arms and ammunition to raid inside his territory.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Issa Nikkhah.

²⁹⁸ IOR. R/1 (34-38).

The British called these *Sardars* "Friendly Chiefs".³⁰⁰ Not only was Bahram Khan's advance toward Gwadar and Pasni forts stopped, but by the intrigue of these *Sardars*, he was compelled to leave Kech and return to Bampur. On December 1915, Bahram Khan made another attempt to capture the border villages, Goumazi, Mand and Tomp, but this time also, retreated with heavy losses, and his brother, Mir Ameen, was killed. Subsequently, after the retreat of Bahram Khan, Khalifa came under pressure and gradually his *jihad* movement also eased.

To counter Russian, German, and Ottoman designs, the British had to dispatch a mission of their own, headed by Colonel Dew of the Political Department, to enter into a political arrangement for the peaceful settlement of disputes with Mir Bahram Khan.³⁰¹ Dew offered a peace treaty, which was accepted by Mir Bahram Khan. The treaty, which was signed on May 7, 1916, provided for recognition of Baranzai authority in western Balochistan, and in return, an agreement by Bahram Khan to suspend hostilities against the British.³⁰² By recognising his position as the effective ruler of the Western Balochistan, the British ended Bahram Khan's threat over Eastern Balochistan. In justifying this agreement, Sir Percy Sykes stated that "in view of the fact that Persian Baluchistan had broken its connection with Persia for many years, and that Bahram Khan, an upstart adventurer had recently led a raid across the British border, Dew deserved much credit".³⁰³

Moreover, the agreement also served an additional purpose and that was to distract and neutralise Bahram Khan while the British launched a simultaneous pacification campaign against the tribes of Sarhadd, which formed, at least nominally, part of his domain. In 1916, the Gamshadzai, Yarahmadzai and Ismailzai tribes of Sarhadd put up the most effective resistance against the British occupation in Sarhadd. One of their leaders Sardar Khalil Khan Gamshadzai was killed in the fighting, while Sardar Jiand Khan was arrested. When the latter was being brought to Quetta a Baloch detachment waylaid the government troops and freed their chief. The conflict with the government continued for nearly two years.³⁰⁴ However, in March 1924 the control of the tribes of the Sarhadd district (which was occupied by General Dyer in 1915-16),

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ G. M. Bayliss (ed.), Operations In Persia, 1914-1919, London (Imperial War Museum), pp. 168-69.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, London, 1930, p. 449; See also, Hasan Mo'aser, Tarikh-e Esteqrar-e Mashrutiat Dar Iran, Second edition, Tehran: Intesharat-e Ibn-e Sina, 1353/1974, p. 1232.

³⁰⁴ Amanullah Jahanbani, Sargozasht-e Balochistan wa Marzha-e-an, pp. 294-295.

was formally surrendered by the British to the Persian government.³⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the tribes of Sarhadd, the Rikis (Rigis) and the Damanis³⁰⁶ protested against this British action and demanded to remain as a part of Western Balochistan ruled by Bampur.³⁰⁷

Mir Bahram Khan died in Bampur in 1921. Having no son, he was succeeded by his nephew, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, who was born in the late 19th century in Bampur. Mir Dost Mohammad Khan declared himself "Shah-e-Balochistan."³⁰⁸ He had become the most powerful ruler in Persian Balochistan, by virtue of personal control over both Pahlava-Bampur and Sarawan and by marriage alliances with the rulers of the major principalities of Makkoran.³⁰⁹ Mir Dost Mohammad Khan extended the frontiers of the confederacy and entered into military alliances with the Baloch tribes of Sarhadd and Sistan, and ruled independently until 1928.³¹⁰

Dost Mohammad Khan successfully pursued the vigorous policies of his predecessor in consolidating the entire Western Balochistan under his rule. In this respect, he launched a centralisation campaign, which curbed the immense powers traditionally enjoyed by the hereditary *Sardars* of various principalities.³¹¹ As stated by the Baloch nationalist writer, Janmahmad, "Mir Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Bampur, did not recognise the boundaries drawn by the Anglo-Persian commission between Persia and Balochistan in 1905, and resisted Iranian hegemony in the country. He declared independence and established close relations with other Baloch rulers in eastern Balochistan, particularly Kalat".³¹² He also tried to establish links with Sultan of Muscat, king Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.³¹³

Mir Dost Mohammad Khan established a modern army with regular daily trainings and special uniform. A deserted officer of the British Levies at Khwash, Subedar Jamal-ud-Din Somailzia was appointed as the head of this army.³¹⁴ Simultaneously, a semi-police force called "Kotowal", responsible for the security and reve-

³⁰⁵ Brian Spooner, *Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography*, p. 619.

³⁰⁶ Damani was a collective name of the Sardaddi tribes of Yarahmadzai, Gamshadzai, and Somalzai (Ismailzai).

³⁰⁷ L/PS/10/875.

³⁰⁸ MSS EUR F131/24-27.

³⁰⁹ Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

³¹⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 279.

³¹¹ Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

³¹² Janmahmad, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle In Pakistan*, p. 204.

³¹³ L/PS/10/1136.

³¹⁴ Fighting in the war of Dizzak against the Persians in 1928, Subedar Jamal-ud-Din Somailzia was taken prisoner. He was subsequently released through the interventions of the *Sardars* of Sarhadd. In the later Sarbaz disturbances he again took sides with Mir Ali Mohammad and Mir Nausherwan. After their defeat, Subedar and his company crossed the border and entered into Rabat, Afghanistan and took refuge in that country.

nue collection was also established in all most all the provinces. Moreover, a heavily armed security guard, headed by Hayatan Khan Rind, was keeping guard on the fort of Pahrah, the head quarters of the Khan. His position was so strong that he no longer was merely appointing tribal leaders, but actually naming governors for the area under his control.³¹⁵ He appointed one, Mirza Hashom, as his Wazir. It is interesting to note that, according to the India Office Records, to translate the English language newspapers and reports from India, the daughter of a Hindu trader from Simla, was recruited as his personal translator.³¹⁶

Describing Mir Dost Muhammad Khan's military ability, in 1958 Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch wrote, "He was able to muster up 10,000 fighting men equipped with martini-peabody rifles."³¹⁷ According to Sardar Khan Baluch, Bampur in his time was well guarded and well administered. As a free stronghold of the Baloch, it served as an asylum for all insurgents who absconded from Kalat state.³¹⁸ Hossein Makki, a Persian historian, however, numbers Mir Dost Mohammad Khan's regular army to 5000 men.³¹⁹ The revenues from produce, which was 1/10, and the *Khani-Arziat* (crown land) were the main sources of income to the treasury of the Hakomate. The custom posts of Chabahar, Gwatr and the other part of Balochistan constituted another important source for the state treasury.³²⁰ On demand each tribe had an obligation to provide *Lankbandi* (troops). Of course, those tribes who provided *Lankbandi* were exempted from paying taxes.³²¹

Having defeated the revolutionary movements in Azerbaijan (1920), and Gilan (1921), in northern Iran, Reza Khan formalised his dictatorial rule to become the Shah of Iran. Supported by the British, he overthrew Ahmad Shah, the last king of the Qajar dynasty in 1925.³²² On December 12, 1925, he proclaimed himself as Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.³²³ Reza Khan was a shrewd politician; any force that stood in his way mercilessly attacked and, so far as possible destroyed.³²⁴ With Ahmad Shah

³¹⁵ Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

³¹⁶ Cf., L/PS/10/1136.

³¹⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan*, p. 260.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Hossein Makki, *Tarikh-e Bistsaleh-e Iran* (The Twenty Years History of Iran), Tehran: Amir Ka-beer, 1362/1983, pp. 129.

³²⁰ L/PS/10/1136.

³²¹ Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

³²² M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", PhD. Thesis, The Amerikan university, 1984, p. 118.

³²³ Reza Khan rise to power in 1921, when his British-supported military coup established him first as the minister of War and then as the Prime Minister in 1923.

³²⁴ Hossein Makki, *Tarikh-e Bistsaleh-e Iran*, Vol. II, pp. 203-33.

thus deposed and dictatorial powers handed to Reza Khan, he adopted a policy to crush sub-nationalism in Iran. In 1925, he annexed the British-protected Arab principality of Khuzistan or Arabistan, as it used to be called, which was ruled then by an Arab ruler, Shaikh Khazal.³²⁵ The Baloch *Sardars*, and especially Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, were informed that they would no longer be treated as independent rulers and that they were to surrender to Iran's rule.

Consequently, a Perso-Baloch war, led by Mir Dost Mohammad Khan started.³²⁶ In the early 1928, Iranian troops invaded Balochistan with artillery and aeroplanes.³²⁷ Various hotly contested battles were fought between the two sides for seven months. Describing the intensity of resistance, and the bravery of the Baloch forces in the battle with Iranian army in 1928, the commander of the Iranian armed forces, general Amanullah Jahanbani stated, "In my opinion the reason for such [Baloch] resistance... lies in the [Balochs'] historical legends, ..."³²⁸ While acknowledging that none of the defenders surrendered, he said that they had to be eliminated one by one in order to secure the fort of Dezzak.³²⁹

What feelings did stimulate such a sacrifice in the Baloch? The most likely explanation for this lies in the Baloch desire to preserve their independence and to resist political control by the non-Baloch. It may also be of some interest to note that to undermine the resistance morale of the Baloch, Iranian planes dropped leaflets over Bampur, Pahrāh, and Dezzak, the major cities of Western Balochistan, printed in Persian and English. These leaflets told the Baloch that the Iranian forces would soon liberate them from the tyranny of the *sardars* and that after their liberation the Baloch could decide their own destiny.³³⁰

Being defeated in Dezzak and Bampur, Mir Dost Mohammad resorted to guerilla tactics against the Iranians. In spite of numerical superiority and the sophistication of their armament, the Persians did not succeed in subjugating the Baloch. Seeing no other way, Reza Shah reverted to the traditional treachery of a Persian Monarch and sent word to Mir Dost Mohammad expressing the desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the Baloch. Reza Shah sent a delegate carrying the Muslim holy writ, the

³²⁵ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", pp. 118-119.

³²⁶ Janmahmad, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 204.

³²⁷ M. G. Pikulin, *Baloch*, p. 193-94.

³²⁸ Amanullah Jahanbani, *Amaliyat-e Qushun dar Balochistan*, p. 70.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Koran, to Mir Dost Mohammad, along with a letter in which the Shah gave a solemn commitment that he wanted to negotiate with Mir Dost Mohammad in Tehran.³³¹ He promised that Mir Dost Mohammad would remain ruler. The letter said Balochistan would be allied with Iran only in the conduct of its external affairs. The Shah, the letter promised, was keen to have a settlement on the same lines arrived at between the British government and the Khan of Kalat.³³²

Taking Reza Shah's assurances for granted Mir Dost Mohammad not only stopped the hostilities, but also set out for Tehran along with some of his trusted colleagues. But soon after his arrival in Tehran he was arrested and put in jail. A reign of terror was let loose, killing and maiming hundreds of people in Balochistan.³³³ To continue the freedom movement of his country, Mir Dost Mohammad managed his escape, but returning to Balochistan was arrested and executed in 1931 by the Iranian government.³³⁴ According to the India Office Records, before his defeat, Mir Dost Mohammad sent a delegation headed by Abdul Karim and Arz Mohammad Bozorgzadeh from Dezzak, to British Balochistan's capital Quetta, to meet the Agent to the Governor General for help against the Persians, but with no success.³³⁵

His first hope was king Amanullah of Afghanistan. It is said that Amanullah wanted to help the Baloch, because of having common religious faith and common anti-British and anti-Persian feeling. It may also be of some interest to note that a pro-Dost Mohammad Khan lobby in Kabul including Amanullah Khan himself were propagating that the Baranzais of Balochistan, were ethnically the same as the Barakzais of Afghanistan, a Pashtun tribe to which Amanullah and other members of the royal family belonged.³³⁶ Perhaps the reason then was to justify the Afghan claim over the Baloch country. But in 1928, the King himself was struggling for his own survival and was not in a position to support Mir Dost Mohammad.³³⁷

Criticising king Amanullah Khan's foreign policy, Syed Mehdi Farrokh, a pro-Iranian writer, pointed out: "Amanullah wanted to create some excitations in Iranian

³³⁰ Information obtained from Mir Yar Mohammad Baleidai of Sarboug in 1977. Siding with Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, Mir Yar Mohammad participated in the war of Pahlav against the Persians in 1928. He was also present in the emergency *Jirga*, of *Sardars* in Pahlav in 1928.

³³¹ L/PS/10/1136.

³³² *Baluchi Dunya*, Multan, February 1972, p. 6.

³³³ L/PS/10/1136.

³³⁴ *Baluchi Dunya*, Multan, February 1972, p. 6; *People's Front*, London, November 1979, p. 5.

³³⁵ L/PS/10/1136.

³³⁶ Interview with Afghan historian Mohammad Azam Sistani.

³³⁷ In 1929, one year after Mir Dost Mohammad's fall, king Amanullah Khan was overthrown.

Balochistan.”³³⁸ Meanwhile, the Persian army arrested one of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan’s messengers, leaving toward Afghanistan. According to Persian sources he was carrying a letter from Dost Mohammad Khan to the ruler of Afghanistan. In this letter Iran was mentioned as the neighbouring country, which had attacked Balochistan. He was requesting help from his Afghan brethren.³³⁹ Similarly, in 1928, the Khanate of Kalat was experiencing its worst political crisis. Under the direct control of the British administration, the rule of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Mahmud Khan was nominal. Thus, Dost Mohammad Khan’s repeated requests to the Khan of Kalat for ‘come and help us’, according to the nationalist writer Sardar Khan Baluch, were answered “immediately and mercilessly” by a decided no.³⁴⁰

On the Soviet Union side, Dost Mohammad Khan was not too optimistic; firstly, because of Reza Khan’s democratic and anti-British gestures, and secondly, because of geographical distance. In the same way he was not expecting any help from the British. The British having their own vested interest, had already sided with the Persians, and, as mentioned earlier, they openly rejected his request for help. Without hope of outside help, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan resorted to a new tactic. He tried to attract the attention of the followers of the exiled Shah, Ahmad Shah Qajar. He stated that Ahmad Shah was the legitimate king of Iran, and that he would support the Qajar king. On the 9th of June 1928, a report by the British consul at Kerman stated that “Ahmad Shah will shortly land in Baluchistan and join Dost Mohammad”, and added, “Ahmad Shah has left Paris for Beirut”.³⁴¹ There were also rumours that the Russians were following the events with curiosity.³⁴² However, nothing is known about the reaction of Ahmad Shah Qajar.

In 1810, as mentioned earlier, a British spy, Henry Pottinger noted a profound hatred between the Persians and the Baloch in his discussion with Mehrab Khan of Bampur, in Western Balochistan. Expressing such revived old hatreds, on 25th January 1927, about one century later, Sir J. Ramsay, the AGG in Balochistan wrote:

The tracts named are Persian in international law, because the boundary pillars prove that they are so; but there is not a vestige of Persian authority existing, nor has Persia any means of asserting her theoretical claims

³³⁸ Syed Mehdi Farrokh, *Tarikh-e-Seyasi-e Afghanistan*, p. 455.

³³⁹ Jafar Mehdinia, *Nakhost Waziran-e-Iran* (4), *Zendagi-e Seyasi-e Sayyed Zeya-ul-Din Tabatabai*, Tehran, 1369/1991, p. 614.

³⁴⁰ Interview with Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch. See also, cf. Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *Baluch a Nation*, Lahore, 1947, p. 158.

³⁴¹ L/PS/10/1136.

³⁴² Ibid.

to sovereignty over an area in which Persians are aliens and in which they detest and are detested by the people... Not only has the country under discussion slipped out of Persian grasp; it has been so hostile to Persia that its inhabitants have taken Persian forts and lands and have laid waste districts further west which still own allegiance to Persia, while they have carried off numbers of Persian subjects into slavery.³⁴³

Mir Dost Mohammad Khan's rebellion in the late 1920s was a prototype of post-World War nationalist movements. In Harrison's view, it was a turning point in the history of the Baloch in that nationalism was the prime factor.³⁴⁴ Dost Mohammad Khan based the legitimacy of his rule on ethnic criteria such as Sunni Islam and his tribal alliances. The townsfolk and Baloch *Ulema* (clergy) supported him. The fear of Shiism prompted the *maulavis* to issue a religious *Fatva*, declaring the Persian armed forces "infidel" in order to mobilise popular support for Dost Mohammad Khan against Reza Shah in 1928.³⁴⁵ His weaknesses, however, were the usual ones: inter-tribal rivalry. The Rikis, the Naruis, the Kurds, and many other tribes made a separate peace with Tehran to guarantee their relative strength vis-à-vis the newly created urban power centre of Baranzais. Even in Makkoran, the power base of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, several tribes who fought the hardest against the Iranian, were willing to make a deal. Another reason for tribal reticence in Sarhadd to be involved in a rebellion was the chieftains' reluctance to jeopardise the relationships they had cultivated after the British departure from the region and the transfer of the Sarhadd administration to Iranian in 1924. Bampur fell against the overwhelming power of the Iranian army, but it had been weakened by tribal desertion to the other side before the army took a single town.

With Mir Dost Mohammad Khan's fall, the Iranians succeeded, for the most part, in pacifying the Baloch tribes. Occasional revolts, however, continued in Iranian Balochistan throughout the remainder of Reza Shah's reign. Major examples were the revolt of Jumma Khan Ismailzai and Jiand Khan Yar-Ahmadzai in Sarhadd in 1931. Both were subdued by the intensive Persian air bombings. Being unable to stand against the superior Persian power, Jumma Khan with his forces took refuge to British Balochistan, but was soon extradited to Iran; there he was exiled for life to central Persia, Shiraz. The other rebellious chief, the ninety years old Jiand Khan, was ar-

³⁴³ L/PS/10/875.

³⁴⁴ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 3.

³⁴⁵ Amanullah Jahanbani, *Amaliyat-e Qushun dar Balochistan*, p. 70.

rested and died in a jail in Mash-had northern Iran.³⁴⁶ The next major rebellion was the rebellion of a number of tribes led by Mehrab Khan Nausherwani in Kuhak in 1938, demanding reduction of customs duty on livestock, in which more than 200 Baloch were executed under orders from Persian General Alborz.³⁴⁷

The last rebellious chief, who took up arms against the Tehran power, was Mirza Khan of Jask, but at last he was forced for his safety to flee toward the Arab Sheikdoms. "Henceforth", wrote the Baloch nationalist writer, Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, "the entire Persian Balochistan remained like a body without head. Descending unto most mean ruptures of beastly whims, Reza Shah, destroyed one by one, the rank and fashion of the millions of Persian Balochis, by means, most deplorable. Family after family were deported, thousands were deprived of their property; the elders of distinguished families exposed to most inhuman tortures were flayed, blinded maimed and often minced".³⁴⁸ However, as it will be discussed in chapter five, the Baloch nationalist struggle in Iran, encouraged by the upsurge of the Baloch nationalism in Pakistan, was resumed in the early 1960s.

The main causes of the failure of the various Baloch resistance movements, according to historian Inayatullah Baloch, were the disunity of the tribal chiefs, lack of a social base for Baloch nationalism in Iran, a powerful Iranian military force, and the joint Perso-British interest in pacifying the Baloch tribes.³⁴⁹ In spite of the large popular support enjoyed by Mir Dost Mohammad Khan in his confrontation with the Iranian forces, his feudally structured government was highly fissiparous and vulnerable. The defection by some *Sardars* who viewed the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the Baranzai ruler as a threat to their traditional hereditary privileges very soon proved it. As a result, Jahanbani reports that several *Sardars* in Dez-zak district defected to him during the course of the military operation.

Apart from the inadequate arming of the Baloch forces, the Persian air attacks made the launching of general offensives by the Baranzais difficult.³⁵⁰ It should be noted that the air power was an effective means by which Reza Shah consolidated his power, especially against the Baloch, just as British air power was instrumental in consolidating British's imperial power in the post-World War I Middle East. More-

³⁴⁶ General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, London, 1964, p. 254.

³⁴⁷ Gholam Mohammad Lalzad, "Baloch Kist?", p. 34.

³⁴⁸ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, p. 261.

³⁴⁹ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 144-45

³⁵⁰ General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, London, 1964, p. 256.

over, the lack of active material support from other Baloch regions, the lack of a social base for the Baloch nationalism in Iran played also an important role to the defeat of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan.³⁵¹

After Hossein Khan and Bahram Khan, Dost Mohammad Khan's rebellion was the third Baloch-wide attempt within three decades (1898-1928) to establish the Baloch rule in Western Balochistan. Dost Mohammad Khan called for a Baloch nation to be united under his leadership, and he based his legitimacy on his control of Baranzai tribe. As a tribal leader, Dost Mohammad Khan controlled the allegiances of the tribal members who would fight for his cause. However, due to the British intrigues and counter-activities, Mir Dost Mohammad Khan's attempts to include the Sarhaddi tribes into his domain was unsuccessful.

Dost Mohammad Khan's rebellion was tribal. Although a few members of the ruling class may have been exposed to modern nationalistic ideas through their contact with the British and the Baloch of Eastern Balochistan, the society was highly underdeveloped socially and economically.³⁵² There were no notable middle class or other modern classes, which are identified as the base for modern nationalism. However, a delegation of Iranian Baloch attended "the Balochistan and all India Baloch Conference" in December 1932, at Jacobabad.³⁵³ It is said, influenced by this delegation, that Magasi himself took a secret tour to Sarhadd, Iranian Balochistan.³⁵⁴ Was he able to meet the Sarhaddi rebellious chiefs? Nothing is known about this. In 1934, however, according to Inayatullah Baloch, Magasi suggested an armed struggle for the liberation and unification of Balochistan.³⁵⁵ Similarly, in 1933, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, a prominent national leader of Balochistan, showed his opposition to the partition and division of Balochistan by publishing the first map of Greater Balochistan.³⁵⁶

The Baloch struggle for their freedom, during the whole British period, like in the two other parts of the Baloch country (British and Iranian Balochistan) continued in Sistan (Afghanistan) as well. Impressed by king Amanullah's anti-British campaign, the Baloch of Nimruz showed their protest against the demarcation and occupation of their land by intensive raiding inside British Balochistan in the early 1920s. By

³⁵¹ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 145.

³⁵² M. G. Pikulin, Baloch, p. 198.

³⁵³ Weekly, Young Baluchistan, 15 January 1934; Saeedi Baluch, "Azad Baluchistan aur Hakumat-e-Iran" in: Weekly, Baluchistan, 4 March 1936, cited in: Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 145.

³⁵⁴ Interview with Anwar Sajidi.

³⁵⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 32.

attacking Kundi, a British garrison, Ghazi Sher Jan Sanjarani arrested a British officer and his escorts and took them to the court of Amanullah Khan in Kabul.³⁵⁷ Ghazi Sher Jan is a legendary hero among the Baloch of Afghanistan and songs about him are sung even today.

Summation

The strength of Baloch identity is rooted in proud historical memories of determined resistance against the would-be conquerors who perennially attempted, without success, to annex all or part of Balochistan to their adjacent empires. It seems that the migration of the Baloch into the territory of present-day Balochistan was an important milestone in their ethnic history. It is in this territory that the ethnolinguistic community formed as a result of various contacts with the local pre-Indo-European, Indo-Aryan and Iranian populations during the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. It is evidently during this period that the major tribal unions, which formed the nucleus of the Baloch feudal nationality, arose. Thus, in seeking to mobilise a nationalist movement today, the Baloch leaders are manipulating the powerful historical symbolism of a tortuous struggle for survival stretching back more than two thousand years.

Much of the Baloch ancient history is clouded over with uncertainty, and controversy exists about many aspects of it. Basing their arguments mainly on legendary accounts, some Baloch scholars' today claim that their ancestors came from Babylonia, in modern Iraq, through northern Iran to Makkoran. According to Sardar Khan, this migration began in 538 BC., when Cyrus the Great conquered Babylonia. Western investigators, relying essentially on the evidence of phonological and etymological comparisons of the Baloch language, have tended to an alternate view that the Baloch are first identifiable in history inhabiting an area in northern Iran adjacent to the southern coasts of the Caspian Sea. Virtually all of them judge the Baloch a racial amalgam of many peoples and classes. The Balochi language, together with Persian, Pashtu and Kurdish, is the Iranian group of the Indo-European language family. Some Baloch writers, however, believe that the Baloch are the ancient inhabitant of Makkoran.

From the 12th century onward the powerful Baloch chieftains, such as Mir Jalal Han, Mir Shaihak and Mir Chakar, forcefully extended their rule over most of

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

Balochistan. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of regional state formations, in which the feudalizing aristocracy of the Baloch tribes was in the ascendant, arose in the territory of Balochistan. Of these the Malik dynasty of Kech and Bampur, Buledai dynasty, the Dodai Confederacy of Derajat and the Khanate of Kalat are the most important.

In 1734, the Iranian conquerer, Nadir Shah Afshar, invaded the subcontinent. In order to save his realm, the Khan of Kalat paid tribute to Nadir Shah. On the death of Nadir in 1747, the Khan of Kalat acknowledged the superiority of Ahmed Shah Durrani for some years. In 1758, however, the Khan declared himself entirely independent, upon which the Afghan forces under the command of Ahmad Shah himself invaded Balochistan and besieged the Kalat fortress for forty days. This expedition terminated in a treaty of peace, by which the Khan agreed to furnish troops to assist the Kabul armies, and the Afghan King in return, agreed to pay cash allowance. From that time till 1839, when the British army occupied the country, Balochistan was completely independent owing no allegiance to any authority in India or elsewhere. The British government in India never claimed the doctrine of paramountcy was applicable to its relations with Kalat; nor has the Khan ever admitted that the powers of paramountcy could be exercised against him and his government.

Like the Rind-Lashari confederacy, Nasir Khan's powerful state was also short-lived. His domain declined soon after his death. The Qajars of Persia annexed western Balochistan to Persia. The Talpurs of Sindh took over the port of Karachi. Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Lahore occupied Harrand and Dajal (Dera Ghazi Khan area). The insurrection also started in Sarawan and Jhalawan supported by the Mengal and Bizenjo tribes. There was anarchy in Makkoran. Under Khan Mohmud Khan the process of disintegration and weakening of Khanate reached to its lowest ebb.

Britain, whose interest in India's Trans-Indus western frontiers dated from the early nineteenth century, was the only foreign power to succeed in establishing relatively effective control over Balochistan prior to the founding of modern Pakistan in 1947. The First Afghan War (1839-41) and annexation of Sindh and Punjab to British India soon thereafter mark the formal arrival of British military and political power to the region.

³⁵⁷ Gholam Mohammad Lazad, "Baloch Kist?" in: *Tran* No 5, Baloch Komite, June 1999, Stockholm, pp. 34-35.

Opposing to cross his territory, Mehrab Khan, the Khan of Kalat was killed by the British troops on 13 November 1939. Furthermore, internal strife and weakness in the Khanate opened the way to British manipulation of the Baloch confederation. However, in its early phases, British influence over Balochistan was exerted largely through agreements negotiated with tribal leaders, and through subsidies, manipulation of tribal feuds, and the conduct of periodic punitive expeditions against rebellious tribesmen.

Balochistan came under British influence by the treaties of 1854, and 1876. In 1854, the British entered into an agreement with Nasir Khan II, the ruler of Kalat, which was subsequently renewed and affirmed in another treaty in 1876, in which the British government once again committed itself to respect the independence of Kalat, and to aid the Khan in case of need in the maintenance of a just authority and protection of territories from external attack.³⁵⁸ During British hegemony, the Baloch country was arbitrarily divided into several parts. One portion was given to Iran, a small portion was with Afghanistan and the northeastern region remained with the colonial administration under lease. The rest of the country was left in possession of the Kalat State. The Kalat state was further carved into the agencies territories and the federation of Balochi States (Kalat, Kharan and Las-Bela) with the Khan of Kalat as the head of the federation. In 1879, British Balochistan included the Pashtun districts and the leased Baloch areas with its capital at Quetta was created.

The British hegemony in Balochistan in 19th century aroused the question of Baloch national sovereignty. Big-power rivalry in central Asia, which resulted in the British invasion of Afghanistan, also brought its forces into the Baloch region. In 1809-10, the East India Company's army had sent a Captain Christie and a Lieutenant Pottinger to explore Balochistan. British frontier policy in the early 19th century was motivated by an urge to consolidate the colony and reduce perceived threats to its security. This demanded acquisition of information, creation of allies, dependencies or buffers, delimiting and then demarcating frontiers and finally, the deployment of resources to maintain the impermeability of the frontiers. Threats from an equally expansionist Czarist Russia led to an era of intrigue and conspiracy along the border.

Up to the mid-19th century, the Baloch state of Kalat, then generally known as Balochistan, embraced the present day Balochistan provinces of Iran and Pakistan in-

³⁵⁸ See "Treaty Between the British Government and the Khelat State – 1876" in: Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, pp. 230-34.

cluding some areas now forming parts of Punjab and Sindh provinces in Pakistan, and was an independent state. When the British arrived in the subcontinent, they entered into treaty relations with the state of Kalat. Kalat and Nepal were the two states which never formed part of the Indian Empire.

With the beginning of the twentieth century, Baloch discontent found new forms of expression. Political unrest took various forms and there was an increase of sporadic uprisings both in eastern and western Balochistan. External events, such as the Iranian Revolution (1907), the First World War, the 1917 Russian revolution, Turkish and German activities, pan-Islamism and the Indian freedom movement also had effects on the Baloch. The Baloch tribes of Sarhadd resisted against the British occupation in Western Balochistan. However, they were defeated and Sarhadd was occupied in 1915. Simultaneously, the Mengal and the Marri revolted against attempts by the British government to raise mercenaries in Balochistan. Rebel chiefs fled to the Soviet Union and formed the delegation to the famous "Baku Congress of the People of the East". Communist influence in Balochistan, though not to be overestimated, dates from that time, and Lenin's appeal for the "right of self-determination for all oppressed nations had already had some influence on rapidly developing nationalist tendencies.

Western Balochistan became part of Iran in 1871 under the Perso-Baloch agreement. The British representative, General Goldsmid, supervised the demarcation of the Perso-Baloch frontier. In the late nineteenth century, Pan-Islamism as propagated by Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani and Caliph Sultan Abdul Hamid influenced the politics of Persian Balochistan. Their influence led to Baloch revolts against Persian rule and against British control of eastern Balochistan. During the First World War (1914-18) a number of Baloch tribes, irrespective of their beliefs or sectarian affiliation, took part in uprisings, which were guided by the Turko-German alliance. In 1907, the Baloch tribes of Makkoran (Iranian Balochistan) under the leadership of Mir Bahram Khan Baranzai established a semi-independent state in Persian Balochistan, which lasted until 1928.

Mir Dost Mohammad Khan united the most of the Iranian Balochistan by force, by marriages, and by tribal alliances, in face of Iranian weakness. In 1925, Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty implemented an aggressive policy towards minority ethnic groups aimed at their Persianization and at restricting their autonomy. In 1928 the Iranian army defeated the Baloch forces in western Balochistan. Some

Baloch tribes, however, supported the Iranians. Dost Mohammad Khan's defeat marks the beginning of a thirteen-year crusade by Reza Shah against the Baloch, until the Shah had flirted with the Axis powers, and the Allies removed him from office in 1941.

In the course of time, however, the British direct rule in Eastern Balochistan led to the construction of the first networks of roads, railroads, and telegraph lines. The British though on a limited basis, introduced the modern education. They also developed several coal-mining fields, and related servicing facilities in that part during the second half of the 19th century. As a result, the first educated and politically conscious Baloch class emerged in Eastern Balochistan and formed the original nucleus of the modern Baloch nationalism in the 1920s, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Nationalism in Practice

National Consciousness and Nationalism

In the mid-19th century, the nationalistic sentiments, along with the first reproduction of European nationalist historical works in India and other lands of Asia started to spread all over the continent. For example, Sir William Jones and other founding European scholars of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 eventually yielded a sizeable accumulation of knowledge about the history of India. In this manner “educated Indians increasingly were to learn about their own culture through the mediation of European ideas and scholarship”. Then, in these circumstances, “Indians began to write history in the European mode”.¹ The lumping together of the vast and diverse multiple civilisation of the Indian subcontinent not only demonstrates distorting effects of nationalistic doctrinal restrictions but also reveals an overarching contempt for sound and principled methods of historiography. Thus India became the subject of rigidly maintained misconceptions among its native scholars as well among Western historians who conceptualised India in a nationalistic context. In the same fashion, the Baloch, educated from the Indian universities introduced this new concept of history for their homeland in the turn of the 20th century.²

The British occupation of eastern Balochistan and the martyrdom of Mehrab Khan in 1839, the Persian occupation of western Balochistan in 1928, and the subsequent execution of its leader Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, the death of famous freedom fighters, such as Barkat Khan of Jask and Jiand Khan of Sarhad in the Persian jails, and the imprisonment of the rebellious tribal chief, Noora Megal by the British, mark the beginning of far-reaching changes in Baloch political history. The Baloch nationalist writers and poets recapitulated these events in subsequent decades. Although, the war economy retarded the consolidation of the Baloch as a nation; the destruction and suffering stimulated a political consciousness that was unprecedented in the region.

Since the 1920s, the Baloch national awareness grew rapidly with every fresh Baloch outbreak. Although at times it may have seemed deceptively like modern nationalism, Baloch national awareness did not actually attain to this stage until the

¹ Bernard S. Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India”, in: E. Hobsbawn, T. Ranger (ed.), Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 182-183.

early 20th century, especially after the Young Baloch movement and the Anjuman Ittehad Balochan in 1920s. This movement coupled with other developments and events within and without the British Indian Empire, hastened the emergence and growth of doctrinaire nationalism among the Baloch. The Baloch national sentiment thus acquired a new motive power, and became a political force of great importance in the affairs of the region.

Moreover, the twentieth century inherited all the territorial and administrative ambiguities, as well as the awkward political and social system, which were the consequences of the events of the nineteenth century in Balochistan. What had been good enough for securing imperial frontiers was inadequate to cope with the needs and aspirations of a people entering the "modern world". Entering the first decade of the 20th century, the Baloch peoples' discontent found new forms of expression. Political unrest took various forms and there was an increase of sporadic tribal uprisings. External events such as the First World War, the 1917 Russian revolution, the subsequent civil war, revolution in Turkey and the Indian nationalist struggle acted as catalysts for the Baloch nationalist tendencies.³

It should be remembered that at the same time as the Baloch tribes were in revolt, the *Hijrat* Movement was started by some Muslim *Ulema* calling for the migration of British Indian Muslims to Afghanistan and Muslim Central Asia. It wanted to put pressure on the British to change its anti-Ottoman policy during and after the World War 1. The religious-minded people and a few Baloch from Derajat, Jacobabad, Nushki and Quetta migrated to Afghanistan.⁴ However, the movement, according to Inayatullah Baloch, had very little appeal for the Baloch tribesman, who did not understand peaceful agitation against British imperialism.⁵

From the end of the First World War the Baloch nationalists increased their efforts to achieve unity among the people and work to create an independent Balochistan. "The failure of the Baloch resistance movement", Inayatullah Baloch writes, "gave rise to groups of nationalists".⁶ He classifies them into two categories: those who decided to migrate from Balochistan to Soviet Union and got Soviet support against British imperialism. This group he termed as revolutionaries, led by Misri

² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 90.

³ M. G. Pikulin, *Baloch*, p. 181

⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, p. 143.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Khan Baloch, one of the leaders of the Marri-Khetran uprising in 1917; the second group consisted of the constitutionalists, who were educated in British educational institutions and had a middle class background, and followed the style of the Indian nationalists.⁷ It is, this group which organised the Anjuman and later on the Kalat State National Party.

The war economy, as indicated above, not only retarded the consolidation of the Baloch as a nation, but also accelerated the trend toward west to east migration. By the end of 1930s, there were more Baloch in the British Indian Provinces of the Punjab and Sindh than there were in the Khanate.⁸ However, the destruction and suffering of war and migration as well as the new *Sardari* system (Sandeman System) stimulated the Baloch nationalism. The Baloch of Sindh and Punjab sympathised with the cause of the Khanate-based Baloch Movement, although there was no mechanism to transform this romantic sympathy to meaningful and effective action.⁹

As mentioned in chapter 3, after much blood was shed on both sides, the Baloch and Persian, western Balochistan was subjugated in 1928. This, and the subsequent atrocities of the Iranian armed forces, led to mass migration of the Baloch towards eastern Balochistan and Sindh. Most of these people settled in Karachi. Accordingly, this mass migration of the Baloch, affected their brethren on the eastern side, and provoked their sympathy and national feeling towards western Balochistan and Baloch nationalism as a whole.¹⁰ Perhaps, it was against this background that in 1981, Selig Harrison opined in his Book, In Afghanistan's Shadow that the idea of Baloch nationalism originates with Mir Dost Mohammad's resistance against the Persians in Western Balochistan.¹¹

The Persians' state system not only denied the Baloch national identity but also subjected it to political, economical, cultural and military domination. The Persian-dominated governments have turned their state-building strategies into a "Persianization" campaign aimed at socio-cultural assimilation and the absorption of subordinate nationalities into the Persian-dominated state structure, culture and society. All decisions in respect to the Baloch and other nationalities were made in Tehran and

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Aijaz Ahmad, "The National Question in Baluchistan", pp. 7-26

⁹ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan, pp. 203-209.

¹⁰ Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.

¹¹ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 3.

carried out through provincial bureaucracies dominated overwhelmingly by the Persians.¹²

Having responded to the missionary activities, the first anti-British intellectual movement started in the 1880s in Balochistan. This movement called the "Darkhani" movement was inspired and pioneered by *Maulana* Mohammad Fazil of Darkhan (now called Fazil Abad). The *Maulana* is said to have called a gathering of the *Ulema* in 1883, and it was decided that they would translate religious books into Balochi and Brahui. Such books were in Persian or Arabic but it was now felt that they would be more effective in countering missionary propaganda if they were available in Baloch.¹³ *Maulana* Huzoor Bakhsh Jatoi translated the Koran into Balochi in 1902-1903. It is said that this literary movement wrote a fairly large number of books up to the end of the 19th century. Exact numbers are disputed but Syed Abdul Quddus lists as many as 600 books, which were published from the "Maktaba-e Darkhani" (the Darkhani school).¹⁴

The Baloch intelligentsia gradually developed political awareness during the British rule. In 1891 there were only one high school and one middle school for girls in eastern Balochistan. There were 27 boys and 15 girls enrolled in these schools. This number had risen to 14 schools mostly in Quetta municipality, in 1901. In 1903, there were 21 Schools with 800 students.¹⁵ Maulai Shaidai, however, mentions 2 secondary and 22 primary schools, out of a total number of 24 schools in the country in 1902.¹⁶ Mostly the children of non-Baloch, the servicemen of the British administration were enrolled in these schools (only 349 children of the local citizens were included). Medium of instruction was in Urdu, and at the secondary schools in English and not in Balochi.¹⁷ The people were usually given some religious education and primary-level knowledge in Persian through the mosque schools. In 1903, it was estimated that some two thousand people were being given religious education in these mosques.¹⁸ As the Muslim University of Aligarh was created in 1912, a number of Baloch, mostly from *Sardar* families received modern education. Many of them, however,

¹² Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, pp. 102-117.

¹³ Nadir Qambrani, "Brahvi Adabi Akabereen", in: *Pakistan Studies*, Vol. I: No. I, 1990, pp. 13-21.

¹⁴ Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan*, p. 72.

¹⁵ M. G. Pikulin, *Baloch*, pp. 84-85.

¹⁶ Maulai Shaidai "Education During British Rule in Balochistan", in: *Ouman*, Karachi, August 1951, pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

quit school before completing a high school education. Along with financial difficulties, their political activism distracted them before they could fit into the Imperial Indian system.

As the British authorities established themselves in Balochistan in the mid-19th century, they made Urdu the official language alongside English and replaced Persian. It is said that to isolate Balochistan from its western part (Iranian Balochistan), the British changed from Persian to Urdu an Indian language.¹⁹ Consequently Urdu and English languages became the medium of communication, education and administration in Balochistan. Thus the Baloch nationalists had no other options but to express their thoughts in Urdu or English. In the late twenties, however, in Balochistan, there were curbs on open expression of political opinions and there was no press.²⁰ In 1927, the Baloch nationalists, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Master Pir Bakhsh, also known as Nasim Talwi, together started publishing a newspaper called "Balochistan" in Delhi.

The British introduced an entirely new administrative system in Balochistan. Political Agencies were established in every District, with a Political Agent at the head of the District Administration; below the Sub-Divisions, *Tahsils* (district), and *Sub-tahsils* were administered by the Extra-Assistant Commissioner, *Tahsildars* and *Naib-Tahsildars* respectively who also supervised the revenue matters in their respective jurisdiction and were also vested with judicial powers to deal with judicial cases, which they decided with the help of local *Jirgas*. The Political Agents, the District Judges, the *thanas* (prisons) and the Levies men played an important part in the matter of law and order, while in the towns where regular law was enforced, the maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of the Police.²¹ Thus, the British brought a completely new concept of province and administrative system to the region.

As mentioned above, the opening of Western-style schools in the early 20th century, which reached a total number of 24 by 1902, served as an important channel of new awareness.²² Moreover, the intellectual works of the European writers and travellers in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries had a stimulating role for the Baloch awareness and the imagination of the modern Baloch nationalism. The British secret agent, Lt. Henry Pottinger, in his work, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde

¹⁹ Interview with Anwar Sajidi.

²⁰ Monthly, Balochi Labzank, Hab, June 1995.

²¹ R. Hughes-Buller (ed.), Baluchistan District Gazzetteer Series: Quetta-Pishin, 2nd Edition (1st Published, 1906), Quetta: Gosh-e Adab, 1986, pp. 215-16.

²² Moulai Shaidai, "Education During British Rule in Balochistan", in: Ouman, Karachi, August 1951, pp. 9-10.

(1816) wrote freely, giving a detailed account of the geography, history and politics (1809-10) of Balochistan. In the mid-19th century, Charles Masson (1842) published his work in four volumes. Hughes (1877) introduced, in a modern style, the Baloch history, geography, topography, ethnology and a comprehensive map of Balochistan for the first time. The works of Longworth Dames (1904) and (1907), and other British officials and scholars who prepared the Provincial Series of the Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908), which included the "Balochistan" District Gazetteer, and many other valuable documents during the first quarter of the 20th century, deserve credit and appreciation.

It should be remembered that the Balochistan series of Imperial Gazetteer of India, was an extraordinary compendium of information, and ranks among the best of all the Indian gazetteers as well as other literature of the same type.²³ In the last decades of the British rule, however, we see also the further consolidation of such methodology and acceleration of publications on various topics both by the British and the Baloch writers like Magassi, Unka and Sardar Khan Baluch. Thus, in the early 20th century the western methodology for the conceptualisation of the Baloch nation was established.

However, the organizational break with feudal and tribal politics occurred in the late 1920s, with the formation of the "Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan" (Organisation for Unity of the Baloch) in Mastung, Eastern Balochistan. The bulk of its leadership and membership were largely drawn from the urban bourgeoisie, large and small, educated youth, and nationalist-minded members of the clergy and tribal aristocracy. After Magasi's death in 1935, the Anjuman was replaced by the "Kalat State National Party" in 1937, in order to establish constitutional rule in the Khanate and an independent Balochistan after the British departure, as it will be discussed in this chapter.

The Founding Fathers

Influenced by Indian nationalistic thought, some Baloch called for an independent state of Balochistan with the end of the First World War. During this period of Baloch resurgence, urban dwellers as well as the tribes were caught up in a new sense of Baloch nationalism. The modern Baloch movement, however, unlike the past, was non-tribal, but national in its nature. It included, for the first time in Baloch history, individuals from all classes and from many different tribes in the rank of its

activists.²⁴ The change could be observed in the involvement and participation of Azam Jan, Ahmad Yar Khan, Ibrahim Khan and Agha Abdul Karim, from the Khan family; Yusuf Ali Magasi, Shahbaz Khan Nausherwani and Abdul Rahman Bugti, from the top *Sardar* houses; Abdul Aziz Kurd, Gul Khan Nasir and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, from the upper middle class related to the lesser *Sardar* families; and Mohammad Hossein Unqa, Naseem Talavi (Master Pir Bakhsh), and Addul Karim Shorish, from the commoners.²⁵

Thus, the ethnic element was a present and conscious force facilitating popular mobilisation and providing focus to the movement. This universal aspect of the movement owed much to the emergence of modern nationalism all over the world and, nevertheless, to the British intervention. However, the British administrative personnel and most of the greater *Sardars* as well as lesser *Sardars* who were recognised by the British Establishment as members of decision-making *Jirgas* on various levels were against the national movement.²⁶

Yusuf Ali Magasi had rightly been considered as the organiser and the moving spirit of the modern Baloch national movement. "This young man", stated Sardar Khan Baluch in his book, Baluch a Nation, in 1947, "preached a crusade against the Pharaohs of capitalism, though he himself was a capitalist".²⁷ Magasi (1908-1935) was the son of the chief *Sardar* of the Jhal-Magasi region. The Magasi *Sardar* enjoyed not only traditional political prestige in the Baloch system but also occupied a part of the most productive agricultural lands in Balochistan and Sindh.²⁸ The Magasi *Sardar* was traditionally included in the Kalat *Darbar* (The State Council), the highest decision making institution under the Khan.

In 1913, a private tutor was engaged for the young Magasi's religious and traditional classical education. Later a graduate (BA) from Lahore was employed for his modern education including English. His father Qaisar Khan had earlier received the title of "Nawab" from the British government. However, Qaisar Khan's liberal and populist attitude did not suit the British authorities in those days.²⁹ The British-

²³ Brian Spooner, "Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography", pp. 598-632, In: Ehsan Yarshater, (ed), Encyclopadia Iranica, Vol. III, London - New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989, p. 614.

²⁴ Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain, pp. 101, 113, 141, 151, 163.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 152, 156.

²⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, Baluch a Nation, Lahore, 1947, p. 131.

²⁸ Inamul Haq Kausar, Balochistan Men Urdu, pp. 109-115

²⁹ Ibid.

appointed Chief Minister of the Khan, Sir Shams Shah (a non-Baloch Indian), forced Qaisar Khan to abdicate from this *Sardarship*. Sir Shams Shah later became a target of the movement.

Yusuf Ali Magasi lived with his family in exile in Multan and Lahore until 1929.³⁰ In these cities of the British Indian Province of Punjab, Magasi had better chances for education and political training. According to one report, he completed his college degree in Lahore.³¹ During this period the ongoing political movements in India more closely influenced him. *Maulana* Zafar Ali Khan and *Maulana* Mohammad Ali, the famous scholar-journalist-activists of Muslim India, especially impressed him. Zafar Ali was a prominent pressman and was famous for his writings for the cause of independence of India and the rights of the Muslim population.³² Through Magasi's political poems and essays in some Urdu language newspapers and periodicals in Punjab and other parts of Muslim India, he was introduced to wider Indian circles. Admiring his growing popularity, in a poem, *Maulana* Zafar Ali Khan commented: *Lafz-e Baloch mehr-o-wafa ka kalam hay, Manee hay, es kalam ke Yusuf Ali Aziz* (The word Baloch is a word of love and affection. The meaning of this word is Yusuf Ali Azi).³³

Yusuf Ali Magasi kept in contact with news from the Khanate and the British Balochistan. In 1916, Sir Shams Shah, who belonged to the British Political Department, was given the post of the Political Adviser to Khan Mahmud Khan and later he assumed the title of *Wazir-e-Azam*. In 1920 Khan Mahmud Khan lost his eyesight and became blind. After that Shams Shah became practically the ruler of Kalat State with vast powers to run the administration of the State for the next ten years. By 1929, he isolated the *Sardar* of Jhal-Magasi. Among the independent minded and nationalist circles, Sir Shams was considered the most notorious official. Magasi, bitterly criticised the policies of the Shams government and demanded constitutional rule through elected representation.³⁴

In 1929 when Magasi returned to the Khanate, he started his political career by publishing an article, the "Faryad-e-Balochistan", (Cry of Balochistan), in the 17th November 1929, issue of *Weekly Hamdard*, Lahore. In the article an appeal was made

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Sir Edward Wakefield, *Past Imperative: My Life in India, 1927-1947*, p. 129

³² M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, p. 244.

³³ Maulana Zafar Ali Khan quoted in Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 285.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

to the Baloch to organise themselves for the liberation and unity of Balochistan. Criticising the policies of the British government and the Prime Minister of Kalat State Sir Shams Shah, he also demanded for constitutional reforms.³⁵ It is said that Magasi's "Faryad-e-Balochistan" was the first Baloch literary document for the cause of Baloch nationalism.³⁶

In 1929, Magasi was arrested, fined Rs. 20,000, and sentenced to a year of imprisonment in the central prison at Mastung, a town well known for the political initiatives of its residents throughout the history of Kalat State.³⁷ He had almost regular contact with the politically minded young men of the town and its suburbs, and these contacts and the exchange of ideas greatly encouraged him for the achievements of his future objectives. After his release in 1931, the Anjuman was reorganised. Magasi became the president and Abdul Aziz Kurd General Secretary.³⁸

Magasi was also a wealthy young man and financed the publication of several Urdu language Baloch nationalist newspapers in Karachi.³⁹ As mentioned earlier, his article, the "Faryad-e-Balochistan", in 1929, resulted in his arrest and detention for nearly a year. On the 20th November 1931 Magasi published a pamphlet, "Shams-gardi", Tyranny of Shams, the prime minister of Kalat, condemning the undemocratic manner of his government.⁴⁰ In another pamphlet in 1933, entitled "Balochistan ki Awaz" (the voice of Balochistan), Magasi informed the British Parliament about the grave socio-political conditions in Balochistan.⁴¹

Next to Magasi, the most popular figure in the movement was Abdul Aziz Kurd. He was born in 1904. His father was a civil servant of Kalat State. His early childhood and teenage experiences, his socio-political background and the resulting state of mind and political career are similar to those of many other activists of the Anjuman. There are, however, some differences with those of Yusuf Ali Magasi who came from an upper stratum of the Baloch society.⁴² It is said that after he was appointed as the president of the Nation Party in 1937, he hung a map of the "Greater

³⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 150-62.

³⁶ IOR. L/P+S/12/45 file PZ 7548/31.

³⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 150.

³⁸ Monthly, Azad Baluchistan, December 1984, p. 4.

³⁹ Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography in the Balochi Language, p. 134.

⁴⁰ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan, vol. II, p. 420.

⁴¹ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 168.

⁴² Baluchi Dunya, Multan, June-July 1968.

Balochistan” behind his desk.⁴³ This may have shown Kurd’s intention to be the leader of all the Baloch in southwest Asia.

Mohammad Hossein Unqa who in real terms represented the commoners, was another popular leader in this period. He was born in 1907. His family and a number of labourers had migrated from the coastal areas to Mach, a small town along the Balochistan railroad in the leased Khanate territory. Life in such places of British oriented activities had the advantage of contact with the outside world. Though basically for the non-local migrants, this contact meant establishment of elementary schools and access to publications and information from other parts of India. Unqa passed his elementary school in Mach, and in 1924 he graduated from a High School in Quetta. Apart from the fact that Unqa came from a non-tribal commoner family, he is important for his role as a poet and journalist for the movement. Nevertheless, Unqa was among the few intellectuals of the movement who participated in militant and paramilitary activities on several occasions.⁴⁴ It must be born in mind that traditionally, participation in politics was restricted only to the upper classes, the *Khans* and the *Sardars* or the *Hakoms* as they were called in Makkoran. The commoners, the artisans and the poets, were not expected to be involved in the affairs of the state and nation.⁴⁵

Thus, the new political activists (the nationalists) consisted of different classes in the Baloch society. Being expanded beyond the traditional political centres like Mastung, Quetta and Kalat, they included Magasi from Jhal, a Kalat-State region close to Sindh, Abdur Rahman Bugti who later, like Magasi, was deprived of the *Sardarship* of the largest and most powerful Baloch tribes (Bugti) by the British because of his anti-British political activities⁴⁶; and Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a commoner from coastal Makkoran. This mass participation was a new phenomenon, which indicated the emergence of a Baloch nationality with a sufficient developed national consciousness and distinctive characteristics shared by the members of all classes of the Baloch nation.

Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan

Inspired by the political upheavals in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Russia, as well as the anti-colonial movement in British India itself, Baloch nationalism became

⁴³ Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.

⁴⁴ Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, *Yaddashtain*, pp. 163-177

⁴⁵ Inamul Haq Kausar, *Balochistan Men Urdu*, (Urdu in Balochistan-in Urdu), Lahore, 1967, pp. 107-137.

⁴⁶ *Balochistan*, Organ of “Jonbesh-e Khalq-e Baloch-Iran, No. 7, 1364/1985 (Persian).

established in the 1920s. In 1920, an underground organisation, called “Young Baloch” was formed by a group of Baloch nationalists under the leadership of Yusuf Ali Magasi, educated in India, and Abdul Aziz Kurd son of a Kalat state official.⁴⁷ A few years later, the movement changed its name to the “Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan” (Organisation for Unity of the Baloch, hereafter called Anjuman) and its direction from being a clandestine organisation to being an open political party under Magasi’s leadership in 1931.⁴⁸ In many ways the Anjuman marks the beginning of a new force in Balochistan – the secular, non-tribal nationalist movement, organised as a political party. Being a clandestine organisation for many years, the exact date of the movement’s early formation is not certain.

The Anjuman called for political and constitutional reform within the Khanate, and ultimate unification of all Baloch lands into an independent state. As noted above, from 1931, the Anjuman started to work openly, promoting different ideas of reform within the state, and advocating the need for more representative institutions.⁴⁹ During the early 1920s, which was the formative decade of modern Baloch nationalism, the movement worked underground. Its leaders, adherents and other like-minded persons in the Baloch regions including those in Sindh, Punjab and Karachi, acted on an individual basis. During this period, the leaders accumulated experience, continued their self-education, observation and contemplation, and maintained contacts through correspondence and the media.⁵⁰ The newspapers and periodicals published by some like-minded Baloches of Karachi during this period, and the sympathetic attitude of some Indian newspapers with mass circulation played an important role in communication and training.⁵¹

Being the largest Baloch urban centre, Karachi has played an important role for development of the Baloch national consciousness. Karachi is not only the cradle of the modern Balochi literary movement, but also the centre of the modern Baloch politics. Simultaneous with formation of the Anjuman, the Baloch intellectuals in Karachi formed a nationalist organisation, called the Baloch League. Gholam Mohammad Noor ud-Din, educated from Bombay, was appointed as its president. The

⁴⁷ Monthly, Azad Baluchistan, No 6, December 1984

⁴⁸ It also is known by some sources as the “Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Balochan wa Balochistan” (Organisation for the Unity of the Baloch and Balochistan), see Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India, 19th – 20th Century, Firenze: Il Maestrato, 1997, p. 143.

⁴⁹ Taher Bizenjo, Balochistan: Kia Howa, Kia Hoga, Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publisher, 1989, p. 121

⁵⁰ Balochi Dunya, Multan, June-July 1968.

⁵¹ Ibid.

other members of its leadership were: Waja Omar Bakhsh Sabera, a famous merchant, Maolavi Mohammad Osman, Mehrab Khan Issa Khan, Maolavi Abdul Samad Sarbazi, Khan Sahib Osman, Pir Bakhsh Shahdad and Allah Bakhsh Gabol. In its annual conference in 1930, the League condemned Magasi's imprisonment and openly demanded his immediate release from the British authorities. In the late 1930s, after his graduation from Aligarh University, the legendary nationalist leader, Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo also joined the League.⁵²

In 1931, with the presidency of Yusuf Ali Magasi, the Anjuman, as noted, started a new and open career. Its activities evolved around three fundamental demands: 1 – Reform in the Khanate. 2 – Unification of the traditional Baloch lands which were divided between different administrative units (and countries). 3 – Establishment of a sovereign, independent and united Balochistan.⁵³ For initiation of reform in the Khanate the party demanded abrogation of rules and regulations, such as the Frontier Crime Regulation, which curbed political freedom. They demanded establishment of an elected parliament for the Khanate, and consequently, of a responsible constitutional cabinet under the Khan. Such an act would mean the end of the *Sardari-Jirga* system as well as the end of indirect, but overwhelming, British rule. The Anjuman, it seems, was more interested in political-structural change rather than education, and economic and social reform. It was a reflection of their belief that nothing could be done before bringing change in the political structure.⁵⁴

The British used the *Sardari* system as their main instrument of oppression in Balochistan.⁵⁵ To confront the British, the nationalists attacked the *Sardari* system, which they depicted as one in which the *Sardars* were able to exert total power over their subjects, even to the extent of oppression and abuse. Being closely allied with the colonial government, the *Sardars* were intolerable in the eyes of the young nationalists.⁵⁶ Under these circumstances through the mandate given by Yusuf Ali Magasi and his principal colleague Abdul Aziz Kurd, one of the main objects of the movement and the party when organized under the latter's auspices was the abolition of the *Sardari* system. "They could not fight the Sardars", Aijaz Ahmad, a leftist Pakistani writer wrote, "by fighting the British, but they could fight both the Sardars and the

⁵² Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.

⁵³ Monthly, *Azad Baluchistan*, December 1984

⁵⁴ Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, *Yaddashtain*, pp. 53-58

⁵⁵ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 170

⁵⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 150-62.

British by fighting against the Sardar whose aggression was more immediate, who was more accessible and vulnerable, and on whose presence the imperial hold itself was predicated".⁵⁷

Traditionally, the Khans nominated their successors. Mahmud Khan, however, did not. According to historian Dehwar, "he [the Khan] knew that none of his sons had the capability to be his successor."⁵⁸ In the middle of 1930, when the Khan fell ill, the prime minister Shams Shah realised the gravity of the situation and started to make endeavours to contact the British authorities to get the nomination of Mahmud Khan's elder son, Mohammad Anwar Khan, as his successor. By this gesture Shams wanted to perpetuate his tenure of office indefinitely, with the view that Mohammad Anwar, thus selected, would certainly depend upon him for running the administration of the State. But, in the same year, the Anjuman secretly negotiated with the imprisoned prince Mohammad Azam Jan, the Khan's brother, who was pro-Anjuman, and announced its support to him for the Khanship. The Anjuman thus directed its efforts against the pro-British Sir Shams Shah. Its leaders initiated a mass migration from the Magasi area to Sindh and Punjab to force Shams into resigning.⁵⁹

The migration of Magasis had a great impact on the neighboring Baloch tribes. Sympathising with them, the Rind, Mengal, and Bugti tribes revolted against their *Sardars*, who were the supporters of Sir Shams Shah or the British.⁶⁰ Moreover, the mass migration of Magasi tribesmen into Sindh had given rise to complications in the social life of the people of the area and created problems of law and order. When the reports regarding this situation were disclosed, the British authorities made Sir Shams Shah responsible for the popular unrest and rejected his proposal to appoint prince Mohammad Anwar Jan. Instead the British administration accepted Mohammad Azam Jan's nomination as the new Khan, under certain conditions.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Aijaz Ahmad, "The National Question in Pakistan", p. 23.

⁵⁸ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 240.

⁵⁹ S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 134.

⁶⁰ M. Hossein Unka, "Baloch Sardaroun ka Ghair Mustahsen Rawiya", in: Al Baluch, Karachi, 13 August 1933.

⁶¹ The British conditions for the selection of Azam Jan as the new Khan were: 1. The treaty of 1876 shall remain in force. 2. The present system of administration shall remain intact including the revenue system without any drastic change. 3. The state council should be expanded to include the *Sardars* of the big tribes with two sessions in a year in order to acquire their opinion in important matters of the state. The Khan and his *Wazir-e Azam* should abstain from issuing such orders without the consent of the State Council, which directly or indirectly may affect their position or interest. 4. The *Sardars* must consider themselves as right hand of the Khan while the Khan should also consider them as such giving due weight to their wishes (cited in: M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan p. 241).

With Mahmud Khan's death in 1931, his brother, Mohammad Azam Jan, succeeded. His formal coronation ceremony, however, was held on 26th April 1932. Lord Willington, the viceroy of India, personally attended the *darbar*. Azam Jan's ascendance to the Kalat throne was considered a victory for the Anjuman. In the same month as he ascended to the throne (December 1931), he removed Sir Shams Shah and installed a new prime minister, Khan Bahadur Gul Mohammad Khan. However, the authorities and the *Sardars*, it seems, after his nomination, warned the Khan about the Anjuman. After a dialogue with Magasi on 22 December 1931 about the Anjuman's demands, the Khan asked Abdul Aziz Kurd to stop his political activities.⁶² The British government's attitude may be ascertained from Lord Willingdon's speech during the coronation ceremony. Addressing the Khan he said: "You are not only the ruler of Kalat State but also the head of an old and powerful confederacy. Therefore, it is appropriate for you to work and think together with the Sardars".⁶³ Pointing to the danger posed by the Anjuman to the *Sardari* system, Lord Willingdon assured the Khan of his help for the maintenance of the system: "Every State Ruler is sometimes confronted with difficulties and concerns. You should rest assured that our officers will provide all kinds of help and advice on such occasion. Be sure that I would personally continue my deep interest in your State's affairs."⁶⁴

When Azam Jan assumed the reins of the Khanship of Kalat, the state was extremely backward. The sphere of education was limited and the schools for children were few in number and hospitals for health care were almost unknown except in Quetta. The educated people had received education up to secondary level and some of them received employment in *niabats* (districts) as *moharrers* (clerk) while grade posts and posts of teachers were filled by non-locals most of whom came from Punjab. Although the educated people were limited in number in the State, political awakening was sharply progressing. This was considered as an important development during the reign of Khan Azam Jan. The people of the State after a long period of stalemated were jubilant at his election as the Khan, which was considered to be a change for the good.

Being an aged person⁶⁵, Khan Azam Jan could not therefore involve himself directly with politics, contrary to the expectations of the younger generation. His

⁶² Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, Two volumes, Quetta, 1954, p. 407.

⁶³ *Baluchi Dunya*, Multan, June-July 1968.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 110.

promise to abolish *bigar* (forced labour without due remuneration), cancel the illegal taxes, and stop the encroachment of *Sardars* over state land in Kacchi remained unfulfilled, because the *Sardars* opposed such reforms.⁶⁶ However, during his short rule (1931-1933) the political awakening of the people intensified and soon took the form of a full-fledged political movement under the leadership of Yusuf Ali Magasi and Abdul Aziz Kurd.⁶⁷

The Anjuman and the Issue of Independence

After having declared its (Anjuman's) goal to be the establishment of an independent and united Balochistan with a representative form of government, the General Secretary of the Anjuman, Abdul Aziz Kurd said, "In the magazine *Zamindar* of September 9, 1932, I have presented an ideology to separate Balochistan from India and form an independent Muslim government in this country, which I had formulated not today but twelve years ago in 1920 in view of local conditions, and which I had expressed before the world earlier in 1922 in a publication of the newspaper "Hamdam"... I want to see a constitutional government in Balochistan which is purely Islamic and independent in all aspects. That is, just as I cannot like the fact that Baluchistan remains under the slavery of the Hindus, I am also opposing to my country wearing the enslaving chains of the colonizing Europe".⁶⁸ It must be remembered that the All India Muslim League had not yet formulated the demand for Pakistan. Instead, having faith in a United India, they were struggling for the preservation of the rights of Indian Muslims.

The Indian reaction, Muslim as well as Hindu, was not favourable to the Anjuman's increasingly explicit demands for the secession of the Baloch land from the sub-continent and the formation of a sovereign, independent Balochistan. "The Muslim Outlook", Lahore (1932), called the idea of a free Balochistan "a British imperialist conspiracy", and The Daily Zamindar, a pro-Muslim League newspaper, opposed the idea and advised for the creation of a "United Muslim front against the Hindu bureaucracy".⁶⁹ The Baloch activists were confronted in Balochistan with a Muslim, principally Punjabi bureaucracy. For the Baloch, the problem of Hindu bureaucracy

⁶⁶ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 244.

⁶⁷ Monthly, Azad Baluchistan, December 1984.

⁶⁸ Daily Zamindar, Lahore, 18 September 1932, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 153-54.

⁶⁹ Daily, Zamindar, 28 September 1932, quoted in *ibid*.

was non-existent. The debate over independence was still continuing when the Anjuman decided to convene the Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference in 1932.

Having decided to summon all the Baloch nationalists to the “Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference”, on October 20, 1932, the Anjuman leaders issued the following statement regarding its purpose: “It has been decided to convene the Baluchistan and All Baluch Conference at Jacobabad in the month of December (1932). The Baluch are properly acquainted with democratic principles but our nation is being tremendously affected by external influences. Consequently, we have no choice but to organize ourselves by establishing bonds of unity and alliance. Otherwise, this will result in our lagging behind all other nations. Our objectives are the following extremely important aims... Unity of Baluch, compulsory education, protection of rights, religious education and legal reforms. We have faith that members of our nation will spare no efforts to make this conference a success”.⁷⁰

On 27 December 1932, the Anjuman-organised “Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference” was held at Jacobabad, Sindh. The conference commenced with the Presidential address by Mir Ali Nawaz Khan Talpur, the ruler of Khairpur State, in which he called on the Baloch for unity. The deliberations of this first Conference lasted for three days.⁷¹ More than 200 delegates from Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab, including the non-Baloch Abdus Samad Achakzai participated in it.⁷²

Numerous resolutions were passed. The following aims were the most significant:⁷³ 1 - To unite the Baloch that is to create the unification of the different regions of Balochistan. 2 - The establishment of a constitutional government in Balochistan. 3 - The abolition of the Frontier Crime Regulation in Balochistan. 4 - The establishment of colleges of advanced education in Balochistan. 5 - The establishment of industries in Balochistan. 6 - Conference condemned the Iranian occupation of western Balochistan and demanded an end to Persian atrocities.⁷⁴ It should be noted that a few days before the Conference, the Anjuman’s weekly, al-Baluch, from Karachi, in its issue of 25th December 1932, published a map of Greater Balochistan, showing the

⁷⁰ Daily, Zamindar, 22 October 1932, quoted in *ibid*.

⁷¹ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 169.

⁷² Baluchi Dunya, Multan, June-July, 1968: Malik Ramazan, who later became a member of the Movement and survived as a local journalist, had mentioned that 200 delegates from Karachi, Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan proper attended the Conference; See also A. B. Awan., Baluchistan, p. 165

⁷³ Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, “A Brief Summary of Evidence, Before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, London”, in: Daily Gazette Press, Ltd., 1st May 1933; see also Baluchi Dunya, Multan, June-July 1970.

Baloch areas of Iran, the territories of the Kalat Confederacy, the leased areas under the British control and the Baloch land in Punjab and Sindh.⁷⁵

The “Balochistan and all Indian Baloch Conference” was a great opportunity for the Baloch nationalists from different parts of Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab to communicate their views about the destiny of the Baloch nation and Balochistan. Western Balochistan (Iranian Balochistan) was represented by the Baloch refugees living in Karachi.⁷⁶ A second Baloch Conference was convened at Hyderabad (Sindh) towards the end of December 1933. While supporting the resolutions of the previous conference, it stressed the establishment of a constitutional government in Balochistan.⁷⁷ The Baloch conferences were a demonstration of a common Baloch forum shared by all (British) Baloch regions.⁷⁸ A famous political poem of Yusuf Ali Magasi was recited in the last day’s session of the Conference.⁷⁹

In January 1934, the Anjuman’s General Secretary, Abdul Aziz Kurd was arrested. By issuing statements and publishing articles in weekly Al-Hanif (Jacobabad), Balochistan Jadid (Karachi) and daily Azad (Lahore), he was demanding the return of leased districts of Queta, Bolan and and Nasirabad to the Kalat state, and also the tribal areas of Marri and Bugti, which had been integral part of Khanate in the past. He was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment by the *Shahi-Jirga* at Sibi. In his message to the party at the time of his arrest Kurd said:

Comrades! You must understand Britain’s position in Baluchistan very well. Do not view it from the perspective of Indian politics. Keeping in view the significance of our country for all of Asia constitutes your political ideology under provisional exigencies in accordance with local conditions and national aspirations. The Baluch nation should not imitate Afghan, Indian or any foreign politics. You should impress on your minds the fact that Britain has neither conquered your country nor bought it from any one. Therefore you are not her slave and she is not your master. In fact, Britain has set up temporary camp in your country with the status of a trader holding special

⁷⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, “Mir Mohammad Yusuf Ali Khan Magasi”, in: Monthly Azad Baluchistan, London, December 1984, p. 4.

⁷⁵ Weekly Al-Baluch, Karachi, 25 December 1932, p. 7.

⁷⁶ Weekly Young Baluchistan, 15 January 1934; Saeedi Baluch, “Azad Baluchistan aur Hokumat-e-Iran” in: Weekly, Baluchistan, 4 March 1936, cited in: Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 145.

⁷⁷ Monthly, al-Hanif, Special Number on Balochistan, Jacobabad, 1937.

⁷⁸ Given the existing restrictive rules and regulations, such a conference could not be held in Balochistan proper.

⁷⁹ A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, p. 165.

concessions by virtue of friendly and equal treaties. Therefore you must always be aware of your true status and political dignity.⁸⁰

Having been hardly two years in power, Mohammad Azam Jam died on 9th September 1933, and was succeeded by his son Ahmad Yar Khan on the 20th of the same month in 1933. Ahmad Yar Khan was born in 1902 at Loralai, where his grandfather (Mir Khudadad Khan), father (Mir Azam Jan), and other family members were imprisoned by the British.⁸¹ He received his early education from private tutors in Persian, Arabic and English. He was married to the granddaughter of the famous leader of Pan-Islamism, Syed Jamal al-Din Afghani.⁸²

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was a supporter of the programme and manifesto of the Anjuman and his policies gave the movement legitimacy. Consequently, his accession to the throne led to the development of more favourable conditions for the Anjuman's work aimed at achieving independence for Balochistan. Influenced by the Baloch nationalist movement, he carried out some important reforms in the state. For example, he abolished the *bigar* system, improved the judiciary and education. The education budget was raised from Rs. 13000 to 400,000. Scholarships were given to students to study in Indian and other foreign universities. Preference in employment was given to the Baloch, and he also established a printing press in Kalat.⁸³

To improve the woeful economic condition, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan established a factory for manufacturing small arms and ammunition, thereby providing employment to people and the needed equipment for the state army. Small-scale industries like spinning and cloth weaving, carpet making and leather tanning were opened at various places. Moreover, by establishing numerous farms, and by giving the Baloch students special stipends to specialise in this field, he paid due attention to agriculture. An extensive chain of fruit farms was set up under the direct management of the state government to streamline the horticulture production on commercial basis. To link towns and ports, attention was given to road and communication. This created a good and healthy competitive atmosphere between the state-run and private sector farms.⁸⁴

More important, however, was his sympathetic and cooperative role in the Anjuman's struggle for independence. In this respect his contribution is much greater than the previous Khans. In 1934, he sent Magasi to Britain as his personal represen-

⁸⁰ Abdul Aziz Kurd, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 154.

⁸¹ M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, Quetta: Edareh Tadriss, 1994, p. 142.

⁸² Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 161.

⁸³ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 126.

tative to discuss the sovereignty of the Khanate of Kalat with the highest authorities and to negotiate the return of all the leased area to the Khanate.⁸⁵ However, according to Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, a leading figure of the Anjuman, Magasi's travel to London was in fact a secret conspiracy against the Anjuman by the British. The British thought that in the absence of Magasi the Anjuman could not survive.⁸⁶ Of course, before Magasi's compulsory departure, the Khan asked him to look for means and ways in London for the freedom of the Khanate.⁸⁷

While in London, Magasi tried to contact some British circles. Apparently he was advised to keep his activities peaceful and constitutional, British-Indian style, in other words to generate public opinion pressure through organisation, public meetings, strikes and resolutions. Ironically, these activities were possible only in British India, where a degree of constitutional reforms, providing comparative freedom for political action, had taken place. It was not possible in the Khanate a frontier state, which suffered from a lack of urban population centres and an abundance of restrictive rules and regulations. Magasi's talks in London were not very productive and the British Government refused to introduce reforms in Balochistan. As written by the historian Inayatullah Baloch, "The failure of Magasi's mission resulted in radicalism".⁸⁸

According to some sources, Magasi as president of the Anjuman favoured an armed struggle with the help of the USSR.⁸⁹ Magasi's relaxed mood when he returned to Balochistan and his unexpected death in 1935, added to the lack of available sources, and made it difficult to ascertain the degree of his seriousness about the armed struggle. The death of Magasi was the great loss for the future of the Baloch national movement. In his last days he planned to reorganise the Anjuman on revolutionary lines. He wrote to his friends about his plan to expel the pro-British element from the Anjuman and to devote himself to the cause of Balochistan.⁹⁰

Up to 1937 the activities and the strategies of the modern Baloch national movement (1920-1937) were based on demands for political, social and economic re-

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 126-127.

⁸⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 155; M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, Quetta: Edareh Tadriss, 1994, p. 204


⁸⁶ Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusufzai, Yaddashtain, Progressive Writers Association, Balochistan Quetta, 1997, p. 30.

⁸⁷ M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan, Tarikh wa Mazhab, Quetta: Edareh Tadriss, 1994, p. 204.

⁸⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 155

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.



Map 6. First map of Greater Balochistan

BY: Abdul Aziz Kurd, the general secretary of the Anjuman (1933)

Adopted from weekly Al-Baloch, Karachi, 25 December 1932

forms within the jurisdiction of the Khanate. The movement opposed special administrative and judicial arrangements in the Baloch regions, which limited political activities and the development of modern institutions similar to those evolving in British India. As a result of gradual constitutional reforms, the provinces of British India were moving towards home rule and parliamentary representative government. This development implied greater freedom of the press, political activities and public opinion and a more equitable judiciary system on western lines. The Baloch national movement established the goal of liberalisation of colonial political rules for the enhancement of its struggle.

Since 1937, as the goals of the movements on the sub-continent shifted rapidly toward independence, the Baloch national movement concentrated its activities on the consolidation of the Kalat State's legal status as a sovereign state, hoping that Kalat would become the nucleus of a Baloch state after the departure of Great Britain and would attract other Baloch areas. The idea behind the party's political support to the Khan, according to Baloch nationalist writer Janmahmad, lies in the fact that while the nationalists favoured a united front, which included the Khan and his loyal *Sardars*, it aspired to identify itself with the Baloch Confederacy of Kalat.⁹¹ In different ways, the Anjuman's programme and activities involved the Khan, and the British who ruled the country; the *Sardars*; the Pashtun population;⁹² the Indian National Congress, which was working for a free united India; and the Muslim politicians of India.

Kalat State National Party (KSNP)

Yusuf Ali Magasi was killed in the Quetta earthquake in 1935. After Magasi's death the Anjuman's left wing decided to reorganise. In February 1937, the "Kalat State National Party" emerged with the Anjuman's objective articulated more ardently. Political workers from the Kalat state and a few members of the Anjuman attended a convention at Sibi on the 5th of February and formed the National Party.⁹³ The party convention discussed the prevailing situation in Balochistan and views were exchanged regarding Baloch national identity in the fast-changing political conditions of the region. The National Party recruited educated Baloch youth and state employ-

⁹¹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 170

⁹² The "British Balochistan" included some areas populated by Pashtun-speaking people. The process was similar to annexation of many Baloch region to Sindh and Punjab.

⁹³ In the same convention, the National Party elected Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd as its first President. Malik Faiz Mohammad Yusefzai and Mir Gul Khan Nasir were elected as Vice President and General Secretary of the party respectively.

ees. The National Party also persuaded the Khan to abolish a number of taxes levied on tribes by the *Sardars*.⁹⁴

The party manifesto issued at the convention maintained that Balochistan had gained immense importance because of its geographical position as a buffer state separating Afghanistan, Iran, and India. It declared its objective of uniting the Baloch people under one centre, with a representative government which could reflect their glorious traditions. The party manifesto was one of the best documents ever produced on the Balochistan situation. It reflected the deep nationalistic sentiments and conscious expression of a political elite, determined to work for the liberation of their country. The manifesto took pride in the traditional heritage and glorious past of the Baloch people, linking it with the ancient people of Babylonia.⁹⁵ "The Baloch", the document maintained, were committed to achieve the goal of national independence. In the meantime the party expressed its desire to fill the political vacuum of a sensible and responsible government in the state.⁹⁶

The National Party's programme was very similar to that of its predecessor, the Anjuman, and it tried to broaden its base of support among all Baloch classes. The party's nationalist programme influenced the intelligentsia in Balochistan, consisting primarily of employees of the Kalat state.⁹⁷ This group was responsible for the party's financial support.⁹⁸ The National Party was dominated by the more secular-minded, anti-imperialist and populist elements. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Nasir, Abdul Aziz Kurd and most of the other National Party leaders, by temperament and practice were more impressed by Abul Kalam Azad and other moderate Muslims, who supported a secular federal United India, rather than the Muslim League leadership. Almost all the Baloch *Ulema* (clergymen) in the Baloch regions had graduated from the famous Deoband School of Islamic studies. Some of these Baloch *Ulema* such as *Maulavi* Mohammad Umar and *Maulavi* Arz Muhammad were among the National Party's activists. The leaders and adherents of the Deoband School all over India were overwhelmingly opposed to the Muslim League.⁹⁹

As the National Party started to work intermittently in the open, promoting different ideas of reform within Kalat and advocating the need for more representative

⁹⁴ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, pp. 453-456.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 444

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 443-45.

⁹⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *Baluch a Nation*, Lahore, 1947, p. 127.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Interview with *Maulana* Abdul Haq Baloch.

institutions, the reaction of the Khanate was mixed. Even if a Khan like Mir Ahmad Yar Khan personally sympathised with the nationalists, there was little room in which to manoeuvre. On the one hand, the Khans were dependent upon a consensus being reached on every major issue with the *Sardars*, on the other; they were under the tight control of the British political agents. They also had to consider the maintenance of their historical legitimacy, drawn from the ancient confederacy, as well as growing demands for the formation of democratic institutions. The leaders of the Anjuman and its offspring, the National Party, expressed their loyalty and their spirit of continuity with the traditional democratic tribal organisation and thus indirectly threatened the autocratic features of the Khanate as well as, more directly, the power of the *Sardars*, the latter having evolved from a tribal toward a form of "feudal" system.¹⁰⁰ It was possibly under the pressure of the movement that in 1938, the Khan issued a *farman* (order), equalising the status of all his subjects and fixing an equal amount of blood compensation for all persons including Ghulams, Lohris, Jamots, etc.¹⁰¹

The Baloch nationalists had based themselves on the argument that the Kalat state like Nepal had direct treaty relationships with London.¹⁰² They declared their goal as being the restoration of an independent, unified Balochistan, to which the British must revert the forcibly leased area of northern Balochistan and the self-made principalities of Las-Bela and later on Kharan. Although the National Party declared its backing for the government of the Khan, it never gave up its progressive stand against the *Sardari* system which the British, with the Khan's connivance, had established in Balochistan, and which was the main instrument of oppression in the state. While avoiding any conflict with the Khan, the party worked secretly against the *Sardari* system.¹⁰³ The Khan for his part, though he agreed with certain viewpoints of the party, especially its demand for a sovereign independent Balochistan and its committed goal of maintaining the traditional norms of the Baloch people, which by implication meant the Khan's continued over-lordship, could not go very far in the party's support without compromising his position with the British or annoying the *Sardars*. However, it appears that the Khan had little enthusiasm for the activities of the party and the convention, which it held at Mastung in June 1937.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 155-56.

¹⁰¹ V/10/636.

¹⁰² Munir Ahmad Marri, *Balochistan: Seyasi Kash-makash*, Quetta: Gusheh-e Adab, 1989, p. 86.

¹⁰³ Inayatullah Baloch, "Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men 'Kalat State National Party' Ka Kerdar", in *Monthly, Azad Baluchistan*, December 1982, London, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Shaiha Ragam, "Aqelan Sassa Kan et" in: *Monthly, Balochi*, Quetta February 1988.

In its struggle against social injustices, the National Party continuously encouraged the Khan to follow its programme. In this regard, the party succeeded to correct many political wrongs. The *bigar* system and the illegal taxes, for example were abolished. Thus for his services and his cooperation to materialising the party's radical programme, in 1938, the National Party conferred the title of "Khan-e-Muazzam" (the great respected Khan), on the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan.¹⁰⁵

The National Party wanted an independent and sovereign state for the Baloch people. For this, the party was gathering tremendous support especially from the educated people.¹⁰⁶ The party workers and its leaders were not unaware of political movements in India but they wanted a separate identity and were by no means ready to lose their political sovereignty. They were conscious of the fact that Balochistan faced a peculiar geographical situation and the National Party had a tremendous task to achieve the pre-determined objectives of national independence. Balochistan was a sovereign state independent of India. The British had certain treaty relations with the Baloch stating that they were not to be treated like the Indians whom the British claimed to be their conquered people.¹⁰⁷

As noted above, one of the National Party's objectives was to abolish the *Sardari* System. This annoyed the *Sardars*. In 1939, when the British Government failed to obtain the Jiwani port, because of the Party's opposition, it gave the British and the *Sardars* sufficient cause to ally themselves against the National Party.¹⁰⁸ On July 6, the tribal *lashkar* (tribal armed force) of the *Sardars* launched an armed attack against the Mastung convention of the National party and disrupted the gathering.¹⁰⁹ On the next day the *Sardars*, headed by Nawab Mohammad Khan Shahwani demanded that the National Party should be banned and its leaders arrested. They also demanded the closure of Darul-Uloom (a religious school) of Mastung and a ban on the entry and circulation of all the newspapers and especially weekly al-Hanif and the Kamal of Jacobabad, the weekly Balochistan Jadeed and the Baluchistan of Karachi,

¹⁰⁵ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Mukhtaser Tarikh-e-Baloch aur Khawanin-e-Baloch, Quetta: Aiwan Kalat, 1972, p. 86.

¹⁰⁶ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e Balochistan, vol. 2, p. 446.

¹⁰⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, "Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men 'Kalat State National Party' Ka Kerdar", in: Monthly, Azad Baluchistan, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 156.

¹⁰⁹ Shaihi Ragam, "Aqelan Sassa Kan et" in: Monthly, Balochi, Quetta, February 1988.

in Kalat State. The Khan and his British-Indian dominated administration sided with the tribal chiefs opposed to the party.¹¹⁰

On July 20, 1939, the Prime Minister of Kalat banned the National Party within the Khanate and asked its activists, Malik Abdur Raheem Khwaja Khel, Abdul Karim Shourish, Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Rais Mulla Hossein Abizai, Mirab Shahnawaz, Mian Noor-ul-Haq, *Maulavi* Arz Mohammad, *Maulavi* Mohammad Umar and numerous others to leave Kalat territory. The party shifted its headquarters to Quetta but the Second World War brought open political activities to an end all over India.¹¹¹

After the banning of the National Party and the forcing of its leaders to exile, it continued its struggle as a clandestine organisation even inside the Kalat State. Moreover, from its headquarters at Quetta, the Party remained a strong force over public opinion. The National Party strongly condemned the move by the British government to recognise Kharan as a separate state, independent of Kalat. The National Party's Secretary, Abdul Karim Shourish, termed the move an attempt to break-up Balochistan. He feared that Kharan's separation would be one in a series of similar actions, which would ultimately destroy the Baloch identity.¹¹² On 25th August 1939, he warned against attempts at the further disintegration of Balochistan. He said: "... at present Kalat state is the name of the surviving Baloch front in whose name we can form a united front of all the Baloch in time to come. If this is broken into pieces today it renders the inevitable disorganisation of the Baloch. Thus political wisdom demands that we should avoid such short-sightedness, which contains the seeds of disintegration and ignominy".¹¹³ He called upon the people to demand the merger of Kharan and Lasbela with Balochistan.¹¹⁴

After the War the banishment orders on the National Party leaders were withdrawn. In the meantime the party entered an alliance in 1945, with the All India States People Conference, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru. In a meeting held in Srinagar on 6th – 8th August 1945, the Standing Committee of the All India States People Conference discussed the question of the alliance of Kalat State National Party with the conference. The committee also expressed concern over the ban by the government of Kalat on the struggle launched by the National Party, banning of the party president and

¹¹⁰ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, pp. 266-67.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹¹² Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, vol. 2, p. 472.

¹¹³ Abdul Karim Shourish, quoted in Inayatullah Baloch, "The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination", p. 195.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

others, and the restrictions on entry into the state of newspapers from British Balochistan.¹¹⁵ This decision of the National Party in 1945 to join a Congress dominated movement which was working for a united, federal India reflected the complication and ambivalence which had developed in relations between the Khan and the Party.

The National Party started its activities in society with a strictly tribal set-up in which politics circled round the figure of the *Sardars*. A corrupt and inefficient government manipulated by the British agents was running the state. The National Party, not only received tremendous support from the general people but also from some tribal elders and *Sardars* of the country.¹¹⁶ Between 1937 and 1948, the party was allowed to operate for less than two years, but it left a tremendous impact on the people. When the Khan held elections, the party was returned to parliament with a quite large majority in spite of the fact that it was not allowed to contest as a party and its members contested in their individual capacity.¹¹⁷

Independence: its Emergence and Collapse

In the early 1947, when the independence issue was in its apex, Sardar Khan Baluch, the Secretary-*e-khas* (principal secretary) to the Khan of Kalat, wrote, "To begin with the question of a united and freed Baluch race, the question of a Greater Baluchistan is inevitable".¹¹⁸ As the prospect of the British withdrawal was coming closer, the National Party and other nationalist organisations joined the Khan of Kalat to seek independence for Balochistan.¹¹⁹ The Khan made a strong legal case for independence, arguing that Kalat like Nepal enjoyed a legal status based on direct treaty relations with Whitehall and was not bound to deal with the British Raj government in New Delhi as was the case with the other princely or "native states" of the subcontinent.¹²⁰ He invoked the treaty of 1876, which committed Britain to respect the "independence of Kalat" and to protect its territory against external aggression.

The Labour Party Government headed by Clement Atlee in Britain, after considerable debate, decided to send a three-member Cabinet Mission to India in a final

¹¹⁵ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, pp. 270-71; see also *Baluchi Dunya*, Multan, June 1973 and *Nokien Dour*, Quetta, 21 October 1966. Malik Abdur Raheem Khwajakhel, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Malik Faiz Mohammad attended many meetings of the Conference held in Jodhpure, Jaipure and Delhi. They explained the Balochistan situation in the context of the Indian freedom movement.

¹¹⁶ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, vol. 2, p. 457.

¹¹⁷ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 99.

¹¹⁸ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *Baluch a Nation*, Lahore, 1947, p. 205.

¹¹⁹ Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India, 19th – 20th Century*, Firenze: Il Maestrale, 1997, pp. 173-174; see also Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 24-25.

bid to devise the methodology for the transfer of power in India. The Mission comprising the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, AV Alexander and Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on March 24, 1946. With his case prepared by eminent lawyers like I I Chundrigar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar BK Memon and Sir Walter Monkton, and including M. A. Jinnah, the Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan approached the Mission on behalf of his government to discuss the future status of his state in the scheme of independence for India.¹²¹

Submitted in the form of an official memorandum to the Mission in March 1946, the main concern of the Government of Kalat regarding the future position of the Khanate at the time, according to the document, was to restore its independence with the British withdrawal. In the memorandum the Khan of Kalat, stated that Kalat expected to restore its pre-1876 status by regaining its full independence and recovering its sovereign rights over all the Kalat territories held or leased by Britain upon the cessation of her power in India. As stated by the memorandum, the state of Kalat: “will become fully sovereign and independent in respect to both internal and external affairs, and will be free to conclude treaties with any other government or state... The Khan, his government, and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Union...”.¹²²

It is interesting to note that in 1936, the Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan retained a barrister, M A Jinnah, to defend Kalat’s claim to independence in post-colonial India. Defining the case of Kalat state, the future founder of Pakistan, Jinnah wrote to the Cabinet Mission in 1946: “Several representatives of the British have described Kalat as a sovereign and independent state. In 1872, Sir W L Merewether, who was in charge of the British Government’s relations with Kalat, wrote as follows: there cannot in my opinion, be the least doubt of the course which should be followed with regard to Kalat or Baluchistan as it should be correctly termed. H H the Khan is the de facto and de jure ruler of that country. We have treaty engagements with him under which he is bound to keep his subjects from injuring British territory or people to protect trade etc. But the treaty is with him as ruler only.”¹²³

The Baloch nationalists also point out to another petition prepared the same year by Pakistan’s future prime minister, I I Chundrigar, in which he stated: “Kalat,

¹²⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 174-175.

¹²¹ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 255-296.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.

¹²³ M A Jinnah quoted in Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 265.

which is not an Indian state and which was brought in relation with the British Government on account of its geographical position on the border of India, is just like Afghanistan and Persia. The State had no intention of entering into a federal relationship with successive government or governments in British India and I have, therefore, to request your Excellency to declare the independence of Kalat State”¹²⁴

Apart from the independence, the Kalat cabinet considered four other possibilities: 1 - Kalat becoming a British protectorate: rejected by the foreign minister of the Khan, Douglas Y. Fell. 2 - Merger with Iran: also rejected since Tehran was already engaged in brutal suppression of the Baloch demanding self-determination. 3 - Merger with Afghanistan: supported by some members of the royal family but Mr. Fell pointed to the possibility of Communist infiltration of the Khanate through Soviet influence in Afghanistan; the devoutly religious Khan then rejected this option. 4 - Merger with India: recognised as awkward geographically and an option that would be unpopular. Such a decision would be seen in Pakistan as a provocation. The Khan asked the Prime Minister to accept the fifth proposal. 5 - Independence: Kalat would maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and ensure sovereign equality. A merger was not considered.¹²⁵

Simultaneously, a memorandum signed by the Baloch chiefs of the Marri-Bugti areas, Sardar Doda Khan Marri and Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan, was sent to the British government demanding to join the Khanate. Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari and several other Baloch chiefs of Derajat also demanded their separation from Punjab and to be linked with the Kalat state. The British, however, ignored all these requests and demands.¹²⁶ Similarly, the directly administered “British Balochistan” had taken a different course. One month before Kalat’s declaration, the British-nominated council of tribal elders, the *Shahi Jirga* (royal assembly), and the Quetta municipal council had voted to join Pakistan; that decision was not changed.¹²⁷ The British representatives, in R. Redaelli’s opinion, failed to settle any of the matters put forward by

¹²⁴ I. I. Chundrigar, *Memorandum to Viceroy*, 1946, cited in Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, in Zingel Lallement (ed.) *Pakistan in the 80s*, Lahore, 1985, p. 350.

¹²⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 181-182.

¹²⁶ Weekly, *Bolan*, (Macch, Mastung), 8 April, 2 May and 16 1947; see also Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, pp. 143-144.

¹²⁷ It should be noted that since the early 1940, besides the National Party, the Anjuman-e Watan a local party and the Muslim League were active in British Balochistan. The Pashtuns dominated both parties. Anjuman-e Watan a supporter of All India Congress was struggling for constitutional reform in British Balochistan. Muslim League was founded in 1938 in Quetta and its main aim like the Anju-

Kalat, both because of the Muslim League's opposition to any concessions being made to the Khan, and because of the Government of India's own evident loss of authority.¹²⁸

On 11 April 1947, in the *Ailamiah* (The Declaration of Independence), which was published and distributed as a pamphlet by the KSNP, the outlines of the Constitution of a Free Baloch State were explained.¹²⁹ Balochistan according to the *Ailamiah*, would become a welfare state and protect minority rights. The foreign policy of Balochistan, according to the *Ailamiah* would be based on "friendly treaties with the government of Afghanistan, Iran, Arab countries, Pakistan, India and other countries". About M. A. Jinnah, the *Ailamiah* said that he had been a consultant to the Khan and the former had "fully agreed with the freedom of Kalat, return of the leased regions and inclusion of Baloch territory to Kalat".¹³⁰

The Khanate was neither an English protectorate, nor part of the Indian Federation, but an independent state linked to Great Britain by a Treaty of Alliance.¹³¹ However, in 1935, a unilateral English act, the "Government of India Act", treated the Khanate as an Indian state, but the state was never consulted in the drafting of the Act, nor was it a party to it in any manner.¹³² The territories of the Kalat State being outside the limits of the legislative authority of the British parliament, the Act could not be held binding on the state. Nevertheless, the Khan of Kalat lodged a protest against the provisions of this Act, to the Government of India. He considered that the "Government of India Act", to be an infringement of the treaty of 1876. On June 1939, however, the British Government informed the Khan that "His Excellency (the Crown Representative) recognises the treaty of 1876 as fully valid in every respect and that it would henceforth form the relations between the British and Kalat"¹³³

To discuss the future position of Balochistan and the return of leased areas hitherto under the control of the British Government, the Chief Secretary of Kalat State was sent to Delhi with a draft of the new position of Kalat State as prepared by

man-e Watan was the constitutional change in the province. For more detail see Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 158-159.

¹²⁸ Riccardo Redaelli, The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century), Firenze: Il Maestrone, 1997, p. 187.

¹²⁹ Shah Mohammad Marri, Baloch Qaum, pp 300-301. For more detail see, Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, (vol. II), p. 481.

¹³⁰ Declaration of Government of Kalat, Quetta: Balochistan Press, 1947 (pp. 5-6), cited in Inayatullah Baloch, "Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men "Kalat State National Party" Ka Kerdar", p. 5.

¹³¹ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, pp. 171-172.

¹³² IOR. L/P&S/13/1847

¹³³ Ibid.

legal experts. This resulted in a round table conference, held on August 4, 1947, in which Lord Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Kalat, Sir Sultan Ahmed, the Legal Advisor of Kalat State and the Khan of Kalat took part in the deliberations. The following points were agreed upon: "Kalat State will be independent on August 5, 1947, enjoying the same status as it originally held in 1838, having friendly relations with its neighbours. In case the relations of Kalat with any future government become strained, Kalat will exercise its right of self-determination, and the British Government should take precautionary measures to help Kalat in the matter as per the Treaties of 1839 and 1841"¹³⁴

Thus, the "Standstill Agreement" (formally announced on the 11th August 1947), accepted the sovereign status of Balochistan. It stated: "The government of Pakistan recognises the status of Kalat as a free and independent State which has bilateral relations with the British Government, and whose rank and position is different from that of other Indian states"¹³⁵.

After the formal announcement of the Standstill Agreement on 11th August 1947, the Khan of Kalat proclaimed Khanate's independence on August 15, 1947. Addressing his audience in Balochi, the Khan announced, "Today our country is independent, and I can express my views freely and openly."¹³⁶ The lower house of the Kalat *diwan*, the *Darul-Awam*, which was convened specially for that purpose in September of 1947, overwhelmingly approved this move. The majority of the fifty-two assembly members voted for independence, but did not foreclose the possibility of a special relationship between the independent Kalat and the newly established state of Pakistan.¹³⁷

The traditional flag of the state in green over red colour and the crescent and star in the centre was hoisted. A *khutba* (a welcome address) was read in his name, at the beginning of the Friday prayers in the Jamia mosque of Kalat, as the independent ruler of the state. After the prayers the Khan addressed his audience in a lengthy speech expressing his determination to achieve three important objectives. 1- complete independence of the country from the foreign yoke and domination. 2- Promulgation of *Shariat* Law with a constitution based on the injunctions of the Holy Quran

¹³⁴ India Office Record "Independence of Kalat, 1948", cited in: Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p. 352; see also Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, (vol. II), p. 487.

¹³⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p. 352.

¹³⁶ Malik Allah-Bakhsh (ed.), Tarikh-e-Khawanin-e-Baloch, Quetta, 1979, pp. 407-413.

¹³⁷ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 150-66.

as understood. 3- the unity of the Baloch as a nation spread over a large part of Asia in large numbers. Immediately after declaration of Independence, the Khan announced holding of election for the new *diwan*.¹³⁸

The *diwan*, a bicameral legislative body, consisted of the *Darul-Umara* (the House of the tribal chiefs or Upper House) and the *Darul-Awam* (the House of Commons or Lower House). *Darul-Umara* was composed of the hereditary chiefs of the tribal provinces of Jhalawan and Sarawan, 35 in number. *Darul-Awam* had 52 members, of whom 47 were elected and 5 nominated by the Khan.¹³⁹ The *Rawaj* (unwritten constitution) continued to be valid as the constitution of the Khanate. However, besides the *Rawaj*, the Kalat Act of 1946 was used as the written constitution. The legislative period was five years. It should be noted that the 1947 election was held only in Kalat and Makkoran, and it was the first general election in Balochistan's history; the National Party won 32 out of 52 seats in the *Darul-Awam*.¹⁴⁰

Struggling since 1920s for the independence of their country, it was a big victory for the Baloch nationalists. One of the important decisions taken during the brief life of the Kalat parliament was the recognition of the Balochi language as the state and national language of Balochistan. The *Darul-Awam* in its first three-day meeting, held in Dadar on December 12 and 14, 1947, recognised Balochi as the "official and national language" of the state of Kalat and decreed that it should be taught in schools.¹⁴¹ The decision was then approved unanimously by the *Darul-Umara* in its meeting of January 4, 1948 and "a committee was formed to study and report on the adaptation of measures and methods for the introduction of Balochi as a medium of instruction in schools".¹⁴²

As the head of a sovereign state, during his visit to Pakistan in October 1947, the Khan was received as the King of Balochistan by thousands of Baloch in Karachi. In a reception at Masti Khan Lodge, the Khan urged the Baloch to make every effort for the uplift of their country and to raise their educational standard. The Khan appealed to the gathering to inspire the people with freedom and equality.¹⁴³ "It was a great occasion" the seventy years old Yusuf Naskanti, then a young participant, said

¹³⁸ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, (vol. II), pp. 489-490.

¹³⁹ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, Quetta, 1996, pp. 99-102.

¹⁴⁰ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 173

¹⁴¹ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 499.

¹⁴² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 180.

¹⁴³ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 182.

proudly.¹⁴⁴ However, contrary to diplomatic tradition, he was not received by the Governor General or by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In Dr. Baloch's opinion, "it was a clear signal of a shift in Pakistan's policy towards the Khanate".¹⁴⁵ M. A. Jinnah advised the Khan to expedite the merger with Pakistan. The Khan, although refused his demand and argued:

As Baluchistan is a land of numerous tribes, the people there must be consulted in the affairs prior to any decision. I take, accordingly to the prevalent tribal convention, no decision, which can be binding upon them unless they are taken into confidence by their Khan.¹⁴⁶

Following Jinnah's proposal on Kalat's merger, the Khan of Kalat summoned the Kalat State *diwan*, on December 12, 1947. Opposing unanimously the merger proposal of Kalat's state with Pakistan, the *Dar-ul-Awam*, (Lower House) argued that the proposal militated against the spirit of the earlier agreement arrived at between Kalat Government and the spokesmen of Pakistan on August 4, 1947, as well as against the Independence Act of 1947. Similarly the *Dar-ul-Umara* (Upper House) composed of the majority of the *Sardars*, hailed the decision of *Dar-ul-Awam*, in its meeting on January 4, 1948. In view of this opposition, the *diwan*, however, supported the Khan's decision to initiate talks with Pakistan.¹⁴⁷

In order to discuss the leased areas, under the Kalat-Pakistan Agreement of August 1947, late in September 1947 Kalat's Prime Minister, Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam, and Foreign Minister Douglas Y Fell, were sent to Karachi to meet the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign and States Affairs. The meetings between the officials of the two states were not fruitful because their host advised a merger with Pakistan rather than a treaty relationship. Thus negotiations provided for by the "Standstill Agreement" of August 1947 did not take place.¹⁴⁸

Since then the Pakistani authorities not only started a campaign against the Khan to compel him to join Pakistan, but also prepared to use coercive methods for a forced merger of the state.¹⁴⁹ Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Khan instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Khanate's forces, Brigadier General Purves, to reorganize the forces and arrange the arms and ammunition. In December 1947, approaching the Commonwealth Relations office and the Ministry of Supply in Lon-

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Ysuf Naskanti.

¹⁴⁵ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 183.

¹⁴⁶ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, cited in *ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

¹⁴⁸ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, pp. 310-311.

don, General Purves failed in his efforts, because of British refusal to supply any arms to the Khanate without the Pakistan Government's approval.¹⁵⁰ In the same time, however, the Khan desperately requested to the Indian authorities and the Afghan king for help, but with no success.¹⁵¹

When it became apparent to Pakistan that the Khan was merely playing for time, the Government of Pakistan announced on March 18th, separate accessions by the states of Lasbela and Kharan, which were feudatories of the Khan, and of Makkoran, which was never more than a district of the State of Kalat.¹⁵² Accession of Makkoran, Kharan and Lasbela robbed Kalat of more than half its territory and its access to the sea. The following day the Khan of Kalat issued a statement refusing to believe that Pakistan as champion of Muslim rights in the world would infringe the rights of small Muslim neighbours, pointing out that Makkoran as a district of Kalat, had no separate status and that the foreign policy of Lasbela and Kharan was placed under Kalat by standstill agreement.¹⁵³

In a desperate attempt on 25th March, three days before accession, the Khan tried to summon his *Sardars* and persuade them against accession. But only two unimportant *Sardars* obeyed the summons. All others refused to attend. The Khan, according to India Office Reports, then intensified his efforts to rally people to his side, and is believed to have distributed large sums of money to *Mullas* in the hope of obtaining their support, but the State Muslim League emissaries counteracted these efforts.¹⁵⁴ However, a letter of 27 March from the Khan to Jinnah denied reports that he had attempted to urge *Sardars* and people against Kalat's accession to Pakistan. In it he also denied reports that he had entered into negotiations with India or Afghanistan.¹⁵⁵ The independence moves, however, came to an end when the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, hearing of the movements of troops in Pasni and Jiwani and fearful of further problems, acceded to Pakistan on March 27, 1948. The Khan defines the matter of signing, the merger document as a "dictate of history", adding, "I confess, I knew I was exceeding the scope of my mandate...[but] had I not taken the immediate step of signing Kalat's merger, the...British Agent to the Governor-General

¹⁴⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 183-184.

¹⁵⁰ IOR. L/P&S/13/1847.

¹⁵¹ Shaikh Ragam, *Shap Roch Shap*, Quetta: Balochi Publications, 2000, p. 34.

¹⁵² IOR.L/P&S/13/184.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ IOR.L/P&S/13/1847

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

could have played havoc by leading Pakistan into a fratricide war against the Baluches".¹⁵⁶ Even so, the Pakistani Army moved to Kalat on April 1, 1948 with orders to overcome resistance from the nationalists.¹⁵⁷

Obviously the Baloch nationalists never even entertained the merger idea with Pakistan.¹⁵⁸ The independence case was best articulated by Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, then an assembly member from the majority party, the Kalat State National Party, who argued in the *diwan* meeting of December 1947 that: "We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims require us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan. They say we Baloch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, are Afghanistan, Iran and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against the superpowers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a lot of others cannot do so either".¹⁵⁹ Rejecting the merger proposal with Pakistan, Bizenjo continued, "This mean signing the death-warrant for 15 million Baloch in Asia. We cannot be guilty of this major crime to humiliate the Baloch nation to a merger with a non-Baloch nation."¹⁶⁰

A well-known authority on Pakistani affairs, Lawrence Ziring maintains that Baloch leaders did not enter into the arrangement to join Pakistan willingly. The government of Pakistan was threatening to use force to achieve the accession of the country. The Baloch nationalists were ill prepared to ignore this fact.¹⁶¹ The National Party and the *diwan*, which it dominated, repeatedly rejected accession to Pakistan and insisted on preservation of a free Balochistan.¹⁶² They also demanded return of those Khanate territories, which were already annexed to Pakistan. On March 27, 1948, after Pakistan's armed forces had been mobilized for military operations against the State, the Khan silently signed the Document of Accession.¹⁶³

The accession of Balochistan into Pakistan was one of the epoch-making events in the history of Baloch people and their country. On 28 March, the Khanate became a part of Pakistan. A Political Agent, an officer subordinate to the AGG was appointed to look after the administration of the state and guide the Prime Minister in

¹⁵⁶ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, pp. 161-162.

¹⁵⁷ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 25.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁵⁹ Malik Allah-Bakhsh, *Baluch Qaum Ke Tarikh ke Chand Parishan Dafter Araq*, Quetta:, Islamiyah Press, 20 September, 1957, p. 43.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan, The Enigma of Political Development*, Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, p 160.

¹⁶² M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, p. 313

all internal affairs. By this, the legal entity of the Khan of Kalat was abolished, and most of the members of the Balochistan Cabinet were arrested or exiled from Balochistan.¹⁶⁴

With this, the Baloch Confederacy and rule came to an end after nearly three hundred years (1666-1948). The Khan's decision was opposed by the Baloch nationalists; wrote a Baloch writer, "Nasir I united all. Nasir II endeavoured to maintain it. Khudadad Khan fought for the whole of his life to organise a government. Mahmud Khan II prepared the coffin for the state, and Ahmad Yar, the present Khan, buried all, and the glory and vanity of his line."¹⁶⁵

Oppression and First Baloch Resistance

The merger of the Khanate into Pakistan in 1948 resulted in unrest and anti-Pakistan rallies throughout Balochistan.¹⁶⁶ The National Party, which had espoused the cause of a "Greater Balochistan" incorporating all Baloch areas into an enlarged Kalat state, rejected accession and was behind much of the agitation. Its leaders, Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd and others, were arrested.¹⁶⁷ This first encounter between the Baloch and the forces of the Pakistan state was crucial in shaping nationalist insecurity and fear of repression at the hands of foreigners. Under the Raj, Baloch affairs outside of British Balochistan had been left to the Baloch; now, centralising forces appeared that the Baloch tribes could not easily accept.

Under these circumstances, on 15 April 1948, Agha Abdul Karim, brother of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1933-1948) started an armed movement in the Jhalawan area backed by some nationalist leaders and with the secret approval of the Khan. Agha Abdul Karim was educated in Karachi, and served as the governor of Makkoran province until March 1948. He invited the leading members of the nationalist parties (the Kalat State National Party and the Baloch League), to join him in the struggle against Pakistan. "The showdown between Kalat and Pakistan" Harrison wrote, "came in April 1948, when the Pakistani army ordered its garrison Commander in Baluchistan to march on Kalat and arrest the Khan unless he signed a agreement of accession."¹⁶⁸ However, neither the Baloch nationalist parties nor the *Darbar* (Royal Court) of Kalat were prepared for any armed resistance.

¹⁶³ S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 137.

¹⁶⁴ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, pp. 521-22.

¹⁶⁵ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, pp. 125-126.

¹⁶⁶ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, pp. 525-26..

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

¹⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 25.

In addition to this, the nationalist leaders were also divided on the future line of action. Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a prominent journalist, Malik Saeed Dehwar, the Secretary General of the National Party, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani and some other activists, favoured armed struggle in the form of guerilla war, while Abdul Aziz Kurd, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Gul Khan Nasir along with some other leaders of the Kalat State National Party “were cool to the idea of a military showdown with Pakistan” because of the lack of preparation and internal and external support.¹⁶⁹

On 16 May 1948, after brief skirmishes with the well-trained and well-equipped army of Pakistan, Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the “Baloch Mujahideen” (holy warriors), as they called themselves, about 1000 in number, crossed the border into Afghanistan and erected their camp at Karez Nazar Mohammad Khan situated in no man’s land known as Sarlat in search of help. The National Party members who were still free, along with a few Baloch individuals from Sindh and Derajat, joined the Prince.¹⁷⁰

While staying in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen adopted the following measures to achieve their goal: 1 – The sending of messages to the Baloch chiefs of eastern and western Balochistan, asking them to join in the struggle. 2 – The running of a propaganda campaign in Balochistan, aimed at the creation of unrest, disturbances, and revolt as well as the enlistment of a national liberation force. 3 – The search for international support, particularly from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.¹⁷¹

The propaganda campaign was to be carried out on two fronts: The national cultural front and the religious front. On the national cultural front, the party distributed a series of pamphlets all over Balochistan, aiming to cause an uprising against the oppressive rule of Pakistan. On the religious front the Baloch nationalist *Maulavis*, *Maulavi* Nazeer Hossein, *Maulavi* Arz Mohammad, *Maulavi* Mohammad Umar, *Maulavi* Mohammad Afzal and a few others issued the *fatwa* (decree by a learned religious figure) and proclaimed *Jihad* (holy war) against Pakistan and demanded that the Baloch people join the national movement.¹⁷² Addressing the government servants and military personnel of Pakistan the *fatwa* demanded that the Muslims of Pakistan

¹⁶⁹ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, p. 323

¹⁷⁰ Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 307. However, according to Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, when crossed the Afghan border, Prince Abdul Karim had 2500, supporter with him (interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai).

¹⁷¹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 193.

¹⁷² K. B. Nizamani, “Kaumi Azadi ki Council ka Qeyam”, in: *People’s Front*, London, May 1980, p. 4.

and particularly the soldiers, should engage in Jihad against the non-Islamic Government of Pakistan.¹⁷³

The Prince, who was also chosen as the supreme commander of the Baloch Mujahideen, issued an appeal to personages to help with the recruitment. A person recruiting 100 men was offered the rank of a major and a person recruiting 50 men was entitled to the rank of captain. The Baloch Mujahideen had a secret agency called *Jannisar* (devotee), whose duty was to provide information, destroy the communication system, and watch the activities of traitors. In addition to this, there was a secret unit *Janbaz* (darer), to kill all traitors. The headquarters of the agency was known as *Bab-i-Aali* (secret war-office) and headed by the Prince himself.¹⁷⁴

The Afghan authorities, however, refused to provide any sort of help and told the Baloch Mujahideen either to reside as political refugees at Kandahar or to leave. The Prince approached the Soviet Embassy in Kabul for help. The Soviet embassy was sympathetic, but offered no material assistance, which was to be the pattern for relations between Baloch nationalists and Moscow. Under these circumstances, the Prince returned to Balochistan with his militia.¹⁷⁵

The Afghans were not happy hosts. Kabul-Karachi relations had been embittered over the Pakhtunistan issue. But, since the rise of Ahmad Shah, the Afghan had treated Balochistan as a vassal state until the Baloch-Afghan war in 1758, when an agreement of "non-interference" was signed between the parties. In the 19th century, Afghan rulers like Shah Shuja and Amir Abdur-Rehman desired to occupy Balochistan. With the ending of Imperial paramountcy, it was only fitting in Kabul's view that its historical claims be fulfilled. Kabul's irredentist claims included what had now become Pakistan's Balochistan province, a fact Prince Karim's nationalists failed to appreciate. As argued by Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, "the idea of an independent Baluchistan was contradictory to the Afghans because Pakistani Balochistan was a part of Afghanistan's concept of Pashtunistan".¹⁷⁶

It must be borne in mind that the Afghan expansionist policy reflected the economic considerations of a landlocked state. At the same time, it was impossible for the Afghan Government to neglect its own national interests and to support the

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Monthly, *Azad Baluchistan*, London, January 1983.

¹⁷⁶ Inayatullah Baloch, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of selfdetermination", in: Zingel, W. (ed.), *Pakistan in its Fourth Decade*, Hamburg, 1983, p. 200.

movement of an independent Greater Balochistan, which claimed the Baloch region in Afghanistan.

As earlier mentioned, before the Khan signed the Accession Document, All India Radio announced that the Baloch Khanate had offered and requested accession to India.¹⁷⁷ Whatever the authenticity of this controversial report, the government of India did not take any effective action to accept the offer and protect the allegedly Congressite leaders of the National Party. In 1948, Agha Abdul Karim, approached the "Iranian" Baloch *Sardars* for help but his appeal was refused because the *Sardars* were afraid of repression.¹⁷⁸ Meanwhile, messages were sent to Mir Ghulam Faruq of the Rudini tribe, Sardar Mehrab Khan, Sardar Mir Jumma, Mir Wazir Khan Sanjrani of Chagai, and several other chiefs.¹⁷⁹

Agha Abdul Karim and his partisans, the Baloch Mujahideen, were soon asked by the Afghan government to leave.¹⁸⁰ Being disillusioned, Prince Agha Abdul Karim and his party returned to Balochistan on 8 July 1948. After a minor clash near Harboi with the Pakistan army, the Prince along with more than one hundred of his followers was arrested. On 27 November 1948, he was tried by a special *Jirga* in Mach Jail and sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000. His colleague and advisor, Mohammad Hossein Unqa, a poet and intellectual, also received ten years' imprisonment. The other members of his party were given various sentences and fines.¹⁸¹

Thus in 1948, the Baloch national movement was crushed by Jinnah's Pakistan, which had inherited a part of the British Imperial Indian Armies, treasury and administration. Though the elected *diwan* (parliament) of the Khanate had noted what the leaders of the movement wanted: a sovereign independent Balochistan. The Baloch political movement began by Yusuf Ali Magasi, Abdul Aziz Kurd, and some others in the 1920s continued through the 1930s and 1940s. In 1947-48, however, the ambitions of the Baloch national movement failed to materialise. The surviving leaders and their new adherents, as we will see in the next chapters, continued the same movement on various lines after 1948 when the party was outlawed by the government of Pakistan.

¹⁷⁷ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 321.

¹⁷⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 145.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁸⁰ S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, p. 138.

¹⁸¹ Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, p. 526.

Summation

The twentieth century marked a major watershed for the Baloch. Direct British rule in northern Balochistan led to the construction of the first networks of roads, railways, telegraph lines, the introduction of modern education, though on a limited basis, the establishment of several large cantonments, the development of several coal fields, and the related servicing facilities in that part during the second half of the 19th century. Due to these developments, the Baloch intelligentsia - and through them, their relatives, friends and tribesmen - came to know more than their forefathers had known about their country and the world at large. On the one hand the political developments in India, Afghanistan, Middle East and Europe, and on the other hand the publications prepared by British administrators, orientalist and missionaries contributed to the development of Baloch national consciousness.

The Baloch had never lost their freedom before their conquest by the modern armies of Britain and Iran. From the end of the First World War, underground activities and propaganda were strengthened mostly around a "classical" nationalist ideology not adverse to the concept of "Greater Balochistan". Greater Balochistan would have encompassed the Khanate of Kalat, British administered territories and western Balochistan. The Baloch bitterly resisted their forcible incorporation into Iran by Reza Shah in 1928. Thus, the alien domination, the British and the Persians motivated the rise and development of Baloch nationalism in the early 20th century.

Inspired by the political upheaval in Turkey and Russia, as well as the anti-colonial movement in British India itself, some Baloch called for an independent state of Balochistan. Yusuf Ali Magasi and Abdul Aziz Kurd were the early leaders in the Baloch national movement. In 1920 under the leadership of Magasi and Kurd, a secret political organization called "Young Baloch", which remained underground until 1929, was formed. Later on the organization was renamed as "Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan" (Organization for the Unity of the Baloch).

After Magasi's death in 1935, the movement was continued under the leadership of Abdul Aziz Kurd. In February 1937, a formal political party, the "Kalat State National Party", commonly known as the "National Party", replaced the Anjuman. The party persuaded the Khan to abolish a number of taxes levied on tribes by pro-British *Sardars*. But within the state the party could not ignore the strength of the *Sardari* system or the designs of the British Government. Both of these were obstructions to national liberation that is to the establishment of an independent Balochistan.

These policies, however, created a backlash against the nationalists. Consequently, the pressure from the British and several *Sardars* forced the Khan to declare the party illegal in 1939. However, the National Party intensified its activities for independence, as the partition of the subcontinent approached after the World War II.

The views of the Government of Kalat regarding the future position of the Khanate at the time of the British withdrawal, as submitted to the Cabinet Mission in 1946, were as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Government of Kalat maintains, and they are supported in this by the unanimous will of the subjects of the state: That the Kalat State is an independent sovereign state whose relations with the British Government are governed by the Treaty of 1876; that its Indian associations are merely due to its connections with the British Government; that Kalat being an independent state, the Khan, his government, and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Union; and that with the termination of the treaty with the British Government, the Kalat State will revert to its pre-treaty position of complete independence and will be free to choose its own course for the future.¹⁸²

Despite the good prospects for independence after British withdrawal, the frozen social structure, which was the legacy of the Sandeman system, directed Balochistan along a gloomier path. Different possibilities for the future of the Kalat state and the British leased territories were considered. Despite the poor state of political life in Kalat, formally a sovereign state under the Raj, though linked by a treaty (frequent parallels were drawn to Nepal), the Muslim League, as well as the departing British, at first seemed ready to allow independence to Kalat and to return to it some of the surrounding areas under direct British administration.¹⁸³

On the 15th August 1947, the Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, declared the independence of his country. An assembly was formed, elections were held and the national forces became dominant in the parliament. This was the first instance of elections in Balochistan's history. Although the National Party was still an illegal organisation, it participated indirectly in the elections through its members as individual

¹⁸² IOR. L/P & S/13/1847.

¹⁸³ IOR. L/P & S/13/1846; S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State*, p. 135; Inayatullah Baloch, "Baloch Qaumi Tahrik Men, Kalat State National Party Ka Kerdar", p. 5.

candidates. The National Party's members won 39 seats out of the total 52, thus taking the Government of Kalat and the *Sardars* by surprise.

It seems odd that the Khan of Kalat should have turned to the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. As the events immediately following the 1947 partition were to reveal, Jinnah had no interest in bolstering the Khan's position, or in giving him any hope of independence. Thus, since then, they (the Khan and Jinnah) confronted each other as political foes. The Khan and the National Party insisted on an independent sovereign Balochistan. Jinnah arranged the annexation of some part of the Khanate territory to Pakistan by controversial means.¹⁸⁴ For the remaining part of Balochistan, he demanded formal accession by the Khan. To counteract Jinnah's pressure, the Khan continuously referred the matter to the Khanate's elected *diwan*. This action was in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which required that the "Princes' decision about the future of their States will take the desire of their people into consideration".¹⁸⁵

The independence of Kalat, however, did not last for more than eight months. On 27th March the Khan was forced to accept the incorporation of his state into Pakistan. This event provoked a rebellion led by his brother Agha Abdul Karim who unsuccessfully sought to gain help from Afghanistan. Consequently, the state of Kalat with its weak socio-economic and political structure collapsed in the face of the Pakistan's relatively very strong economic infrastructure and its modern civil and military institutions. Thus, the principal reason for the collapse of the Khanate was the overwhelming force of the Pakistani army. However, the reasons the collapse occurred so quickly after the British departure were an old and dying tribal and feudal system, represented by the Baloch *Sardars*, and the lack of sufficient unity among the Baloch tribes for the cause of independence.

¹⁸⁴ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 509.

¹⁸⁵ Sir Conrad Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew: From Reading to Mountbatten*, India: Indo-British Historical Society, 1975, pp. 146, 139-160.

CHAPTER FIVE

Post-colonial Balochistan

Introduction

It is widely believed that the Baloch national identity, as opposed to identification with tribes, has become stronger as Balochistan has been incorporated into the states of Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948).¹ “Our political process”, argued the former speaker of the Balochistan assembly, Mohammad Akram Baloch, “started with annexation”.² The former head of the Arts Council of Balochistan, Lal Bakhsh Rind, gave a further clear explanation on the development of Baloch nationalism. According to Rind, at the time of partition Baloch nationalism was in its primitive stage. To support his argument, Lal Bakhsh Rind said, “while Pakistan occupied the most part of Balochistan, there was no strong mass reaction, it means”, he said, “There was no strong national feelings. Only Agha Abdul Karim and few intellectuals reacted.” “However”, he continued, “Pakistan oppression was a beginning of mistrust and a motivation for growing the Baloch nationalism.”³ According to Rind, even the demand of Nauruz Khan was limited to the release of Khan Ahmad Yar Khan. Although it was the arrest of Nauruz Khan and his guerrilla leaders that shaped Baloch nationalism, believes Rind.⁴

As observed by the Russian writer, Y. V. Gankovsky the birth of Baloch national consciousness was evident in the early 1950s.⁵ The first Balochi publications emerged in 1951, with monthly Ouman. Gul Khan Nasir, Azad Jamaldini, Maulavi Khair Mohammad Nadvi and Syed Hashomi were the leading Baloch writers. The work for collecting and creating nationalist literature was in progress. The most intriguing personality in the field of history and other socio-political issues during the 1950s and 1960 was Gul Khan Nasir. His works on various socio-intellectual topics such as epical history and revolutionary poetry sought to provide a portrayal of good and evil, right and wrong like a fashionable intellectual. As an untrained historian, he

¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 94-102; Paul Titus, “Routes to Ethnicity: Roads, Buses, and Differential Ethnic Relations in Pakistani Balochistan”, in Paul Titus, (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity*, p. 273.

² Interview with Mohammad Akram Baloch.

³ Interview with Lal Bakhsh Rind.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, p. 208.

made a significant impact on historical thinking and on popular knowledge about the recent and (to some extent) medieval history of Balochistan. He also was the most popular revolutionary poet in Balochi. Despite his literary role, Nasir participated in the Baloch struggle for national independence and remained behind bars for several years from 1941 to 1979.

Contemporary to Gul Khan Nasir, two other influential people enjoyed considerable fame in their nationalist approach to historical topics, Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch (Gishkouri) and Khuda Bakhsh Marri Baloch. Sardar Khan played, one may say, a consequential role in consolidating the national and racial sentiments expressed in academic work. In his writing, Sardar Khan never concealed his national-chauvinist ideas. Sardar Khan's The Baluch a Nation (1947), History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan (1958) and The Great Baluch (1965) provide an interesting account of the Baloch golden age or the Chakarian period (1487-1511). Khuda Bakhsh Marri has a similar place for himself as a purveyor of a bombastic nationalist propaganda of history and national heritage. In generating nationalist feeling, equally important, however, was the role of Azad Jamaldini and Syed Hashomi. Syed Hashomi (1926-1977) in his several compilations of poems, published in the early 1960s, reminded the Baloch of their glorious past and asked them for sacrifices to secure a position of honour and respect. Similarly, Azad through his monthly Balochi, which was published in Karachi from 1956, contributed to the propagation of the idea of Baloch nationalism.

Gul Khan Nasir's two-volume Tarikh-e Balochistan (the history of Balochistan) in 1952, Sardar Khan's History of Baluch Race, Marri's Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan, and several other similar works glorified the Balochs' past. The British-created hatreds and divisions among the different Baloch tribes especially the "Baloch – Brahui" division, were replaced by ideas of the common Baloch – Brahui historical bond and racial origin.⁶ Gankovsky mentions a number of national organisations (All Pakistan Baluch League, Baluchistan Students League, Ustaman-Gall and others) in which he believes, "apart from bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, landlords also were urging the establishment of a single province in West Pakistan incorporating all Baloch-peopled territories."⁷

⁶ Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, pp. 95-95.

⁷ Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 208.

Describing this evolutionary process of Baloch nationalism, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, whose tribe took an active part in both the major revolts during the 1960's and 1970's, had this to say. "In earlier years our struggles had been tribal but since 1947 they have become more and more political. It has been a natural process, like a child growing from an embryo. Our people have slowly sensed that they (Pakistanis) would destroy our identity as a nation if we did not fight back. Agha Abdul Karim's revolt", he said, "was the first expression. What did he want? He was not too clear about it, but he knew he wanted a state, something separate, and what he did, when he went to jail, it had instructive effect and began with the growth of a Baloch consciousness that had been advancing and maturing ever since... When Nauroz Khan went to the hills in 1958, what did he want? Like Abdul Karim, it was vague, but it was also a desire for a Baloch state. He suffered and he believed their promise of safe conduct, and then what was the outcome? What happened to him made a great impression on educated young people, on the petty bourgeoisie, on the generation coming up. Call it an eruption, an outflow, what happened is a part of history. They went to the hills and their tribes followed. I wonder what was in the mind of Nauroz Khan? He could not have it explained in terms of nationalism, but it was to protect his traditions, his sense of identity. There was something in his mind, some vision of freedom for the Baloch".⁸

It was within Pakistan that the Baloch local economy was integrated with the modern and market-oriented economies; simultaneously, it was brought under a vast web of central bureaucratic controls. In practical terms, this meant the construction of roads and growth in transport, the spread of commercialised agriculture and the institutions and technology to sustain it, the promotion of land reforms and of changes in systems of land tenure, increasing pressures for the migration of local manpower to distant cities and to areas abroad, the opening of new industries and – above all – a steady decline of tribalism and its traditional economic autonomy.⁹ Thus, economically, politically, administratively, and culturally, new forces began to act on both

⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet*, pp. 47-48.

⁹ In the course of time "Tribal or *Sardari* ownership", however, often changed into personal ownership. The Land Reform Acts of 1959, 1972 and 1977, which placed limited land ownership undermined the legal status of large land holding also. For more detail see, Aijaz Ahmad, "Balochistan's Agrarian Question", in: Feroz Ahmed (ed.), *Focus on Balochistan and the Pashtoon question*, pp. 44-67; Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Mahmood Hasan Khan, M. Ghaffar Chaudry, *Structural change in Pakistan's agriculture*, Islamabad: PIDE, 1989.

eastern (Pakistani) and western (Iranian) Balochistan, as it will be discussed in this chapter.

The Punjabi Domination

The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his Muslim League Party espoused the "Two Nation Theory" that led to the original division of the subcontinent into a Muslim and a Hindu state namely Pakistan and India respectively.¹⁰ However, the Muslim League, which received power from the British at the time of partition, was a motley collection of Muslim politicians including the regional leaders, who shortly prior to Partition had come together with the sole objective of avoiding the domination of Congress in a united India. The death of Jinnah on 11 September 1948 weakened the Muslim League profoundly. Defections and splits rendered it ineffective and the civilian political process disintegrated.

As observed by Professor Lawrence Ziring, the idea of Pakistan found its warmest reception in the Indian cosmopolitan regions where the Muslim minority perceived an immediate threat from the Hindu majority.¹¹ Such a fear was an action replay of pre-partition fears of the Muslims, who had then argued that under the British parliamentary system of governance, there would be permanent rule of the majority, the Hindus. This fear of rule of the majority was one of the reasons to put forth the two-nation theory – the ultimate *raison d'être* for creation of Pakistan.¹²

However, the Baloch and Pashtuns who did not feel such a threat from the distant Hindus, to their remote frontier regions of Balochistan and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), respectively, opposed the idea of Pakistan from its very beginning.¹³ As the partition of sub-continent approached, the Baloch opted for independence, as described earlier, while the Pashtun nationalists under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the head of the Khudai Khidmatgar, (Red Shirts) joined Nehru's Congress Party in opposing the division of Subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan.

Successive Pakistani rulers have attempted to propagate Islam as the basis of state nationalism in the hope that religious homogeneity would supersede ethnic heterogeneity and would eventually serve to unite and integrate its various nationalities into the state structure.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the common Islamic faith has not prevented

¹⁰ Lawrence Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics, New York & London: Praeger Publishers, 1978, pp. 89-90, 96-100.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ishtiaq Ahmed, Separatistrelser i Sydasien, p. 14.

different nationalities from coming into collision or from harming each other ever since the independence of Pakistan.¹⁵ There are other major historical, ethnic, political, economic, and socio-psychological factors, which shape the question of nationalities comprising Pakistan as well. In this respect the Baloch case in Pakistan, as observed by Selig Harrison, is good example. Harrison wrote, "The inability of the Punjabi-*Muhajir* establishment to neutralize ethnic self-assertion with Islamic appeals has been particularly evident in the case of the Baluch"¹⁶.

Since the Partition, a number of imbalances attended the creation of Pakistan. Along with differences of language and culture, not to mention unequal levels of interest in the very concept of Pakistan, the regions forming Pakistan were also characterized by uneven development. Originally comprising two geographically separated Eastern and Western wings, the newly created state came to be dominated from the outset by the Punjabis in alliance with the *muhajirs*. This domination came to be seen by the other regional groups in ethno-national terms. Thus, the seeds of ethnic conflict and tensions were sown from the beginning in the Pakistani state structure. The large-scale Muslim immigrants from India contributed greatly to aggravating ethnic imbalances. The *muhajirs*, according to Pakistan's 1951 census constituted some seven million people.¹⁷

As said, the *muhajirs* and the Punjabis together dominated Pakistan's economy and controlled its civil and military administration as inherited from the British. This was the case in spite of the fact that at the time they were even a minority as compared to the majority East Bengalis let alone other non-Punjabi nationalities.¹⁸ Given their urban base and dominant economic position as well as their control of the state bureaucracy, the ruling Punjabis and their *muhajir* allies began to shape and define the state identity and structure according to their own perceptions and image.¹⁹

Initially, the *muhajirs* were over-represented in the powerful civil service of Pakistan.²⁰ A prime example of their dominance was the imposition of Urdu, spoken only by *muhajirs*, as the lingua franca of the state to the exclusion of the various other languages used by the indigenous national groups, a decision which led to the 1952

¹⁵ K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976, pp. 139-78.

¹⁶ Harrison, Selig S., "Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case", in: Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony D., (ed.), *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 299.

¹⁷ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 101.

¹⁸ Gul Khan Nasir, *Balochistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men*, p. 350.

¹⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 82-83.

²⁰ B. Ali, "Political forces in Sind", p. 184.

language riots in East Bengal and the subsequent defeat of the Muslim League at the polls in 1954.²¹ It is important to note that Urdu was not the language of all the *muhajirs*. A lot of them spoke either Punjabi or Gujarati. In the early 1950s only around 7 per cent of the Pakistan's population spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.²² Another example was the adoption of the One-Unit plan designed to merge the four ethnically distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP into a single wing of Western Pakistan in 1954. The informal ruling alliance of the *Muhajir*-dominated Bureaucracy and the big Punjabi landowners during the first decade of Pakistan's existence perceived National Unity as a system securing their own hegemony. *Muhajirs* provided administrative and economic experience, while the Punjabi elites political power. Anybody, who was not part of this combination or not willing to be co-opted as a junior partner, was perceived as a potential threat to Pakistan. Therefore, ethnic minorities or most provincial governments became marginalized.²³

However, some significant changes occurred after partition in the ethnic composition and structure of the oligarchy in the country. Pakistan, as stated by Björn Hettne, gradually "became more and more a state for Punjabis."²⁴ On 18 October 1951 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, the most senior *muhajir* leader, was assassinated while addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi in Punjab. In *muhajir* perceptions it was the beginning of the decline of their influence in Pakistan. The murder remains a mystery to this day. At any rate, the Punjabi bureaucrats expanding their control over the state followed it immediately. In 1958 when general Ayub Khan brought the first military coup, he fired many top civil servants of *muhajir* background. In 1960, he also shifted the capital of Pakistan from Karachi a *muhajir*-dominated area, to Islamabad in northern Punjab. Those *muhajirs* working for the federal government had to abandon Karachi. Furthermore, the governments of Ayub Khan (1958-69), Yahya Khan (1969-71) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) carried out retrenchments of government officers on charges of corruption. *Muhajir* bureaucrats figured prominently in these expulsions. More dramatically, the rise of the PPP and its coming into power in Sindh in 1972, followed by the language riots, created a tremor in *muhajir* circles.²⁵ Later when General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq captured

²¹ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia*, London, 1996, p. 221.

²² Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 26.

²³ Jannahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 82-83.

²⁴ Björn Hettne, *Att studera Internationella relationer*, Göteborg: Padrigu Papers 1990, pp. 75-76.

²⁵ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, p. 154.

power in July 1977, the predominantly Punjabi army eclipsed the bureaucracy, which was constrained to play second fiddle.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah most probably wanted a secular and bourgeois democratic state in Pakistan. "Our decisions in the affairs of the State", he said, "shall be guided by discussion and consultation".²⁶ On August 11, 1947, Pakistan's constituent assembly met in Karachi for the first time and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was elected to preside the meeting said:

I think we should keep in front of us our ideals and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.²⁷

However, his subsequent behaviour does not show that he was really able to progress beyond the communal politics of pre-partition India. By eliminating strong leaders and planting pliable men in the provinces, Jinnah made it extremely difficult for a collective leadership to emerge after his death. Jinnah expelled the popular Sindhi leader and president of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League (during 1943-45), G. M. Sayed, from the Muslim League because of his outspoken criticism of Sindh's landowning politicians and the Central High Command.

Similarly the Pakhtun nationalist leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan tried to prevail upon Jinnah to make the Muslim League a non-communal party. Being disappointed to convince Jinnah, these nationalist leaders formed "All Pakistan People's Party" later renamed the "People's Organisation" on 6 May 1948.²⁸ Ghaffar Khan became the president and G. M. Syed, was elected the Party's general secretary. The party demanded full autonomy for "linguistic groups" in the country and the recognition of the inalienable rights of the people to rule. Ghaffar Khan was arrested on 15 June 1948, on the charge of creating sectional hatred.²⁹ Moreover, it was Jinnah who established a tradition for the dismissal of elected governments in Pakistan. Under his express directions, the Governors of the Frontier and Sindh dismissed the Ministries of

²⁶ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate of Research, Reference and Publications, Speech of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d., p. 58.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958, p. 129.

²⁹ M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, National Commission on Historical Research, Islamabad, 1976, pp. 90-91.

Dr. Khan Sahib and M.A. Khuhro on 22 August 1947 and 26 April 1948 respectively.³⁰

Much to the surprise of the nationalists, both in East and West Pakistan, in February 1948 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan stated in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly that Urdu would be the sole national language of Pakistan. Governor General Mohamed Ali Jinnah reiterated this later in March in a public speech at Dhaka. Now, Bengali was not only the mother tongue of more than 55 per cent of Pakistan's population but also a highly developed language, which had been in official use for a long time. Jinnah's speech provoked angry demonstrations by Bengali students. The language question was not only to become the centrepiece of emergent Bengali nationalism, but it also led to further politicisation of the Balochi as argued by the last Wali (ruler) of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb.³¹ However, Jinnah's attitude towards the language question was criticised by the nationalists throughout Pakistan. The Pashtun leader, Ghaffar Khan, even went much further and accused Jinnah to be a British agent.³² Muhammad Ali Jinnah's later speeches in 1948, give some more clues to his thinking not only about his position on Balochistan but also about his undemocratic manner. For example, on 15 February 1948, addressing a "Royal Darbar" in Sibi, Jinnah surprised his audience by expressing a preference for a dictatorial, rather than democratic, form of government in Balochistan. He announced that until the Pakistan Constitution was finally worked out in about two years' time Balochistan would continue to be governed by himself, assisted by an advisory council nominated by him.³³ The day after, in an interview with the Daily Telegraph, Jinnah explained that he did not mean in his speech that a dictatorial form of government would have been more suitable for the rest of Pakistan. "Baluchistan", Jinnah explained, "is very undeveloped, and I think my record shows that I can be very useful to it in its present condition".³⁴ Anyhow from the very beginning of accession, the popular leaders in Balochistan were jailed and political parties were banned with the exception of the Muslim League.

³⁰ Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 128.

³¹ Miangul Jahanzeb, The Last Wali of Swat: An Autobiography as told to Frederick Barth, Oslo: Univesitetsforlaget, 1985, pp. 51, 114.

³² M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, pp. 90-91.

³³ L/P & S/13/1846.

³⁴ Ibid.

From Federation to Province

With the lapse of paramountcy in 1947, as mentioned in chapter 4, Balochistan (the Khanate of Kalat) emerged as an independent, federal, and constitutional monarchy, with the Khan of Kalat as its formal head. The Khan Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, however, made the formal declaration of its independence, on August 15, 1947. Territorially, in 1947-1948, the Baloch federation constituted the Khanate of Kalat, including Makkoran³⁵, and the states of Kharan and Las Bela. In other word it comprised only a portion of the Baloch land, the proper Balochistan as the British called it.

Under the British, as earlier mentioned, the Khan was the head of the State only on paper. For all practical purposes, authority was vested with the political Agents who functioned under the direct orders of the Agent to the Governor General. Nasirabad, Chagai and the tribal regions of Marri, Bugti had each a separate Political Agent. Dera Ghazi Khan was absorbed in the Punjab, and Jacobabad (formally Khan-garh) was given over to Sindh. Also a substantial tract of the borderland of Balochistan was handed over to Iran and Afghanistan in 1871, and 1894, respectively. Quetta was occupied in 1870, but the Treaty of Lease was signed with the Khan on the 1st of April 1883, against payment of Rs.25, 000 for revenue annually and Rs.30, 000 in lieu of tolls. Nasirabad was occupied in April 1893, and leased in 1903 for Rs.115, 000 annually. Nushki was leased on 1st July 1899 for Rs.9, 000 annually.³⁶ However, since the withdrawal of the British in 1947, the Baloch federation was demanding the return of all its territories. In March 1946, as noted, in an official memorandum, submitted to the Cabinet Mission, the Khan demanded that all such regions as were given under the control of the British in consequence of any treaty should be returned to the sovereignty of the Kalat state.³⁷

Thus, up to its annexation in 1948, the Baloch federation not only was struggling against its merger with Pakistan, but also demanding its separated lands back to resume their original status as parts of the Kalat state. These territories were now handed over to Pakistan, with the partition by the British. Forcing the Baloch state into merger with Pakistan, as noted in chapter 4, Karachi decided to cut off Kharan, Lasbela and Makkoran by giving them an equal status as the Kalat state and obtaining their "mergers" with Pakistan directly a few weeks before the forced annexation of

³⁵ Makkoran became a separate state after partition.

³⁶ A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, pp. 213-214.

³⁷ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 255-296.

Kalat itself.³⁸ With its annexation on March 27, 1948, the proper Balochistan (the Kalat state) was reverted to the position it held in the British period. Thus, politically, in the early 1950s, the disintegration of Baloch country was at its apex.

By this time, like their territory the Baloch population was also divided. In the early 1950s, there were more Baloch in Sindh than in Balochistan proper. It is important to note that it was in Sindh that the Baloch petty bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia were taking shape. During the Second World War and the immediate post-war years the number of Baloch in Sindh rose from 235,000 to 442,000 an increase of 88 per cent.³⁹ In addition, more than a hundred thousand Baloch lived in the vicinity of Karachi. In 1951, most of those literate in Balochi were living beyond the frontiers of Balochistan proper, mainly in Karachi.⁴⁰ It was also in Sindh that the Baloch periodical press emerged in the 30's (first in Urdu and later, in the 40's, in Balochi). For years the Baluchistan Gazette, published in English at Quetta, was the only newspaper in Balochistan itself. There were neither newspapers nor books published in Balochi. Farsi and Urdu were in use as literary languages among the Baloch.

As earlier mentioned, the government of Pakistan assumed power in the whole of Balochistan including Kalat State on 15th April 1948 and officials administered the province from Karachi. In late 1950 the Pakistan government broached the idea of forming the "Balochistan States' Union" by merging the states of Las Bela, Makkoran and Kharan into Kalat. In 1950, the Muslim League Government, headed by Liaqat Ali Khan, formed a committee to propose constitutional reforms in Balochistan.⁴¹ About a month after the death of Liaqat Ali Khan, the committee presented its report to the Pakistan Constitutional Assembly. It recommended the formation of a Governor's Province in Balochistan, without disturbing the existing institutions of the *Sardari* System.⁴² As mentioned earlier, in 1950, the Baloch nationalists, headed by Abdul Karim Shurish, a former General Secretary of the National Party, had formed the "Balochistan Peace Committee" with the aim of struggling for the right of self-

³⁸ IOR.L/P&S/13/184.

³⁹ Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, Census of Pakistan, (vol. VI), Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1951, pp. 107-108.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, see Vol. I, Table 8, p. 37; Vol. II, p. 53.

⁴¹ Government of Pakistan, Report of the Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in Balochistan, Karachi, 1950, p. 21.

⁴² M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 333.

determination for the Baloch people. This committee could not make any headway and was soon to be replaced by the Ustaman Gall.⁴³

Having supported the concept of a unified Baloch State, the states' rulers arrived at a "Covenant" On 12th April 1951. Approved by the government of Pakistan, the covenant maintained that the leaders of the four states were convinced that the welfare of the people of the region could best be secured by the establishment of a United States comprising territories of the respective states with a common executive, legislature and judiciary, under the common Constitution of Pakistan. The document provided for a council of rulers, with one of the rulers elected as its President. The *Wazir-e-Azam* (Prime Minister) was to be a nominee of the government of Pakistan. An interim constitution provided for a legislative assembly of 28 elected and 12 nominated members.

As a result of the above arrangement, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan became the president of the Council of Rulers of the Union (Balochistan States Union) in 1951.⁴⁴ In April 1952, the Pakistan government appointed a civil servant, Agha Abdul Hamid as its Prime Minister.⁴⁵ The formation of Balochistan States Union was a starting move towards consolidation of the Baloch country and the constitution of a single political entity.

But there were hitches. Within two years, differences erupted between the Punjabi-*Muhajir* dominated Central government and the Khan of Kalat. Many Pakistani leaders including the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra and the Governor General, Iskandar Mirza began to think that the Khan had his own agenda and was working towards creating an independent Balochistan.⁴⁶ Thus, in the early June 1954, the Pakistan States Ministry dismissed the Balochistan States Union's assembly⁴⁷, and nearly a year later the Union itself was dissolved and merged by the One-Unit scheme into West Pakistan in 1955.⁴⁸

Overriding objections and opposition from the nationalist forces of the oppressed nationalities, the four ethnically distinct regions of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP were amalgamated under the so-called One-Unit plan into a single

⁴³ Shaiih Ragan, "Aqelan Sassa Kan et" in: Monthly, *Balochi*, Quetta February 1988 (Balochi).


⁴⁴ Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century)*, p. 193.

⁴⁵ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, pp. 530-31.

⁴⁶ Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.

⁴⁷ *Outlook*, Vol. 2, No. 41 January 12, 1974, p. 10.

⁴⁸ Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 541.



Map 7: Balochistan States Union (1951-1954)

political unit of West Pakistan on 30 September 1955.⁴⁹ The purpose of this plan was to counter the numerical majority of the Eastern wing in order to ensure the Punjabi control of the government as well as to prevent the growing political alliance and cooperation between the non-Punjabi nationalities of West Pakistan with the East Bengalis.⁵⁰

In the early 1950s Pakistan's ceaseless bickering with India over Kashmir, Punjab and Indus river waters⁵¹, disputed frontiers and enclaves, distribution of assets and liabilities, the management of evacuee property, and the lack of a workable constitution left its rulers feeling beleaguered. This was reflected in its policy-making.⁵² The insecure political elite developed linkages with the Punjabi-dominated civil and military bureaucratic apparatus that had held together the imperial superstructure and now maintained the new order. Punjab's feudal interests lent support to, and co-opted, the state structure as an insurance. This was the nature of Pakistan's emerging power elite when the new state's Bengali majority began demanding an equal share in political and economic decision-making. As Pakistan approached constitutional rule, the potential threat posed by the Bengali petit bourgeoisie grew. To counter east Bengal's demographic weight, the rulers in Karachi contrived the One-Unit formulation whereby Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and the various states were grouped into a single province enjoying parliamentary parity with East Pakistan.⁵³

The One-Unit scheme became the unifying factor in the struggle of all nationalist parties and elements within West Pakistan. The perceived threat of assimilation by the more numerous Punjabis, and the concern to protect their national and cultural identities became the major driving force in the national movement of the Baloch and other nationalities in Pakistan. As stated by Professor Lawrence Ziring:

Just as the Muslim League raised the cry of 'Islam in Danger' and mobilised a movement for the independence of a Muslim state in the subcontinent, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans believe their way of life and particularly their distinctive culture are in jeopardy, especially given their experience with the Pakistan movement and their fear for

⁴⁹ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia*, p. 192. On 22nd November 1954, Mohammad Ali Bogra the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed the One-Unit plan designed to merge the various provinces and princely States in the West wing of Pakistan into one single province.

⁵⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan", in: *Aussen Politik*, no. 3, 1980, p. 295; Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 27.

⁵¹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst & Company, 1998, pp. 112-113.

⁵² C.f., Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 167.

⁵³ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 236.

the more numerous Punjabis. In some ways it is the same fear that Jinnah exploited to get the British to partition.⁵⁴

When Agha Abdul Karim and Mohammad Hossein Unqa were released after completing their term of imprisonment in 1955, they called a meeting of their prominent followers at Karachi and a political party was organised there, under the name of Ustaman Gall, (People's Party). The former was elected the president while Mohammad Hossein Unqa became the general secretary. The party had identical objectives to those of the Kalat State National Party. However, under the changed circumstances, the Ustaman Gall mentioned its goal of creating a separate province for the Baloch people on the basis of ethnicity, geography, culture and language.⁵⁵ It also aimed at establishing a republican federal political system in the country with equal rights and complete provincial autonomy for the constituent units; all the Baloch areas of Balochistan were to be merged in a separate province where Balochi would be the official language.⁵⁶

During the life of the Balochistan States Union (1951-54), little had been done in the way of economic development. Now under the One-Unit scheme, the domestic autonomy enjoyed by the Khanate was again removed. Opposition from Baloch, Sindhi and Pathan politicians was matched by support from Pakistan's patrons in Washington. There, it was seen as one way of consolidating the Pakistani State, which could serve as a stronger link in the global anti-Communist chain.⁵⁷ Pakistan became a part of the Western strategy of ringing the Soviet Union with military and air bases in the early 1950s. The country signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in May 1954, and joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954, and the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation – CENTO) in February 1955.

The end of the Balochistan States Union increased Pakistani worries about the Baloch response to the One-Unit scheme. To preclude protests on legal grounds, the government presented a 'New Instrument of Accession'.⁵⁸

Being pressed by the Centre, the Khan of Kalat expressed his support for the merger scheme on 23rd November 1954. In a conversation with the court minister of

⁵⁴ Lawrence Ziring, *The Subcontinent in World Politics*, p. 89.

⁵⁵ Gul Khan Nasir, *Baluchistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men*, Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982, pp. 337-38.

⁵⁶ *Baluchi Dunya*, Multan, June-July 1973, p. 19.

⁵⁷ S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State*, p. 139.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

the Khan, Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai on this subject, he said, "The Khan signed the agreement under duress, and later repudiated his support".⁵⁹ The Khan's support for the merger plan was actually announced by the Government on 3rd January 1955.⁶⁰ The delayed announcement of the Khan's support spread speculation that his approval was not freely given.

It was said that the Khan was ordered to come to Karachi in December 1954, and discuss the plan with the minister for States and frontier regions. On his arrival at the ministry at Karachi he was asked to sign the instrument of accession. The Khan complied with the instruction before he left the room.⁶¹

On the 30th November 1956, six nationalist political parties joined hands together in a meeting at Lahore and formed a new political party, Pakistan National Party. Those who attended included Ustaman Gall (People's Party) from Balochistan, the "Azad Pakistan Party" of Punjab, "Khodai Khidmatgar" (Red Shirts) of Abdul Ghaffar Khan from Frontier Province, G. M. Syed's "Awami Party" from Sindh, "Sindh Hari Committee" of Haydar Bakhsh Khan Jatui and, the "Wror Pashtun" of Abdul Samad Achakzai. The main objective of the newly created party was opposition to the One Unit plan, because according to the party this plan made the smaller provinces feel that "they were being denied their constitutional, national and economic rights." The Pakistan National Party demanded dissolution of the West Pakistan Province and provincial autonomy. In 1957, Maulana Bhashani of the East Pakistan Awami League, joined the new party, and the party was renamed National Awami Party, commonly known as the N.A.P.⁶²

The NAP set the following as its main aims: 1 - Defence of the sovereignty, integrity and independence of Pakistan. 2 - Non-aligned, independent foreign policy. 3 - Ending of exploitation of Pakistan externally and its people internally. 4 - Abolition of One-Unit and reorganisation of provinces on linguistic basis. 5 - Right of vote to every adult citizen.⁶³ In July 1965, as the manifesto was amended, the NAP declared that the system of government in the country should be based on the concept of people's sovereignty. The Party advocated the maximum provincial autonomy in a federal structure. Only Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency were to be left with the

⁵⁹ Interview with Agha Naseer Khan Ahmadzai.

⁶⁰ Lawrence Ziring, *The Subcontinent in World Politics*, p. 338.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Gul Khan Nasir, *Balochistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men*, p. 339.

⁶³ Ibid.

Federal government, while other powers were to rest with the autonomous units. One-Unit in West Pakistan had to be replaced by a "regional Federation where no province could dominate the other on the basis of its population", a clear reference to the Punjab whose numerical strength surpassed all the other provinces in the West wing put together. In foreign affairs the Manifesto asked for non-alignment and withdrawal from the military pacts.⁶⁴

Thus the NAP's position on provincial autonomy influenced the Baloch nationalists and it brought their activities within the ambit of opposition politics in Pakistan and led to socialisation between the regional and progressive forces that had been kept at bay by an entrenched elite; and it provided a formal channel to the leftist groups for expressing their alternative view of what the Pakistani state should be.

1960s was a very decisive period for the Baloch nationalism. Pakistan government reacted by removing the traditional *Sardars* and replacing them with their own supporters. By killing the Pakistan-selected *Sardars*, the Baloch showed their dissatisfaction against the government.⁶⁵ These events led to open confrontation between the Baloch and the Centre, which fanned the sense of separatism.⁶⁶ It was in this period that the Baloch students realised the necessity for their own organisation. In 1967, the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO) was formed. The Baloch press appeared on a scale which never existed before. The Baloch language was homogenised partly through the Balochi, a radio programme, which were broadcast both from Iran and Pakistan, and partly through the newly established educational academies and societies. In Professor Aziz Mohammad Bugti's view, it was difficult to understand the different dialects of Balochi prior to 1960s. Being a speaker of Eastern Balochi, Bugti opined that 'they did not understand the western dialect of Balochi up to 1960s properly, as they do it today'.⁶⁷ It appears that from this time on Balochi became more homogenised and commonly spoken.

In 1969, Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan. With the departure of Ayub Khan, the Baloch leaders were released and the army withdrew. Yahya Khan met the Baloch leaders, Ataullah Mengal, Akbar Bugti and Khair Bakhsh Marri. The new military

⁶⁴ National Awami Party (NAP), The Manifesto of National Awami Party of Pakistan, Karachi: Anjuman Press, nd, p. 5.

⁶⁵ The tribesmen assassinated Doda Khan an uncle of Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Karam Khan Mengal, the uncle of Ataullah Mengal's father. See, Pakistan Progressive, Vol. III, No. III and IV December 1980, p. 33. In April 1963, the Centre appointed Sardar Karam Khan was killed after ten days of his nomination.

⁶⁶ Interview with, Abdul Ghaffar Nadeem, the former secretary of education in Balochistan.

⁶⁷ Interview with Professor Aziz Mohammad Bugti.

ruler agreed to withdraw the One Unit Plan, establish a unified Balochistan province and introduce free elections in the country, thus bringing a cease-fire between the Baloch guerrillas and Pakistan army.⁶⁸ The restoration of Balochistan as a unified province constituted a major achievement for Baloch nationalists.

Western Balochistan: end of the Hakomates

Like Eastern Balochistan, it took a similar long process for Western Balochistan (Iran), to become a full-fledged province in 1959. As discussed in chapter three, before the Persian occupation in 1928, Western Balochistan was divided into several political and administrative units called Hakomates.⁶⁹ After the death of Mir Nasir Khan the Great (1795), Makkoran and Sarhadd became two separate political identities. In the early 20th century Sarhadd was occupied by the British and remained a British influenced zone until their departure from the region in 1948,⁷⁰ while Makkoran with its several "Hakomates" remained a semi-independent federation, headed by Bampur.⁷¹ With the Persian invasion and the annexation of Western Balochistan in 1928, the process of centralisation of power or detribalisation, which was started by Mir Dost Mohammad Khan, was disrupted. After years of war, especially with the tribes of Sarhadd, the Persian consolidated their position in the western Balochistan up to the end of 1930s. In 1937, Balochistan was proclaimed a Hakomate, called "Hokomat-e Makkoran", later renamed as "Hokomat-e Balochistan".⁷² Politically and administratively, the Hakomate of Balochistan was under the control of the 10th province, namely, Kerman.

As mentioned earlier, it was in the mid 19th century, that the Persian forces invaded western Balochistan. After various hotly contested battles with the Baloch, the tired and half defeated Persian forces, also pressed by revolutions and uprisings inside Persia, withdrew from Balochistan to their own region in 1907, but the Persian claim remained over the Baloch territory.⁷³ When in 1905 for the first time Persia became a

⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp 29-33.

⁶⁹ A region ruled by a Hakom (Hakem) was called a Hakomate. Prior to 1928, Western Balochistan was divided into several Hakomates, namely Bampur, Dezzak, Magas, Geh, Jashk or Jask, Kaserkan and Bahu-Dashtiari.

⁷⁰ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 355-56.

⁷¹ N. P. Grant, "Journal of a Route through the Western Part of Mekran", pp. 329-340.

⁷² Hossein Ali Razm-Ara, *Joghrafiya-e Nezami Shahrestan-ha-e Marzi*, p. 97; Interview with Amir Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam. He was the first Governor General of Balochistan in 1939-40.

⁷³ The Persian claim on Baloch territories resulted in the setting up of a mixed commission in 1870 to settle the frontier beyond which Persia should not be permitted to move eastwards. The Commission's proceedings, when announced, were also objected to for various reasons by the British officials. Colonel Holdich remarked that he could hardly agree to the statements on boundary claims from point to

constitutional monarchy, the first *Majlis* (parliament) recognised the country as consisting of five separate *ayalat* (provinces), including Balochistan.⁷⁴ The other four were Azerbaijan, Fars, Kerman, and Khorasan. However, in practice Balochistan was not under Persian influence in the first quarter of 20th century.

Moreover, the ruler of Bampur (Balochistan), Bahram Khan did not recognise the Iranian *Majlis* and had already refused to send any representative to Tehran. Thus, there was no representative in the Iranian *Majlis* from Balochistan in 1905. It was in 1935 that the first Baloch representative from Balochistan, Morad Khan Rigi, was elected for the 10th *Majlis*. It is important to note that some Persian nationalists claim that prior to the occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928, the country had a representative in the fourth Iranian *Majlis* in 1922. They refer to one Syed Hassan Khan Narmanshiri, a representative from Bam, Kerman. The ruler of Bampur, Mir Bahram Khan, sent this Syed Hassan Khan Narmanshiri, according to a Persian writer, Jafar Mehdinia, to the fourth *Majlis*, to represent Balochistan.⁷⁵

In a conversation with Akbar Barakzai on this subject, he strongly dismissed the Baloch representation in Iranian *Majlis* in 1922, and called it a groundless Persian claim to justify the occupation and the forced annexation of the Baloch land by Reza Shah in 1928.⁷⁶ There are several reasons for the Baloch to call it an empty claim. For the first, the fourth *Majlis* was inaugurated in 1922, during the reign of Dost Mohammad Khan, not Bahram Khan as stated by Mehdinia. Mir Dost Mohammad Khan had already proclaimed himself, as the “Shah-e Balochistan” (king of Balochistan), and he did not recognise Persian superiority. Secondly, Hassan Khan Narmanshiri, did not belong to Balochistan, but Kerman, and he was also a representative from that region. Thirdly, as discussed in the third chapter, Western Balochistan, until the end of the 1920s, was struggling to maintain its independence both from the Persians and the British.⁷⁷

In 1937, Reza Shah introduced a new political organization, according to which Iran was politically and administratively divided into ten *Ostans* or provinces. Each *Ostan* was subdivided into a number of *Shahrestan* (equivalent to Division in

point which the Perso-Baloch commission completed. For more detail see, Government of Pakistan, The Frontier of Pakistan, Karachi: The National Publishing House, 1971, p. 205.

⁷⁴ Mehrdad Arfah-Zadeh, 188-Payegah-e Mardom-Salari, Paris, 1376/1998, p. 24.

⁷⁵ Jafar Mehdinia, Nakhost Waziran Iran, No 4: Zendagi-e Seyasi-e Syed Ziauddin Tabatabai, Tehran, 1369/1991, p. 605.

⁷⁶ Interview with Akbar Barakzai.

⁷⁷ For more detail see, Jafar Mehdinia, Nakhost Waziran Iran, No 4: Zendagi-e Seyasi-e Syed Ziauddin Tabatabai, p. 605.

Pakistani Balochistan). Each *Shahrestan* was subdivided into one or more *Bakhsh*, each, in turn, subdivided into one or more *Dehestans*; each *Dehestan* included a number of small towns and villages. Furthermore, a smaller administrative unit known as *Farmandari Koll*, which is a degree lower in status from that of *Ostan*, has been fashioned.⁷⁸ Comparatively, since 1970, Eastern Balochistan comprises six administrative divisions, namely, Quetta, Sibi, Kalat, Makkoran (Makran), Loralai and Nasirabad. Furthermore every Division consists of several Districts. In spite of the above-mentioned plan, Iranian Balochistan was officially constituted as an *Ostan-e Nezami* (Military province) in 1937.⁷⁹ It was in early 1939 that the government of Reza Shah, however, appointed for the first time Amir Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam as the Hakom (Governor General) of Balochistan.⁸⁰

With the Anglo-Russian invasion of the country and the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1940, the central government temporarily lost control over the region due to the ensuing disintegration of the Iranian armed forces and the simultaneous uprising by the Baloch, events which disrupted the process of its integration into Iran during the war. Reza Shah's son and successor Mohammad Reza Shah reinstated the central authority after the Second World War and initiated a more aggressive integrationist policy, which continued to progress until his downfall in 1979.⁸¹

Fearful that the Greater Balochistan movement developing in Pakistan would influence the Baloch in Iran, the Shah pursued a ruthless, hard-line policy toward the Baloch, designed to stifle any expression of Baloch identity. In particular, he was determined to prevent the growth of a politicised Baloch intelligentsia. Sharply limiting education in the Baloch areas, he banned the use of the Balochi language in the few schools attended by Baloch students and made the use of Persian mandatory. He compelled Baloch students to use history textbooks in which the Baloch were described as Persian in ethnic origin and prohibited the use of Balochi in government offices. He also made it a criminal offence to publish, distribute, or even possess Balochi-

⁷⁸ Dr. Kazem Vadie, *Moghaddameh-i bar Joghrafiya-e Iran*, (An Introduction to the Geography of Iran), Tehran, 1974, p. 194.

⁷⁹ Hossein Ali Razm-Ara, *Joghrafiya-e Nezami Shahrestan-ha-e Marzi*, p. 97.

⁸⁰ Interview with Amir Hussain Khan Khozeime Alam; c.f. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *The Amirs of Borderlands and Eastern Iranian Borders*, pp. 195-96.

⁸¹ E. Jansson, *Pakistan and Indien 1947-83*, p. 39.

language books, magazines, and newspapers, a prohibition, which curtailed but did not entirely choke off the flow of underground publications from Pakistan.⁸²

In 1959, Balochistan, under Mohammad Reza Shah, was administratively divided into three major and separate parts, as has been the case ever since. The northern part was included in the neighbouring Persian-speaking province of Kerman. The westernmost part was included in the Governorate-General of the Ports and Coasts, which later became a full province called *Ostan-e Saheli* (The Coastal Province) and is presently known as the Province of Hurmuzgan. The third and the largest part constitute the "*Ostan Sistan-wa-Balochistan*" (province of Sistan and Balochistan). This covers 181,578 square kilometres, which is in itself the second largest province after Khorasan. It is divided into seven *Shahrestan* (districts or townships), namely Zahedan (the provincial capital), Iranshahr (Pahra), Saravan (Dezzak), Nikshahr (Geh), the port of Chabahar, Khash, and Sistan. The policy of dividing and assigning large portions of Western Balochistan to adjoining Persian-speaking provinces appears to have been intended to speed up the process of its consolidation under the Iranian civil and military machinery, thus facilitating its integration into the state.⁸³

In the early 1970s, Iran was divided into 21 provinces including Balochistan. Appointed by royal decree, the province was administered by an *Ostandar* (Governor-General).⁸⁴ No Baloch were ever appointed to this position throughout the Pahlavi reign. In fact, the first Baloch governor-general was Dr. Danish Narui, who was appointed immediately after the revolution of 1979, a position which he held for less than a year.⁸⁵

Apparently, the revolt of Dad Shah Baloch was the most significant event under the second Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah that furthered the Baloch national emotions both in Iran and Pakistan. Dad Shah started his rebellious activities in the early 1944 by attacking government outposts and harassing the Iranian officials. By 1957, several events brought Dad Shah's revolt to the world attention. The first involved an ambush of a convoy, on 24th March 1957, killing two American military aid officials. An American contractor and two Iranians were also killed in the attack. They were driving to Chabahar, a port-city on the Makkoran coast (Gulf coast).⁸⁶

⁸² Brian Spooner, *Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnology*, p. 620; E. Jansson, *Pakistan and Indien 1947-83*, p. 39.

⁸³ Shah Mohammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, p. 295.

⁸⁴ *Iran Yearbook 1977*, Tehran, 1977, p. 47.

⁸⁵ Interview with Dr. Danish Narui.

⁸⁶ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 104.

From then on the scope of the Dad Shah's movement widened and its character drastically changed. It attracted the attention of the nationalist and anti-imperialist forces of the region to the Baloch question. The killing of the Americans, however, was by mistake.⁸⁷ Dad Shah and his men took the jeep to contain Persian soldiers, the *gajars*.⁸⁸ The event was given prominent coverage in the Western press. The outside world came to know the Baloch resentment against the Iranian government for the first time in many decades. The Persians took it as a big affront. The Prime Minister, Hossein Ala resigned. The Shah put a price of 10,000 dollars on the head of each member of the Dad Shah Guerrillas, dead or alive.⁸⁹ A military operation on an unprecedented scale was launched jointly by Iranian and Pakistani forces, and lasted for nearly ten months after the killings of the American officials. Dad Shah not only successfully faced the situation but also rallied around him more men to fight the enemy.

On March 1957, the Iranian armed forces launched a heavy assault on Dad Shah's stronghold, Ahorran. As a result, several of his men were wounded and his youngest son, Kamal was killed. Avoiding further army and gendarmerie operations, his elder brother, Ahmad Shah along with the women, children, and the older men of the tribe, entered an adjacent Pakistani area in the eastern Balochistan and demanded asylum in that country. However, they were arrested by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to Iran, later in the same year, despite the lack of an extradition treaty between the two countries.⁹⁰

In 1957, denouncing the move to extradite Ahmad Shah as a violation of human rights, Jumma Khan, a Baloch nationalist, organised a vigorous Baloch protest movement in Pakistan that quickly took on broader nationalist overtones.⁹¹ He raised Ahmad Shah's case in the High Court of Pakistan. The High Court, however, issued a statement in favour of Ahmad Shah, but as indicated above, the Pakistani government handed him over to the Iranian authorities.⁹²

Protesting against this action of the Pakistan government, the Baloch nationalists struck in big cities of Pakistan like Quetta and Karachi. Even the Baloch from Punjab and interior Sindh sympathised with Dad Shah.⁹³ The Baloch masses saw in

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ The Baloch always refer to a Persian individually or collectively as Gajar.

⁸⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 104.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 105.

⁹¹ Azim Shahbakhsh, *Pozhuheshi Dar Tarikh-e Maaser-e Balochistan*, Shiraz, 1373/1995, p. 161.

⁹² For more detail see, *ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

⁹³ Interview with Professor Ali Mohammad Shaheen.

him a symbol of a “true Baloch” who upheld the Baloch code of honour and martial virtues against the *gajars*, thus identifying with him to the extent that everyone saw himself as a potential Dad Shah. The nationalists venerate him as a “national leader who raised the flag of revolt” and “gave great sacrifices for the cause of independence, for awakening the Baloch nation and fighting against imperialism”.⁹⁴ The Monthly Balochi, Karachi, in its issue of March 1958, eulogised him as one of the greatest of Baloch heroes who had laid down their lives for the great cause.⁹⁵ The Dad Shah case, according to Selig Harrison, marked the first time that a Baloch leader had attempted to rally nationalist sentiment in both Pakistan and Iran around an issue of common concern under the banner of Greater Balochistan”.⁹⁶

Unable to suppress his activities, the Persians again adopted treacherous means by offering negotiations with Dad Shah. But during the negotiations in 1958, the agents of the Iranian government killed him. The rebellion of Dad Shah acted as a catalyst in awakening the Baloch national consciousness and reviving their sense of pride. According to the writer of Pozhuheshi Dar Tarikh-e Ma'aser-e Balochistan (Research on the Contemporary History of Balochistan), Azim Shahbakhsh, Dad Shah’s case brought closer the whole Baloch community together, for the first time, after the division of Balochistan into different states (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan).⁹⁷ “As Dad Shah’s brother, Ahmad Shah was arrested by Pakistani army,” said the former Baloch political activist from Karachi, Akbar Barakzai, “we supported him, because he was a Baloch.”⁹⁸

Establishing close relation with the Shah of Iran, the first act of Ayub Khan’s regime was to deal with the supporters of Dad Shah. Thus, shortly after martial law in 1958, Jumma Khan fled to Dubai.⁹⁹ Staying in Dubai, Jumma continued his nationalist activities from there. Encouraged by the Baloch dissidents of Iranian Balochistan, he shifted his activity centre to Baghdad in 1964. Supported by the Iraqi government, he organised the Baloch dissidents living in exile especially in Gulf States under the name of “Balochistan Liberation Front” (BLF).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 105.

⁹⁵ Monthly Balochi, Karachi, March 1958.

⁹⁶ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 105.

⁹⁷ Azim Shahbakhsh, Pozhuheshi Dar Tarikh-e Ma'aser-e Balochistan, p. 161.

⁹⁸ Interview with Akbar Barakzai.

⁹⁹ Abdul Samad Amiri, “Chest o Eyr”, in: Monthly Balochi, Quetta, Feb. 2001, p. 17.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.

The BLF scored its biggest success when it attracted the support of one of the best-known tribal chieftains in Iranian Baluchistan, Mir Abdi Khan Sardarzai.¹⁰¹ In the late 1950s, Mir Abdi Khan, while demanding greater autonomy, clashed with the Iranian government. He was supported by Ali Khan Naqdi of Bent, Hout Ibrahim of Kouchu, and many other lesser *Sardars*.¹⁰² The Iranian gendarme forces attacked Dashtiari, his stronghold, Kaserkand and Sarbaz. Many Baloch including Hout Ibrahim and his famous commander, Mahmmd Sheran, were killed. Abdi Khan was defeated but did not submit to the Iranian will.¹⁰³

Protesting against the Persian atrocity in Balochistan, Mir Abdi Khan went into self-imposed exile to the United Arab Emirates in 1963.¹⁰⁴ Following the Ba'ath Party's takeover in 1968 in Iraq, Abdi Khan obtained the Iraqi state support and established his office in Baghdad. Since then, the Baloch nationalists made Balochi-language broadcasts beamed from Baghdad to Iranian Balochistan and regularly toured the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, rallying Baloch émigrés and migrant workers to the Greater Balochistan standard. Several intellectual Baloch, like Abdul Samad Amiri, Adul Rashid Amiri, Akbar Barakzai, Rahim Zardkahi, Yar Mohammad Baloch (Bewatan), and in the late 1971, Mussa Khan Mobaraki joined the movement.

The lightly armed Baloch militias organized attacks on Iranian army units in the name of the Front. But it was Mir Abdi Khan's identification with the movement that gave it an aura of legitimacy previously lacking, not only in Iranian Balochistan itself but also in the eyes of its sympathisers and supporters outside Iran, especially in the Arab world. "Abdi Khan wanted independence. He internationalised the Baloch question", stated the nationalist poet, Azizullah Baloch.¹⁰⁵ However, with the Iran-Iraq agreement in 1975, which deprived the Iraqi Kurds of the Shah's support, the Iraqis for their part also withdrew assistance for the Baloch dissidents, and their access to the publicity media came to an abrupt end.¹⁰⁶

The Iranian central government, in addition to military pressure and economic inducements, initiated a policy of general amnesty for the Baloch guerrillas who laid down their arms, promising them employment and subsidies as well. The programme proved largely successful, particularly after SAWAK (Sazeman-e Amniyati Wa At-

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² A. B. Adenag, *Salarani Karawan*, no detail, 1999, p. 260.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Abdul Samad Amiri, "Chest o Eyr", in: *Monthly Balochi*, Quetta, Feb. 2001, p. 18.

¹⁰⁵ A. B. Adenag, *Salarani Karawan*, no detail, 1999, p. 260.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Abdul Samad Amiri.



Map 8. Balochistan Provinces (Iran and Pakistan)

tila'ati-e Keshwar) used its intermediaries to convince Mir Abdi Khan to return from exile in Iraq in 1971.¹⁰⁷ However, as earlier mentioned, the final blow to the movement came as a result of the Iraqi termination of its support in the aftermath of the Algiers agreement signed between the Shah and Saddam Hussein in 1975. Consequently, not only did the BLF lose its external base of support, but also its leaders were forced to disperse from Baghdad and seek haven in other Arab Gulf states. Abdul Samad Amiri, a prominent nationalist leader was eventually captured and sent to Iran by SAWAK. His brother Abdul Rasheed Amiri and his son were assassinated in Baghdad.¹⁰⁸ Threatened for their life, the two other prominent nationalist leaders, Akbar Barakzai and K. B. Nizamani went to London.

The repression of this small insurgent movement proved effective. There was no organised political activity in Iranian Balochistan in the last years of the Shah.¹⁰⁹ The Shah's secret police (SAWAK) and the gendarmerie kept the area under tight control. Moreover, the economic boom of the 1970s allowed the state to co-opt an important segment of the population, so that disaffection remained subdued. Salaries of teachers and civil servants rose considerably, and the private sector boomed.

Although overwhelmed by the weight of the Shah's combined military and economic pressures, the BLF's activities had some major impact on the Baloch national movement in Iran. The Front's use of radio broadcasts in Balochi was as effective, if not more, as its guerrilla warfare in raising Baloch national consciousness. Secondly, the advent of the BLF gave the question of the Baloch and Balochistan a new urgency in Iran, thus forcing the central government to reverse its long-practised policy of economic and social neglect toward the Baloch.¹¹⁰ Discussing with the American journalist, Selig Harrison, the Shah's former Prime Minister, Abbas Hoveida admitted, "if it were not for the Soviet Union and its friends in Iraq, we would not give such inflated importance to such a small part of our population."¹¹¹ Finally, it succeeded in gaining a limited degree of international support and recognition for the Baloch movement even though that was limited to the radical Arab sources.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Abdul Samad Amiri, "Chest o Eyr", in: Monthly *Balochi*, Quetta, Feb. 2001, p. 19.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Abdul Samad Amiri.

¹⁰⁹ Hamid Ahmadi, *Qaumiyat wa Qaumgarai dar Iran: Az Afsaneh ta Waqiyyat*, p. 118.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 159.

¹¹² Ibid., pp. 106-107.

Criticising the Persians attitude toward the Baloch question, on May 1973, People's Front wrote, "We have learnt that, let alone, the feudal monarchy, even the progressives of Fars [Persians], refuse to accede our right to autonomy."¹¹³ According to People's Front even the Hezb-e Tudeh (communist party of Iran) could not tolerate any mention of national oppression by Tehran.¹¹⁴ This view also was supported by other observers. For example, in 1979, a prominent authority on the subject of Persian nationalism, Richard Cottam wrote that most of the liberal-minded "Iranians", meaning here Persians, favoured the banning of non-Persian publications in the country.¹¹⁵

In 1952, the Hezb-e Tudeh, however, had defined a policy toward the "national question" which directly emulated the Soviet model. While the Baloch and other minority nationalities were accorded the residual right of self-determination, "progressives in all parts of Iran were enjoined to work together for the overthrow of feudalism and imperialist-controlled reaction in Teheran." Nevertheless, there were a handful of Tudeh sympathisers among the Iranian Baloch, some of whom joined a Tudeh-sponsored group in Baghdad known as the "National Front of the Iranian People". Led by former Iranian army General Mahmud Panahiyan, an Azerbaijani Turk, this group championed the grievances not only of the Baloch but also of the Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, and the Khuzistani Arabs. It published its own journal, Rah-e-Ittihad (Path of Unity), in Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish, and Balochi, and conducted its own radio broadcasting in these languages.¹¹⁶

By concentrating their fire on Teheran, the Iraqi leaders were able to Persuade Panahiyan's National Front and the Baloch nationalists to avoid attacks on each other. But the differences between the two groups were deep rooted.¹¹⁷ In its political programme, the Baloch branch of Panahiyan's coalition, which called itself the "Democratic Party of Balochistan", advocated a "national democratic government" in Balochistan that would be a provincial component of a "federal, socialist" Iran. Demanding a redemarcation of provincial boundaries in Iran on a linguistic basis and the right to use Balochi as a medium of instruction in the schools, the programme pointedly avoided saying whether the party's goals should be pursued peacefully or through

¹¹³ People's Front, May 1973, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ W. Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Yusuf Naskanti.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

military struggle.¹¹⁸ On the contrary, the Baloch nationalists were demanding that the only way of liberating their country is through the armed struggle, thus, rejecting the idea of compromise and political solutions.¹¹⁹

Iranization or Persianization

Iran is a nation built on the Persian nationalism, under this nationalism; national minorities such as the Baloch, Turks, Kurds, and etc. are not only equally represented in the state, but are constantly being assimilated by the state nationalism; in practice this means the “Persian nationalism”. Upon the incorporation of Western Balochistan in 1928, the government initiated the process of its integration into the Iranian State. Under the influence of Nazi Germany, Reza Shah started the movement of Pan-Iranism. In 1937, the new policy as noted earlier resulted in the administrative division of Iran into 10 *ostans* (provinces) aiming to divide and destroy non-Persian nations. The names of the provinces such as Balochistan, were officially dropped from use. Reza Shah’s government, however, relied on the military for its administration in Balochistan. This was so because the military not only had effected its incorporation, but was also to pave the way for the gradual introduction of the civil bureaucracy in the area. For this purpose, the military had to pacify a series of successive tribal revolts, which lasted until 1938 in order to secure its own hold in the region.¹²⁰

The Pahlavi monarchy combined extreme violence with extensive propaganda in order to build the nation-state of Iran – one nation, one language, and one centralised state. Ideologically, the Pahlavi State propagated racist and national chauvinistic myths in the state-controlled media, in educational institutions (all state owned), and in government departments. “Iranians” were declared to be of *nezhad-e asil-e arya’i* (pure or genuine Aryan race) boasting a 2500-year old civilisation. Imperial power was the cornerstone of this ancient civilisation, which was said to have extended from Egypt to India. The pre-Islamic past associated with the Persian culture and its Zoroastrian religion was glorified, while the post-Islamic culture, rooted in Arabic language and traditions, was vilified. Turkish and Arab domination over Iran in the re-

¹¹⁸ Political Program of the Democratic Party of Balochistan, in Mahmud Panahiyan, Farhang Joghrafiya-e Milli Balochistan Iran, Baghdad, 1971, pp. 8, 11, 15-19.

¹¹⁹ M. H. Hosseinbor, “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, PhD. Thesis, The Amerikan university, 1984, pp. 194-195.

¹²⁰ M.G. Pikulin, Baloch, pp. 194-95.

mote past was declared the main historical obstacle to the continuity of the glorious Persian Empire.¹²¹

This racist ideology denied the national, linguistic and cultural diversity of Iran. Turkish, Kurdish, Balochi and other languages were branded “local dialects” of Persian. The culture (for example, dance, costume, music and food) of non-Persian peoples were also labelled as *mahalli* (local) or *asha’eri* (tribal) varieties of “Iranian” – that is, Persian – culture. The state machinery especially the educational system and the media, was used to Persianize the non-Persians.¹²² Some champions of Persian nationalism like Mahmud Afshar, went even to the extent of calling for the eradication of linguistic diversity in Iran by uprooting the non-Persian-speaking nationalities from their homelands and scattering them in other parts of Iran.¹²³

In 1935, Reza Shah’s regime replaced the word “Persia” with “Iran” in official documents (for example, diplomatic correspondence in European languages, passports, and stamps), and informed other governments of the change.¹²⁴ However, this measure was not motivated by respect for non-Persian people. To the contrary, in a country where non-Persians were forcibly assimilated into the Persian entity, “Iranian” and Persian could not be but full synonyms. It should be noted that the concept of *Millat-e Iran* (the Iranian Nation) developed during the constitutional revolution (1905-1906), for the first time in Persia’s history.¹²⁵

The construction of a nation-state in a multinational country where the dominant nation constituted no more than 50 per cent of the population could not be achieved without the destruction of the ethnic and linguistic identity of non-Persian peoples.¹²⁶ The Pahlavi State, especially under Reza Shah, conducted genocide, ethnocide and linguicide in order to Persianize non-Persians.¹²⁷ The use of languages other than Persian was strictly prohibited for literary purposes as well as for official

¹²¹ Ali Reza Ardbili, “Dad-Nameh-e Azerbaijan”, in: Tribun, Solna, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 270-72.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 276-82.

¹²³ Mahmud Afshar, “The Problem of Nationalism and the Unity of Iran”, in: Ayandeh, Spring 1927, pp. 566-67. See also Ziya Sadr, Kasrat-e Qaumi wa Huwiyat-e Milli-e Iranian, Tehran: Andishah-e Now, 1377/1998, p. 62.

¹²⁴ Mo’assesa-e Tahqiqat Strategic America, Tarh-e Strategic America Dar Bareh-e Iran wa Khawar Mayaneh, London, 1987, p. 29.

¹²⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 82.

¹²⁶ In 1980, only 45% of Iran’s population were Persians. For more detail see, Ingvar Svanberg, “Etniska och språkliga minoriteter i Iran”, in: Hans Bäckman (ed.), Inte bara shi’a, Stockholm: Gidlunds, 1992, p. 109.

¹²⁷ For a definition of genocide, see the text of the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, in Kuper Leo, International Action Against Genocide, London: Minority Rights Group, Report No. 53, revised edn.

use in their respective homelands. As pointed out by Eden Naby, only Persian history was taught as the "Iranian" history, never the history of other national groups. No cultural institutions or activities were tolerated among the non-Persians.¹²⁸ In this regard, each ethnic region was divided into several parts, which were incorporated in different provinces at different times. For instance, under Mohammad Reza Shah, Kurdistan was divided into three parts each forming part of a separate province namely, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Western Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan itself was also divided into the Western and Eastern halves each forming a separate province. And, so was the case of Balochistan.

The Shah followed a policy of destruction of the Baloch national identity. He was unhesitatingly attempting to Persianise every aspect of Baloch society, according to the former Iranian MP, Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.¹²⁹ As earlier mentioned, the assimilation of the Baloch in Iran took various forms and was exercised at various levels. There was also forceful recruiting of young Baloch into the Iranian army. Such measures were severe because the Baloch hated the Persian army. Yet, despite all the hardships, the Baloch managed to maintain their separate identity. The Pahlavis, however, viewed the Balochs' clinging to the distinctiveness of their culture as a threat to the building of a *millat-e Iran* (Iranian nation) based on Persian national, linguistic and cultural identity.¹³⁰

To eradicate the very existence of the Baloch identity, the Persians changed the historical names of the important Baloch cities and districts and replaced them with Persian names. Thus, Duzzap became Zahedan, Pahra, Geh, Magas and Dezzak, respectively, became Iranshahr, Nikshahr, Zaboli and Dawarpanah. They attached ethnically mixed border areas, where the Baloch claim an estimated population of 300,000, to adjacent provinces such as Kerman and Khorasan.¹³¹ Furthermore, this policy of politically smothering and dividing the Baloch was reinforced by the systematic immigration of Persian settlers, who bought up or confiscated Baloch lands and businesses with the backing of the Persian-manned bureaucracy and gendarmerie. By 1978, Persian immigrants constituted about 40 per cent of the population of 75,000 in the provincial capital of Zahedan. It is believed that an estimated 150,000 Iranian

¹²⁸ Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities", pp. 72-79, 83-110.

¹²⁹ Interview with Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari.

¹³⁰ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", PhD. Thesis, The Amerikan university, 1984.

¹³¹ Interview with Sadar Sher Ali Narui.

Baloch migrated during the Shah's reign to the Arab sheikhdoms across the Persian Gulf.¹³² It is important to note that even the Iranian census data did not reflect the nature of the country's ethnic heterogeneity. Instead it used religious designations to emphasise Muslim homogeneity, thus distorting the multi-ethnic nature of the country. Therefore, there is no accurate data about different ethnic groups in Iran.¹³³

Reza Shah's army conducted many operations in order to integrate the nationalities, and to suppress the tribal and nomadic ways of life. Far from succeeding in de-ethnicizing the nationalities, repression fanned the flames of nationalism, especially in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Balochistan. After Reza Shah's abdication, despotism was moderated between 1941 and 1953, but his nation-building policies were pursued until the fall of the dynasty.¹³⁴

Under Mohammad Reza Shah, central authority manifested itself in Balochistan mainly in the form of a watchful military and administrative machinery tightly controlled from Tehran. This was augmented to some extent, particularly after 1963, with the implementation of what the Shah hailed as a White Revolution, by attempts to introduce social, economical and political reforms.¹³⁵ The centrepiece of the White Revolution was the break-up of large estates and distribution of land to poor peasants; but vast human and material resources were also to be poured into female emancipation, literacy, health and other social welfare and development programmes.¹³⁶ However, regarding Sistan-wa-Balochistan, the monarchy showed no sign of interest in encouraging greater cultural or political self-expression among the Baloch, even of the limited sort accepted in Pakistan. On the contrary, in the 1970s Tehran's response to upheavals on the other side of the border was to repress the Baloch language, dress or any other expression of Baloch identity even more vigorously than before.¹³⁷

¹³² Interview with Aid Mohammad Kurd and Abdul Samad Amiri. However, M. H. Hosseinbor believed, there was an estimated population of more than 340,000 Baloch living in the Gulf Arab States in late 1970s, see M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 294.

¹³³ Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities", pp. 72-79, 83-110.

¹³⁴ W. Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 98, 102, 115.

¹³⁵ The Shah launched with much fanfare a six-point programme known as the White Revolution. Besides land distribution, the six points called for nationalisation of forests, sale of state factories to private entrepreneurs, profit-sharing for industrial workers, extension of the vote to women, and establishment of a rural literacy corps. To legitimise the "revolution" the Shah organised a nationwide referendum. According to the government, in January 1963, 99.9 percent of the voters endorsed the six-point reform programme.

¹³⁶ *Nationalencyklopedin* (nionde bandet), Höganäs: Bokförlaget Bra Böcker AB, 1992, p. 561.

¹³⁷ Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan", p. 155-56.

The period in Iranian history between the end of World War II and the Iranian Revolution was turbulent. Winds of change buffeted the Iranian state: the Mossadeq coup, the 1953 counter coup, the Shah's White Revolution, the rise of the religious opposition. While these events were taking place in Tehran, they were reflected palely in Iranian Balochistan. The Iranian Revolution, however, was the most important event which affected the Baloch society. While it was primarily an urban phenomenon centred on (but not limited exclusively to) Tehran, the Baloch intellectual class participated on the periphery of the struggle. When the monarchy was deposed and Khomeini took charge of Iran, there was rejoicing throughout Balochistan. Khomeini's pronouncements while in exile about the democratic nature of his proposed regime led the many Baloch intellectuals to believe that he would be sympathetic to the Baloch demands for autonomy.

Like the Iranian Baloch, the Baloch in Afghanistan have received the least attention from their central government. The main effect on their lives of the Helmand project that began in 1948 and continued in various forms until the end of the Mohammad Dawud regime in 1978, was that it brought a steady stream of outsiders into an otherwise isolated part of the country.¹³⁸ The declaration of the Afghan government for a "Pakhtunistan" was inspired by the idea of restoring the Afghan rule over the areas lost to the Khanate of Kalat and the British. According to Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, a former government official in Nimruz province, until the end of 1970s, many Baloch in Afghanistan related more to their brethren in Iran and Pakistan than to the rest of Afghanistan.¹³⁹

The Second Uprising: nationalism marches on

The second round of the Baloch confrontation with Pakistan took place during the early years of the Ayub regime (1958-69). With the merger of the Balochistan States Union with the provinces of West Pakistan in 1955, the feeling of neglect and deprivation grew deeper and became acute.¹⁴⁰ The Baloch leaders immediately reacted by organising open opposition in defiance of a ban on political activities.

Reviving his 1947 demand for the restoration to Kalat of other Baloch areas taken away by the British, the Khan mobilised widespread demonstrations against the One-Unit plan through the tribal chieftains in his former domain. In October 1957, a large gathering of Baloch leadership took place in Karachi, in which forty-four tribal

¹³⁸ Interview with Rasul Raheen.

¹³⁹ Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, "Baloch-ha-e Afghanistan", unpublished, September 1999.

¹⁴⁰ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 340.

Sardars including the Baloch *Sardars* of Dera Ghazi Khan and Sindh participated. Chaired by the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the meeting demanded abolition of One-Unit system and regaining the original position of the Kalat state.¹⁴¹ It is said that in the same time the Khan also hoisted the old Kalat flag over his palace.¹⁴² However, the main opposition to the One-Unit plan was spearheaded by the Ustaman Gall and later by its successor, the National Awami Party (NAP).

On 7 October 1958, President Mirza and General Ayub Khan abrogated the Constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the constituent and provincial assemblies, banned all political parties and proclaimed martial law. However, it must be borne in mind that on 6 October, one day before the proclamation of martial law, Balochistan was attacked by the Pakistan army due to the agitation in Balochistan aiming at the right of self-determination.¹⁴³ The Khan of Kalat described the military action in the following words:

I gave myself up to the army which paraded with me on the roads and streets of Kalat. I witnessed several of my men falling dead on the ground by the indiscriminate firing of the army... When my people saw me, they rushed with tearful eyes towards me to bid farewell, but fire was opened at them. I shut my eyes in agony, and knew nothing of what happened there till I found myself in the Lahore jail.¹⁴⁴

So they arrested the Khan and his advisors, confiscated his property, and rounded up around three hundred Baloch leaders in other parts of Balochistan. They accused Agha Abdul Karim, the Khan's brother, of collaborating with Afghanistan in assembling a tribal force of 80,000 for rebellion and plot against the central government. The Khan who saw the whole episode as a fabricated pretext for declaration of martial law by General Ayub Khan's military government in October 1958, however, vehemently denied the charge.¹⁴⁵ As observed by Yunas Samad, the plan to seize power was decided by the Pakistan military around 15 September, before "the rebellion by the Khan of Kalat".¹⁴⁶

However, the expedition of the Pakistan army into Balochistan and arrest of the Khan provoked the second major Baloch rebellion in less than one decade. The

¹⁴¹ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 172.

¹⁴² Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 83.

¹⁴³ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 202.

¹⁴⁴ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 183.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-90.

¹⁴⁶ Yunas Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 196.

first, as earlier mentioned, was Agha Abdul Karim's rebellion against the accession of Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948.¹⁴⁷ On 10th October 1958, four days after the Khan's arrest, the army came face to face with a *Lashkar* (tribal force) near Wadh about 40 miles south of Khuzdar and tried to inflict losses on it, but the power of the rebels could not be broken. In fact it was admitted that they continued to hit wherever the opportunity lent itself.

From this point onwards the Baloch ethnicity became a significant force. The movement spread mainly to the villages in the Jhalawan and organised the tribesmen by combining a resolute nationalist posture. Aroused by the bombing and confiscation of his house and properties, the ninety year old Nauruz Khan, the chief of the Zehri tribe, who had previously participated in a series of armed revolts against the British in the 1920s and 1930s, emerged as the leader of a hastily assembled force, numbering according to Selig Harrison, 750 to 1,000 men.¹⁴⁸ As the spirit of insurgency grew, a number of guerrilla bands from various tribes joined him in the hills. Soon the revolt spread all over Jhalawan Sub-Division of Kalat district and the army got deeply involved in counter insurgency measures

The government responded by bombarding the villages and sustaining a reign of terror in the entire area. But the troops failed to counter the activities of the defenders. With the aim of deceiving the leader of the revolt, government envoys met representatives of the rebel leader and took an oath on the Koran, the Muslim holy writ, that if he stopped hostilities and surrendered to the government along with his close comrades he would be received honourably for peace negotiations and the Baloch demands would be considered sympathetically.¹⁴⁹ Nauruz, a simple and honest man, as described by the Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, could not imagine such a mean deception after an oath taken on the Holy Book by the government officials. When the rebels came down from their sanctuary in the hills, their leadership was surrounded and taken into custody. They were removed to Kuli Camp in Quetta. Ayub Khan's military government, however, denied such a promise by its officers¹⁵⁰

Nauruz Khan and seven of his colleagues, including his elder son, were tried in Hyderabad and sentenced to death on charges of treason. The death sentence on

¹⁴⁷ Ahmad Salim, "Balochistan ke Awam Kabi Por-amn aur Kabi Mossallah Jadd ow Johd Kartey Rahay Hem", in: Monthly, *Rastah*, Lahore, July 1990, p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 28.

¹⁴⁹ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 186.

¹⁵⁰ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 28.

Nauruz was commuted to life imprisonment because of his old age.¹⁵¹ He was above ninety years at that time. He died in a Pakistani prison in 1964. Others, Wali Muhammad Zarakzai, Ghulam Rasool Nichari, Sabzal Khan Zehri, Masti Khan, Bhawal Khan, Jamal Khan and the elder son of Nauruz, Mir Batay Khan, were hanged on 15th July 1960 in Hyderabad and Sukkar Jails. Jalal Khan Zarakzai, Bahand Khan, Muhammad Umar and Dil Morad were given life imprisonment. Their bodies were taken to Balochistan and buried in the graveyard of Kalat Nasiri. There was general mourning for the executed souls. Their bodies were received with all solemnity and greatest respect. Thousands of people turned out to participate in the burial ceremonies in Kalat.¹⁵²

This atrocity of the Pakistan army shook the whole Baloch society, not only in Balochistan, but as far away as Sindh and Punjab. "Most of us got an inspiration with Nauruz Khan's uprising", said the former president of NDP (National Democratic Party), Sherbaz Khan Mazari, from Punjab. "For the first time" he continued "I realised that I think, it was the beginning of the Baloch nationalism. This was the time when people in Karachi and in Lahore tried to look like Baloch. They wore Balochi Sawas, (traditional shoes), grew a Baloch style beard, and wore Balochi dresses. At that time, internationally I remember Baloch issue and Baloch cause broke down the barriers and the boundaries. For the first time I felt that the Baloch issue was an international issue. Now, it was not limited only in Balochistan. It was the first expression of the Baloch nationalism in Sindh and Punjab. But more than one unit, after the atrocity and suppression the army committed, villages burnt down, people mercilessly killed and livestock were auctioned, then the Baloch felt it was a raiding army, and not their army. I think, that was the time, when Balochistan's national spirit and national identity spread, and continued right up to Bhutto ages"¹⁵³

Compared to Agha Abdul Karim, Nauruz Khan fought in a wider area against the army and had about 1000 to 5000 guerrillas with him.¹⁵⁴ His main demands were the release of the Khan and the withdrawal of the One-Unit plan. The government responded by bombing villages suspected of harbouring guerrillas and by reinforcing army units. Finally, with no end to hostilities in sight, representatives of the army and the guerrillas met in early 1960 to discuss peace terms. As mentioned earlier, accord-

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Interview with Chakar Khan Baloch.

¹⁵³ Interview with Sherbaz Khan Mazari.

¹⁵⁴ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 357.

ing to Pakistani sources, no agreement was reached. But in nationalist accounts, Nauruz Khan and his men agreed to lay down their arms in return for the withdrawal of the One Unit scheme and a promise of safe conduct and amnesty.¹⁵⁵ Once again, as in the case of Agha Abdul Karim in 1948, the army representatives sanctified their safe conduct pledge with an oath on the Koran and, once again, they dishonoured the pledge. The significance of these events for the Baloch national movement was direct and notable. One result was that nationalist feeling grew deeper and was expressed more clearly in the political literature of early sixties. Nauruz Khan emerged as the archetypal hero and the Baloch were depicted as being exploited by the anti-Baloch forces of Centre.¹⁵⁶

After the executions the government ordered an intensification of the military operations. The leadership of the insurgency had now passed in to the hands of political activists, who condemned the cruelties of the army against the people. On the eve of Ayub Khan's visit to Quetta in August 1962, a meeting of political workers was convened, in which the Baloch leaders warned Ayub Khan against contemplating a military solution of the issue. However, the Pakistan military dictator was infuriated and in a public meeting threatened the Baloch with "total extinction" if they continued resistance.¹⁵⁷ Contrary to this threat, by the early 1960s, the guerrilla activities had increased in the Jhalawan and Marri areas. In 1963, a group of Baloch nationalists headed by Sher Mohammad Marri, the leading Baloch strategist of irregular warfare, and a man who already had undergone a total of 14 years imprisonment for seditious activities, began to lay down the organisational infrastructure of the Parari Movement with the aim of waging an all-out guerrilla war to back the Baloch demand for the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Balochistan, cancellation of the One Unit Plan, and restoration of Balochistan as a unified province.¹⁵⁸

Sher Mohammad Marri, also known as General Sherof, was born in 1924 at Kohlu, a remote area of Balochistan. He was educated in Sibi and joined politics in 1945. He founded "Mazlum Party" in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains aiming to oppose the *Sardari* system and support an independent Balochistan.¹⁵⁹ In 1963, as mentioned earlier, Sher Mohammad Marri organised the Parari Movement. He had

¹⁵⁵ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 186.

¹⁵⁶ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 132-34.

¹⁵⁷ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, p. 189.

¹⁵⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan Shadow*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, p. 282.

two “commands”, the Northern and the Southern. The Northern Command of the Marri-Bugti area was under his personal supervision. Here Mir Hazar Ramkhani who was in charge of recruitment and training assisted him.¹⁶⁰ Ali Mohammad Mengal headed the Southern Command in Jhalawan district.¹⁶¹ A command force of 400 persons manned each of the two Headquarters. They could also call hundreds of reservists at short notice.¹⁶²

At the beginning of 1968, the Army, under the command of Major General Tikka Khan, struck the “Pararis”. Sher Mohammad Marri put up a stiff resistance. Meanwhile, the government took some administrative measures to break the power of the *Sardars*, and the sons and relatives of the *Sardars*, who in its view were behind the apparently populist insurgency. Prominent tribal *Sardars*, Akbar Bugti, Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri were deposed from their chieftainships.¹⁶³ The governor of West Pakistan Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh appointed other men in their places who were favourably disposed towards the Government. Even the British had not changed the *Sardars* in such an arbitrary manner as Kalabagh did. In 1963 the tribesmen assassinated the new appointees, Doda Khan, an uncle of Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Karam Khan Mengal, the uncle of Ataullah Mengal’s father.¹⁶⁴ The killing of the nominated chiefs was to undermine the Government’s authority. The Baloch seemed more united now. In fact, military operations supported by the airforce made them die-hard.¹⁶⁵ Sher Mohammad Marri’s movement gained momentum and Baloch youth from the urban centres started joining the Pararis in the hills. The Baloch Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) became stronger. The Pararis published an underground weekly paper called Chingari (Spark) in Balochi, Urdu, and English languages.¹⁶⁶ It is said that the Chingari gained currency among the Bengalis as well as the Baloch.¹⁶⁷

In Chingari, the movement declared its ultimate goal to be Baloch self-determination without defining the concept in terms of self-autonomy or independence. “Our struggle was for equal rights - the formation of provinces on a national basis and for the right of self-determination and autonomy”, declared Sher Mohammad in an interview with the News International after his return from Kabul. “We had

¹⁶⁰ Outlook, Vol. 2, No. 41 January 12 1975, p. 10.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 30.

¹⁶³ Outlook, Vol. 1, No. 24, 16 September 1972, p. 11.

¹⁶⁴ Pakistan Progressive, Vol. III, No. III, and IV December 1980, p. 33.

¹⁶⁵ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 33.

¹⁶⁶ Outlook, Vol. 1, No. 24, 16 September 1972, p. 11.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

grievances against one unit... Then there was a conspiracy by the Shah of Iran to convert the Baloch into a minority in their own land. These were the key factors which compelled us to go into the mountains, not as escapists but as revolutionaries".¹⁶⁸ Pararis, however, had close ideological affinity and organisational links with the NAP. And since NAP had clearly stated its goal as Baloch self-determination within a "federal-socialist" Pakistan, one can assume that Pararis had tacitly accepted the NAP's position on self-determination, i.e. autonomy.¹⁶⁹ Between 1962 and 1969, about two hundred Baloch leaders were taken into custody from Karachi, Quetta, Kalat and other places. They were charged in the courts for "rebellion" and were put in jails at Quetta, Mach, Bolan, etc.¹⁷⁰

It was believed that by July 1963 there were about ten base camps in the Marri-Bugti area, which had been established by the guerrilla fighters. The same was the case in Jhalawan and Sarawan Sub-divisions. The camps had been established for the purpose of giving training to the people in guerrilla warfare. It was estimated there were nearly 400 hard core hostiles in each area apart from hundreds of loosely organised part time reservists. The guerrillas engaged the Pakistan army over an area of four thousand sq. miles. The guerrilla forces divided in groups headed by commandos avoided pitched battle and resorted to harassment of the army in classical guerrilla fashion. They ambushed army convoys and army engineers engaged in road construction and army signals deputed on telephone maintenance. The army hit back with force but could not pursue them in the difficult terrain of the area because they had no experience of combating a guerrilla force in a mountainous area. The guerrilla commandos eventually engaged themselves in organising and supporting guerrilla activities on a large scale over a vast area against the Government of Pakistan.

The Pararis of Sher Mohammad Marri were influenced heavily by the concept of "Popular War" as experienced in Algeria, Cuba, China, and Vietnam. The Pararis gradually established a network of 23 camp bases in the major strategic points of Central and Eastern Balochistan.¹⁷¹ By 1969, these camps employed a command force of 900 full-time activists responsible for organising and training reserve forces, operating schools and medical facilities, and manning logistical supplies in areas under their

¹⁶⁸ Sher Mohammad Marri's interview with The News International, 3rd-9th July 1992.

¹⁶⁹ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 296.

¹⁷⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of selfdetermination", in: W. Zingel (ed.), Pakistan in its Fourth Decade, Hamburg, 1983, p. 202.

¹⁷¹ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan, p. 197.

control. With this organisational infrastructure, they were able to wage a nine-year guerrilla war of attrition, which ended in 1969 when General Yahya Khan replaced Field Marshal Ayub Khan as the head of government. Yahya Khan negotiated a truce with the Pararis through his Governor of West Pakistan, Air Marshal Nur Khan.¹⁷²

In November 1969, General Yahya Khan announced two major changes in the coming political system. The first was the proposed dissolution of the One Unit in West Pakistan. The other major announcement was the regime's commitment to the principle of "one-man-one-vote". The first proof came in the form of a Legal Framework Order on 30th March 1970. This order broke up one unit in West Pakistan into the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Frontier and Balochistan.¹⁷³ It also did away with the "Parity Formula".¹⁷⁴ Under this Framework Order general elections to the national and provincial assemblies were held on 7th and 17th December 1970 respectively. Thus, by abolishing the One-unit system and allowing the first free elections, General Yahya Khan opened the way to a new attempt at a federal solution for Pakistan in December 1970.

The greatest challenge to Pakistan's ruling elite, the Punjabis, however, was presented by then East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, who insisted on a federation under which East Pakistan would be virtually independent. He envisaged a federal government that would deal with defence and foreign affairs only.¹⁷⁵ Even the currencies would be different, although freely convertible. His programme had great appeal for many East Pakistanis, and in the election of December 1970 called by Yahya, Mujib, as he was generally called, won by a landslide in East Pakistan, capturing a clear majority in the National Assembly. Out of the total of 313 seats in the National Assembly Mujib's Awami League won 167 seats out of 169 seats in East Pakistan and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party 88 seats out of a total of 144 seats in West Pakistan.¹⁷⁶ In the provincial elections the Awami League

¹⁷² Rashed Rahman, "The Rise and fall of Baloch Nationalism", in: The Quetta Times (Weekly), Quetta, October 27-November 2, 1997.

¹⁷³ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan, p. 117.

¹⁷⁴ The Pakistan's Constitution of 1956 was based on the Parity Formula, which means equal representation in Parliament for East and West Pakistan.

¹⁷⁵ Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 188.

¹⁷⁶ Accusing Mujib of secessionist politics, Yahya in March 1971 postponed indefinitely the convening of the National Assembly. Mujib in return accused Yahya of collusion with Bhutto and established a virtually independent government in East Pakistan. Yahya opened negotiations with Mujib in Dhaka in mid-March, but the effort soon failed. Mujib was arrested and brought to West Pakistan to be tried for treason. Meanwhile Pakistan's army went into action against Bangali freedom fighters, who demanded that East Pakistan become independent as the nation of Bangladesh. The Awami League leaders took refuge in Calcutta and established a government in exile. India finally intervened on December 3, 1971, and the

swept the polls. In West Pakistan the PPP won large majorities in the Punjab and Sindh assemblies while in the remaining two provinces NWFP and Balochistan the NAP and JUI together were in the majority.¹⁷⁷

Baloch nationalism and the Pashtuns

The Baloch ethnic identity, according to historian Ian Talbot, has gained importance in the post-colonial era because of the competition for resources with the Pashtun.¹⁷⁸ The Baloch nationalists consider the Pashtuns in the province to be a constant hostile element dominating the provincial economic and social life.¹⁷⁹ The differences between the Baloch and Pashtun are rooted in history. As earlier mentioned, once occupied, the British divided Balochistan into the British Balochistan which included the mainly Pashtu speaking north-eastern regions, for strategic reasons relatively modern infra-structure was built, while Balochistan under the Khan remained backward and neglected. "Nevertheless", Talbot believes, "the colonial inheritance for the region was the favouring of the Pushtun population in competition with the Baloch for resources and power"¹⁸⁰. However, the joint struggle against the Punjab from the political platform of the NAP could not diminish the Baloch suspicions of the long-term aims of the Pashtuns.

When in 1970, Balochistan became a full-fledged province, the differences between the two communities widened. The Baloch, because of their numerical superiority took control of the provincial government. This situation was not acceptable to many Pashtun nationalists and in fact the rise of Khan Samad Khan and his faction of the NAP was a direct response to this development. Furthermore, the armed resistance in Balochistan and the government ban on the National Awami Party accelerated the process of alienation between the two peoples, which came to a climax when the Baloch leadership formed a separate party of their own, the Pakistan National Party, on 1st June 1979.¹⁸¹ It is important to note that geographically, both Baloch and Pashtun inhabit fairly exclusive ethno-territories; there is a cultural boundary, to the north of which are the Pashtun and to the south the Baloch. This territorial separation is quite

Pakistani army surrendered 13 days later. On December 20, Yahya relinquished power to Bhutto, and in January 1972 Bangladesh established an independent government. When the Commonwealth of Nations admitted Bangladesh later that year, Pakistan withdrew its membership, not to return until 1989. However, the Bhutto government gave diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh in 1974.

¹⁷⁷ A. B. Awan, Baluchistan, p. 254.

¹⁷⁸ Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 56-57.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.

¹⁸⁰ Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 58.

¹⁸¹ The Herald, Karachi, March 1992, p. 63.

real. The members of the two groups perceive themselves as occupying territories, and competition for a range of opportunities and resources is often framed in spatial terms. As mentioned earlier, it was in the second half of the seventeenth century, that the Baloch Khanate consolidated Baloch tribes into a sort of proto-nation state, and the Afghan state did the same for Pashtun tribes when it was established one hundred years later by Ahmad Shah Durrani.¹⁸² Prior to this, the Pashtun areas were either under the control of groups from Central Asia or Persia, or decentralised and divided among autonomous tribes.

The Pathan territory within Balochistan is mainly the outcome of Gandamak Treaty of 1879 AD, and the Durand Agreement of 1894 AD. The British concluded the Gandamak Treaty with Yaqoob Khan, son of Sher Ali, the then ruler of Afghanistan.¹⁸³ The area, which the Pashtun tribes cover, is 23,000 square miles out of the total 134,000 square miles of Balochistan province of Pakistan. The Pashtun population, according to the Pakistan Census of 1972, was 5 lacs.¹⁸⁴ According to the same Census, the total population of the province was 2,500,000. The area which Pathans occupy is mountainous and witnesses a severe cold climate, with heavy snowfalls in the winter.¹⁸⁵

Furthermore, the massive influx of Afghan refugees during 1980 and 1981, the overwhelming majority of whom were Pashtuns from Afghanistan's eastern provinces, created difficulty in regard to the ethno-political balance in Balochistan province. Wherever the refugees settled, they were competitors for limited economic resources. No wonder then, that as early as July 1979, the Baloch nationalist leader Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo chided the government for turning Balochistan into a *Mohajiristan* (land of immigrants) and demanded that the Afghan refugees be sent back to their own land.¹⁸⁶ His sentiment has been echoed many times since then among the Baloch.

The Baloch-Pashtun conflict, however, remained a burning issue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Expressing his concern over the issue in 1997, the nationalist Chief Minister of Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal stated, "We consider Pushtoons,


¹⁸² The Khanate of Balochistan was found in mid 17th century, while Afghanistan became independent after the death of Nader Shah of Persian in mid 18th century. For further information, see Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 101-105.

¹⁸³ Olaf Caro, *The Pathan*, p. 375.

¹⁸⁴ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan*, p. 291.

¹⁸⁵ Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan*, Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd., 1991, p. 109.

¹⁸⁶ *The Muslim*, 28 July 1979.



Map 9. Pashtun and Persian majority areas

Hazaras, and settlers living in Balochistan as Balochistanis. They have equal rights. But we can't allow certain Pushtoon elements calling themselves 'nationalists' to destroy the age-old relationship between Pushtoon and Baloch just to increase their vote bank".¹⁸⁷ Thus, the Pashtun threat escalated the Baloch national feelings, as a counter-reaction, believe many Baloch nationalists.¹⁸⁸

Summation

As discussed in this chapter, the modern expression of Baloch ethnic identity, as opposed to tribal identification, became stronger in the post-colonial era, due to the growth of a middle class (even though small), urbanization, modernization of transport and communication system and the increased political influence of other progressive ethnic movements of that period. The political mobilization was structured around the issue of abolishing of One-Unit system and the restoration of Balochistan as a unified province, the language rights etc. Very soon, the problem of economic inequalities, lack of participation in decision-making, denied access to employment opportunities, colonization of newly irrigated land by Punjabi migrants and domination of Punjabi civil and military bureaucracy raised the Baloch national feelings to the extent that led to the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s.

The description of Pakistan by the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 as federal, took into consideration a complex heritage of populations with diverse histories, socio-cultures, languages, and economies (not to mention the awkward geographical distribution of potential constitutive parts of a future Muslim State). The de facto outcome, however, was that the Punjabis had 85 per cent of the armed forces and civil administration and control over an assembly with a Bengali majority. Successive military dictatorships replaced civilian regimes that had become entangled in political intrigues and feuds and which were incapable of handling the fundamental regional distortions in the newly created state. Yet, neither the political system together with the so-called "basic democracy", nor the 1973 constitution that nominally restored a federal state and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's banner of Islamic Socialism, fulfilled the demands of the Pashtuns, the Baloch or the Sindhis for provincial autonomy or their due share of representation within the country's institutions.

From the very inception of Pakistan, Punjabis and *muhajirs* dominated the upper levels of the state's bureaucracy and military. Relatively developed under the Brit-

¹⁸⁷ Daily Jang, London, 18 October 1997.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Dawood Khan Ahmadzai.

ish, Punjab was an important recruiting ground for the colonial bureaucracy and army. In other areas Hindus, not Muslims had predominated in the colonial civil service, and in some, such as Balochistan, most of the civil servants were recruited outside the province. Such factors as higher levels of urbanisation in Punjab and Sindh - *muhajirs*, not Sindhis, predominate in Sindh's cities - and the tendency for appointments to be made on the basis of social connections as well as merit, maintained a pattern of over-representation of Punjabis and *muhajirs* in the bureaucracy in Pakistan's first decades. The perception that the state was run by and for those groups contributed to the dismembering of Pakistan in 1971, and such perceptions have been a source of ongoing friction between the smaller provinces on one hand, and the Punjab and/or the central government on the other.

Being united with "Ustaman Gall" (People's Party), and with other social and political organisations, such as the "Baluch League", the "Baloch Student Federation" etc, the Baloch intelligentsia came forward with the demand for greater autonomy inside Pakistan in the early 1950s. The intelligentsia made demands for social and economic reforms directed towards raising the national level of the people. In this period the main concern of Baloch, as well as other sub-nationalities in Pakistan, was One-Unit. The failed system aimed at consolidation of various provinces and semi-independent entities into a single administrative unit West Pakistan, despite its smaller population, had representative parity with ethnically homogeneous East Pakistan. The Baloch saw this administrative-political structure as reducing their autonomy, and in the 1950s and 1960s their opposition to the central government grew as a result. Opposition to One-Unit in Balochistan took various forms, including well-organised, though small-scale, armed opposition to the expanded army presence that it brought.

The One-Unit system and the Parity formula invoked a sharp reaction among the Baloch, and the demand for its dissolution took a violent turn in Balochistan. Thus, the fifties saw the resurgence of nationalist aspirations. Agha Abdul Karim, who was released in 1955, laid the foundation of Ustaman Gall (People's Party) in the same year. Its nucleus was the former "National Party" (Kalat State National Party) and its manifesto declared that it would establish a "Baloch province on linguistic and cultural lines" with Balochi as the official language. In 1956, the Ustaman Gall joined the Pakistan National Party that merged in the National Awami Party (NAP). The forces of ethno-nationalism were represented by NAP in both East and West Pakistan.

In the Western Balochistan (Iran), the Pahlavis successfully repressed any nascent Baloch national feeling from the 1930s to 1950s. Harsh measures were taken to suppress the Baloch and force them to assimilate. The Balochs' very existence was denied. Balochi language, Balochi publications, Baloch associations, Balochi names and music were banned. However, Baloch nationalism reawakened during the 1960s, inspired, in part by the Arab nationalism of Gulf States, but also as a result of political and socio-economic developments in Iran. Many Baloch became aware of the economic backwardness of their region and of the violence of the state in suppressing their nationalism.

The 1970s in Iranian Balochistan were characterised by the spontaneous and parochial nature of the Baloch revolts. Given the commonality of their cause, goal, and impact, these revolts were the popular manifestation of a political-military movement against the central government or, as called by the Baloch, against the *Gajars*. Apart from their economic and military costs to the Iranian regime, they also served to politicise the masses, awaken the Baloch national consciousness, and, in short, keep the spirit of resistance alive.

Nauruz Khan's revolt lasted until 1960, when he allegedly received the government's promise to withdraw the One Unit Plan, thus agreeing to cease-fire with the army. He, however, was deceived and arrested along with his associates by the Ayub Khan's regime. All of them were sentenced to death; only the octogenarian Nauruz Khan was spared from the scaffold because of his age. In the 1960s, the Baloch came under the influence of the leftist-nationalists, especially the Pararis led by Sher Mohammad Marri. The Pararis were keen to apply Marxist-Leninist theory to the region. Throughout the 1960s the Baloch Mountains were the scene of guerrilla activities.

However, much of the political opposition to One-Unit was channelled through the NAP, a coalition of left-wing and ethnic-nationalist parties from East and West Pakistan. Because it was an alliance of parties, the programme of NAP was broad and addressed both national and international issues. Of special concern to Baloch and other West Pakistanis in the NAP was the replacement of One Unit with four ethnically defined provinces. The NAP's platform called for "cultural-ethnic" and geographical boundaries to coincide, and for those provinces to have maximum autonomy in a federal structure. Several influential Baloch *Sardars* either joined the NAP or actively supported it without actually joining.

In 1970, Balochistan became a full-fledged province after the fall of Ayub Khan and Yahya's decision to break up the One-Unit system and the Parity formula. However, he did a great disfavour to the country by not demarcating the provinces on the basis of language and geography. Balochistan was declared a separate province but a large number of Pashtuns in the three districts of Loralai, Zhob and Pishin were included in the province, while the Baloch living in adjacent districts of Sindh and Punjab (Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan) were excluded against the wishes of the Baloch. In the following general election, however, the Baloch nationalists emerged as the majority in the provincial parliament and formed their first representative government in the history of Pakistan in 1972.

CHAPTER SIX

Autonomy, its Rise and Fall

Nationalists in power

With the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, its official “Two Nation Theory” was disclosed as wishful thinking.¹ The former East Pakistan became independent as the new state of Bangladesh, after a civil war cum external war, in which the Muslim Bengalis of East Pakistan joined forces with the “Hindu enemy”, India, against Muslim West Pakistan. As a result of this defeat, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was invited by the Pakistan army to take control of the rest of the country. He became the President of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator on 20 December 1971. Bhutto, a top Sindhi landlord, began his political career when General Ayub Khan recruited him as a minister. After serving in some junior ministries, Bhutto rapidly rose to become the very conspicuous foreign minister of Pakistan. In 1967 he founded the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). In the 1970 general elections the PPP won victory in Punjab and Sindh, but not Balochistan.²

On the evening of 20 December 1971, upon assuming the offices of Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President, Bhutto made his emotional “Picking up the Pieces” speech on the national radio and television network. Speaking in English Bhutto said: “We have to pick up pieces, very small pieces; but we will make a new Pakistan”.³ In order to meet the challenge of building a new federal Pakistan, Bhutto asked the majority party of the NWFP and Balochistan to co-operate with him in the creation of a democratic system. He signed an agreement with them on March 6, 1972. The most important clauses of the agreement were as follows: 1 - Martial law will be lifted with effect from August 14, the day, when the National Assembly would be convened to consider the Draft Constitution. 2 - ... The Centre would appoint governors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of the NWFP and Balochistan. 3 - The Government at the centre and in the provinces will be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority. The three parties settled for PPP rule at the Centre and in Punjab and Sindh, and NAP-JUI rule in the NWFP and Balochistan.⁴

¹ C.f. Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p.188.

² Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 200.

³ *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 21 December 1971.

⁴ *Dawn*, Karachi, 7 March 1972.

The NAP formed the largest single group in both the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan (8 out of 20 seats), but in order to get a majority, it was obliged to make an alliance with the JUI representing the interests of orthodox Muslims in certain districts of Pakhtunistan.⁵ The federal government appointed the veteran Baloch nationalist leader, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, as governor of Balochistan. Bizenjo (1917-1989) was born at Nal in the *Sardar Khail* (*Sardar* family) of the Bizenjo tribe. After passing his elementary school in Quetta, Bizenjo joined the Ali Garh University in 1936. Returning from Ali Garh in 1939, he started his political career by joining the “Baloch League” of Karachi. In the same year (1939), as a representative of the Baloch League, Bizenjo participated in the convention of the National Party in Mastung.⁶ Having joined the National Party in the early 1940s, Bizenjo served as its president in 1946-1947 and opposed the merger of Balochistan with Pakistan. He also became the Vice President of the Ustaman Gal and later National Awami Party. As observed by one of his closest colleague, Sherbaz Khan Mazari, “Bizenjo always preferred negotiation to confrontation. He believed that ‘a door’ for a compromise should always be left open.”⁷ Thus, being a populist leader, Bizenjo, was widely regarded as the “Baba-e-Balochistan” (the Father of Balochistan). In Harrison’s view, he was one of the ablest politicians in Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s.⁸

The *Sardar* of the Mengal tribe, Ataullah Mengal was appointed as chief minister. His government commanded a 13-7 majority in Balochistan Assembly, and his opponents, according to Harrison, “were almost all Pushtons and other non-Baluch”.⁹ Mengal was born in the early 1930s in Wad, a remote village in southern Balochistan. By 1956, Ataullah Mengal along with Nawab Akbar Bugti and Khair Bakhsh Marri were influenced by Bizenjo and they began to espouse a style of politics, which was different from the traditional-feudal politics of pandering to the government.¹⁰

Known as the most radical and uncompromising of the three giants of Baloch politics since Partition, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri headed the NAP in the assembly, which met in April 1972. He was the *Sardar* of the most numerous tribe, the Marri, with a population of some 135,000, historically centred in a strategic 3,300 square-

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibrahim J. Negwari, “Balochistan-e Siasi Tarikh o Gall o Sarokani Kerd” in Monthly *Balochi Lab-zank*, Hab (Balochistan), May-June 1996, pp. 42-43.

⁷ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 310.

⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 52.

⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁰ Zainab Rizvi, “The Last Warrior”, in: *Friday Times*, April 18-24, 1997.

mile area in the north-eastern corner of Balochistan.¹¹ Initially Bhutto had no intention of letting them govern Balochistan but a wave of demonstrations against his appointment of an unpopular governor, Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani, made him change his mind. According to Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Bhutto would never have agreed to this; the only reason he surrendered was that the army was still facing the Indian forces on the border; thus he could not afford a confrontation with the nationalists in Balochistan.¹²

The first attempts by the provincial government to "Balochistanise" regional administration, as well as the pressures exerted by tribal people on Punjabi landowners, antagonised the Punjabis. The provincial government began to set up a regional guard known as *Dehi Muhafiz* (rural police) and to establish its own press. A programme aimed at upgrading Baloch culture in the province was launched. The National Council of Arts was established at Quetta. Lal Bakhsh Rind, a prominent Baloch leader from Karachi, headed this. The council contributed to Balochi literature and culture. The NAP-controlled provincial government attempted to address the issues of mother-tongue education in Balochistan and a standard writing system for Balochi.¹³ To resolve these issues the provincial minister of Education, Gul Khan Nasir, held a convention in Quetta in September 1972. The convention was an attempt to gain formal support from Baloch intellectuals for introducing the Roman script for Balochi. In a speech Gul Khan Nasir pointed out that the Arabic script was not a script chosen by the Baloch themselves, and that it presented a number of unsolved orthographic problems for writing Balochi.

Supported by left-leaning Baloch intellectuals,¹⁴ Gul Khan Nasir suggested introducing a "phonemic-Roman" script, which he said would be both easy to learn and profitable to use in the present scientific era.¹⁵ He favoured the adoption of a phonemic Roman script with 36 letters. Giving quasi-linguistic arguments, the students of the BSO appeared to support Roman as a reaction to the Pakistani State's emphasis on Arabic as a marker of Islam and Pakistani identity. For them the Arabic script would not symbolise the distinctiveness of the Baloch identity, as it was common to all the languages of Pakistan. Opposing the secular ethno-nationalism of NAP, the right wing

¹¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 42.

¹² Weekly, *Friday Times*, April 18-24, 1997, pp. 24.

¹³ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 41; Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* 2nd printing, Penguin Books, 1983, pp. 112-14.

¹⁴ Abdul Hamid, "Balochi Zaban ke Rasmulkhat ka Convention", in: *Jang*, (Daily) Karachi, October 1, 1972.

¹⁵ Government of Balochistan, *Balochi Rasm ul-Khatte Kanwinshin*, Quetta, Text Book Board, 1972.

religious parties attacked Romanization as a conspiracy of socialists against Islam and Pakistan.¹⁶ In the meantime, however, the Mengal government retreated on the language issue and adopted Urdu as the provincial language. Balochi was neglected, and did not gain its status as a provincial language. Apart from asserting its concern with the preservation of Baloch identity through its position on standardisation, the NAP did not do much to promote the use of Balochi. Perhaps the only other event of note is the passing of a resolution in the Legislative Assembly that Radio Pakistan Quetta should give two-thirds of the time to the local languages and one-third to Urdu.¹⁷ But this was only an empty gesture as Urdu kept getting stronger at the expense of the local languages in all domains.

When it came to power in Balochistan in 1972, the NAP supported the regional languages of the people and opposed the imposition of Urdu by the Centre. Thus, it was expected that Balochi would be made the official language of the province. As the Governor, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Chief Minister, Ataullah Mengal; and the Minister of Education, Mir Gul Khan Nasir, were all nationalists most Baloch felt that Urdu would not be allowed to keep its privileged place in Balochistan. However, the Governor declared that Urdu would be the official language of Balochistan.¹⁸ The paradox has never been fully explained but it is a significant landmark in nationalist politics and opinions about it need to be recorded. According to Janmahmad:

The Baloch leaders, mindful of the Pathan role, proceeded very cautiously. They reluctantly decided to declare Urdu the official language of the province not because they had any love for the language, or because Urdu had any place in the province's social and political life at all, but because adopting Balochi as official language would have been severely opposed by the Pakhtoons, who would have demanded that their tongue should also be given official status.¹⁹

Like Janmahmad, the linguist Tim Farrell believes that the Baloch and Brahui are ethnically one people, but linguistically quite distinct. Thus, according to him, so long as Urdu is the means of instruction in schools in Balochistan, their ethnic unity is not questioned, but when there are separate Balochi and Brahui schools established the distinctiveness of the two language groups is more in focus. If the Baloch and Brahuies were seen as two, rather than one, people, then it was feared that the Pathans

¹⁶ See editorials in *Jang*, (Daily) Karachi, 6 Aug. 1972; *Nawai Waqt*, Aug. 6 & Sep. 8, 1972; see also, M. Musa Bhutto, "Balochi Zaban ke Rasmulkhat ka Masla", in: *Jasarat*, September 14, 1972.

¹⁷ Interview with Bashir Ahmad Baloch.

¹⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 52-61.

might claim to be the single largest people in the province. With demography being one of the most powerful forces in politics, it was felt by some that it would be better to carry on with Urdu education in the province so as not to raise the linguistic differences of the Baloch/Brahui people.²⁰

Most probably the NAP government being aware of their precarious position *vis-à-vis* the central government did not want to highlight which had been a major cause of the secession of the East Bengal. As observed by Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, "A decision against Urdu would have immediately raised the scare of secession".²¹ Harrison's opinion, however, is somewhat different. According to him it "was partly to deflect Brahui pressures that Bizenjo and Mengal agreed to the designation of Urdu, the Pakistani national language, as the official language of the state government, thus providing a pretext for temporarily setting aside the choice between Baluchi, Brahui, and Pashtu".²²

As the Bhutto administration gradually lost its populist, Islamic-socialist image and increasingly depended on established interests, the NAP, and especially the administration in Balochistan, appeared to him to be dangerously radical. The stridency with which the NAP government advocated radicalism could also lead to difficulties in Iranian Balochistan. In the early 1970s, Iran had become an influential power in West Asia, holding together the edifice of an alliance with the West. As power at the Iranian centre grew, the relative influence of the periphery declined. Therefore, any resistance appeared as a challenge that had to be met.

It seems that the Shah's invitation to Bizenjo to visit Tehran in the early 1973 was unprecedented in terms of diplomacy and protocol. It reflected the intensity of the Shah's discomfiture and the degree to which Bhutto was beholden to Tehran. According to exiled nationalist poet, Akbar Barakzai, the Iranian government invited Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, because they thought that, he gave them assurance of not interfering in Iranian Balochistan.²³ But Bizenjo would not promise to tone down Baloch rhetoric or action. "Even after Bizenjo's visit to Tehran," stated a close friend of

¹⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 292.

²⁰ Tim Farrell, "Mother Tongue Education and the Health and Survival of the Balochi Language", paper for the Symposium on the Balochi Language at Uppsala University, Sweden, 16th August 1997 (unpublished manuscript).

²¹ Inayatullah Baloch, "Nationality Problems and Political Parties of Pakistan: The National Awami Party (NAP) and its Successors" in: Georg Berkemer, Tilman Frasch, Hermann Kulke, and Jurgen Lutt (ed.), *Explorations in the History of South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001, p. 359.

²² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 185.

²³ Interview with Akbar Barakzai.

his, Gul Mohammad Hout, "the NAP continued to encourage nationalism in Iranian Balochistan."²⁴ On the contrary, Bizenjo's visit to Tehran, as claimed by the Baloch nationalists in Iranian Balochistan encouraged their national feelings further.²⁵ However, according to the last head of SAWAK, General Hossein Fardoost, Bizenjo promised the Shah that he would not extend his party's activities to Iranian Balochistan. As pointed out by General Fardoost, Bizenjo kept his promise up to general Zia's coup in 1977.²⁶ Of course, it is difficult to trust the statement of general Fardoost, because a few months after his return from Tehran, the NAP government was overthrown, Bizenjo along with other NAP leaders, was arrested and remained in prison until his release by the coup leader General Ziaul Haq in 1978. It is important to note that Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo's request to visit Iranian Balochistan was rejected by the Shah.²⁷

The Shah, widely regarded as the keeper of the regional peace, conceivably decided that the Baloch in Pakistan could no longer be allowed the luxury of provincial autonomy. Bhutto also viewed the provincial government's moves with concern, and cautioned the governor against steps that could threaten national integrity. Bizenjo claimed that the NAP-JUI government, far from threatening national integrity, was strengthening Pakistan by developing democratic forces in Balochistan. These exchanges did not help the growth of mutual confidence. Tension mounted in September 1972, when Islamabad accused the NAP leaders Wali Khan and Ataullah Mengal of hatching the "London Conspiracy" with Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, when they were in London. They were alleged to have agreed to turn Pakistan into a confederation of four autonomous states, which could then be joined by Bangladesh, India and Afghanistan. The NAP dismissed it as a 'figment of imagination'.²⁸

Sabotage and organised rebellion by Centre

When Bhutto came to power in December 1971, the military stood totally exposed as a result of their insane and brutal policies in East Pakistan. He lifted the ban on the NAP with a view to getting NAP support for strengthening his own position with the military-bureaucracy alliance. Moreover, at that stage Bhutto was not in a

²⁴ Interview with Gul Mohammad Hout.

²⁵ Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik, Azizullah Baloch and Sardar Sher Ali Narui.

²⁶ Hossein Fardoost, *Zahoor wa Soqoot-e Saltenat-e Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 547.

²⁷ Interview with Siddiq Baloch.

²⁸ A. B. Awan, *Baluchistan*, p. 267.

position to invite confrontation with and ignore the NAP, which had a clean record and held a majority in two provinces.²⁹ He immediately offered two seats to the NAP in the Federal Cabinet. However, to his surprise the NAP refused to co-operate with him as long as he was head of the Martial Law Administration, with no definite date for its withdrawal fixed.³⁰ This was the real point of NAP's difference with him.

As soon as Bhutto found his position secure, after getting his constitution passed, he launched a campaign of vilification against the NAP ministries.³¹ Every effort was made to paralyse administration in the NAP-controlled provinces especially Balochistan by all available means.³² Almost all secretaries and heads of department came from the Punjab bureaucratic cadres where the People's Party held sway.³³ Their security of service and promotions depended on the good will of the PPP. They were instructed to put every possible obstruction in the provincial administration. These officials, who considered themselves the servants of the PPP Government in Islamabad, acted in complete disregard of their ministers' instructions. They were made to believe by the Centre that the NAP Ministries were only for a short period. Hence they should not ruin their future by becoming loyal to them.³⁴

Finding itself powerless against the intransigence of federal government, the Mengal ministry recruited a new force called the *Dehi Muhafiz* (rural police), which consisted of Baloch and other local people in 1973. The federal government looked at it with considerable suspicion and planned to defeat the move by any means. According to Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the *Dehi Muhafiz* force in Balochistan was organised with the full knowledge and approval of the Governors' Conference. Yet the Centre launched a campaign alleging that this was a private "army" of the NAP.³⁵ The

²⁹ Friday Times, Lahore, Aril 18-24, 1997, p. 24.

³⁰ Rashed Rahman, "The rise and fall of Baloch Nationalism", in: The Quetta Times October 27-November 2, 1997, pp. 6-7.

³¹ It may be of some interest to note that the majority of the Baloch leaders did not sign the 1973 Constitution, because they were not satisfied with the quantum of provincial autonomy granted in the document. Out of the five MNAs from Balochistan, only two, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Abdul Haq put their sign on it, while the other three, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Mrs. Jenifar Musa refused to sign the Constitution. They were opposed to the concurrent list for the federation and federating units given in the constitution. They were emphatic to state that the federal government should deal with currency, foreign policy and defence only. Taxes should be collected by the provincial governments and they should make financial contribution to the federation according to a formula to be mutually agreed upon to enable the federal government to take care of itself (See, Daily Balochistan Express, Saturday, 12 May 2001).

³² People's Front, London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

PPP ministry later maintained this force, with only its name changed into "Balochistan Police Reserve" and its chief Col. Sultan Mohammad Mengal removed. Before the NAP took over, there was a Civil Armed Force in the two provinces of Balochistan and NWFP. The Inspector General of the Frontier Corps used to be the secretary to the Governor in NWFP. In Balochistan, the Deputy Inspector General of this force used to be the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General. On the NAP's take-over of the administration, the Federal Government abolished it, depriving the two provincial ministries of an instrument for the maintenance of law and order.³⁶ The former Chief Minister, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, recalling the event to Tariq Ali in 1981, said, "When we tried to correct the balance in the police force, Bhutto and his Punjabi aide Khar organised a police strike against our government."³⁷ The Governor of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar also withdrew all Punjabi bureaucrats who were serving in Balochistan, creating a severe administrative problem. This was followed by a police strike, which paralysed the province.³⁸

In fulfilling its electoral mandate, the Balochistan government attempted to consolidate its power by purging the overwhelmingly non-Baloch officials from the provincial bureaucracy, by taking control of the police and law enforcement forces, and by resisting the habitual Pakistani military intervention in the provincial affairs. These actions were strongly opposed by Bhutto's government for being incompatible with the national constitution. At the same time the relation between the two parties was further damaged by the growing popular Balochi resentment over the non-Baloch settlers who were competing for the limited arable lands in the province. The central government officials incited and encouraged disputes among cultivators. When the provincial government suggested that all land be nationalised and distributed to the real tillers, this suggestion was ignored by the Centre. Apparently, the People's Party rulers had no interest in the abolition of landlordism, which they were pretentiously advocating.³⁹ Bhutto, however, blamed the incident on the Baloch leaders.⁴⁰

When all these means failed in defeating the NAP administration, in the early 1973, in order to undo the provincial government of Balochistan, the Federal government created an artificial law-and-order problem in Pat Feeder and Las Bela districts

³⁶ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, p. 390.

³⁷ Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?*, pp. 117-118.

³⁸ Zainab Rizvi, "The last warrior", p. 24.

³⁹ *The Herald*, Karachi, July 1986, p. 59.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

of Balochistan.⁴¹ Thus, on the initiative of the Federal Government of Pakistan, several disturbances occurred in Quetta, Las Bela and Pat Feeder. The *Dehi Muhafiz* (Rural Force) and supporters of the NAP advanced to prevent the marauders backed by the Centre from marching on Las Bela and to eject them from their hideout and bring an end to their mischief. The centre interfered and sent its own armed force to oppose the provincial force! When the NAP protested against the Federal Government's armed intervention in Balochistan, the Centre flatly denied it.⁴² However, they stealthily continued sending more and more Federal forces into Las Bela. Reports poured in from all parts of Balochistan about army and militia deployments. Simultaneously to the astonishment of the NAP, the controlled media began to explain that these moves were being made at the request of the provincial Chief Minister with the aim of helping the provincial forces restore law and order, although by this time law and order had been fully restored.⁴³ The Mengal Government successfully crushed those attempts. It was alleged that the Mengal Government was trying to bring about civil war.⁴⁴ The Government was dissolved and later, the majority of the provincial assembly members were arrested including Governor, Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the NAP chief, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, and the Chief Minister, Sardar Ataullah Mengal.

On 2nd December 1973, Abdus Samad Achakzai of Pashtunkhwah-NAP was assassinated and his death meant one seat less for the Opposition in the Provincial Assembly. Achakzai was an outspoken critic of Z. A. Bhutto's politics and style of government. The culprit, of course, was never traced. According to the NAP leader Wali Khan, by murdering Abdus Samad Achakzai, Bhutto intended to create civil war between the Baloch and Pashtuns. In an interview with the People's Front, Wali Khan stated:

The murder of Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai should have been most opportune for Mr. Bhutto – with a prominent Baluch killed in retaliation there would have been real cause for a civil war between the Baluchs and the Pushtoons, and that would exactly suit Bhutto's politics.⁴⁵

We might deal here with one more victims, Maulavi Shamsuddin. One day in March 1974, Maulvi Sahmsuddin, Deputy Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly of the oppo-

⁴¹ Janmahmad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 301-302.

⁴² People's Front, London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, pp. 3-4.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, pp. 145-46.

⁴⁵ People's Front, Vol. 2, No.1, 1974.

sition party Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI), was vanished but proved difficult to dispose of. Rumour said he had been kidnapped, kept in detention and pressurised to change sides. But the Maulavi did not succumb; neither did he open his mouth. On 13 March 1974, his dead body was found in a parked car, one more member of the opposition out of the way. The police said this was a "pre-planned conspiracy by the Afghans" but failed to trace the culprits.⁴⁶

In the 1970 election, the People's Party could not get a single member elected to the Provincial Assembly in Balochistan.⁴⁷ Whereas in 1974, it had the majority in the assembly though no general elections were held during this period.⁴⁸ How did this take place? The PPP achieved its majority by unconstitutional means, brute force, political bribery and blackmailing. False cases were instituted against the NAP members of the assembly and their seats declared vacant and then the PPP men were brought in unopposed.⁴⁹ The appointment of Ghulam Qadir (Jam of Lasbela) as Chief Minister was made in violation of article 131 of the constitution, which required a vote of confidence by the majority of the total members of the house for such an appointment.⁵⁰ Instead of calling an assembly session, signatures forced from members comprised hardly one-fourth of the total membership of the house. A no confidence motion moved against Jam Ghulam Qadir in accordance with article 54 (2) was ignored and not allowed to be discussed. The Budget was sanctioned by an ordinance in utter violation of article 125 of the constitution.⁵¹

On 20 October 1974, the government of Pakistan published its White Paper on Balochistan. In the White Paper, the main allegation against the provincial government of Balochistan was the expulsion of Punjabi employees from various utilities and departments such as the railways, the education sectors and in the administration, requiring them to go back to their provinces of birth.⁵² It should be noted that this decision was taken at the break-up of One-Unit during the rule of General Yahya Khan in 1970, and the decision was in the process of implementation when in 1972, the

⁴⁶ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 138.

⁴⁷ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 200.

⁴⁸ *People's Front*, London, Vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ See Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan (ed.), *The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1973.

⁵¹ *People's Front*, London, Vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975.

⁵² Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan*, Rawalpindi, 19 October 1974, pp. 5-39.

NAP-JUI coalition came into power. The decision at the break up of One-Unit had been that these employees gradually would go back to their provinces.⁵³

The government of Pakistan maintained that a small clique of tribal *sardars*, determined to resist any form of socio-economic change that might erode their absolute feudal authority, had provoked the conflict. The government in its White Paper in October 1974 declared:

But some of the sardars who wanted to keep their tribes isolated and lands free from the impact of roads, schools, dispensaries, electricity, tubewells, industries and impersonal administration and to retain their tribesmen as serfs decided to resist the ending of their privileges. It was this resistance to change which led to a confrontation, in some areas of Baluchistan, between the forces of progress and those of reaction.⁵⁴

Islamabad has always ignored the emergence of Baloch nationalism. It tends to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organisational patterns. Baloch discontent is artificially stimulated by the tribal *sardars* to protect their feudal privileges, it argued, and economic modernisation would alleviate Baloch unrest by gradually eroding the *sardari* system.⁵⁵ This argument, according to Selig Harrison, is undercut by the fact that the central government has been more than willing to protect and extend the privileges of co-operative *sardars*.⁵⁶ The NAP leader, Wali Khan, in an interview with People's Front said:

Bhutto claims that he is against the Sardari system according to him [Bhutto] Bizenjo was removed because he was a Sardar – which he was not. But then he replaced Bizenjo with Akbar Bugti – a really big Sardar! Akbar Bugti was a bigger Sardar than Bizenjo – and now of course he has the Khan of Kalat, the Khan of all the Sardars put together – and yet Mr. Bhutto claims that he is totally against the Sardars and Sardari system!⁵⁷

Bhutto exploited the *sardari* system. People's Front wrote, in its tenth issue in 1974, that “he was anxious to do away with *Sardari* system in Baluchistan he claimed. His anxiety continued but he lacks courage to act. Because contradictory to all his public claims, he and his stooges in Baluchistan drive their strength from this

⁵³ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 394.

⁵⁴ Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵⁶ Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan”, pp. 298-299.

⁵⁷ People's Front, vol. 2, No.1, 1974, p. 4.

very *Sardari* system.”⁵⁸ He played off the Marris and the Mengals against the Bugtis, and then in a volte-face, the Bugtis against the others. When the Bugtis were no longer helpful, he moved to the side of the Khan of Kalat and proceeded to throw the Pakistan military against the tribes, claiming that they were in open rebellion.⁵⁹ The insurgency in Balochistan posed the Pakistan government the problem of justifying its military operations. For this purpose, all the Baloch nationalist leaders were painted as cruel *sardars* fighting for their own selfish ends. When in 1973, the Mengal government proposed the abolition of the *Sardari* system in Balochistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister and the Chairman of the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), contrary to his party’s programme, denied the approval of the Mengal Government’s proposal for the abolition of the *Sardari* system.⁶⁰ Instead, according to historian Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, Bhutto embraced the tribal and feudal chiefs in his party and made political alliances to overthrow the Mengal Government. “Among those who joined him”, as stated by Baloch, “the most prominent was Nawab Akbar Khan, the chief of the Bugti tribe, who played an important role in the overthrow of the Mengal Government in 1973.”⁶¹

Accusing Bhutto, as the real supporter of *Sardars* and tribal chiefs, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, in an interview with the monthly The Herald, on July 1986 said:

NAP introduced a bill in the Baluchistan assembly in 1973, for the abolition of the sardari system. The PPP opposed that bill and the central government refused to ratify it. ... In fact however the PPP and then the martial law regime gave a new lease of life to the sardari system. Apart from Nawab Khair Bakhsh and Ataullah Mengal all the other sardars have supported every government in power.⁶²

A leader of the BSO, however, claimed that in the 1970s, out of seventy tribal chiefs (*Sardars*) of Balochistan, only five, including Akbar Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal, supported the NAP. All other important *sardars*, including the “chief of chiefs”, the Khan of Kalat were opposed to the NAP.⁶³ “In the NAP”, the head of Balochistan Arts Council under NAP, Lal Bakhsh Rind said in jest, “we had

⁵⁸ People’s Front, vol. 1, No. 10-11, 1974, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan, The Enigma of Political Development, Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, p. 164.

⁶⁰ Inayatullah Baloch, “The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of Selfdetermination”, p. 204.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² The Herald, Karachi, July 1986.

⁶³ Manzoor Ahmad Baloch, Balochistan and Political Parties, pp. 3-21.

only two and a half *Sardars*, namely, Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo, a half *Sardar*.”⁶⁴ Before losing office, Bhutto declared an end to the *Sardari* system and claimed the people of Balochistan would freely choose their leaders. In 1977, however, despite his populist rhetoric, Bhutto liberally dispensed PPP election tickets to the landlords.⁶⁵

On 12 February 1973, Bhutto abruptly dismissed the ten-month old Balochistan government, charging its leaders with repeated violations of their constitutional authority. The decision came two days after the discovery of a large cache of Soviet-made arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, which were allegedly destined for Iranian Balochistan. As observed by Selig Harrison, Bhutto’s dismissal of the Baloch leaders was timed to a “broader international significance” by alleging not only that the Baloch leaders “had repeatedly exceeded their constitutional authority” but that they had done so “in collusion with Iraq and the Soviet Union as a part of a sinister, long-term plot to dismember both Pakistan and Iran”.⁶⁶ In its White Paper on Balochistan, issued on October 19, 1974, the Pakistani government repeated the same charges, but relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence to support its case that the Baloch NAP leaders had sought in concert with unnamed hostile foreign powers to bring about the country’s disintegration”.⁶⁷

Having rejected the Pakistani allegations, the Iraqis, however, claimed that the weapons were destined solely for Iranian Baloch, while the Pakistani Baloch leaders viewed the whole episode as a “conspiracy” plotted by Bhutto to justify their removal from office.⁶⁸ In Sherbaz Khan Mazari’s word, “It was eerily reminiscent of Hitler’s plot of burning down the Reichstag and using it as an excuse to ban all forms of political opposition.”⁶⁹ Thus, the news that Pakistan Intelligence had found Soviet sub-machine guns and ammunition ordered by Baloch leaders in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad was used as a pretext to dissolve the NAP government, according to Baloch nationalists.⁷⁰ Proof of this conspiracy was never found, not even after the arrest of NAP leaders and the Hyderabad trial, or later under General Zia ul-Haq.⁷¹

What was the main motive behind Bhutto’s move against the Baloch? At least two sets of explanations could be discerned from some of the fundamental political

⁶⁴ Interview with Lal Bakhsh Rind.

⁶⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 231.

⁶⁶ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 35.

⁶⁷ Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan*, p. 39.

⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 35.

⁶⁹ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, p. 292.

⁷⁰ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 35.

contradictions that existed between the Baloch nationalists, and his regime. The first explanation emphasises the contradiction between the emerging Baloch nationalist elites and the national elite of Pakistan. This contradiction had been further heightened by the emergence of the PPP government under Bhutto in which he mobilised political support of the provinces of Sindh and Punjab. The central government was predominantly Punjabi. Whether Balochistan remained a part of Pakistan or emerged as a separate state, it had to make up for the years of underdevelopment that the British and their successors, the Pakistani regimes, had imposed on the Baloch. As the new Chief Minister of Balochistan, Mengal's main interest was to strengthen the economic and political infrastructure of his province. Thus the nationalist historian, Dehwar argues, "Bhutto's dismissal of the NAP Government was also conditioned primarily by his deep mistrust of groups demanding greater provincial autonomy".⁷² However, on the other hand, the second explanation puts a greater importance on the external factors. While he neither accepted nor rejected the government charges against Baloch leaders, Robert Wirsing observed that the latter had already won a major concession from Bhutto on the issue of provincial autonomy, and therefore, "it seems unlikely that they would have so quickly and so clumsily risked destroying it".⁷³

Could one say that it was not so much any immediate threat from the Baloch nationalist movement that precipitated the dismissal of the NAP government as pressure from Iran? According to Wali Khan, who made this charge in the National Assembly as well as during his trial in the Supreme Court, Bhutto was reluctant to install the NAP government in Balochistan and said; "I cannot hand over Baluchistan to NAP, because the Shahinshah [king] of Iran does not approve of it".⁷⁴ Noting that the constitutional disputes between Bhutto and the Baloch were not of "decisive importance in themselves", Selig Harrison viewed "Bhutto's larger political objectives in Pakistan, pressure on Islamabad from the Shah of Iran, Iraqi Iranian tension, and the Soviet support for Baghdad in its conflict with Tehran" as the "key factors" that also

⁷¹ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 399.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁷³ Robert Wirsing, "The Baluchis and Pathans", in: The Minority Rights Group, Report No. 48. (This report was first published in March 1981) July 1987, p. 11.

⁷⁴ In the Supreme Court of Pakistan: "Written Statement of Khan Abdul Wali Khan", Peshawar, 1975, p. 48.

contributed to Bhutto's dismissal of Baloch leaders and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities between the two sides.⁷⁵

The Shah's regime, as the main supplier of economic assistance to Pakistan at the time, was particularly apprehensive that the autonomous Baloch government in Pakistan might provoke a similar quest for self-rule among Iranian Baloch. Moreover, the Shah also suspected the leftist-oriented Baloch leaders of assisting and harbouring the Iraqi-backed Balochistan Liberation Front guerrillas who were then active in Iranian Balochistan. As noted by Selig Harrison, pressures from the Shah were largely responsible for Bhutto's decision to oust the Baloch autonomous government in 1973 and to use air power as well as ground forces in crushing the Baloch insurgency. "Bhutto told me in a 1977 interview that the Shah had been very insistent, even threatening, and he promised us all sorts of economic and military help, much more than we actually got. He felt strongly that letting the Baluch have provincial self-government was not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baluch dangerous ideas", Harrison pointed out in his book, In Afghanistan's Shadow in 1981.⁷⁶

According to the Chief Minister of Balochistan, Ataullah Mengal, his ministry was dismissed for two reasons; firstly Mr. Bhutto had to tell the Iranian monarch that he was trying to protect his interests in the Persian Gulf and that is why the Balochistan ministry had to be removed. Secondly, some of the policies adopted by the NAP Governments in Balochistan and the Frontier were being approved and appreciated by the people, who were making comparisons. "There were two provinces in Pakistan with People's Party ministries and two provinces with coalition ministries-the NAP and JUI", Ataullah Mengal said. "People were realising that the rules and regulations that we were passing, and our attitude to national issues, were more rational in character. Most of the reforms, in spite of what Bhutto says, were coming from Baluchistan and NWFP; educational reforms, land reform, laws for labour-they were much more progressive than Bhutto could tolerate. So he had to get rid of these ministries."⁷⁷ Rejecting Bhutto's allegations on lawlessness in Balochistan, Ataullah Mengal said, "As far as the law and order situation was concerned; how many people were killed in Sind, ruled by the People's Party? In the entire Lasbela disturbance in Baluchistan only four people were killed - two from the Army side and two civilians. But hun-

⁷⁵ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 34.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

dreds were killed in Sind and hundreds in the Punjab. There were political assassinations”, Ataulah Mengal continued, “in provinces ruled by the PPP, but none of these Ministries were punished for it. No, it wasn't that at all - it was definitely not that our NAP Ministries couldn't keep the law and order situation under control.”⁷⁸

Similarly the governor of Balochistan, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo blamed the ruling party, PPP, for using double standards. According to him, when police went on strike in Lahore and the public came to perform duties, they were praised for showing a high sense of patriotism. While a similar reaction by the people of Balochistan was termed as treason! Similarly, according to Bizenjo, when dozens of the people were murdered and hundreds rendered homeless in Sindh during the language riots, no blame was laid at the door of the People's Party Ministry in the province. While disturbances on a much lesser scale in Balochistan were considered sufficient cause for the Centre's armed interference and dismissal of the provincial ministry.⁷⁹

The third Baloch uprising (1973-77): a new test for the Baloch Nationalism

Ironically, the provocative activities of the Pakistani central government contributed to the revival and unity of the Baloch separatist forces. Thus, the dismissal of Balochistan's provincial government in 1973 and the arrest of its elected leaders provoked the third armed confrontation between the Baloch and the Pakistani central government. This war, according to Selig Harrison involved more than 80,000 Pakistan troops and some 55,000 Baloch guerrillas at various stages of the fighting.⁸⁰ “Armed with obsolete weapons”, Janmahmad wrote, “they fought a Pakistani army numbering three divisions and paramilitary forces, and armed police totalling more than 100,000 men”.⁸¹ According to Janmahmad, almost every section of the Baloch population was affected in central and eastern Balochistan by this war.⁸² It resulted in the loss of at least 3,000 Pakistani troops and 5,300 guerrillas with even higher casualties among the civilians caught in the crossfire.⁸³ Still thousands more were forced to leave their villages razed by the Pakistani army. The conflict ended only after the overthrow of Bhutto by General Ziaul Haq the coup leader, and his release of the Baloch leaders.

⁷⁷ People's Front, vol. 2, No.1, 1974, p. 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ People's Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁰ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 97.

⁸¹ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 305.

⁸² Ibid.,

⁸³ Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan”, in: Foreign Policy, No. 32, Fall 1978, pp. 136-60.

As earlier mentioned, differences over, for example, the wish of the nationalist government in Quetta to repatriate Punjabi bureaucrats or Punjabi *abadkars* (settlers) who had been allocated the most fertile lands in schemes such as the Pat Feeder Canal area, and to resist military and para-military intervention in local conducts, soured relations between Islamabad and Quetta. However, these specific controversies were more the symptom than the cause of the government's dismissal. Bhutto's wish to dominate over all of Pakistan, and pressures from Iran to dismiss the nationalists from power in Pakistani Balochistan for fear their example would infect simmering nationalist sentiments in Iranian Balochistan, played a central role in the drama.⁸⁴

The main proxies representing the Centre's interests in this confrontation, however, were *Sardar* Doda Khan Zarakzai, chief of the Zehri tribe and Jam Gholam Qadir of Las Bela. These two tribal leaders had previously benefited as members of Muslim League during Ayub Khan's ten-year regime and had strongly opposed the emerging force of Baloch nationalists. But Doda Khan and Jam Gholam Qadir were not the only ones already enlisted by Bhutto in his strategy to weaken the NAP provincial government. According to Bizenjo, Bhutto had been all too willing to believe the exaggerated stories Akbar Bugti fed him about a guerrilla army being raised in Balochistan. Bugti's motivation was thwarted ambition, pure and simple, since the NAP had refused to make him Governor under the deal they had struck with Bhutto for the formation of the NAP-JUI government in Balochistan. Akbar Bugti was duly rewarded for his anti-NAP activities by being made Governor after the NAP government was dismissed, but could not last more than a year because the army, by now fully engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the province, did not trust him entirely. However, in the last days of his governorship, Akbar Bugti asked Bhutto to withdraw his troops from Balochistan and restore the dismissed NAP administration to power.⁸⁵ With Akbar Bugti's resignation, on New Year's Eve (1973), Bhutto installed Ahmad Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat in the name of a PPP government in Quetta. The latter's image had been tarnished by his weak-kneed reply to Pakistani pressures; under him Quetta was an extension of the state machinery in Islamabad.⁸⁶

Nawab Akbar Bugti played an enigmatic and controversial role in many of these events. Akbar Bugti was the *Sardar* of the Bugti tribe, one of the three major tribes of Balochistan. He was born in 1927, in Barkhan, a small town in Northern Ba-

⁸⁴ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 158-60.

⁸⁵ Interview with Nawab Akbar Bugti.

lochistan. In 1956, he was elected as an MNA (Member of National Assembly) from the only seat of Balochistan and soon after joined the cabinet of Sir Feroz Khan Noon as Minister of State for Interior. Then after Martial law (1958), along with Ataullah Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Bugti joined the struggle for the rights of their province. In the election of 1970 the group led by Mengal, Marri and Bugti won a majority in Balochistan. The tension between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto gave Bugti the opportunity to meet and befriend the former.⁸⁷

Akbar Bugti was appointed as governor by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after the NAP regime was sacked. But even Bugti couldn't resist the pressures of being Baloch and resigned when the army began its more extreme action in the area and in protest against the continuous detention of NAP leaders.⁸⁸ Despite Akbar Bugti's role in precipitating the guerrilla war in Balochistan, he did not become an apologist for Pakistan as claimed by his opponents. He continued to agitate for greater autonomy and more resources for Balochistan within Pakistan, albeit in relatively moderate terms as Baloch political discourse became radicalised during the guerrilla war.

Faced with a powerless symbolic role, Akbar Bugti resigned as the governor of Balochistan on 31 October 1973. By the late 1970s his speeches were echoing calls made by Bizenjo and Mengal for a restructuring of the state to give parity to the four provinces in a confederal rather than a federal structure.⁸⁹ During the 1980s, in his characteristically provocative and idiosyncratic style, he made a personal protest against the martial law government of Ziaul Haq by refusing to speak Urdu, Pakistan's national language. He resumed speaking it only when elections were held in 1988. Bugti's nationalist and anti-Islamabad attitude throughout 1980s, however, consolidated his political position in Balochistan, which is evident from the fact that he was the first one to form a government after the 1988 elections.

Ironically, Bhutto's dismissal of the NAP government made the prophecy of a guerrilla struggle a self-fulfilling one. The Baloch nationalists took to the mountains to mount resistance to the Bhutto regime's violation of their democratic rights. They demanded to re-install their government in the province, based on the results of the 1970 elections (the same results on which Bhutto based his claim to legitimacy as an

⁸⁶ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 138.

⁸⁷ Zainab Rizvi, "The Lion in Winter", in: *Friday times*, Lahore, May 23-29, 1997.

⁸⁸ Mazhar Zaidi, "Whatever happened to the Nationhood", in: *Jang* (Daily) London, 18 October, 1997.

⁸⁹ Jannahmad, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, pp. 332-37; Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p, 191.

elected leader). When Baloch guerrillas, using their intimate knowledge of their home terrain and enjoying the support of their people, became increasingly effective in ambushing army and para-military units, Bhutto flew in April 1973 to Tehran, where he announced after a meeting with the Shah that Iran would provide 200 million dollars in emergency and financial aid to combat the Baloch guerrilla resistance.⁹⁰ The most significant aid came in the form of 30 Iranian US-supplied Huey Cobra helicopter gunships. These proved critical in improving the ability of the army to keep up with and intercept fleet and sure-footed Baloch guerrillas who knew the mountains like the backs of their hands. At the same time, on the other side of border (Iranian Balochistan), the Shah concentrated 5 divisions of troops, according to People's Front more than 80 thousand armed men.⁹¹

The apex of insurgency

When in early 1973 the NAP government was dissolved and later, the majority of the provincial assembly members were arrested, the militant Baloch students and the political workers organised the Baloch People's Liberation Front for an independent Balochistan.⁹² It is said that two events contributed to the growing disillusionment among the Baloch nationalists, who had become increasingly sceptical of a democratic Pakistan ever emerging. The first concerned Bangladesh where elections, in *Sardar* Ataullah Mengal's view, led not to a transition to democratic institutions, but to violent repression from an army unwilling and incapable of accepting democratic norms. The second was the dismissal of the Balochistan and NWFP assemblies and the arrest of their leaders in 1973.⁹³ The sense of betrayal by Bhutto's civilian regime, which had signed constitutional guarantees of Balochistan's quasi-autonomous status, was only part of the growing nationalist sentiment that fuelled the four-year rebellion which followed. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in his statement to the Supreme Court of Pakistan said:

However, I must accept that by use of superior force, it is possible to maintain state borders, even gain new territories, hold colonies or slaves in chains for certain historical periods, but you cannot create brotherhood by means of bayonets, butchery, deaths and destruction. You cannot create a united nation by force. Nations have risen and come into being in historical processes by feeling of common inter-

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹¹ People's Front, May 1973.

⁹² Inayatullah Baloch, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of selfdetermination", p. 205.

⁹³ Azad Baluchistan, London, July-August 1983, p. 8.

ests, by voluntary unions, by recognition of each other's rights, by respect and brotherly love for one another. Bayonet and bullets cannot give birth to a united nation, they can only damage that objective irreparably.⁹⁴

In early April 1973, the hostilities were at their peak under several young commandos in Sarawan, Jhalawan and Marri-Bugti areas, led by Mir Hazar Khan, Mir Lawang Khan, Ali Mohammad Mengal, Safar Khan Zarrakzai, and Khair Jan Bizenjo. The northern sector comprising Kalat and Mastung areas was the responsibility of Sulaiman Khan Ahmadzai, while in Mohammad-Hassani area Mir Aslam Gichki was active.⁹⁵ The total number of guerrillas in Jhalawan and Sarawan respectively was 4000 persons each, who had adopted hit and run tactics against the army.⁹⁶ The war continued at a high pitch during 1973-74.

On 7 August 1973, the military tried to come close to the villages, but were met with stiff resistance at Mali, the sector headquarters of Lawang Khan who while fighting exclaimed that he regrettably had the opportunity of defending Balochistan in his old age.⁹⁷ In the operation Lawang Khan and 35 other Baloch were killed.⁹⁸ The Pakistani army, reinforced with fresh troops, stretched all over the Baloch area which included Chaghi, Bolan, Makkoran, and Kharan. In spite of this coverage the rebels were blocking the roads linking Balochistan with the neighbouring provinces of Sindh and Punjab.⁹⁹

Adopting the classical guerrilla approach of avoiding any large-scale encounters with the Pakistani army, the Baloch guerrillas used their knowledge of their local mountain to great advantage. They seemed to be well trained in guerrilla warfare and spared no opportunity to attack army convoys and camps. The area of operation extended from the town of Dera Ghazi Khan in the Punjab to Sibi east of Quetta including Bolan up to Kolpur and Dadu in Sindh to Nushki close to the Afghanistan border.¹⁰⁰ In the area of their operation the army convoys moved under protection, and prior picketing on the routes in order to restore traffic was carried out everywhere.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ People's Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, London, 1975, p. 4.

⁹⁵ People's Front, London, October 1973.

⁹⁶ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 403.

⁹⁷ People's Front, London, October 1973.

⁹⁸ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan, p. 184.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p. 357.

The struggle grew in ferocity over the next four years. The rest of Pakistan and the outside world learnt little of what was going on because of the news blackout Bhutto had imposed on the Balochistan operations.¹⁰² The fighting was more widespread than during the previous resistance struggle and affected most of the Balochistan's population at some stage or other. By mid-1974, the guerrillas had been able to make travelling on any of the main roads linking Balochistan with other provinces a risky business. Periodically they disrupted the key Sibi-Harnai railway line, thereby blocking coal shipments to Punjab. The American company AMOCO's attempts to drill for oil and gas, protected by the army were effectively stymied by guerrilla attacks. The Bhutto regime responded by calling in the Pakistan Air Force to bomb guerrilla-infested areas. By the summer of 1974, seven thousand members of the National Awami Party were detained in Balochistan; but many more were arrested when the guerrilla activities were increased. The Balochistan People's Liberation Front estimated that apart from NAP workers, between five and six thousand of its supporters had been arrested by the end of 1974.¹⁰³

Led by a sycophantic Bhutto loyalist, general Tikka Khan, the army unleashed in large numbers to pacify Balochistan by brute force. The turning point of the war, however, came in the Chamalang operations in the Marri tribal area in the winter of 1974-75. Concentrations of the Marri tribe's women, children, older men and livestock sprawling over a 50-mile area, where they had fled to avoid army operations, were attacked with the purpose of drawing out the guerrillas in defence of their families and flocks. The tactic worked. The resistance fighters abandoned their guerrilla tactics and fought a pitched battle against hopeless odds, and suffered heavy casualties. Describing a scene of invasion by the Pakistani army, Rashed Rahman, known as Chakar Khan, a Baloch guerrilla from 1970s, stated, "I remember how one woman, the wife of one of our fighters, took her husband's gun and her little son and ran up the hill behind her house as she saw army jeeps approaching. She kept them at bay with that one rifle for six hours, until she was finally killed."¹⁰⁴ Of the 15,000 people gathered at Chamalang, 900 were captured along with 50,000 goats and sheep and 550 camels, which were later auctioned.¹⁰⁵ This success is what persuaded Bhutto to de-

¹⁰² M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 388.

¹⁰³ Amnesty International, Report on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1976, p 15.

¹⁰⁴ Jang, (Daily) London, 18 October, 1997.

¹⁰⁵ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan, p. 184.

clare in early 1975 that: "The back of the insurgency had been broken".¹⁰⁶ Although that may have been more hyperbole than reality, the fact is that the Chamalang battle did dent the ability of the resistance to mount the same level of hostilities from then on. Justifying the Baloch struggle in 1975, in an interview with People's Front, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo said:

Under these circumstances, the Baluch people had no other way out but to resort to the natural right of self-defence, to take up arms against unprovoked attack on their lives and properties and defend their health and home as best as they could. Any man of honour and self-respect would adopt the same course in such conditions and the Baluch are no exception to natural human instincts for survival. All they have done in this connection, they have done under compulsion and extreme provocation on the part of the armed forces of the Federal Government who should be held responsible for this fratricidal strife and devastation.¹⁰⁷

It was a war of attrition in which the guerrillas with favourable factors like difficult mountain terrain, poor communications, their good knowledge of the ground, friendly locals and secure hideouts were fighting a highly efficient army. Ultimately it was claimed the army had the better of the exchanges. The army had the expertise, great mobility firepower and resources including helicopters and fighter-bombers. In the changed atmosphere Mir Hazar Khan changed his strategy. In late 1975, along with some other commanders, he moved out to Afghanistan and created a number of sanctuaries along the border followed by Safar Khan Zarrakzai and Dad Mohammad, all with 60 followers, while Agha Aslam and Shaistan Khan shifted to Chaghi District. However, in November 1975, the guerrillas again ambushed the army in Soro near Kalat and inflicted heavy casualties on it.¹⁰⁸

The Bhutto regime had greater success against the other six fronts than in the Marri area. It managed to kill, wipe out, or force to flee to Afghanistan, all the other tribally organised groups. The exception was the Balochistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF), whose mainstay was the Marri tribe. But it too was forced to move women and children as refugees to neighbouring Afghanistan to avoid army action. *Sardar* Daud's government in Kabul provided minimal help to the Baloch, until he was overthrown in the communist coup of 1978, according to his critics because he

¹⁰⁶ Rashed Rahman, "The Rise and Fall", p. 7.

¹⁰⁷ People's Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ M. M. S. Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 405.

was getting close to the Shah of Iran and to Bhutto.¹⁰⁹ In 1975, in response to the assassination of a prominent PPP leader of the NWFP, Hayat Ahmad Sherpao, Bhutto sent a reference to the Supreme Court asking for a ban on the NAP. The Supreme Court duly obliged. In 1976, the Bhutto regime initiated the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case against 55 persons of NWFP and Balochistan, accused of “waging war against Pakistan”.

Fighting inside Balochistan, in the meantime, continued until General Ziaul Haq overthrew Bhutto in July 1977. The General, the most intransigent opponent in the Bhutto regime to any compromise with the Baloch guerrillas, ironically was the one who defused the insurgency through political negotiations. However, Bhutto in his testament claimed that the army overrode his plans for a withdrawal because the generals wanted to “spread their tentacles throughout Baluchistan.”¹¹⁰ Thus, not because General Ziaul Haq had suddenly developed any love for the Baloch nationalist, but because he was confronted with a two-front situation in the shape of the Baloch armed resistance and the overthrown and incarcerated Bhutto, General Ziaul Haq announced his decision to release the imprisoned Baloch leaders, withdraw the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case, and make a general amnesty to the Baloch leadership for political negotiations.¹¹¹

The Baloch leadership, however, only agreed to talk to General Zia’s regime after being released from prison. They put forward the following demands; the army should withdraw to its barracks in Balochistan; all political prisoners should be released; compensation be paid to all those who had suffered physical brutality and economic destruction during the war. General Ziaul Haq prevaricated, buying time to ‘get rid’ of Bhutto. The Baloch leadership was divided over the attitude to adopt towards what was increasingly clear was General Zia’s bad faith. Some Baloch leaders did not accept the amnesty offered on the grounds that they had fought an illegal government and went to Afghanistan.¹¹²

From then on, the Baloch movement in Pakistan lost its impetus. Baloch political activities did not cease altogether but they remained on a very small scale. The BPLF, which had been established in 1973 by the militant Baloch students disintegrated. Some of its members took refuge to Afghanistan and, while maintaining a low

¹⁰⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, p. 376.

¹¹⁰ Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated*, cited in Ian Talbot, *Pakistan A Modern History*, p. 226.

¹¹¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, pp. 39-40.

¹¹² Monthly, *Azad Baluchistan*, London, July 1982.

profile, kept some of the party organisation of alive there. Thus, the Baloch national movement accumulated a heavy toll of human suffering and misery during the war. These pressures and internal differences produced an 'implosion' in the resistance movement. In a series of staggered returns, the refugees in Afghanistan trickled back. The last to return were the fighters and supporters of the BPLF, under the hostile pressure exerted by the impending triumph of the Mujahideen in Kabul. It is important to note that on the one hand, through military actions, they crushed the Baloch movement, economically and physically, intellectuals were put in jail or compelled to leave the country, and all political forces were discouraged, while, on the other hand, government pursued a penetration policy, through its intelligence agencies. "With a policy of bribe and threatening, by encouraging and patronising corruption", stated the editor of the Daily Balochistan Express, Siddiq Baloch, "they succeeded to suppress the Baloch national movement."¹¹³ To destroy the Baloch youths' moral and physical health, according to the Director General of Jinnah Hospital, Karachi, Dr. Abdul Majeed Baloch, even the promotion of alcohol, opium, and heroin were a part of this game of the Pakistan government.¹¹⁴ The lack of proper organisation, according to nationalist writer Janmahmad contributed to the disheartening of the "liberation forces."¹¹⁵

However, Rashed Rehman, a guerrilla in 1970s and now a journalist, blames the *Sardar* leadership for the failure of the movement. According to Rahman, when the political leaders, mostly *Sardars*, came out of jail, they felt threatened by the radical direction that the movement was taking. Seeing their politics under strain and pressure from the great mass of conscious commanders in the field, who had been hardened by the struggle itself, the *Sardar* leadership tried imposing their authority on a *Sardari* rather than political basis. They failed and this according to Rahman created tremendous contradiction and division within the movement.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, according to Rashed Rahman, who was part of the resistance movement and was later given amnesty, because the Baloch could not get any help from either Afghanistan or Soviet Union, the resistance movement technically, logistically and militarily failed to overcome its material shortcomings.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Interview with Siddiq Baloch.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Abdul Majeed Baloch, Director General of Jinnah Hospital in Karachi.

¹¹⁵ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 325-26.

¹¹⁶ Mazhar Zaidi, "Whatever Happened to the Nationhood", in: Jang (Daily) London, 18 October 1997.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

One of the most serious problems encountered by Baloch nationalists has been the continual lack of external support, even during the period of their recent history prior to 1977 when they were fighting with arms. Wars have been waged with Second World War rifles, Chinese or US arms belonging to the Pakistan army, or even nineteenth century guns. Soviet historians long ago recognised the “nationalities” of Balochistan and Pakhtunistan¹¹⁸ but their views bore no weight compared with the USSR’s recognition of Pakistan as a state following the backing by Moscow of the Muslim League's demands during partition. After the 1977 amnesty, some of the Baloch guerrilla, led by Mir Hazar, decided to stay in Afghanistan where their camps had been installed during the war. Khair Bakhsh Marri, a former member of National Awami Party (NAP) who was dismissed from the government and chose to settle in Kabul, backed this group. However, this “Kabul connection” was not new. Successive Afghan regimes had been obliged to give asylum to the Baloch refugees because of the importance of the Pakhtun issue in Afghanistan national politics and the Pakhtuns' direct and popular affiliation with Balochistan. Despite these theories the Soviet strategists have played down the "Baloch question" and allowed the refugees to maintain a minimum subsistence level.¹¹⁹

It is believed that it was largely as a result of the Shah’s military assistance that the tide of war changed into the Pakistan army’s favour. At the height of the fighting in late 1974, United States-supplied Iranian combat helicopters, some manned by Iranian pilots, joined the Pakistan Air Force in raids on Baloch camps.¹²⁰ Developed for the Vietnam war the Cobra gunships had formidable firepower, which included a 20mm cannon which spewed out 750 rounds a minute. Previously the troops attempted to block off guerrilla escape routes by concentrating soldiers at key points on the trails. The guerrillas who used their superior knowledge of the terrain easily overcame these tactics. With the Cobra gunships the Army could send them ahead of the guerrillas sealing off their escape. On the other hand the Baloch for their part, did not receive substantial foreign help and were armed only with bolt-action rifles, home-made grenades, and captured weaponry.

¹¹⁸ For more detail see Yur. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental literature, 1971.

¹¹⁹ Taj M Breseeg, “Den baluchiska rörelsen: Separatism or integration”, pp. 50-53.

¹²⁰ People’s Front, May 1973.

Military operations in Balochistan, as mentioned earlier, began in early April 1973. Significantly, when they started their insurgency, the Baloch were not fighting for independence but rather for regional autonomy within a radically restructured, confederal Pakistani constitutional framework. In his interview with People's Front in 1975, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo categorically refuted the accusation against the Baloch about their desire and urge to build independent Balochistan outside Pakistan. He asserted that the rulers of Islamabad coined the terms like "greater Balochistan". "Having destroyed all democratic institutions," Bizenjo said, "they hurl such terms as accusations against their political opponents in order to suppress opposition and further strengthen their strangle-hold on the people of Pakistan, to consolidate the dictatorship of military bureaucratic clique"¹²¹ The Baloch were seeking the creation of a Baloch-majority province¹²² as part of a larger re-demarcation of provinces to be followed by a division of power within which Islamabad would retain control over defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency, while the province would have unfettered local authority over everything else, including the exploitation of natural resources and the allocation of development funds.

The war of 1973-77 sharpened the divide between the central government of Pakistan and the Baloch. In 1977, by the time the shooting subsided, the separatist feeling had greatly intensified. The Pakistan government had not only failed to crush completely the armed rebellion of the Baloch guerrillas but also the use of combined superior fire power by the Pakistani and Iranian forces during the conflict, especially the indiscriminate air attacks on Baloch villages, had created deep-seated resentment and desire for revenge among the Baloch guerrillas. "If we can get modern weapons", guerrilla leader Mir Hazar Khan said in an interview with Selig Harrison in his camp in southern Afghanistan, "it will never again be like the past... Next time we will choose the time and place, and we will take help where we can get it. In the beginning the Bengalis didn't want independence, but if Pakistan continues to use force to crush us, we'll have no alternative but to go that way."¹²³ Thus this conflict (1973-1977) left a legacy of bitter and enduring hatred. Since nearly all Baloch felt the impact of Pakistani repression, the Baloch populace has been politicised to an unprecedented degree.¹²⁴

¹²¹ People's Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5.

¹²² Aziz Mohammad Bugti, Tarikh-e Balochistan, pp. 126-130..

¹²³ Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan", in: Foreign Policy, No. 32, (Fall 1978).

¹²⁴ Azad Baluchistan, London, July-August 1983.

“For the first time in the modern history of Balochistan”, the former NAP MP, and the BNM leader, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch said, “the whole Baloch people supported the Movement (1973-77).”¹²⁵ The third resistance movement had some far-reaching consequences for Baloch nationalism as well as for the Baloch society as a whole. The cruelty of the Pakistan army led even the Baloch of Punjab, Sindh, and many other areas outside Balochistan to sympathise with their people inside Balochistan. Moreover, it is said that many Baloch among the PPP’s own members throughout Pakistan resigned from their party, as a protest. Many of these people according to the writer and former member of Pakistan National Party (PNP), Mansoor Baloch, demonstrated against the military operations and army cruelties in Karachi’s streets.¹²⁶ Given its duration, scope, and intensity, the four-year conflict affected almost all the Baloch population and regions at various times, hence generating an unprecedented politicisation and political awareness among the Baloch of all classes and social strata. “The Baluchis”, Lawrence Ziring in his book Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (1980), wrote, “are more politically conscious today than any other time in their long history”.¹²⁷

Psychologically, this war intensified the ever-widening gap of distrust and mistrust between the Baloch and the central government. Even after the release of the Baloch leaders from jail and the pronouncement of a general amnesty by the military government, the majority of Baloch guerrillas, including the main fighting force, the BPLF refused to surrender and lay down their arms. Instead they crossed the border and went to Afghanistan.¹²⁸ “The 1973-7 insurgency”, wrote Selig Harrison, “aroused unprecedented political awareness in Baluchistan, and the degree of psychological alienation from Islamabad now evident in Baluchistan, is strikingly reminiscent of the angry climate that was developing in East Pakistan during the late 1960s”.¹²⁹

Forces in the third uprising

The war of 1973-77 radicalised the Baloch national movement immensely. Prior to the beginning of the hostilities in 1973, NAP was the main political force in Balochistan. It was largely due to Bizenjo’s moderating influence that more radical elements within and without NAP limited their demand to autonomy within a consti-

¹²⁵ Interview with Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch.

¹²⁶ Interview with Mansoor Baloch.

¹²⁷ Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan, The Enigma of Political Development, Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980, p. 165.

¹²⁸ Munir Ahmad Marri, Balochistan: Seyasi Kash-makash, Quetta: Gusheh-e Adab, 1989, p. 105.

¹²⁹ Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan”, p. 300.

tutionally restructured federal state of Pakistan and took part in the democratic process, which brought the first elected autonomous Baloch government to power in 1972. In this respect, the dissolution of the elected provincial government and the ensuing conflict were major blows to the moderate forces represented by NAP, which was banned in 1975.

After the ban on NAP, the party workers formed its successor, the National Democratic Party, NDP, on 6 November 1975. However, the armed resistance in Balochistan and the growing differences with the Pashtun leaders specially Wali Khan, regarding the question of a political reconciliation with Prime Minister Bhutto and later with General Ziaul Haq, accelerated the process of alienation between the Baloch and Pashtun leaders. At its climax, on 1 June 1979, the Baloch leadership formed a separate party of their own, the Pakistan National Party (PNP). Like the NAP, the PNP also advocated federalism and greater autonomy, but it was banned within six months along with all other Pakistani political parties by Zia's military regime.¹³⁰

As previously noted, removal of the NAP ministry, installation of Akbar Bugti as Governor of Balochistan and formation of a puppet ministry in Quetta, disillusioned many NAP workers. These events amply proved to the Baloch nationalists that the only course to achieve their national right was to organise themselves in a united front. The Baloch insurrection was not a spontaneous outburst of nationalist fervour but the outcome of concerted efforts by left-of-centre tribal *sardars* to transform ancient pattern of relationships that kept the tribes apart. However, their attempts to forge an overall Baloch national unity transcending tribal loyalties were not successful.¹³¹ As observed by Harrison, during the insurgency seven separate guerrilla groups operated independently in the hills under seven separate sets of leaders.¹³² He, however, acknowledges that due to a broadly accepted high-level Baloch leadership, there were no tensions among them.¹³³

Of the three major forces of BPLF, tribal guerrillas, and BSO, which were active on the Baloch political scene, the strongest was the BPLF. It emerged as the principal vehicle of organised Baloch nationalist activity in Pakistan in 1973. Espousing a revolutionary doctrine in its programmes, the BPLF was known for its leftist tenden-

¹³⁰ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, pp. 57-58.

¹³¹ Shaikh Ragam, *Shap Rouch Shap*, pp. 75-76.

¹³² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 71.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

cies and advocating the goal of self-determination.¹³⁴ It commanded mainly the western front – the Marri territory.¹³⁵ Being a successor organisation to the Parari guerrilla movement, the BPLF adopted its name in 1973.¹³⁶ Its decision-making organ, People's Revolutionary Command, was still headed by the former Parari military commander, Mir Hazar Khan, also a disciple of Sher Mohammad Marri, the founder of the Parari movement. Sher Mohammad Marri had been arrested in 1973 and spent the rest of the war years in jail.¹³⁷ After the Chamalang battle in 1975, the BPLF shifted some of its military camps inside Afghanistan. It is said that the BPLF had an estimated force of 7,000 to 12,000 combatant guerrillas.¹³⁸ The BPLF, as earlier mentioned, drew support from both students and the Marri tribe, and numbered some 60,000 supporters. As observed by the historian, Ian Talbot, the BPLF had bases in Kandahar and in Baghdad as well as in Balochistan.¹³⁹ The tacit support of the Marri *Sardar*, Khair Bakhsh Marri, certainly greatly enhanced its power and legitimacy.

In addition, in the tribal belt of Jhalawan and Sarawan, the Mengals, Bizenjos, Mohammad Hasanis, Zarakzais and the Zehris organised their own tribal forces. Operating in Las Bela, Kharan and Makkoran, they added up to about 8,000 guerrillas who had adopted hit and run tactics against the Pakistan army.¹⁴⁰

Another important nationalist force in the 1973-77 Baloch movement in Pakistani Balochistan was the "Baloch Students Organisation", BSO. In the turbulent years of the 1960s, the nationalists' effort created the context in which many Baloch students, exposed to external influences, broke out of the tribal mould and became highly politicised within the Baloch Students, which spread headed the struggle against the Punjabi-dominated Centre. The students announced the formation of BSO on 26 November 1967, after a three-day convention in Karachi. A medical student, Abdul Hayee Baloch was appointed as its first chairman.¹⁴¹ However, in 1969, within a few years of its creation, BSO was transformed and polarised into two camps of moderates and revolutionaries, known as BSO and BSO-Awami or anti-*sardar* respectively. The National Awami Party's rapprochement with the Peoples Party wid-

¹³⁴ Inayatullah Baloch, "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the right of selfdetermination", pp. 205-206.

¹³⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 226.

¹³⁶ S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State*, p. 149.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 257.

¹³⁹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 226.

¹⁴⁰ M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, p. 403.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch.

ened the gap between the two groups furthermore and led to the formal formation of two separate student organisations in 1972 as named above.¹⁴²

The BSO-Awami, according to S. Harrison leaned unambiguously towards the Baloch People's Liberation Front. This orientation, Harrison wrote, "goes back to the controversy among Baluch leaders over the terms of the 1969 cease-fire"¹⁴³. Equally important, however, were the intellectual activities of the BSO and BSO-Awami as reflected in their publications. The former published Giruk (Lightning) a monthly newsletter, while the latter's publications included Pajjar (Identity) and Labzank (Treasure of Language), both monthly journals. Harrison estimated that between the 1967 and 1981, 25,000 students had joined the two BSOs at one time or another.¹⁴⁴ In this respect, the BSO served as one of the most important recruiting grounds for nationalist organisations as well.

Writing on BSO, the nationalist writer Janmahmad, stated, "The most significant organization after the Anjuman, the Kalat State National Party, the Ustaman Gal and the National Awami Party in the context of the Baloch national struggle is the Baloch Students Movement, the Baloch Students Organization, BSO".¹⁴⁵ During the military rule of General Zia ul-Haq, many of its members were imprisoned, hanged or forced to go to exile. The BSO stands for socialism and the right of self-determination, including separation.

Being a powerful pressure group, BSO played a major role in organising the Baloch students not only in the educational and cultural fields, but also on issues relating to Baloch national rights, during the last three decades. One of its leaders, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, contested the National Assembly on the NAP ticket. He defeated Prince Yahya, the son of Ahmad Yar Khan, ex-ruler of Kalat. The selection of Abdul Hayee was recognition of BSO's sacrifices and its appreciable role in the Baloch political movement.¹⁴⁶ At present BSO is a great supporter of the "Balochistan National Movement" (BNM).

It is not within the scope of this study to analyse the Baloch national question beyond the 1980s. What follows is therefore only a short note about the political developments of the 1980s and 1990s. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had tried a mixture of

¹⁴² On 25th September 1983, the two factions merged again with each other in the name of BSO.

¹⁴³ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 85.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁴⁵ Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 214.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

repression, social mobilization and populist rhetoric to defeat the Baloch nationalist movement, Zia ul-Haq mixed more repression with Islamic rhetoric and a skilful foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan, which produced considerable amounts of US foreign aid. The Baloch, on the contrary didn't find a foreign mentor.

As earlier mentioned, since the early 1980, the Pakistan military has won the armed contest against the Baloch autonomous movement, and for the immediate future, Baloch nationalism has again been defeated. While there are no prospects for autonomous rule under the present regime, any serious crack in the state structure in Islamabad will bring Balochistan under the control of the Baloch parties once again.

After the death of General Zia ul-Haq in August 1988, demands for new elections were raised from many quarters. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a senior Pashtun bureaucrat, announced new elections for November 1988. This time political parties were free to contest in their own name. Formed before the elections, the BNA (Balochistan National Alliance) won victory in the province. Nawab Akbar Bugti who headed the alliance became the Chief Minister of Balochistan, while Benazir Bhutto's PPP formed the government at the Centre. Although this government was short lived. On August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir Bhutto from her post as prime minister, accusing her government of corruption. The national and provincial assemblies were dissolved and new elections were called for October 1990.¹⁴⁷

The General Ziaul Haq's era, as indicated above, was a disaster in many respects for the Baloch nationalists. By creating doubts about the credentials of their leaders and even workers, it fragmented the nationalist forces badly.¹⁴⁸ Repeated efforts by the Baloch leaders in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 failed to reunite the nationalists. However, as the result of Ataulah Mengal's efforts the Balochistan National Party (BNP) emerged as the single most powerful nationalist party in the 1997's elections. His son Akhtar Mengal, became the Chief Minister, with the support of "Jamhoori Watan Party" and Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat-ul Ullema-ul-Islam and later survived by the support of the Pakistan Muslim League. However, on the nationalist account the BNP's victory didn't mean a 'nationalist revival' of any sort in Balochistan. Criticizing the BNP's nationalist policies, the leader of Balochistan National Movement (BNM), Dr. Abdul Hayee, in October 1997, called the BNP's victory, not nationalism, but the revival of Kursi (the chair) and the politics of opportu-

¹⁴⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia*, p. 205.

ism. According to Dr. Hayee, BNP's ideological stand is negated by its relationship with the centre and the overwhelming support it has given to the Pakistan Muslim League.¹⁴⁹

It must be borne in mind that the longest stretch of democratic rule in Pakistan is the period between 1988-1999. But this 11-year period of democracy was marred by the dismissal of four elected governments and the installation of a similar number of interim un-elected governments in between. This period has also been described, as one of "controlled" democracy where the President, empowered by the 1985, 8th Amendment, could dismiss the elected government at will.¹⁵⁰ Thus the so-called democratic period of Pakistan's existence, like that of its military rule has led to further alienation of the Baloch from the central government of Pakistan.

With little clout in the parliament, no share in civil and military bureaucracy and having only a marginal role to play in the process of decision-making, the Baloch find themselves marginalized in the Pakistani state apparatus more than ever. The central government is seen to have over-enlarged its role not only in the financial sphere, but also in the province's politics and administration. Politically the federal government has been dismissing the provincial governments and assemblies at will, without any regard to Baloch sentiments and aspirations, since its very inception. Administratively, the central government of Pakistan exercises total control over the province. Governors, chief secretaries, IGs of police and all other key appointments in Balochistan are made by the centre.¹⁵¹

On October 12, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf dismissed Nawaz Sharif's Government. By this ended the so-called democratic period (1988-1999) and the affairs of Balochistan took another turn. On 17 October 1999, one week after his taking over, Musharraf announced a seven-point reform agenda including the restoration of democracy and devolution of power. The Baloch leaders, however, rejected his devolution plan and termed it a negation of provincial autonomy. On 22 August 2000, briefing newsmen, the president of the BNP, Ataullah Mengal said that the regime's blueprint of local government is a mode of imposing unitary form of government in the name of decentralization. Comparing it to the One-Unit plan, Mengal said that it

¹⁴⁸ Siddiq Baloch, "Partyless Elections and Balochistan", Unpublished Manuscript, Quetta, March 2001.

¹⁴⁹ Dr. Abdul Hayee, quoted in *Jang* London, October 18, 1997.

¹⁵⁰ Torbjörn Pettersson, *Pakistan och Demokrati* (Pakistan and Democracy) i serien "Världspolitikens Dagfrågor", Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1990, p. 22.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Mohammad Akram Baloch.

would revive the bitter experiment of the 1950s and 1960, which was the major cause of the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.¹⁵² It should be noted that the new system as proposed by General Musharraf transfers power from the provinces to districts, but not from the centre to the provinces, thus it would lead to further weakening of the provincial authority.¹⁵³

Having formed a nationalist front (Pakistan Oppressed Nations' Movement, PONM), with the other four nationalities of Pakistan, namely the Muhajirs, Sindhis, Seraikis, and Pashtuns, the Baloch nationalists are presently using the demand for a confederation based on the same 1940 Lahore Resolution, to call for a new constitution.¹⁵⁴ The PONM has a single agenda programme aimed for a complete autonomy of the provinces and the re-demarcation of the provincial frontiers. It favours only three subjects for the federation, such as defence, foreign affairs and currency.¹⁵⁵

Since the end of the Cold war, a mixture of trans-border and ethno-nationalist conflicts has been a dominant feature of the changing geopolitics of Southwest Asia – the region comprising Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the Central Asian republics. This development has already challenged the very existence of the above states. In Pakistan, the 1999 Martial Law sharpened the divide between the Baloch and the Centre. From then on, a large number of Balochistan's nationalist leaders are either incarcerated or have been driven out of the country. For example the former governor and Chief Minister, Nawab Akbar Bugti has been confined to his native Dera Bugti, Nawab Kair Bakhsh Marri, a resolute nationalist leader with a militant background, and Abdul Nabi Bangulzai a former guerrilla leader, are behind bars, and the Balochistan National Party's (BNP) *Sardar* Ataullah Mengal is again living in London in self-imposed exile, fearing the government may somehow do him what has been done to the others.¹⁵⁶

Returning from Afghanistan, after the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government in 1992, the founder of the Parari Movement in the early 1960's, Sher Mohammad Marri stated, "History is changing and I assure you that the existing set-up will not be able to be sustained".¹⁵⁷ However, at this moment an outright national movement in Balochistan is unlikely. But at the same time the last elections have shown a strong eth-

¹⁵² Ibid., 29 March 2000.

¹⁵³ See the "Text of Gen Pervez Musharraf's Speech, in *ibid*, 18 October 1999.

¹⁵⁴ Shiraz Raj, "Panic Reaction?" in *The Herald*, November 2000.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Haroon Rashid, "Resurgent Nationalism" in: *The Herald*, November 2000.

¹⁵⁷ *The News International*, 3-9 July, 1992.

nicization of politics in Pakistan. In the 1997's elections hardly any party had truly 'national' importance: the PML (Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif) had overwhelming support in Punjab. But in all other provinces it was weak. The PPP (Pakistan People's Party) and the MQM (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) controlled the rural respective urban Sindh. And in Balochistan and – to a lesser degree in the NWFP (North Western Frontier Province) the nationalist parties dominated.¹⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that since the first (1970) election in Pakistan that was based on the adult franchise, the vote bank of the Baloch nationalists increased continuously. For example in 1988 the Baloch nationalists secured 47.8 per cent of the votes in Balochistan, while in 1970, they got 45.1. In the election of 1990, they received 51.74 per cent.¹⁵⁹

As indicated, the fragmentation of political system in Pakistan, has increased considerably during the last three decades, and has grown more "provincial" in character than national. General Pervez Musharraf in his seven-point agenda, however, stated to take care of the issue of provincial autonomy by removing their sense of deprivation. But his devolution plan, which is likely to create 106 district governments, is being perceived to be striking at the very root of the present (1973) constitution of Pakistan, which recognizes the country as a federation of four autonomous nationalities. In view of all the above, it seems that there is little concern for the harmonious development of the Baloch and other national minorities by Pakistan, with its over-inflated military budget and nuclear arms race with India.

Baloch Nationalism and the Iranian Revolution

The revolution of 1978-79 was the most popular political struggle in modern Iranian history. It drew the majority of the population, especially in urban areas, into political activism for the overthrow of the monarchical dictatorship. However, the participants in this revolution did not have a common goal. Visions of a future Iran were diverse, ranging from an Islamic regime to a democratic and socialist state. Activists among the non-Persian peoples, especially in Kurdistan, Balochistan, Turkmen-Sahra and Khuzistan, sought a secular, democratic, federal state allowing extensive autonomy in administration, language, culture and economy.¹⁶⁰ It should be pointed out that

¹⁵⁸ Dawn, Karachi, 5 February 1997. For more information about the Baloch nationalists and the 1997 elections, see, Dr. Jehan Zeb Jamaldini, "BNP Ka Qeyam" (the emergence of BNP) in: Monthly Balochi Labzank, February 1997, pp. 45-47.

¹⁵⁹ Inayatullah Baloch, "Nationality Problems and Political Parties of Pakistan: The National Awami Party (NAP) and its Successors" in: Georg Berkemer, Tilman Fransch, Hermann Kulke, and Jurgen Lutt (ed.), Explorations in the History of South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001, p. 364.

¹⁶⁰ Akherdad Baloch, Siasat Dar Balochistan, 75-81.

this revolution acted as a catalyst in awakening the national aspirations and politicising the Iranian nationalities, especially the Baloch, to an extent never known before in the history of these people or that of Iran. On 11 February 1979, the revolutionaries announced the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of *Ayatollah* Ruhullah Khomeini, a Shiite theologian. Once again, the central government was weakened while the struggle between secularists and clerics took place. In Balochistan, the Baloch nationalists took advantage of the power vacuum to press their cause.

The Revolution led to a total breakdown of government authority in Balochistan. Faced with the prospect of loss of control in Balochistan, the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan responded favourably to the demand for appointing the Baloch to positions of authority in the province. Thus Danish Narui, a mathematics professor at the University of Balochistan and a Baloch favourite, was appointed to the post of governor-general of Sistan-wa-Balochistan. This was the first time a Baloch had been allowed to occupy that position since the incorporation of Balochistan into Iran in 1928. Similarly, among other top positions occupied by Baloch appointees was the Chancery of the University of Balochistan, which went to Ameer Gamshadzai a statistics professor. Persians, however, replaced both officials, in less than six months.

The revolution reinforced the centrifugal tendency among the Baloch trying to organise on the basis of ethnic and religious identification. Consequently the first Baloch open political organisations were formed in Iran. The “Sazeman Demokratik Mardom Balochistan” (Balochistan People’s Democratic Organisation, hereafter called the “Sazeman Demokratik”), the Balochistan Raji Zrombesh (the Baloch National Movement, hereafter called Zrombesh) and the “Hezb Ittehad ul-Muslimeen” (Muslim Unity Party) started their activities in public. In many ways the revolution marks the beginning of the new nationalist forces in Iranian Balochistan – the secular, non-tribal nationalist movement organised as political parties. By comparison, such political development took place five decades earlier in eastern Balochistan in the 1920s.¹⁶¹

Sazeman Demokratik, which was formed shortly before the revolution, was the more organised, and more vocal organisation in its demand for autonomy. The Sazeman Demokratik derived its main support from the Baloch intelligentsia, students, and the emerging middle class. Being a democratic and secular organisation, it

absorbed large groups of leftist-oriented non-Baloch who were working and living in Balochistan. The naming of the organisation was debated upon and the term Balochistan (Sazeman Demokratik Mardom "Balochistan") instead of the Baloch was adopted to make it not only broad based but to include the Persians living in Balochistan, if they wanted to be included. However, certain Baloch intellectuals were sceptical about this designation.¹⁶²

However, from its very formation, the Sazeman Demokratik was a nationalist-leftist front.¹⁶³ As a front, it represented a loose coalition of leftist-oriented nationalist factions, including "Kanoon-e farhangi wa Siasi-e Khalq-e Baloch", a youth organisation representing nationalist students with socialist tendencies, "Nabard-e Baloch" (The Baloch Struggle) serving as the provincial arm of the "Paikar organisation", The "Bami Estar" (The Morning Star), local branch of the "Feda-i organisation", and the Zrombesh. Of these Zrombesh was an armed underground guerrilla movement.

Like the NAP in Eastern Balochistan, in its manifesto, Sazeman Demokratik rejected "all the manifestations of secessionism" in favour of *Khodmokhtari* (self-autonomy) in a united Iran. It defined self-autonomy in terms of full administrative autonomy for the Baloch, the adoption of Balochi language as the official medium of instruction and administration in Balochistan, the revival of the Baloch culture, full control of the Baloch over their natural resources, their representation and participation in the highest organs of the central government, and protection of Sunni religion.¹⁶⁴ As indicated, the Sazeman's main demand was self-government in the administration of local affairs, while reconfirming it would respect the Iranian integrity and Constitutional Law. This was a basic contradiction in the platform, since the Iranian Constitution did not provide for the kind of local autonomy for which the Baloch were calling. However, Iranian authorities accused the Sazeman to be secessionist, and refused direct talks with its leaders.¹⁶⁵

Speaking about the relation of the Sazeman Demokratik with their nationalist counterpart in Pakistani Balochistan, a former activist of the organisation, Ayub Hosseinbor said, "The Sazeman Demokratik sent a delegation to Pakistan to meet Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and other nationalist leaders. But due to political uncertainty in

¹⁶¹ Aziz Mohammad Bugti, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, p. 83.

¹⁶² M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 220.

¹⁶³ Interview with Ayub Hosseinbor

¹⁶⁴ For the text of the manifesto of the *Hezb Demokratik* Balochistan, see *Mai Balochistan*, Karachi, August 1980, p. 10.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik.

Iran the delegation was not able to fulfil its mission and returned back half way.”¹⁶⁶ However, from the Pakistani side a close friend of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Mohammad Hout, met the Sazeman Demokratik leaders in Zahedan in 1979. Interviewing Hout, in 1997 in Karachi, the author was told that “in 1979 as I met the Sazeman Demokratik leaders in Zahedan, I was very impressed on their national feelings.”¹⁶⁷

Zrombesh, as mentioned above, was formed in 1971.¹⁶⁸ Disagreeing with the BLF’s policies, the Iraqi supported guerrilla group headed by Raheem Zardkahi, the field commander of the Front inside Balochistan, proclaimed itself as an independent organisation, the “Baloch Raji Zrombesh” in the early 1970s. Soon after the peace agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 (which is commonly known as the “Algiers Agreement”), the Iraqis ended their support to Baloch nationalists. Consequently, the BLF, which was backed by the Iraqi government, ceased to exist. Zrombesh, however, continued its activities mostly underground inside Iranian Balochistan. According to Selig Harrison, Zardkahi headed some seventy-five highly politicised guerrillas.¹⁶⁹ With the revolution, the organisation started its activities openly.¹⁷⁰ Practically, however, it operated mainly as the guerrilla wing of the Sazeman Demokratik in 1979.

Zrombesh stands for an autonomous Balochistan with a sovereign legislature within the framework of a federal Iran. The provincial boundaries are to be re-demarcated to include in the province of Balochistan all the Baloch areas of Iran now in various administrative districts of the county, in order to make a cultural and ethnic entity.¹⁷¹ According to Article 7 of the *Barnama* (manifesto), of the Zrombesh, the area of the autonomous government includes Iranian Balochistan; the boundaries of the autonomous government to be determined by keeping in view historical, geographical and economic factors, and the will of the majority of the people of Balochistan.¹⁷²

Zrombesh’s *Barnama* (manifesto), which was issued in 1983 from Karachi, was very similar to that of Sazeman Demokratik. It demanded that Balochi should be

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Ayub Hosseinbor.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Gul Mohammad Hout.

¹⁶⁸ Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh., *Tarikh-cheh-e Jombesh-ha-e Milli Dar Baluchistan*, Kabul, 1986, p. 75.

¹⁶⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, p. 107.

¹⁷⁰ Monthly *Balochi*, Quetta, January-February 1979. See also, Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh., *Tarikh-cheh-e Jombesh-ha-e Milli Dar Baluchistan*, Kabul, 1986, p. 75.

¹⁷¹ Baluch Raj-e Zrombesh., *Barnama-e Khodmokhtari wa Asasnama* (Manifesto), Karachi, 1983, pp. 1-18.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

declared the official language of communication in Balochistan. The Balochistan government, if the party comes to power, will replace all the imposed Persian armed forces in Balochistan by a newly created Baloch para-military force, which will be responsible for maintaining internal law and order and defence of the Balochistan borders. The government of Balochistan will support all the Baloch revolutionary movements in the neighbouring countries fighting for the achievement of their genuine socio-cultural, economic and political rights. It should serve as a safe refuge for all Baloch exiled for political reasons from any neighbouring states. The Movement advocated an armed struggle to achieve these objectives.¹⁷³ Furthermore, Zrombesh's *Barnama*, in article 54, emphasises that the autonomous government of Balochistan should give all possible assistance to the Baloch revolutionaries in eastern Balochistan (Pakistani Balochistan) and other Baloch areas, who are fighting to achieve their national rights.¹⁷⁴

As soon as the first post-revolutionary government was established in Tehran, in February 1979, discussions and negotiations on the future status of Balochistan began between representatives of the Baloch and the revolutionary authorities in Tehran. In March 1979, *Ayatollah* Khomeini met a Baloch delegation headed by *Maulavi* Abdul Aziz Mollazadeh and reportedly promised them to give equal treatment to both shi'a and Sunni branches of Islam in the projected constitution.¹⁷⁵ In his return from Tehran, Mollazadeh declared to the Baloch 'all your national and religious wishes have been accepted' by the new Islamic leadership.¹⁷⁶ He invited the Baloch to vote for the establishment of the Islamic Republic as proposed in the referendum of April 1979.¹⁷⁷

Objecting to the concept of "Islamic Republic" as lacking any precise definition in its form, substance, and content, Sazeman Demokratik, boycotted the referendum. The new central authorities were, understandably, eager to assert their control over the entire country and severely distrusted the Balochs' intentions. In the following months, both the Baloch and the central authorities saw their mutual distrust confirmed. At several places there were violent clashes between Baloch nationalists and supporters of the Islamic regime, both of which accused the other of provocation.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik.

¹⁷⁶ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", p. 211.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 258.

Islamic committee and Revolutionary Guards supported local Shiite minorities and other groups that clashed with the nationalist Baloch. The Balochs' demand for autonomy was not the only reason they were distrusted by the Islamic authorities. The Hezb was a pure Sunni organisation and the Sazeman had explicitly secular programme.¹⁷⁹

However, in spite of the strong opposition by the national minorities and the secular opposition, Khomeini's forces won the referendum of April 1979 with an overwhelming vote for the Islamic Republic. Taking notice of strong opposition demonstrated by different national groups, *Ayatollah* Khomeini attempted to calm their fears in his message of congratulation to the nation for the approval of the Islamic Republic by stating that: "...Congratulations on such a government [Islamic government] which does not discriminate between races, black or white, Turk, Fars [Persian], Kurd or Balouchi. All are brothers and equal. Superiority is accorded to piety and virtue, ethics and good deeds..."¹⁸⁰

The Islamic Republic's original draft constitution, which was released to the public on 18 June 1979, went to great lengths in efforts to appease minorities. Article 5 stated that the minorities would have equal rights with the Persians: "All people in the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turcomans, and others, will enjoy complete equal rights."¹⁸¹ Article 13 gave Muslims the right to follow their own school of religious thought¹⁸², and Article 21 authorised the use of local languages in schools and press: "The common language and script of Iran is Persian. All official texts and correspondence must be in this language and script. However, the use of local languages in local schools and press is permitted".¹⁸³ The draft constitution did not meet the approval of the secular parties, however, it insisted that the duly elected representatives of the people should approve the constitution.

The secularists' objections gave the hard-line clerics the opening they had been seeking. They agreed to an elected Assembly of Experts to revise the draft. The elected *Majlis-e Khobregan* (Assembly of the Experts) was dominated by pro-Khomeini clerics. Thus their revised draft, recognised only Shiism as the state relig-

¹⁷⁹ Cf., M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", pp. 210.

¹⁸⁰ Government of Iran (The Ministry of Islamic Guidance), *The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution*, Tehran: Echo of Islam, 1982, p. 50.

¹⁸¹ Fereshteh Koochi-Kamali, "The Development of Nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan", in: Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (ed.), *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 185.

¹⁸² Charles G. MacDonald, "The Kurdish Question in the 1980s", in: Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (ed.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 245.

ion and Farsi as the only official language in Articles 13 and 15, respectively.¹⁸⁴ It accorded no equal recognition to the Sunni branch of Islam nor did it include any provision for granting administrative or cultural autonomy to non-Persian nationalities. As a result, the Baloch members of the Assembly of Experts, *Maulavi* Abdul Aziz Mollazadeh and Hamidullah Mir-Moradzai, a lawyer, tried in vain to persuade the council to introduce the necessary changes in the draft to meet the Baloch demands.¹⁸⁵ Mir-Moradzai was the only person in *Majlis-e Khobregan* who rejected every aspect of *Valayat-e Faqih* (the supreme religious leader). But he was not allowed to justify his view, because the chairman of the session in which he chose to speak declared that the debate on the subject was closed.¹⁸⁶ In the end, clerical supporters packed the Assembly, and they wrote the concept of *Valayat-e Faqih* into the constitution. The final version of the constitution, which was eventually ratified on 2-3 December 1979 made no mention of ethnic minorities, their rights, or their religious schools of thought. Local languages could be used in the press if alongside Persian, but textbooks had to be in Persian.

Khomeini's opposition to the Baloch came from his interpretation of Islam: "There are no nationalities in Islam. It supersedes and abolishes all of them. In a sense, nationalism is a 'pre-Islamic legacy.' Islam came to eliminate (national) fanaticism. The subject of Islam is man and not his nationalism...The issue of nationalities is not brought up by Islam. All Muslims are brothers in the view of Islam and all Muslims must shed whatever divide them, be its source nationalism, race or colour."¹⁸⁷ Khomeini's interpretation of religion, and its emphasis on Islam rather than nationalism, did not meet universal acceptance among the Sunnis. Like *Maulavi* Abdul Aziz Mollazadeh, another prominent Sunni scholar, Izziddin Husayni criticising Khomeini's views on Islamic interpretation of autonomy and the rights for minorities, stated: "At present, we do not fight for Islam because we are not at the outset of Islam. Islam is present, and strongly."¹⁸⁸ Contrary to the Shiite clergy the Sunni *Maulavis* emphasised the equal rights for the national minorities in Iran.

¹⁸³ Fereshteh Koochi-Kamali, "The Development of Nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan", p. 185.

¹⁸⁴ Government of Iran, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (ratified in Dec. 1979), Translated by Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980., see, articles 13 and 15.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Dr. Habibullah Malik.

¹⁸⁶ *Majlis-e Khobregan*, "Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Islami, Tehran, 1980-94", (minute), MK 1/382, p. 46.

¹⁸⁷ Talal Salman, "Interview with Khomeini at Movement of Shah's Downfall and Eve of Creation of Islamic Republic", in: *Al-Safir* (in Arabic), 18-19 January 1979.

¹⁸⁸ *Al-Hawadith*, London (Arabic), 18 May 1979, pp. 37-38.

Moreover, the Islamic regime was not homogeneous ideologically and politically; its various factions (liberal, radical, conservative; clerical and non-clerical) pursued more or less similar approaches to the autonomist movements. They did not distinguish between the underdeveloped areas of Balochistan or Kurdistan and more developed Central Provinces such as Esfahan and Tehran. Like Persian nationalists, Islamic leaders did not admit the existence of national oppression. As Khomeini had remarked, there was no difference, between the "provinces", all had been equally oppressed.¹⁸⁹ Thus there was no distinction between Persians and non-Persians; they were all Muslims, and had suffered equally under the previous regime. This view would, inevitably, reject demands for autonomy, and equate it with "secessionism".¹⁹⁰

When on the 3rd December 1979 the *Majlis-e Khobregan* approved the final version of the constitution, the Baloch, along with most minorities, demonstrated against it. On 5-6 December 1979, riots broke out in Tabriz among Azerbaijani supporters of *Ayatollah* Shariat Madari to protest the new constitution.¹⁹¹ In spite of sharp ideological division between them, both the Hezb Ittehad ul-Muslimeen and the Sazeman Demokratik, as well as other lesser nationalist organisations, joined forces to organise large demonstrations in protest to the new Constitution.

The protests quickly spread throughout the province and took a violent turn. Soon, armed clashes between the Baloch and Revolutionary Guards became daily occurrences in the provincial capital where there existed a substantial Shiite population.¹⁹² The unrest grew so intense that the angry protesters stormed the office of the governor-general, Javad Jariri, a Persian in Chabahar, and took him captive.¹⁹³ Calm was temporarily restored only when the Baloch leaders called for restraint after Khomeini's promise in mid-January 1980 to amend the constitution.¹⁹⁴ The Baloch demanded not only regional autonomy but also equal rights for Sunnis and greater al-

¹⁸⁹ Government of Iran (The Ministry of Islamic Guidance), The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution, p. 50.

¹⁹⁰ The more liberal or democratic individuals such as *Ayatollah* Taleqani admitted existence of economic disparities and cultural linguistic differences. Taleqani, however, did not go beyond recommending administrative measures as stipulated by the 1906 constitution and its amendments which allowed limited local self-administration (see for example, his last remarks before his death in 1979, quoted in: Hamid Rahsepar, Melliyyat-ha wa Faje'eye Kordestan, Ketab-e Mehrab, no 3, Tehran: Entesharat-e Sabz, n.d., p. 114.

¹⁹¹ Shariat Madari was either the religious equal or superior to Khomeini, yet the constitution gave ultimate authority to only Khomeini and ignored the other Grand *Ayatollahs*.

¹⁹² New York Times, December 23, 1979.

¹⁹³ Interview with Gholam Mohammad Khanzai; See, also Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 16.

¹⁹⁴ David Menashri, Iran, A Decade of War and Revolution, New York, 1990, p. 141.

location of government development funds for their region.¹⁹⁵ The dominant pro-Khomeini clerical forces in the final document adopted by the "*Majlis-e Khobregan*" as "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran" on 3rd December 1979, however, did not heed these protests.

Much like the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic State has consistently violated the right to mother tongue education. According to Article 19 of the Islamic constitution, "all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and colour, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege." This equality is, however, fictional. In real life, linguistic power in Iran is not distributed equally. The Persians alone enjoy the right to a native-tongue education. However, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media is allowed. The teaching of ethnic literature in the schools, together with Persian language instruction, is also permitted."¹⁹⁶ The teaching of "Balochi literature", however, has not materialised yet, 21 years after revolution. Although the teaching of a literature does not necessarily involve the use of the language of the literature, the Islamic regime's refusal to implement the stipulation of the Article 15 indicates, among other things, its strong Persian nationalist ideology.

In 1981, as all the political activities of the Baloch nationalist were banned, the Sazeman Demokratik was declared illegal, and the mass arrest of the Baloch nationalists started, many of the members of Zrombesh and the Baloch supporters of other organisations crossed the border to seek asylum in Pakistan and Afghanistan. By mid-February 1982, an estimated 3,000 Baloch, most "accused of belonging to the Baloch separatist movement", had crossed the border to seek refuge in Pakistan, while another 4,000 of their fellows were reportedly being held in the jails of the provincial capital Zahedan.¹⁹⁷

Like their brethren from eastern Balochistan, the Afghan revolutionaries in Kabul welcomed the Iranian Baloch. The Iranian Baloch, mostly from Zrombesh, were given governmental support to propagate their ideas. From exile, the Baloch nationalists through the platform of Zrombesh continued their struggle against the Islamic regime of Iran. However, the exile life and limited resources in the war torn Afghanistan, shifted their strategy of struggle from direct confrontation with the ruling *Ayatullahs* to more cultural and educational realms. The Zrombesh started the publi-

¹⁹⁵ *Bamdad* (Daily Tehran), 21 December 1979; *Kayhan*, (Daily Tehran) 23 December 1979.

¹⁹⁶ Government of Iran, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, pp. 22-3.

cation of its organ, the Balochistan from Kabul. It carried articles and write-ups on Balochistan, criticising the Khomeini government for its anti-populist policies. The paper advocated the socio-cultural and political rights of the Baloch people in Iran and elsewhere.¹⁹⁸

The Zrombesh maintained its office in Afghanistan up to the defeat of the Afghanistan Democratic Party by the Pakistan-Iran backed fundamentalist Islamic Mujahideen in 1992. Other groups of Baloch exiled took refuge in Great Britain and Scandinavian countries as well. The overwhelming majority of these exiles were the former members of the "Sazeman Demokratik", while a smaller number were the Baloch followers of the leftist organisations, the "Fedai-e Khalq", the "Fedaiyan-e Khalq", and the "Paikar". Of the detainees, several dozen were executed after being charged and tried for counter-revolutionary activities as well.¹⁹⁹

Thus, as indicated above, in the early 1980s, the Islamic regime crushed the Baloch movement in Iran. However, with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, the Iraqi regime tried to use the Baloch against the Iranian ruling *Ayatullahs*. Baghdad recruited lightly armed Baloch militias, headed by the traditional tribal leaders. The largest of these were the "Wahdat-e Baloch" (the Baloch Unity) headed by Mir Maoladad Sardarzai, a royalist *sardar* and the "Jonbesh-e Mojahideen-e Baloch" headed by Mohammad Khan Mir-Lashari a member of the last *Majlis* (parliament) of Shah. The Wahdat-e Baloch had close links with the Iranian opposition groups supporting the return of the monarchy in Iran.²⁰⁰ According to Hosseinbor, in 1984, the "Wahdat-e Baloch" stepped up its guerrilla campaign against the Islamic government to the extent that it forced Tehran to divert a large number of its Revolutionary Guards from the war front with Iraq to Balochistan.²⁰¹ In 1985, with the death of its leader Mir Maoladad, the Wahdad-e Baloch disintegrated. Supported by the Iraqi government, Jonbesh-e Mojahideen continued its activities up to the Iran-Iraq peace treaty in 1988. Relying on the outside powers these groups gave up their struggle, as the outside support withdrew. Obviously, at present the Baloch nationalism in Iran has been defeated, and there are no prospects for self-autonomy under the Islamic

¹⁹⁷ The Economist, February 13, 1982, p. 50.

¹⁹⁸ Balochistan (Organ-e Sazeman-e Jonbesh-e Khalq-e Baloch-Iran), No. 1, 1364/1985.

¹⁹⁹ Akherdad Baloch, Siasat Dar Balochistan, pp. 120-122.

²⁰⁰ M. H. Hosseinbor, "Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism", PhD. Thesis, The Amerikan university, 1984, p. 227.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.

regime. The Baloch demand for self-rule constitutes a democratic pursuit that is incompatible with the despotism and the Persian ethnic-based nationalism of Iran.

However, in order to win the hearts of the Baloch, the Islamic Republic has offered a number of concessions including material rewards. In Balochistan, for example, investment has been made in the electrification of some villages and the construction of roads and bridges in rural areas, and urban development projects such as the expansion of streets and the construction of parks. It must be noted, however, that most of these projects have military significance, and the colossal network of army and gendarmerie outposts built throughout the region dwarfs them. Another example of the concessions is the offering of limited quotas in institutions of higher education to high-school graduates.²⁰² Moreover, Balochistan University has been expanded and branches of higher-education institutions, including the Free Islamic universities, have been established in some cities of Balochistan.²⁰³

Baloch Nationalism and the Sistanis

The Baloch ethnic identity in Iranian Balochistan has gained further importance during the Iranian revolution, because of the competition for resources with the Persian-speaking Shiite Sistanis. As discussed in chapter five, like the Pashtun populated area in northern Pakistani Balochistan, there is a Shiite dominated *Shahrestan* (division), *Shahrestan-e Zabol* in the northern part of the province, historically known as Sistan. In 1865, as Ameer Ahmad Khan, the Baloch ruler of Lash-Jowein, was defeated and the Persians occupied Sistan, Baloch rule came to an end.²⁰⁴ Ibrahim Khan, the most powerful *Sardar* of the Sanjaranis, appealed to the Afghan King for assistance but was refused. Frustrated by the failure of the Afghans to support him, the Baloch *Sardar* turned to the British for assistance but to no avail.²⁰⁵ The arable lands of Sistan – 90,000 hectares in total – were confiscated in 1865 and declared the same year to be *Khaliseh* (government owned).²⁰⁶ This was a measure of punishment in the mid-19th century against the Baloch *Sardars* who owned most of the lands in Sistan and refused to accept Persian rule.

²⁰² Government of Iran (Vazarat-e Farhang wa Amuzesh-e 'Ali, Sazeman-e Sanjesh-e Amuzesh-e Keshwar), *Rahnema-e Entekhab-e Reshteh-ha-e Tahsili*, No. 2, Tehran, 1372/1994, p. 6

²⁰³ Interview with Azim Shahbakhsh.

²⁰⁴ Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlight On Baloches and Balochistan*, p. 288.

²⁰⁵ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zaheh, *The Amirs of the Borderlands and Eastern Iranian Borders*, UROSEVIC Foundation, 1995, pp. 375-76.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

In the beginning of the 20th century the political importance of Sistan further diminished. In 1894, the British officially divided Sistan between Iran, Afghanistan, and the British Balochistan. Thus, the politically divided Sistan, faced with water shortage and increasingly complicated land ownership, lost also its economic significance as a result. Due to this geographical shrinking and the lack of importance in the later political and administrative arrangement of Iran the name of the "Iranian portion of Sistan" has been officially replaced by the name of its capital Zabol, and it constitutes a *shahrestan* (division) in the larger province of Balochistan, whereas the name "Sistan" is added to the name of the Province of "Sistan-wa-Balochistan". The reason, according to the Baloch sources, is the Persian dominated government's interest to play the Persian or Sistani minority card against Baloch nationalism.²⁰⁷ However, the Persian writer, Dr. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, believes that the reason of including the name to the larger Balochistan province was the large Baloch population living in Sistan.²⁰⁸

Officially, Zabol was included in Balochistan in 1959.²⁰⁹ With an area of 8,117 square kilometres²¹⁰ Zabol is the smallest *Shahrestan* in the province, inhabited by a mixed ethnic population of Sistani (Persian) and Baloch.²¹¹ However, the discrepancy between official census figures and nationalist claims in Iran is comparable to that in Pakistan. The 1978 official population estimate of 659,297 people in the province of Sistan and Balochistan includes some 217,000 ethnic Sistanis and excludes many Baloch living in gerrymandered districts attached to other provinces. Criticising the above figures, the Baloch nationalists in Iran claimed that they were more than two million.²¹² It is believed that more than half of Zabol's population is comprised of Shiites. Because of these two factors (Persian and Shiism), its name is included in the official provincial designation "Sistan wa Balochistan". This reflects the prominence given to the Shiite Sistani segment in the key positions in the provincial administration, despite a large portion of the district's population being Baloch. Because of the Iranian state's anti-nationality policy, there is no exact statistic about Zabol's Baloch population, but even some Persian nationalist sources confirm the Ba-

²⁰⁷ Interview with Dr. Danish Narui.

²⁰⁸ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *The Amirs of the Borderlands and Eastern Iranian Borders*, p. 80.

²⁰⁹ Robert G. Wirsing, "The Baluchis and Pathans", p. 13.

²¹⁰ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *The Amirs of the Borderlands*, p. 80.

²¹¹ Government of Iran, *Shonasai-e Mokhtasar-e Ostan-e Sistan wa Balochistan*, Zahedan, 1357/1979, p. 11.

²¹² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 96.

loch majority in *Shahrestan-e Zabol*.²¹³ However, as earlier mentioned, the differences between the Sunni Baloch and the Shiite Sistanis culminated with the Iranian revolution in 1979. While the Baloch demanding greater autonomy boycotted the nation-wide referendum held for approval of the Islamic Republic on April 1979, the Sistanis supported it openly.

Baloch Nationalism: The Role of the Great Powers

The Baloch case, according to Dr. Inayatullah Baloch, the most prominent authority on the subject of the Baloch nationalism, is not a case of an ethnic minority in Pakistan or Iran but “is a sad and tragic story of a nation and independent state that has been occupied by its powerful neighbours with the assistance of British and American imperialism”.²¹⁴ In the view of the Baloch nationalists, the Baloch suffered their unhappy fate simply because they happened to live in an area of vital military importance to the British, in contrast to the more fortunately situated Afghans.²¹⁵ Confirming this view, the head of the Italian Historical-Anthropological and Archaeological Mission in Makkoran (southern Balochistan), Valeria F. Piacentini wrote:

Baluchistan lies in a central position, at the crossroads of two “axes”, east-west and north-south, of three macro-regions: Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean basin. It is, in fact, at one and the same time (a) the hinge between the Indian sub-continent, Central Asia and the Euro-Asiatic steppes and the Iranian plateau; (b) the link between those regions which give on to – or gravitate towards – the Indian Ocean and its two western “sea routes”, namely, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. For this reason, it is still of vital importance from a geo-strategic and geo-economic point of view.²¹⁶

The whole question of Balochistan and its division as it exists today, is rooted in the famous “Great Game”, which, until the beginning of the twentieth century, was to set Great Britain and the Czarist Empire against one another for supremacy in south-central Asia, including Balochistan. Concerning India’s defence, the differing political perceptions of British politicians and officials gave rise to two antithetical policies: the so-called “Close Border Policy” (or Masterly Inactivity Policy), and the “Forward Policy”. In 1860s, with the Russian advancement southwards, and the crea-

²¹³ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *The Amirs of the Borderlands*, p. 81.

²¹⁴ Baloch, Inayatullah, “Resistance and National Liberation in Baluchi Poetry”, Paper presented at Balochi Symposium at the University of Uppsala on 17-20th August 2000, Uppsala, Sweden.

²¹⁵ Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan”, p. 297.

²¹⁶ Valeria F. Piacentini, “Introduction”, in: Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century)*, Firenze: Il Maestrale, 1997, p. 21.

tion of the Russian Province of Turkistan (1867), increased the British concern of a Czarist invasion of India. From then on, the second approach, the “Forward Policy” became dominant. According to the champions of the “Forward Policy”, the defence of India should be undertaken not from within her own frontiers, but by challenging the enemy in the Iranian plateau.²¹⁷

The “Great Game”, thus, brought Balochistan under the hegemony of Britain as her forward base for securing Iran and Afghanistan as buffer states in order to prevent further Russian advances toward the British Indian Empire.²¹⁸ Under the Forward Policy the India’s best defence lay in its unique geographical setting – bordered by towering mountainous ranges, mighty rivers, waterless deserts and warlike tribes.²¹⁹ A Russian army, which reached India after overcoming all these obstacles, would be so weakened by then that it would be no match for a waiting British Army.

During the Cold War, the superpowers sought to expand their spheres of influence worldwide actively. This rivalry affected the Baloch question quite early when Pakistan and Iran entered into military pacts with the West in the mid-50s. In the post-war world, the Americans replaced the British as the predominant players in the region’s politics, as shown by the American role in returning the Shah of Iran to power in 1953, and including Pakistan as a part of Western strategy of encircling the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. To protect American interest abroad while reducing American commitments, president Richard Nixon developed the Nixon doctrine. The president called for additional American financial and material support of its allies, rather than promising to send American troops to the world’s trouble spots. The allies, and not the United States, would then become the major actors in their respective regions of the world. Thus in building up the Shah of Iran as one of the United States’ major allies in the region, Nixon enmeshed America in Middle East politics.

The United States had no national security interests at stake in the Baloch question, other than a desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Iran and Pakistan. The U.S. support, however, for strengthening Iran and Pakistan, took a seemingly indifferent posture toward the Baloch issue. For instance, when in Pakistan on an official visit in 1962, the former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, then a Harvard pro-

²¹⁷ Riccardo Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20th Century), pp. 47-47.

²¹⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p. 200.

²¹⁹ For more detail see, Reza Raees Toosi, “Isteratezhi-e Sarzaminha-e Sookhteh” (The Backward strategy), in: Tarikh-e Ma’aser-e Iran (The Contemporary History of Iran), Tehran: Mo’assesah-e Motale’at-e Tarik-e Ma’aser-e Iran, Winter 1376/1997 (pp. 19-69).

fessor, was asked by a reporter about the then growing Baloch insurgency in Balochistan. His reply was that "I would not recognise the Baluchistan problem..."²²⁰ An arrogant response reflecting the overall United States attitude toward the small nationalities and their quest for self-rule. Similarly, the Soviet Union also did not show any direct interest at least publicly nor did it become involved directly in the issue of Baloch nationalism, in spite of the fact that the Baloch movement was always suspected by Iran and Pakistan of being supported by Moscow through her friends in Kabul and Baghdad.²²¹

Having occupied the landmass of Balochistan, the two countries of Iran and Pakistan have viewed the Baloch quest for self-rule as a threat to their territorial integrity. Thus they always dealt the Baloch issue with their joined forces. To suppress the Baloch nationalism, the emergence of Pakistan in 1947 was an event of great significance for Iran.²²² Both Iran and Pakistan treated Baloch nationalism as a "subversive" and "anti-status quo" force suspected of being part of an overall Soviet plot for gaining access to the Indian Ocean and controlling the Persian Gulf through Balochistan.

Throughout the Cold War years, the Baloch would revolt against the governments in which they lived. Being fearful of Baloch separatism, the Iranian rulers and their Pakistani counterparts followed a common suppressive policy toward the Baloch national movement in the CENTO and other military pacts. The essence of their policies was best underlined by the Shah's Foreign Minister, Khalat-bary, also an ex-director-general of CENTO. During an interview with Selig Harrison in 1977, he bluntly stated that, "In Cento, we always assumed that the Baluch would attempt to create their own independent state some day, with Soviet support, so it was desirable to keep them as politically weak, disunited, and backward as possible".²²³

During the U.S.-Iran-Pakistan alliance in CENTO (1954-1979), the Baloch nationalists were highly critical of that Pact. The Baloch nationalists both in Pakistan and Iran opposed political and military support for the two countries because they feared that such help would serve to further strengthen the two countries in their attempts to suppress the Baloch demand for self-rule.²²⁴ Of course, the U.S.-engineered CENTO military alliance was designed in accordance with her global strategy for

²²⁰ Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 63-64.

²²¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, See, Chapter 7.

²²² Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger*, p. 180. It should be remembered that the Shah of Iran was the first who recognised Pakistan as an independent sovereign state.

²²³ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, p. 159.

²²⁴ Interview with Akbar Barakzai.

containing the Soviet expansion in the region and, as such, it was not directed against the Baloch national movement per se. But in practice, it had the same effect because the U.S. supplied arms were repeatedly used by Iran and Pakistan to put down the Baloch national movement in both countries. In this regard, the most striking example was deployment of the sophisticated U.S. made weapons by the Shah's regime against the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan from 1973 to 1977.²²⁵

Afghanistan was considered friendly. "Republican Afghanistan", wrote People's Front in its tenth issue in 1974, "is particularly dear to all Baluch and Pashtuns as it has with renewed vigour and persistence upheld the Baloch and Pashtun masses."²²⁶ Thus no scenario envisaged the Afghans joining hands with Pakistan or Iran to crush the Baloch liberation movement in either country in the 1970s. The traditional good will between the Baloch and the Afghans seems to endure in spite of the chauvinistic claims on Baloch land by many Pashtun nationalists. According to the ex-chief-minister, Sardar Ataulah Mengal, territorial adjustment with Afghanistan should not pose a problem. He told a journalist in 1982 that territorial issues, which may arise when Balochistan gets its freedom, could be resolved amicably. He said:

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we do not have territorial claims. All that we can say is that the boundaries could be re-demarcated. There is Afghan territory in Balochistan (the Pakhtu-speaking district of Zhob, Loralai and Pishin), which Afghanistan claims to be its territory. There are areas in Afghanistan, which the Baloch think to be theirs. So there could be an arrangement and a redemarcation in certain areas. Certain areas can go there and certain areas can come here.²²⁷

In 1973, during Bhutto's visit to Tehran, the Shah declared in a public declaration that what happens to Pakistan "is vitally important to us, and should another event befall that country we could not tolerate it. The reason for this is not only fraternal affection for you as a Muslim nation, but of Iranian interests; we would not be able to tolerate other changes or difficulties in Pakistan ... We will not close our eyes to any secessionist movement-God forbid-in your country".²²⁸ Prime Minister Bhutto told the American author, Selig Harrison in 1977 that the Shah of Iran had been very insistent, even threatening and had promised Pakistan all sorts of economic and mili-

²²⁵ Rashed Rahman, "The Rise and Fall of Baloch Nationalism", p. 7.

²²⁶ People's Front, vol. 1, No. 10-11, 1974, p. 2.

²²⁷ Interview of Sardar Ataulah Mengal with Lawrence Lifschultz, cited in Janmahmad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 402-403.

tary help. He felt strongly that letting the Baloch have provincial self-government was not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baloch dangerous ideas.²²⁹

The Shah's hard-line policies, as discussed earlier, did not completely succeed in crushing nationalist activity, which erupted in the 1957-1958 Dad Shah incident and in an Iraqi-assisted insurgency from 1968 to 1975 in Iranian Balochistan²³⁰. The Shah became concerned that his continuing troubles with the Baloch would be aggravated by unrest in the Pakistani Baloch areas, especially after the secession of Bangladesh. Moreover, he was obsessed with a geopolitical nightmare: that Moscow would solidify its foothold in Afghanistan and would then synchronise support for the already powerful Baloch nationalist forces in Pakistan with related attempts to intensify Baloch disaffection in Iran. Discussing with his court minister Asadollah Alam, on 14th May 1972, the Shah said, "By seeking a weak and independent Baluchi state, they [the Russians] hope to get access to the Indian Ocean more easily than by going through Bangladesh, or through Iraq which has only a short coast-line at the far end of the Persian Gulf."²³¹ The only way to be sure that his own Baloch problem would not get out of hand, the Shah concluded, was to treat Pakistani Balochistan as a virtual Iranian protectorate. Pressures from the Shah as mentioned earlier were largely responsible for Bhutto's decision to oust the Baloch state government in 1973 and to use air power as well as ground forces in crashing the Baloch insurgency.²³²

Being frightened by the Baloch movement in Eastern Balochistan, the Shah, as earlier mentioned, concentrated more than 80 thousand troops in Iranian Balochistan in early 1973. As declared openly by the monarch himself, it was the fear of further dismemberment of Pakistan, which made the rulers in Tehran sit up and decide on a show of strength in Western Balochistan. While talking about the maintenance of law and order, the real aim of the Shah according to the nationalist paper, People's Front, was to take advantages of the depleted state of the state machinery of Islamabad, which had resulted from its defeat by Bangladesh freedom movement and the later developments in the Eastern Balochistan, to expand his empire eastwards.²³³

²²⁸ New York Times, 15th May 1973.

²²⁹ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 97.

²³⁰ Interview with Abdul Samad Amiri.

²³¹ Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court (1969-1977), London, 1991, p. 216.

²³² Interview with Abdul Samad Amiri.

²³³ People's Front, May 1973.

With the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union, the world is rapidly becoming accustomed to conflicts that are no longer encumbered with superpower rivalries. The ability of the successor states of the Soviet Union, primarily Russia, to work in cooperation with the United States has had a powerful impact on how America defines its national interests in the Third World. Local conflicts between client states of the Cold War protagonists are no longer seen as surrogate battles; the United States can choose to ignore outbreaks of violence in Africa, Latin America, or Asia if it so desires. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988, and the subsequent fall of Dr. Najibullah's government, Pakistan not only lost its generous Western economical support but also its geo-political importance.

In addition, the last quarter of the 20th century has been witnessing a worldwide rise in the political awakening of sub-nationalities – ethnic and regional communities – who are demanding a greater say in the running of their own affairs. Today no serious analysts would contest the state of cultural and social deprivation in which the Baloch have been left since their forced integration into Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948). But many of them question the effect of recent economic development of the province, the progressive breaking down of archaic structures and finally the potential viability of Baloch as a separate entity.

Summation

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the political environment changed drastically. The democratic and ethnic movements in the former Western wing were deprived one of their main source of political strength: the cooperation with the Bengalis. With the independence of Bangladesh what was now left of Pakistan was able to shake off the dominance of the old bureaucracy, and even forced the army back to the barracks – at least for a few years. But at the same time the preconditions for Punjabi dominance were strengthened, by losing the main potential counterweight, Bengal.

The aftermath of the traumatic events in Bangladesh, however, obliged the remaining Western Wing of Pakistan to find some viable institutional accommodation if it hoped to survive. The National Awami Party and Jami'at-e Ulema-e Islam (NAP and JUI), which had won a majority in the two provinces of Baluchistan and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) were called by Z.A. Bhutto to sign a tripartite agreement in March 1972. This called for the lifting of martial law, the drafting of a

new constitution, consultations between the majority parties and the Provinces to appoint governors, and possibilities for each province to form its own government according to a parliamentary majority.

When Bhutto took over as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971, his party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was securely in control of the Punjab and Sindh, but it had very little support in either the NWFP or Balochistan. In the General Elections of 1970, the PPP had won only a single seat in the National Assembly from the NWFP, where it polled less than 15 % of the popular vote, and none at all from Balochistan, where its share of the popular vote was about 2%. It had done just as poorly in the provincial assemblies, having captured only 4 of 40 seats in the NWFP and none of the 20 seats in Balochistan. Among the many opposition parties, the National Awami Party (NAP) emerged in the strongest position, having won 3 seats in the National Assembly from each of the two provinces, and 8 and 13 seats, respectively, in the provincial legislatures of Balochistan and the NWFP. Thus the Baloch and the Pashtuns formed their own governments in their provinces. Relation between the Centre and these two provincial governments were strained. Baloch nationalists accused Bhutto of carrying out a series of provocations in order to prepare the ground for dismissal of Chief Minister Sardar Ataulah Mengal's ministry in Balochistan. The NAP-JUI government in NWFP resigned in protest. However, as expected, Bhutto dismissed the Baloch government in February 1973, which led to the third Baloch armed resistance against Pakistan.

The 1973-77 insurgency aroused unprecedented political awareness in Balochistan. With the dismissal of the NAP-JUI Government in Balochistan, federal troops were inducted in the province to help the provincial administration in "restoring law and order", but the situation kept on deteriorating. The radical elements in the NAP took to militant struggle and were joined by the Marri and Mengal tribes, who had taken the central government's decision as an assault on their "national rights". A large number of those involved in the armed struggle formed the Baloch People's Liberation Front (BPLF) under the leadership of Mir Hazar Ramkhani, who was formally made leader of its People's Revolutionary Command.

The third confrontation lasted four years (1973-77) and involved at its height more than 80,000 Pakistani troops and at least 55,000 Baloch guerrillas. It erupted when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the elected government of Balochistan on 12 February 1973 under the pretext that it had been involved in a conspiracy to begin an

armed rebellion. Bhutto obtained US\$200 million in emergency military and financial aid from Iran to crush the rebels. Iran even dispatched 30 Huey Cobra helicopters to assist the Pakistani military.

The Baloch fighters found sanctuary in Afghanistan from where they launched surprise attacks on the Pakistani army. According to one estimate some 5300 Baloch were killed or wounded. The army casualties were 3300. While accounts of some major battles, such as in Chamalang in September 1974, had reliable observers, it seems that in addition thousands of Baloch civilians were killed by bombardments and various military actions. At the peak of the war 8,000 to 10,000 Baloch (mostly from the Marri tribe) fled to Afghanistan. Numerous reports have testified that torture was common practice.

In 1977, General Ziaul Haq overthrew the Bhutto Government. One of the first measures taken by the General was to declare a cease-fire to release the NAP leaders jailed in Hyderabad and to open negotiations. Several meetings were held in Islamabad in 1977 and 1978. Although some Pashtun leaders, such as Wali Khan, moved by their strong resentment of Bhutto, agreed to discuss with the generals, the Baloch leaders made it clear that they were not fighting individuals but the whole system. In 1978, however, 6000 more Baloch prisoners were set free and a general amnesty for those who had fled to Afghanistan was announced. It should be noted that Ziaul Haq released Baloch leaders and offered terms that allowed Baloch leaders to call off the fighters without actually achieving anything more than a cease-fire. The Baloch insurgence thereafter faded inside Pakistan. Nevertheless, after one year of negotiation, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal came to the conclusion that the possibility of resolving the Baloch national question within the framework of the Pakistani State was not viable, and left the country in 1980.

In 1978-1979, the Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a monarchy to a republic. During this turbulent period, the Baloch nationalist struggle re-emerged. Among the major nationalist organisations which appeared during or immediately after the revolution and demanded autonomy were "Sazeman Demokratik Mardom Balochistan" (Balochistan People's Democratic Organisation), Hezb-e ittehad al-Muslimin (Muslims' Unity Party) formed by a group of *Maulavis* and religious-oriented intellectuals, and the Balochistan-e Raji Zrombesh (Balochistan National Movement), a guerrilla organisation formed in mid-1970s.

The Baloch political life, however, was short-lived in Iran. The final draft of the new constitution adopted the idea of *Valayat-e Faqih* (the supreme religious leader) and rejected the political, cultural, and religious rights of the Baloch and other nationalities in Iran. It became a religious duty for all Shiites to support the central government, and to oppose regional nationalists. Being disappointed in the conversion of earlier promises into reality, some Baloch tribes engaged in new but badly organized insurgencies against the government. As a result, many Baloch were forced to leave the country during the 1980s. Karachi became a centre for them, and as a result a centre of activities of the Iranian secret service.

The Baloch of Afghanistan remained largely isolated from these events and from attempts by the Afghan government to exert administrative control over them. Consequently, unlike the Iranian and Pakistani Baloch, they have not mobilised to demand greater cultural or political autonomy. Since Abdur Rehman's rule the insignificant minority of Sistani Baloch in the remote, barren deserts of south-west Afghanistan has not mobilised on the basis of broader economic or political interests, and the concerns of the large Baloch landholders have mainly been to maximise their personal profit.

While the developments of the last two decades, the martial law of the 1980s, and the co-called democracy of the 1990s, acted as dampener on political activism, the Baloch nationalism may have lost its ardour, but as discussed above, it is not dead. After the fall of Nawaz Sharif's government in late 1990, it seems that Baloch nationalism is once again becoming active. The general belief among the Baloch nationalists is that the military government has either tried to sideline the major political forces in Balochistan or put itself in direct confrontation with them. In this context, the recent MQM's (Muttaheda Qaumi Movement) alliance with Baloch nationalists has assumed great significance.

It is interesting to note that since the early 2000, a new militant group, calling itself the "Baloch Liberation Army" (BLA) has been claiming responsibility for a series of blasts and rocket-firings on government installations in Quetta, including Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Commissioner offices, I.G. Police residence and various sensitive selected targets in Quetta Cantonment as well as the Sui gas installations and traffic on Chamalang coal mines area in Kohlu district.²³⁴ Thus, the new Baloch na-

²³⁴ Surat Khan Marri, "Baloch Liberation Movement, Romanticism, Fact or Fiction", in: Daily Balochistan Express, Quetta, May 18, 2001.

tionalism, emerging from the ashes of post-Cold War, may pose a far greater challenge to the cohesion of already trouble spot states of Pakistan and Iran than the BPLF and BLF ever could. Much, however, depends on how the post-democratic period under General Parvez Musharraf turns out.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

The 20th century has been witness to the rise and development, of the politics of Baloch identity and nationalism. Nationalism may be defined in one of two ways – by ethnic or civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the consciousness of a shared identity, culture, belief in common ancestors and history, civic nationalism is encompassed within a geographically defined territory. In practice, ethnic nationalism has had an advantage over territorial or civic nationalism because the former appears as a natural continuation of a pre-existing ethnicity. The nationalists believe that their corporate interests are best protected by possession of their own state in the international system.

A community has an identity when its members are able not only to distinguish it from other communities, but also to convey its distinctive character in words, gestures, and practices, so as to reassure them that it should exist and that they have reason to belong to it. Thus the emergence of a national identity involves a growing sense among people that they belong naturally together, that they share common interests, a common history and a common destiny. To this extent the Baloch have undoubtedly an obvious claim to national identity, as demonstrated by perceptible political, economic and social events peculiar to the Baloch.

As indicated in chapter three, historically, the period between the 13th century and the end of the 15th was the most significant in the development of the Baloch ethno-linguistic community. With respect to this, the process was just as complex and fundamental. Internally, the Baloch society moved from the smaller unit of clan to the larger one of tribe and territorial differentiation. Externally, it began to assimilate vast segments of other ethnic groups: Iranians, Indo-Aryans of Punjab and Sindh, Arabs, Pashtuns, etc.

A nation may be divided amongst several states. Such a nation is a multi-state nation - or, more appropriately, a trans-state nation. The Baloch today are a trans-state nation. Since the 1920s, their 'coherence and unity' have been growing steadily, and it is directed to the establishment of an independent "Greater Balochistan", which comprises mainly the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of Sistan-wa-Balochistan (Sistan and Balochistan), and the contiguous areas of southern Afghanistan. Thus, as ties of history, territory and ethnicity maintain a unified Baloch national identity that spans state frontiers, so does Baloch nationalism transcend the

international boundaries, which cut across its linguo-ethnic homeland. Therefore, it is important to place the Baloch national struggle in Eastern Balochistan (within the state of Pakistan) in the context of the broader nationalist movement engulfing the Baloch in Iran and Afghanistan.

Numbering over 10 million (1981), the Baloch are one of the largest trans-state nations in southwest Asia. At present, their country is politically divided into two major parts: eastern Balochistan with Quetta as its capital has been administered by Pakistan since 1948; western Balochistan, officially known as "Sistan-wa-Balochistan" with Zahedan as its capital, has been under the control of Iran since 1928. The greatest number of Baloch today still live in Balochistan, though a large Baloch diaspora has developed in this century, especially in Karachi and other cities of Sindh, Punjab, Oman, and in recent decades in the Gulf States as well.

However, it is Balochistan's strategic location, with a long coastline on the Gulf and its function as one of the gate-ways from and to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and as the most important check point of the Gulf's oil, that has placed it in a pivotal position in the Subcontinent's, and since the post colonial years in Pakistan's and Iran's, history.

Having its origin in the Balochs' distinct geography, ecology, culture and history, Baloch nationalism emerged as an ideology in the early 1920s. Representing a popular movement against alien domination, its principal goal is the Baloch national self-rule in their homeland, an aim sought to preserve their national and cultural identity, thus advocated and pursued universally by the Baloch of all classes and social strata.

The ethnic element (ethnicity) constitutes the salient feature of Baloch nationalism. The weakness of ethnicity, however, is its inability to maintain the terminal loyalty of the masses at the national level. Sub-national rivalry, based on tribal loyalties, divides the Baloch national movement. These rivalries are then used by the central governments to weaken the Baloch, in both Iran and Pakistan. Thus the Baloch movement, in contrast to many other national liberation movements, has experienced a persistent contradiction between its traditional leadership and the relatively developed society it seeks to liberate.

A strong sense of ethnicity has existed among the Baloch for a very long time. From the 17th century to the mid-19th century, much of Balochistan was under the rule of the independent Khanate of Balochistan, and the autonomous Baloch princi-

palties (Western Balochistan) that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in the 18th century. Although a people of mixed origin, the Baloch constitute an ethnicity which has proved its vigour throughout the ages. They have withstood the inroads of more numerous and developed peoples such as the Mughals, Turks and Persians, and despite certain affinities with the latter, they have succeeded in maintaining their separate identity. Their vitality has been demonstrated by expansion into non-Baloch regions as well as by the Balochization of neighbouring people.

The Baloch may be divided into two major groups. The largest and the most extensive of these are the Baloch who speak Balochi or any of its related dialects. This group represents the Baloch "par excellence". The second group consists of the various non-Balochi speaking groups, among them are the Baloch of Sindh and Punjab and the Brahuis of eastern Balochistan who speak Sindhi, Seraiki and Brahui respectively. Despite the fact that the latter group differs linguistically, they believe themselves to be Baloch, and this belief is not contested by their Balochi-speaking neighbours. Moreover, many prominent Baloch leaders have come from this second group. Thus, language plays a less important role in the Baloch nationalist movement in Eastern Balochistan, because, as indicated above, language ties do not unite the whole Baloch community.

Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Baloch, in some cases attested in traditions preserved by the tribes, they believe themselves to have a common ancestry. Some scholars have claimed a Semitic ancestry for the Baloch, a claim which is also supported by the Baloch genealogy and traditions, and has found wide acceptance among the Baloch writers. Even though this belief may not necessarily agree with the facts (which, it should be pointed out, are very difficult to prove, either way), it is the concept universally held among members of the group that matters. In this connection Kurdish nationalism offers a good parallel. The fact is that there are many common ethnic factors which have contributed to the formation of the Kurdish nation; there are also factors which have led to divisions within the Kurds themselves. While the languages identified as Kurdish are not the same as the Persian, Arabic, or Turkish, they are mutually unintelligible. Geographically, the division between the Kurmanji-speaking areas and the Sorani-speaking areas correspond with the division between the Sunni and Shiite schools of Islam. Despite all these factors, the Kurds form one of the oldest nations in the Middle East. It is interesting to note that like the Kurdish ruling tribes, various Baloch ruling tribes have also pretended to an Arab descent and

proudly displayed Arab genealogy – a fact no doubt due to the religious prestige which attaches to Arab descent among Islamic peoples. However, even those who have claimed such descent have never considered themselves anything but Baloch.

The Balochs' ethnic background, social organisation, culture, history, and sense of territoriality are proof of an age-old Baloch *qaum* (nation). In many ways, this is a projection of modern concepts into the past. Nevertheless, the Baloch have undeniably had a pool of characteristics which encouraged the development of separate identity well before the 20th century and gave rise to an assertive ideology of Baloch nationalism during the national movements of 1920s and onward. Thus they are united by their belief in common ancestors, culture, history and Sunni Islam. While there is no one dialect or language common to all Baloches, the speakers of the various dialects and languages regard themselves as Baloch and are so regarded by one another. A unity of tradition and culture complements this unity of languages. While it is true that Baloch are divided today between tribesmen (migratory or sedentary) and urban dwellers, their social mores were formed in the tribal cauldron.

Of the various elements that go into the making of the Baloch national identity, probably the most important is a common social and economic organisation. For while many racial strains have contributed to the making of the Baloch people, and while there are varying degrees of differences in language and dialect among the various groups, a particular type of social and economic organisation, comprising what has been described as a "tribal culture", is common to them all. This particular tribal culture is the product of environment, geographical, and historical forces, which have combined to shape the general configuration of Baloch life and institutions.

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Baloch not only unite them but also separate them from the dominant neighbouring cultures. This recognition of their ethnic separateness is reinforced by the separation of the Baloch from the Pakistani and Iranian national economies. Whether this non-participation is based on the difference between centre and periphery, urban vs. rural, industry vs. agriculture, or intentional discrimination, Balochistan lacks modern factories and modern industries. It has shared in neither the development of these countries' infrastructure nor in the rewards of their economic development.

The Baloch history, tradition, culture, language, sense of territoriality and their common ethnic background form the cohesive bases of Baloch nationalism, while geography has had both positive and negative effects on it. Geographical isolation, of

course, did not give rise to nationalism, but there are few factors that strengthen the nationalism of a people more than the belief that they are culturally and historically unique in the world. To the extent that geography was responsible for the uniqueness of the Baloch character, culture, and history, it helped create a national particularism, which in turn served as a catalytic force for the growth of national sentiment in Balochistan.

The same climatic and geographical conditions that aided the growth of Baloch nationalism, from another point of view hindered this growth. As the difficult mountain and desert terrain historically protected their independence, and made it difficult for invaders to annex the Baloch territory, on the other hand, the harsh climate and scarcity of water did not give the Baloch a chance to emerge as a feudal nation. The harsh climate and the scarcity of water forced the Baloch to live a nomadic or semi-nomadic life or to migrate to the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, East Africa, or the Arab Middle East.

Balochistan can boast vast gas deposits as well as minerals like chromium, copper, iron and coal. Gas is found in commercially viable quantities in Sui and Pirkoh (Pakistan). This is an important factor in the attitudes of the various Central governments regarding the question of Baloch self-determination, and has strengthened the Balochs' own feeling of being treated unfairly.

The historical experiences have played an important role to the formation of the Baloch national identity. In this connection the Swiss experience shows a remarkable similarity. In the Swiss case strength of common historical experience and a common consensus of aspirations have been sufficient to weld into nationhood groups without a common linguistic or cultural background. It should be remembered that the history of the Baloch people over the past hundred years has been a history of evolution, from traditional society to a more modern one. ("More modern" is a comparative term, and does not imply a "modern" society, i.e. a culminating end-point to the evolution.) As such, the reliance on tribal criteria is stronger in the earlier movements, and the reliance on nationalism stronger in the later ones. Similarly, the organizing elements in the early movements are the tribes; the political parties gradually replace the tribes as mass mobilisation is channelled into political institutions.

Therefore, as argued in this dissertation, the Baloch constitute a nation distinct from that of the Persians and Punjabis by every fundamental test of nationhood, firstly that of a separate historical past in the region at least as ancient as that of their

neighbours, secondly by the fact of their being a cultural and linguistic entity entirely different from that of the Persians and Punjabis, with an unsurpassed classical heritage and a developed language which makes Baloch fully adequate for all present-day needs and finally by reason of their territorial habitation of definite areas.

The growing presence and power of the British East India Company along the coastal and eastern provinces of India and the simultaneous disintegration of the Mughal Uzbek and Safavid empires in India, Central Asia, and Persia respectively, ripened the conditions for the whole of Balochistan to unite within the framework of a single feudal state (Kalat State). The rulers of the mightiest of the khanate accomplished this unification. They came from the Kambarani or Ahmadzai dynasty (from the founder of the dynasty-Mir Ahmad who reigned in 1666-1695). However, it was the sixth Khan of this dynasty, Nasir Khan I, known as the Great, who drove the frontiers of the Khanate of Kalat northward into Afghanistan, southward into the Makoran, westward deep into Persian territory, and eastward into Punjab and Sindh as far as Karachi.

The Baloch destinies, however, changed radically around the time, when the British and the Persians divided Balochistan into spheres of influence, agreeing on a border in the mid-19th century. As said above, up to the British advent, the Baloch had developed into a major power in the region. They were ruling not only Balochistan, but also the two richest provinces of the region, Sindh and Sistan. The British, whose occupation of the eastern part of Balochistan began in the 1840s, were interested in Balochistan for military and geopolitical reasons. In order to protect their colony (India) from the rival expansionist powers such as Russia, France, and Germany, the British used Balochistan as a base to protect their interests in their sphere of influence (Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region).

To prevent Baloch unity and to suppress their nationalist tendencies the British exploited the Baloch tribal system. Sir Robert Sandeman advocated a new socio-political system, called the "Sandeman System" or *Sardari Nizam* for developing the authority of the tribal chiefs. In 1854, the Khan of Kalat became a British protectorate. The treaty of 1876 gave birth to new political forces in Baloch society, the decline of the powerful feudal overlord (the Khan) and the rise of a new feudal elite (*Sardars*). The Sandeman system granted complete autonomy to the tribal areas. The status of the *Sardar* (chief among equals) was changed into that of a feudal lord and the tribesmen were declared subjects.

The spread of the modern doctrines of nationalism among the Baloch, and the resulting active participation of the Baloch intellectuals in nationalist activities was in large measure a reaction against British and Persian supremacy. The First World War and its aftermath mark an important stage in the growth of Baloch nationalism. The extent and intensity of nationalist feeling among the Baloch was profoundly influenced by the impact of the Russian Revolution, the defeat and break-up of the Ottoman and the abolition of the Caliphate, the anti-imperialist movements of the Afghans and the Indians, and the revolutionary ideas set in motion by these events, as well as by the propagation of the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination.

Frequent internal divisions of tribe and social class have marked the development of Baloch nationalism since its emergence in the 1920s. National boundaries have also fragmented Baloch nationalist groups and made it difficult to present a united front to governments. Governments too have become adept at exploiting Baloch divisions. Their policies towards Baloch minorities have often shaped the goals of Baloch nationalist parties - which at various times have called for cultural and social rights, autonomy or independence.

The first apostle of the Baloch national movement was Yusuf Ali Magasi. In the early 1920s, Magasi and his friends established the "Anjuman-e Ittehad Balochan" (Organization for the Unity of Baloch), an underground political organization, for the liberation of Balochistan. From 1931, the Anjuman with Magasi as its president started to work openly. Having lived in his youth in cosmopolitan Lahore (British India), Magasi was familiar with the anti-imperialist struggle and the material advancement of modern nations. Magasi's definition of Baloch nationalism, and his understanding of who was a Baloch, was based on history, tradition, bloodline and religion.

Thus the material with which the early Baloch nationalist leaders began to build Baloch nationalism was the ethnic characteristics of the people of Balochistan and the surrounding area. As discussed in chapter three, the Baloch have a long history, going back at least 3000 years. They have creation myths, a written record, and a body of literary works (primarily oral). While the Persian and the Punjabi peoples share many of these earliest cultural markers, there are sufficient differences to mark the Baloch as a unique people. Being a colonial movement, the Baloch national movement picked up the language of European nationalism as early as the 1920s. Thus, concepts such as the modern nation, identified homeland, and the right of self-determination, were taken from European ethnic movements.

The Baloch have consistently resisted all attempts at encroachment upon their independent status, whether by the British or the Iranian governments. Their various rebellions in the Eastern and Western Balochistan, besides being violent manifestations of Baloch nationalist sentiments, were also waged in defence of the Baloch way of life. The extension of the external authority of the British into the Baloch country, accompanied by the new and unfamiliar economic and technological process of modern civilization, roused the tribal resistance in the same manner that it had roused the resistance of the Pashtun tribes in the mid-19th century, and increased the vehemence of Baloch nationalism.

It appears that the British reversed their policy in respect to Balochistan after the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. Thereafter, concerned with containing the spread of the October Revolution, they assisted Iran to incorporate western Balochistan in 1928 in order to strengthen the latter country as a barrier to Soviet expansion southward. The same concern also led later to the annexation of Eastern Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948. Henceforth, the Baloch and their homeland were divided against their will between three states, in order to enable one great power to enhance its strategic position against another big power.

Thus, as indicated above, the superimposed division, in turn, has provoked the rise of Baloch nationalism and their sense of irredentism, bringing them into conflict with their respective states, which are intent on preserving the inherited status quo from the big powers. It is the superimposition of this division that has served as the main cause of conflict between the Baloch and the states in which they were incorporated. Since then, the Baloch nation, with its distinctive society and culture has had to confront in both of the "host" states centralizing, ethnically-based nationalist regimes – the Persians and the Punjabis – with little or no tolerance for expressions of national autonomy within their borders.

Following the fall of Mir Dost Mohammad Khan in western Balochistan in 1928, the aggressiveness of nascent Persian nationalism gave rise to new grievances and apprehensions, for besides wounding Baloch national pride; it threatened the Baloch national identity with extinction. The Pahlavi regime was intent on building a Western-type secular nation – based on the Persian national, linguistic and cultural identity. The Baloch response was a series of revolts throughout the 1930s, led by the tribal chiefs. However, by the end of 1937, the last of these was brutally repressed. Thousands of Baloch migrated to eastern Balochistan and Sindh. It should be noted

that, while some of these revolts were well organised and had well-defined political aims, others were no more than violent protest against some real or imagined injustice. Whatever their cause, every fresh outbreak seemed to fill the cup of Baloch bitterness.

Obviously one of the main reasons for the failure of the early Baloch revolts was the local, feudal, tribal and patriarchal characteristics of revolts, which often centred around a local influential leader, followed by the members of his tribe. Even the Baranzais in Iranian Balochistan, although well organised at the higher levels, never penetrated to the broad masses of the Baloch people. Similarly the major cause of the failure of the 1930s and the 1940s national movements was the lack of a modern social basis for nation building. The *Sardars* opposed modern institutions and reforms. From 1929-1948 there were no colleges, universities or industries. There existed only the tribal elite and the oppressed class of nomads and peasants. The nationalists, mostly of lower middle-class background, were not in a position to mobilise the Baloch people in the tribal areas because of the strong control of the chiefs as well as the opposition of the British. To weaken the tribal chiefs they looked for help outside the border of Balochistan. They entered into an alliance with the All India Congress (while the Muslim League refused support because of its alliance with the Khan and the *Sardars*).

In the twentieth century the formation of new nation-states following World War I and the partition of Indian sub-continent in 1947, had a profound impact on Baloch society. Since then, Baloch history has been dominated by struggles between communities, which became minorities in new nation-states and national governments which have sought to divide, to dominate and to suppress their aspirations. These conflicts have created large population movements. Many thousands have been forced to leave their homes and land and many more migrated to escape poverty and oppression. As discussed in chapter two, the Baloch regions of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained among the least developed in those countries. Tribal ties remain strong in many areas, and tribal leaders are still influential at local level, especially in Eastern Balochistan (Pakistan). However, population movements to the cities and the process of urbanization in recent decades have created new forms of political and social organization.

In 1947, the nationalists faced a new situation in the politics of Balochistan due to the lapse of paramountcy. It is important to note that the disintegration of the

British Empire gave the Baloch an opportunity to regain their freedom from the British. Following the end of the War, intense political activities developed among the Baloch nationalists in Balochistan. They obtained a parliamentary majority in the elections of 1947. In 1948, while the nationalists were struggling for independence, the *Sardars*, made an alliance with the Muslim League. In return, Jinnah promised to look after their interests. The reactionary tribal elite could not join the Khan who wanted to introduce modern institutions instead of protecting the tribal and feudal system. Thus, the annexation of Balochistan into Pakistan was a result of the old and dying tribal and feudal system, represented by the Baloch tribal chiefs. The Anjuman (1920-1933), and the Kalat State National Party (1937-1948) represented the Baloch people.

In March 1948, contrary to the agreement of August 1947, Pakistan forcefully annexed the Khanate of Balochistan. Thus, the Baloch state, which emerged with the first Baloch confederacy under Mir Jalal Han in 12th century, came to a tragic end in 1948, one year after the partition of the Indian subcontinent to India and Pakistan in 1947. For a brief period (1952-55), however, the Khanate was given semi-autonomous status as the Balochistan States Union. But this arrangement collapsed when West Pakistan was declared a single province in October 1955. In July 1970, Balochistan was restored to separate provincial status, its boundaries incorporating the former British Balochistan and the Balochistan States Union.

During the fifty years of the existence of Pakistan, three wars have been waged in Balochistan. Agha Abdul Karim's rebellion was the first in a series of insurrections against the government of Pakistan. Under the pressure of the Pakistan government, the Khan of Kalat declared Agha Abdul Karim and the National Party to be rebels, on May 24, 1948. Because of its resistance to annexation and its cooperation with the rebel prince, Agha Abdul Karim, the Government of Pakistan banned the Kalat National Party in June 1948. On May 26, 1948, Agha Abdul Karim with his rebel group had entered Afghanistan and set up his headquarters at Mazar Mohammad Karez in the Shorawak area, in the hope of acquiring support for a sustained war against Pakistan. But the Afghan Government did not approve of the presence of the prince and the National Party in its territory.

Agha Abdul Karim's resources were limited and so was his area of operations. Karim started his movement in the Jhalawan area, backed by some nationalist leaders and with the secret approval of the Khan. His rebel followers were not more than 500 to 700. Due to bad planning and the lack of the expected support from Afghanistan,

the prince and his partisans were forced to surrender. Agha Abdul Karim's adventure was clearly of little immediate importance because it lacked both unified Baloch political support and Afghan military support. But what did make it significant in the long run was the widespread Baloch belief that Pakistan had betrayed the safe conduct agreement. The Baloch regard this as the first of a series of "broken treaties" which have created an atmosphere of distrust over relations with Islamabad. Agha Abdul Karim and his followers were all sentenced to long prison terms and became rallying symbols for the Baloch nationalist movement.

The 1950s and 1960s were decades of political upheaval in Pakistan. In Balochistan tribal structures suffered major setbacks, largely due to detribalisation and the rise of urban population, and later to land reforms initiated by the central governments. Similarly, a visible change occurred in the cultural field. In the early 1950s, the Baloch press was established. In the subsequent years of the 1960s and the 1970s many books, periodicals, and newspapers proudly reported the evidence of the past. Thus to heighten national consciousness, new avenues were opened to learn about the past, about present culture, and about other national phenomena by means of written words. Since then, by the popularisation of Baloch history, Balochi classical poetry and the positive characterisation of Baloch personality and society, the Baloch press has played an important role for the imagination of the Baloch nation.

Following the fall of the Khanate, the Baloch leadership accepted the political reality of Pakistan. As for ideology the "Ustaman Gal" (People's Party) marked the first time in Baloch history that the Baloch stopped asking for outright independence. They couched their demands in terms of autonomy. The Party, however, maintained that only elected democratic governments at the provincial and national levels would guarantee autonomy to the minority nationalities within the framework of constitutional provisions.

The continued existence of military rule in Pakistan from 1958 to the early 1970s obstructed a democratic solution to the Balochistan problem and exacerbated inter-regional tension. The prospect of a democratic political system was lost when the Pakistan army refused to accept the results of Pakistan's first general election in 1970, which led to the dismemberment of the eastern half of the country, now known as Bangladesh. Moreover, the sense of betrayal by Bhutto's civilian regime, which had signed constitutional guarantees of Balochistan's autonomous status, added to the growing nationalist sentiment, which fuelled the four-year rebellion in the 1970s.

Throughout the period since the partition, Baloch have had an uncomfortable relationship with the central government of Pakistan: relations were poorest in 1973 when they engaged three divisions of the Pakistan armed forces in a bitter and intense armed struggle. In 1973, the Pakistani security agencies discovered Soviet arms in the Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad. The government alleged that these arms were for the liberation movement of Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists not only denied this allegation, but also regarded it as a conspiracy by Bhutto and his allies to provide a cause for military intervention aiming at a take-over in the province.

However, despite a new constitution, which guaranteed a degree of provincial autonomy, in less than a year the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Bhutto, dismissed the Baloch government on 12th February 1973. In justifying the dismissal, the centre charged the provincial government with responsibility for several cases of lawlessness in Balochistan and alleged its support, in collusion with foreign governments, for Baloch and Pashtun separatists. In practice, however, Bhutto acted against the NAP because having provincial governments led by a party other than his own limited his personal authority, and because of pressure from the Shah of Iran.

Thus, in the 1970s, open warfare between the Pakistan military and Baloch nationalist guerrillas, whose demands ranged from self-rule to outright independence, racked Balochistan. Guerrilla war went on for more than four years and came to a stand still in 1977, when General Zia ul-Haq ousted Bhutto. However, the Baloch movement, which had come into being in the aftermath of Sardar Ataulлах Mengal's government, might have lost its ardour, but it did not die, as claimed by the Pakistani authorities. In fact, a case can be made that national feelings have grown in potential in the Baloch society and, given the right circumstances, could mount an even greater challenge to the Pakistani state. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo's demand for the specific inclusion of the right of secession for the federating units in the event of military take over in violation of the constitution indicated a deep mistrust of the country's political set-up by the Baloch in the 1980s.

The 1973-7 insurgency intensified the ever-widening gap of distrust and mistrust between the Baloch and the central government. This mistrust ultimately gave way to greater demands for a confederation of the four peoples of Pakistan. The leaders of the sub-nationalities, in self-imposed exile, formed an organisation, the Sindhi, Baloch, Pakhtun Front (the SBPF), in April 1985 in London to demand a confederation in Pakistan. Similarly, the so-called democracy of the 1990s in Pakistan like that

of its military rule led to further alienation of Baloch. Speaking on May 2001, in a PTV (Pakistan TV) programme on provincial autonomy, the former Chief Minister of Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal blamed the rulers of Pakistan for suppressing the will of the Baloch people and violating flagrantly all the previous accord, including the one made with the Khan of Kalat on August 4, 1947.¹

By contrast, in Iranian Balochistan, Reza Shah and subsequently his son Mohammad Reza adopted an iron-fist policy towards the Baloch. For the past several decades the Persians have never hesitated to use their military might against the Baloch to silence their voice. The official Iranian policy reflects their determination to suppress any nationalist movement in their country. It was due to this background that the Baloch national movement in Iran was less vocal than its counterpart in Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Iranians used harsh methods to crush Baloch identity. It was forbidden to wear the traditional Baloch dress in public or to speak Balochi in schools, and it was a criminal offence to publish, distribute, or even possess Balochi language books, magazines, or newspapers. Balochistan was isolated from the outside world and closed to foreigners. The Iranian policy of destruction of the Baloch identity, or Persianization of the Baloch under the Pahlavis may truly be comparable to that of the Turkish government's policy against the Kurds under Kemal Ataturk (1923-38). The Turkish government followed a policy of systematic extermination and Turcification of the Kurdish people in the Turkish controlled Kurdistan. Thousands of Kurds were deported to Western Anatolia, the Kurdish language was officially banned and Kurdish books were confiscated and burned. Even the words "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" were to be omitted from all textbooks. The Kurds were to be called Turks – "mountain Turks". Consequently, this policy of Turcification fanned the Kurdish nationalism furthermore and deepened their separatist aspirations. As the Turcification of the Kurds in Turkey provoked the Kurdish nationalism, so did the Persianization policy of the Iranian authority to the Baloch nationalism in Iran.

During the whole Pahlavi era the Persians continued their assimilation and Persianization policies in western Balochistan. In 1957-9 and again in 1969-73, the Pahlavi administration used military force to crush Baloch resistance to its attempts to enforce assimilation. Subsequently, more subtle 'pacification' methods were used. Baloch tribal leaders were appointed as intermediaries and representatives of govern-

¹ Daily Balochistan Express, Sunday, 6 May 2001.

ment interests with the aim of bridling the economic and social development of Sistan-wa-Balochistan. In spite of the application of diverse means of subjugation, the Iranian Baloch maintained a perception of themselves as a culturally independent *qaum* (nation). This was demonstrated by insurgencies against the Khomeini regime, which initially raised the hopes of the Baloch for greater provincial autonomy.

The Shah of Iran gave much importance to the area, which he always considered very important for the security of his country. Since Iran had a Baloch minority problem, any uprising in eastern Balochistan was thought to directly influence Iran. The Iranian government under the Shah kept a close watch on developments in the Pakistani part of Balochistan. Iran and Pakistan collaborated, due to their joint fear of Baloch national aspirations. It was argued that one of the reasons Pakistan's Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto dismissed the nationalist government in the province was because the Iranian government thought the Baloch nationalists in eastern Balochistan, might encourage dissidents in western (Iranian) Balochistan.

With the collapse of the monarchical regime in 1979, the Baloch began their political activities openly. The "Sazeman Demokratik", the "Ittehad ul-Muslimeen", the "Zrombesh", and many other political and cultural organisations were formed in Balochistan. This period, however, lasted months, not years. The pattern was repeated of Baloch nationalist aspirations reappearing whenever the central government showed weakness. The new regime pursued a policy of Persian ethnic supremacy toward Balochistan, a continuation of the policies of the monarchy.

By comparison, however, like the Baloch political parties in Eastern Balochistan (Pakistan), the major nationalist organisations, which came into existence during or after the Iranian revolution, concentrated their demand on self-autonomy for Balochistan within Iran. As earlier mentioned, the Baloch political life was short-lived in Iran. In the early 1980s, the clerical regime ordered the Baloch parties disbanded, to be replaced with Islamic *komitehs* (committees) and Revolutionary Guards controlled by the central government. *Ayatollah* Khomeini distrusted the Baloch not least because theirs was a purely secular agenda. Moreover, he was a Shiite Muslim and the Baloch were predominantly Sunni. While the Baloch could be acknowledged as Sunnis, no ethnic or "national" minorities were recognised in the new constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Since the end of the Second World War great changes have occurred for the Baloch throughout Balochistan – gradually at first but accelerating since 1970 because

of the changed political economy of the Persian Gulf. In Afghanistan major factors affecting the Baloch have been the Helmand river development schemes, the government's Pakhtunistan policy, and the Afghan Revolution in 1978. In Iran the successive Pahlavi governments attempted to neutralise the *Sardars* and at the same time suppress any activity among the Baloch that could lead to ethnic consciousness or solidarity.

Comparatively, the conditions of the Baloch in Pakistan are definitely better than those of Iran and Afghanistan. But they are still far from satisfactory, the Baloch of Pakistan have consistently fought to improve them economically, culturally and politically. In Pakistan too the Baloch have suffered much injustice. Consider, for example, what happened to the Baloch in the 1973-1977 insurgency. Like their brethren in Pakistan, the Baloch in Iran also consistently resisted the reactionary Persian domination and have shown a fervent desire to live under an independent or autonomous Baloch State as their natural right.

Since the early 1970s, the growing modern intelligentsia has been displacing the traditional intelligentsia, mainly the *sardars* and the *mollas*, in the urban centres. In the 1993 elections, the BNM (Balochistan National Movement) a mainly middle class party, succeeded in winning two national assembly and six provincial assembly seats. In the provincial elections of 1993, the BNM secured over 60 percent from Makkoran.² Another feature of changing social relations is the increasing access of urban women to education, and their participation in social, economic, political and cultural life outside their homes. These transformations left their impact on the nationalistic movement, expanding its social bases and increasing political, ideological and organizational tension.

Moreover, the circulation of money during the Bhutto period, and the fruits of the Gulf syndrome gave strength to the Baloch middle class whose interest collided with its more powerful and well-established Pashtun counterpart. As a result, business sectors such as transport, which were previously monopolised by the Pashtuns, are now witnessing the entrance of a rising Baloch middle class. The change of ownership of some transport businesses like Chiltan Transport from Pashtun to Baloch hands in 1992 was another testimony of this fact.³

² Nek Buzdar, "Social Organization, Resource use, and Economic Development in Balochistan" in: Monthly *Balochi Labzank*, Hub (Balochistan), March-April 2000, p. 76.

³ Abbas Jalbani, "Can Balochistan Survive?" in: *The Herald*, March 1992.

Baloch nationalism, as indicated in this dissertation, is the antithesis to the politically and economically dominant and exploitative Iranian (Persian) and Pakistani (Punjabi) states' nationalism, a pattern similar to the rise of the Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Turkey). In spite of more than 70 years of its existence, Baloch nationalism has not succeeded in achieving its goal, the right of self-determination for the Baloch nation. It is difficult to reach a single plausible explanation, but judging from the finding of this study, one could cautiously conclude that by that time due to a dominant tribal social base, a sense of Balochness had not evolved which was sufficiently strong to force a different course of events.

Nevertheless, the Baloch nationalism has steadily developed. Every time, after being crushed, the national movement arose more forcefully than before. Comparatively, in 1948, Agha Abdul Karim and his rebel followers were about 500 to 700. In 1958, Nauruz Khan fought in a wider area against the Pakistani army and around 1000 to 5000 guerrillas were with him. By July 1963, the guerrilla activities under the command of Sher Mohammad Marri increased in the Jhalawan and Marri areas. The fighters had established a score of camps, where the people were given training in guerrilla warfare. It was estimated that there were nearly 400 hard-core hostiles in each area, apart from hundreds of loosely organised part-time reservists. Meanwhile, the last war (1973-77) involved more than 55,000 Baloch guerrillas at various stages of the fighting, and almost every section of the Baloch population was affected in central and eastern Balochistan by this war. A similar evolutionary process seems to have happened in Iranian Balochistan, after the erosion of central authority in Iran following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, made the prospects for Baloch nationalism appear more promising in Iran than in Pakistan.

The Cold War led indirectly to the weakening of the Baloch national movements both in Iran and Pakistan. Because both the countries were to be America's allies against Soviet expansion in the Gulf region, the United States was prepared to support them in furthering her own foreign policy initiatives. Since the West supported Tehran and Islamabad, so the Baloch turned to Baghdad and Kabul. Thus the U.S. policies indirectly helped to strengthen the two countries in their attempts to suppress the Baloch movement for self-rule during the whole Cold War period. In this regard, the Iranians' use of the U.S. supplied arms against the Baloch movement in 1973-77 is the most striking example.

The political situation of Baloch today reflects two contradictory tendencies. As the old warrior Sher Mohammad Marri in the early 1990s stated, "Baloch nationalism has penetrated the masses and is not confined to the *Nawabs* and *Sardars* alone".⁴ The urbanization, detribalisation and the migration of the Baloch people to the cities of the region, have contributed to the development of mass national consciousness. Yet their political leaderships have often fallen prey to internal divisions on both ideological and tribal lines. Divisions between the Balochs' political parties started with Zia's party-less elections in 1985, and later it sharpened during the so-called 1990s democracy. The regional aspect of the Baloch issue, as well as the growing complexities of Baloch society have greatly complicated the task of the Baloch national movement in achieving unity and a coherent strategy to achieve their goals.

The material analysed in this dissertation warrants the conclusion that the Baloch form a distinct nation and that their national consciousness is strong enough to consider their national movement as having deep roots in the convictions and aspirations of that nation. The divisive factor of tribal loyalties will tend to play a constantly diminishing role because of the impact of modern civilization, which is changing the cultural patterns in the whole southwest Asia.

This study has attempted to connect the Baloch problem with the past policies not only of the Baloch inhabited states but also of the Great Powers in an effort to demonstrate that no Great Power interested in the region can afford to ignore the Baloch problem or avoid the formulation of a Baloch policy as part of an over-all Southwest Asian policy.

There are numerous implications from this study. It provides empirical support to the hypothesis that among the Baloch, ethnicity or ethnic nationalism is a stronger basis of legitimacy than the civic or territorial nationalism. It also provides an explanatory model, which can be used to explain the current disputes in Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and other areas of ethnic conflict. In addition, it provides predictive criteria for use in prognosticating the results of these conflicts.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the empirical evidence cited in this case study is taken from a single trans-state nation in Southwest Asia. Although these formulas are broad enough to be applied to other ethnic nations elsewhere, they need further testing before any definitive conclusion can be drawn in respect to the phenome-

⁴ The News International, 3-9 July 1992.

non under investigation. To that end, it is suggested that more ethnic cases should be studied in all geographic areas of the Third World and then the result of these researches should be compared and contrasted with the findings of studies done on the ethnic cases in the developed states.

Glossary

This is a selected list of those important terms, which appears more than one, or twice in the text. Others Balochi, Sindhi, Urdu and Persian words are defined in parentheses within the text. Several terms have different meanings and expressions in different countries. We have given their translation and meanings as used in Baloch society.

<i>Ailamiah</i>	the Declaration of Kalat Independence
<i>alim</i>	Muslims learned in Islamic religious sciences
<i>amir</i>	ruler, commander, chief
<i>anjuman</i>	political organisation
<i>azad</i>	free, independent
<i>bahut</i>	asylum, refugee
<i>balochiat</i>	Balochness
<i>barnama</i>	manifesto
<i>beiglar beigi</i>	chief of the chiefs
<i>ber</i>	revenge
<i>bulak</i>	tribe district
<i>darbar</i>	court of a ruler
<i>dera</i>	camp
<i>derajat</i>	several camps, the term is used for the Baloch areas of Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Fateh Khan and Dera Ismail Khan.
<i>diwan</i>	parliament
<i>farman</i>	royal order
<i>farmandar</i>	governor
<i>fatwa</i>	decree by a leaned religious figure

<i>Han</i>	the title of the heads of the first Baloch Confederacy
<i>hijrat</i>	religiously motivated exodus
<i>jagir</i>	land grant bestowed the government
<i>jagirdar</i>	one who holds a <i>jagir</i>
<i>jirga</i>	assembly
<i>Kaum</i>	nation, tribe
<i>khalifa</i>	spiritual guide
<i>khan</i>	title for the ruler of Balochistan
<i>lajj</i>	honour
<i>lashkar</i>	army, tribal army
<i>majlis</i>	parliament
<i>maulana</i>	<i>maulavi</i>
<i>maulavi</i>	Muslim scholar learned in the Koran
<i>Mir</i>	title of respect, and the title of the Baloch rulers of Sindh
<i>moreed</i>	disciple of a <i>khalifa</i> or <i>pir</i> .
<i>muazam</i>	great
<i>muhajir</i>	immigrant
<i>mulla</i>	educated person, Muslim priest
<i>naib</i>	agent, governor
<i>namus</i>	honour
<i>Nawab</i>	governor
<i>niabat</i>	district, agency
<i>ostan</i>	province

<i>qabila</i>	tribe
<i>qazi</i>	judge
<i>salar</i>	general, commander
<i>shariat</i>	Islamic law
<i>shieh</i>	tribal-chief, ruler
<i>tehsil</i>	largest administrative subdivision within a district
<i>ulema</i>	plural of <i>alim</i>
<i>ulus</i>	people
<i>wali</i>	governor
<i>watan</i>	homeland, fatherland
<i>wazir</i>	Prime Minister
<i>ziarat</i>	tomb of a holy man

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Interviews

In order to better understand the political situation of postcolonial era, the following persons have been interviewed:

Ahmadzai, Agha Naseer Khan. Court minister of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan and a prominent historian. Interview made in Quetta in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi)

Ahmadzai, Dawood Khan. Son of the late Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi). Also many private conversations.

Alam, Khozeime Ameer Hossein. He was appointed as the governor-general of Balochistan in 1940.s by Reza Shah. Served as deputy of Agriculture under post War period, was Majlis deputy for several duration, and then as Senator for Sistan wa Balochistan and the adjacent districts, appointed by the Shah in 1975-79. Interview made in London in June 1999, (on tape in Persian).

Amiri, Abdul Samad. Ex-politician, poet and writer from Iranian Balochistan, sentenced for life imprisonment in the time of Shah regime for his political activities, nowadays living in exile in United Arab Emirate. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Azad, Rahim Bakhsh. Journalist, general secretary of Zekri Association in Karachi. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Baloch, Abdul Hayee. Medical doctor, senator and president of Balochistan National Movement, BNM. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi and English).

- Baloch, Abdul Majeed. Medical doctor, Director General Jinnah Hospital. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Abdul Malik. Medical doctor, ex-education minister in Balochistan. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Azizullah. Was member of Sazeman Demokratik. After the ban of Organisation, he became a supporter of Fedaeyan-e Khalq. Nowadays he is living in Sweden as a political refugee. Interview made in Stockholm in April 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Bashir Ahmad. Ex-director of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Radio Pakistan), Quetta and the Chairman of the Balochi Academy. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Chakar Khan. Editor of Monthly Balochi Donya, Multan. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Mansoor. Writer on socio-political subjects. Ex-member of Pakistan National Party, PNP. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Maulana Abdul Haq. Amir (president) of "Jamiat Islami" in Balochistan. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri. Ex-care-taker Governor of Balochistan, ex-Chief Justice in Balochistan High Court and a prominent historian. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (not on tape, only written notes).
- Baloch, Mohammad Akram. Ex-speaker of Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, ex-minister of culture and sports in Zulfakar Ali Magasi's Government, Voice General Secretary of BNM and the chief editor of Daily Rehbar, Hub, Balochistan. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baloch, Siddiq. He has been Personal Secretary of late Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in NAP as well as in PNP, nowadays editor Daily Balochistan Express, Quetta. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan. Former Chairman of Balochistan Text Book Board, and former Chairman of the Balochi Academy, Quetta. Has written books in English on the political history of the Baloch. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).
- Barakzai, Akbar. Nationalist poet and politician, was a heading leader in the Baloch national movement of Iranian Balochistan based in Baghdad in early seventy's. Since 1975 he is living in exile in London. Interview made in London in February 1998, (on tape in Balochi).
- Bijarani, Mir Hazar Khan. Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs from August to October 1991, in the care-taker Cabinet. Federal Minister for defence in the care-taker Cabinet formed after the dissolution of the National Assembly on 18th April 1993. Now a Member of National Assembly

sembly on 18th April 1993. Now a Member of National Assembly of Pakistan. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in English).

Bugti, Aziz Mohammad. Professor of political science at the University of Balochistan, Quetta and a historian. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Bugti, Nawab Akbar Khan. Sardar of Bugti tribe, ex-Governor of Balochistan, ex-chief minister of Provincial Cabinet, president of Jamhuri Watan Party, JWP and Member of National Assembly of Pakistan. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in English).

Dehvari, Mohammad Ali. Was a member of Sazeman Demokratik. Later, he became a supporter of Fedai-e Khalq (Aqalliat). Nowadays living in Stockholm, Sweden as a political refugee. Interview made in Stockholm in April 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Gichki, Amanullah. Ex-ambassador, Federal Minister in care-taker Cabinet before Nawaz Sharif. Interview made in Khozdar in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Gichki, Munir Ahmad. PhD. in history. Professor of History at Balochistan University. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Hoseinbor, Ayub. Was a central committee member of the Sazeman Demokratik. Later he joint the Sazeman-e Paykar. Nowadays as a political refugee living in London. Interview made in London in May 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Hoseinbor, Gholam Reza. Was the last head of Rastakhiz Party of Iran in Balochistan. Since Iranian revolution Living in London as a political refugee. Interview made in London in January 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Hout, Gul Mahmud. Originally from Iranian Balochistan, living in Karachi, was a prominent leader of NAP and a close friend of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Jamaldini, Abdullah Jan. Professor of the Balochi language at the University of Balochistan, Quetta. Leading political and literary figure since 1950's. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi). Also many private conversations.

Jamaldini, Jehan Zeb. Medical doctor, head of the Baloch Cultural Society in Karachi. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Kalati, Abdul Rahim. Born in Mombassa, Kenya, student in London University (SOAS). Interview made in London in December 1998, (not on tape, only written notes).

Khanzai, Gholam Mohammad. Living in Dashtiari, Iranian Balochistan, educated from the Karachi University, was a candidate to the first *Majlis* (National assembly) of Islamic Republic of Iran, but was rejected in the

second run of election by the *Shora-e Negahban* (Guardian Council). Interview made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Kurd, Abdurahman. Living in Quetta, a leading Baloch nationalist figure and the Joint Secretary of Awami National Party. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Urdu).

Kurd, Aid Mohammad. Born in Quetta on 15 March 1930, living in London, was President of Word Baloch Organisation (WBO) in 1982-85. Interview made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Malik, Habibullah. Was one of the founder of the Hezb Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (Islamic Unity Party) in Iranian Balochistan. Became Director General of Health in Dr Danish Narui's Administration after the Iranian revolution (1979). Nowadays living in England as political refugee. Interview made in Hasting, England in January 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Marri, Shah Mohammad. Medical doctor, editor of the Monthly Sangat, writer of many articles on politics and social issues, translated books on political history. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Mazari, Sardar Sherbaz Khan. A Sardar of Mazari tribe, ex-president of National Democratic Party, NDP. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in English).

Mir-Lashari, Mohammad Khan. Chief of Lashari tribe, member of the last parliament of Pahlavi regime, leader of Jonbish-e Mojahiddeen-e Baloch (The Movement of Baloch Mojahideen). Nowadays living in London as a political refugee. Interview made in London in February 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Mumtaz, Ismail. Born in Matrah, Oman. Nowadays living in Bahrain. Since 1989, president of "Balochi Adabi Johd-kar", a literary association in Bahrain. Interview made in London in July 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Nadeem, Abdul Ghaffar. Former editor of "Ulus", ex-secretary of education in the Provincial Government of Balochistan. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Nadvi, Maulana Khair Mahmud. Active in educational and literary world since 1950's. Editor of the Monthly Oman and later the Monthly Sawghat. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Narui, Danesh. PhD in mathematics. Was the Governor of Iranian Balochistan in 1979, since 1982 living in London. Interview made in London in August 1998, (on tape in Persian).

Narui, Sher Ali. Sardar of Narui tribe in Iranian Balochistan. Since 1992, living in London as refugee. Interview made in London in August 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Naskanti, Yusuf. Born in Naskant, Iranshahr district, Iranian Balochistan, Living in Karachi, in the late sixties and early seventies participated in the Ba-

loch Liberation Movement in Iranian Balochistan. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Nikkhah, Eisa. Born in Gyavan, the most southwestern part of Iranian Balochistan. He is the grandson of Sardar Barkat of Jask who was executed by Reza Shah Pahlavi, prisoned for his political activities under Khomeini, nowadays living in Sweden as political refugee. Interview made in Stockholm in June 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Qambarani, Nadir. Professor of the Brahui language and former editor of Ulus. Chairman, Brahvi Department, University of Balochistan, Quetta. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Raheen, Rasul. Journalist, Librarian and Professor of the English language in Kabul University under the pro-Soviet regime of Afghanistan. Interview made in Stockholm in May 1999, (on tape in Persian).

Rind, Lalbakhsh. Leading political figure since 1950's, a NAP leader, and head of the Arts Council in Balochistan under NAP government, and former president of the Pakistan Communist Party. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Rodini, Bahadur Khan. Professor, voice chancellor Balochistan University, Quetta. Interview made in Quetta in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Saher, Morad. Editor of Monthly Balochi Labzank (Hab), an appreciated poet and writer of short stories since 1960's. Interview made in Karachi in November 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Sajidi, Anwar. Editor of Daily Intekhab, published from Hub and Karachi. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in Balochi).

Shahbakhsh, Azim. Born in Bampur (1968). Lecturer at the University of Sistan-wa-Balochistan (history department). He is the biographer of Dad Shah. Nowadays a research student at London University (SOAS). Interview made in London in March 2000, (on tape in Balochi). Also many private conversations.

Shaheen, Ali Mohammad. Living in Karachi, mother tongue Sarieeki. Professor of the Islamic history in Urdu College, Karachi. Interview made in Karachi in October 1997, (on tape in English and Persian).

Sher-Del, Mohammad. Born in Turkmenistan, teacher and writer of Balochi school books in Turkmenistan. Interview made in Ilatan, Turkmenistan, in February 1998, (on tape in Balochi).

Sistani, Mohammad Azam. Historian, has about fifteen works on history of Sistan, Khorasan and Afghanistan, was an academician in Kabul, Afghanistan. Since 1995, living in Gothenburg, Sweden. Interview made in Gothenburg in August 1998, (on tape in Persian).

